Military Reasons of Heraclius’ Successes against the Sasanian Spāh: A Re-Examination of Karantabias’ Analysis

چکیده

This article addresses and re-examines Marc-Anthony Karantabias’ analysis of factors that contributed to the defeat of the Sasanian Spāh by Heraclius by 627-628 CE. Karantabias’ analysis may be categorized into four (military) misconceptions with respect to the Spāh: (1) the notion that the late Sasanian Spāh lacked stirrups for the Savaran cavalry (2) the alleged refusal or lack of knowledge of the Mongolian draw which is proposed to have been of greater efficacy than the Sasanian (3-finger) bowshot (3) the notion of “Persian conservatism” leading to the Spāh’s refusal to adopt new military technologies and (4) the alleged supremacy of Steep/Central Asian and/or Hun-Turkic cavalry warfare over the Sasanians. These four misconceptions fail to be supported by a close examination of archaeological sites (e.g., Taghe Bostan) and artifacts (e.g., Sasanian stirrups, metal works, etc.), primary sources and pertinent research studies. A fifth misconception pertains to the lack of consideration of the shortcomings of the Sasanian four-Spadbed system which Heraclius was able to successfully exploit against the Sasanian empire. In conclusion, Heraclius’ successes are attributed to his exploitation of the weaknesses of the four-Spāhbed system as well as the Byzantine willingness to adopt Steppe/Central Asian technology (e.g., compound bow, iron stirrup).