بر باد رفته: نقد حاکمیت شرکتی در سازمان تأمین اجتماعی و صندوق بازنشستگی کشوری (مقاله علمی وزارت علوم)
درجه علمی: نشریه علمی (وزارت علوم)
آرشیو
چکیده
ناکارآمدی قوانین و مقررات مربوط به حوزه حکمرانی و اداره سازمان تأمین اجتماعی و صندوق بازنشستگی کشوری از جمله مهمترین علل وقوع بحران در این دو نهاد است. قوانین و مقررات مربوط به حکمرانی صندوق های مزبور نقش دولت را از رکن تنظیم گر و تضمین کننده فعالیت های صندوق به رکن مداخله گر تبدیل نموده است. ساختار دولتی صندوق های مستمری و عدم نقش آفرینی ذی نفعان، مشکل نمایندگی ناشی از تفکیک مالکیت از مدیریت را تشدید کرده است به نحوی که این مشکل علاوه بر شکل سنتی، به شکل سیاسی نیز بروز می نماید. چنین ساختار حکمرانی به علت فقدان شفافیت و پاسخگویی، انگیزه مدیران را به پیگیری منافع شخصی و سیاسی به جای منافع ذی نفعان سوق می دهد. این در حالی است که از منظر حاکمیت شرکتی، به منظور حل مشکل نمایندگی در صندوق های مستمری، باید از طریق افزایش نقش آفرینی ذی نفعان در اداره و نظارت بر امور صندوق، زمینه تقویت شفافیت، پاسخگویی و مسئولیت پذیری مدیران را فراهم نمود. لذا قوانین و مقررات باید به نحوی اصلاح گردند که نقش آفرینی ذی نفعان را در اداره صندوق های مستمری تقویت نمایند. این پژوهش با استفاده از روش کتابخانه ای به ارزیابی قوانین و مقررات ناظر به حکمرانی صندوق های مستمری از منظر حاکمیت شرکتی می پردازد تا از این رهگذر کاستی های موجود نمایان گردد.Gone With the Wind: A Critique of Corporate Governance in the Social Security Organization and Civil Servants Pension Fund
Introduction
Pension funds play a crucial role in Iran by providing retirement provisions through paying pension benefits to retirees and their eligible survivors. However, the pension funds currently experience a critical situation due to a significant disparity between their financial resources and pension liabilities. This crisis stems from several factors, including the generosity of pension programs (in terms of retirement age and conditions and scope of support for survivors), demographic changes, and increased life expectancy leading to more pensioners and fewer contributors. Additionally, the challenges such as low returns on investment; transference of loss-making enterprises to the funds in order to settle government debts; and structural, governance, and management issues have exacerbated the situation.
In fact, the primary factor contributing to the current crisis is the inefficiency of laws and regulations governing the Social Security Organization (SSO) and the Civil Servant Pension Fund (CSPF). The existing regulations on the governance of pension funds have changed the government’s role from regulator and guarantor to an intervening party. Consequently, most fund managers are appointed by the government, which sidelines beneficiaries and stakeholders from the governance process. Such a governmental structure, coupled with the lack of stakeholder involvement, exacerbates the problem of representation arising from the separation of ownership and management. This issue manifests itself not only in the traditional form but also in the political form.
To address the problem of representation in pension funds requires supervision and increased stakeholder participation in fund management in order to enhance transparency, accountability, and managerial accountability. Therefore, it is crucial to revise laws and regulations to empower stakeholders’ role in the administration of pension funds. In this respect, the present study aimed to analyze the deficiencies in the laws and regulations on the governance and management of pension funds in Iran through the lens of corporate governance principles and mechanisms.
Literature Review
The regulations on the governance and management of pension funds play a crucial role in their performance. Establishing procedures and processes that promote good governance in pension funds can significantly contribute to the prevention and resolution of the current crisis. In this respect, corporate governance and its principles and mechanisms can serve as a vital tool for assessing the governance and management of pension funds. Pension funds in Iran, particularly SSO and CSPF, lack indicators of good governance in line with the corporate governance principles. The stakeholder involvement in company management, a fundamental right contributing to the mitigation of representation problems, is largely absent from the governance structure of Iran’s pension funds. Moreover, there are no legal requirements mandating transparency and reporting of the performance of pension fund managers. Additionally, the failure to recognize managers’ legal responsibility for their decisions, often influenced by their political affiliations, exacerbates the lack of accountability on the part of managers.
Materials and Methods
The present study used a descriptive–analytical method to address the research questions.
Conclusion
Considering the corporate governance mechanisms, Iranian pension funds (esp. SSO and CSPF) lack optimal conditions. The independence of the board of directors, a crucial aspect of corporate governance aimed at achieving its goals and principles, is fundamentally absent in Iranian pension funds. Moreover, the supervisory structure of pension funds fails to consider tripartism and the role of stakeholders. In addition, the absence of independent audit and actuarial committees within the supervisory framework severely undermines its effectiveness.
The Audit Organization is tasked with auditing pension funds as per Paragraph (d) of Article (17) of Act on Structure of Welfare and Social Security Comprehensive System. However, the Audit Organization lacks the necessary independence and impartiality due to its governmental affiliation. Furthermore, the absence of official actuarial mechanisms to calculate the resources and liabilities of the funds, their exclusion from the establishment of rules and regulations related to fund liabilities, and the lack of public disclosure of report results to stakeholders and beneficiaries all have contributed to increased pension liabilities and financial instability of Iranian pension funds.
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