تبعیض نژادی بر اساس نسب ملی در پرتو رأی صلاحیتی ۴ فوریه ۲۰۲۱ دیوان بین المللی دادگستری در پرونده قطر علیه امارات (مقاله علمی وزارت علوم)
درجه علمی: نشریه علمی (وزارت علوم)
آرشیو
چکیده
در پی بحران دیپلماتیک قطر در سال 2017، امارات مجموعه ای از اقدامات را علیه قطری ها اعمال کرد. در پاسخ به این اقدامات، قطر ضمن طرح دعوا علیه امارات در دیوان بین المللی دادگستری، به نقض کنوانسیون رفع تبعیض نژادی استناد نمود و مدعی تبعیض نژادی بر اساس نسب ملی قطری ها شد. دیوان ضمن صدور قراری در ۲۳ ژوئیه ۲۰۱۸ نتیجه گرفت که مطابق ماده ۲۲ کنوانسیون تبعیض نژادی، صلاحیت اولیه رسیدگی به پرونده را دارد. نکته بحث برانگیز، عدول دیوان از موضع خود مبنی بر داشتن صلاحیت اولیه رسیدگی در این پرونده بود. دیوان در رأی 4 فوریه 2021 دادخواست قطر را از حوزه صلاحیت خود خارج دانست. پرسش اصلی پژوهش این است که چه رابطه ای میان تبعیض نژادی بر اساس «نسب ملی» و تبعیض بر اساس «تابعیت فعلی افراد» وفق کنوانسیون رفع تبعیض نژادی وجود دارد؟ مطالعات انجام شده در قالب روش توصیفی- تحلیلی نشان می دهد که اختلافات متعددی پیرامون اصطلاح «نسب ملی» در مذاکرات مقدماتی وجود داشته است که با وجود این، می توان نتیجه گرفت که عبارت «نسب ملی» شامل ملیت فعلی افراد می شود. تفسیر مضیق دیوان از واژه «نسب ملی» از جمله انتقادات وارد بر این رأی می باشد.Racial Discrimination Based on National Origin in the Light of the ICJ Judgement of 4 February 2021 in Qatar v. UAE Case
IntroductionFollowing Qatar’s diplomatic crisis in 2017, the UAE implemented a series of measures against Qatar. In response, Qatar filed an application against the UAE at the International Court of Justice (ICJ), citing a violation of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD) and claiming racial discrimination based on the national origin of Qataris. In its order dated July 23, 2018, the ICJ, in accordance with Article 22 of the ICERD, held primary jurisdiction to handle the case. The Court determined that the dispute between the parties was related to the interpretation or application of the Convention. Previous descriptive–analytical examinations show significant disagreements about the scope of racial discrimination during preliminary negotiations, with the term national origin being the focus of debates. It can be inferred that national origin, as included in paragraph 1 of Article 1 of the ICERD, entails discrimination based on current nationality. In this respect, the present research aimed to investigate the relationship between racial discrimination based on national origin and discrimination based on current nationality as elaborated in the ICERD. Literature ReviewWhile many studies have examined the ICERD and its committee, a conspicuous gap exists in the available literature concerning racial discrimination based on national origin. Moreover, given that ICJ judgment was issued in 2021, there is no serious monograph or article on this specific subject, except a few tangential studies in the legal scholarship. The two articles closely related to the topic are: “Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Qatar v. United Arab Emirates): So Far, So Good?” (Owie, 2020) and “The Role of Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination in the Development of Concepts and Provisions of International Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Racial Discrimination” (MirAbbassi & Hassani, 2020). Materials and MethodsThe current study relied on a descriptive–analytical method, using library research to collect the data from various sources.Results and DiscussionResearch indicates significant differences in the scope of racial discrimination between the premilitary negotiations and the eventual inclusion of the term national origin in Paragraph (1) of Article (1) of the Convention. It can be inferred that this term in the Convention includes discrimination based on current nationality, hence an instance of national origin. The ICERD, which is the main international human rights document combating racial discrimination, defines racial discrimination and outlines its scope and instances. The definition comprises two elements. First, it shall involve “any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference . . . which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of human rights and fundamental freedoms” (UN General Assembly resolution 2106, p. 2). In other words, actions must lead to discriminatory behavior. Second, discrimination shall be based on prohibited grounds, including “race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin” (UN General Assembly resolution 2106, p. 2). However, ambiguities persist regarding the scope and interpretation of the term national origin, as one of the prohibited grounds in the Convention. Disagreements have actually existed among state representatives since drafting the Convention, leading to the ongoing challenges and ambiguities.The Court’s narrow interpretation of national origin and the necessity to address the impact of measures taken against Qatar have drawn criticism. The measures taken by the UAE against Qatari nationals can be considered unilateral coercive measures, violating their rights such as the right to freedom of movement and freedom of communication. Such adverse and negative effects are deemed illegal, as acknowledged by the international documents and reports by the UN Special Rapporteur on the negative impact of the unilateral coercive measures on the enjoyment of human rights. Moreover, since the Convention aims to eliminate all forms of racial discrimination, confirming that the term national origin encompasses current nationality aligns with the Convention’s overall purpose. Conversely, dissenting interpretations that exclude current nationality from the scope of the Convention contradict and undermine the purpose of the ICERD. 6. ConclusionDespite Qatar’s failure in this case, another legal opportunity remains, that is, the decision of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD). In parallel with similar facts, Qatar filed an application to the CERD. In contrast to the ICJ, the committee upheld its jurisdiction in Qatar’s case against the UAE, which is currently under consideration. The Court’s non-compliance with the CERD’s proposal and the ensuing divergent stances of the two judicial and quasi-judicial bodies introduce a new dimension to the issue. In conclusion, the ICJ shall be recognized as the UN’s primary judicial organ with the authority to settle disputes over the interpretation of the Convention. However, the conflicting views between the ICJ and the CERD, particularly following the Qatar–UAE dispute, necessitate judicial dialogue between the two bodies.
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