مطالب مرتبط با کلیدواژه

Value


۱.

Intrinsic Value: Towards A Pragmatic Theory

کلیدواژه‌ها: Value Intrinsic extrinsic instrumental Objective Pragmatism nature

حوزه های تخصصی:
تعداد بازدید : ۵۹۵
Intrinsic value is a concept central to the environmentalist movement. Whether one believes that natural objects have intrinsic value is supposed to determine whether one takes a ecocentric or homocentric approach to environmentalism, whether we practice deep or (merely) shallow ecology. Yet this concept is also a center of controversy and confusion. Just what does it mean for something to have intrinsic value? Is it the same thing as inherent value? Is it ""objective"" value? What of extrinsic, or, instrumental value? Is it somehow less objective? Questions such as these will be the subject of my paper. After a brief historical analysis of the relevant concepts, I shall consider the problem in the context of a wetland in the intercoastal waterway of Northeast Florida and propose a theory of intrinsic value based on the philosophy of John Dewey and George Herbert Mead.[i] Although we're unlikely to reach full agreement on some of these questions, I believe that we can come to agree enough on the intrinsic value of our environment to build a consensus in public policy.
۲.

Twinning Literature and Anthropology: A Proposed Theoretical Framework for Litero-Anthropological Research via “Exemplary Person”, “Value Formation” and “the Good Life”(مقاله علمی وزارت علوم)

تعداد بازدید : ۱۲۶ تعداد دانلود : ۱۲۴
Although literature and anthropology might seem an unlikely pair, their collaboration has been the subject of debate. As a theoretical endeavor, the present study aims to propose the fruitful collaboration between these two domains through the framework of litero-anthropological research. The results of such research disclose how fictional works once analyzed by means of anthropological criteria can be assigned to three levels of reading that are not only relevant to anthropology but also uncover the layers of meaning in literary narratives. For this purpose, a theoretical framework is formed that draws on Max Scheler’s exemplary person, Clyde Kluckhohn’s value and Edward Fischer’s the good life, the combination of which has not been analyzed collectively before. It was concluded that the analysis of a literary work by means of this framework opens a new gate to character analysis whereby literary critics can reveal how protagonists are portrayed as exemplary persons who promote a set of values through their discourse. Finally, the theory of the good life revealed if the set of values the protagonist upholds is conducive to attaining the good life. These values aim to reach beyond the world of fiction and meet the actual world of the readers.
۳.

An Adamsian Theory of Moral Obligations but without Divine Commands(مقاله علمی وزارت علوم)

تعداد بازدید : ۱۴۰ تعداد دانلود : ۸۶
Theological Voluntarism is the view according to which certain moral properties or statuses have to be explained in terms of God’s commands, will, or other voluntary states of God. In his God and Moral Law, Mark Murphy criticizes theological voluntarism in general and Adams’ divine command theory of the nature of moral obligations in particular. Furthermore, he puts forward the first sketches for a theory of moral obligation that is not voluntaristic. In this paper I will first introduce Murphy’s proposed theory and will show that it is implausible. Then, drawing on Adams’ views of the nature of goodness and virtue, articulated in Finite and Infinite Goods and A theory of Virtue, I will try to put forward the first sketches of a viable theory of moral obligations that does not appeal to divine commands in explaining moral obligations and explains them in terms of goodness/badness. An important feature of morality that voluntarists appeal to for motivating their view and criticizing views that explain obligations in terms of goodness is the existence of supererogatory actions, i.e., actions that are good but not required. I will focus on this feature of morality and try to show how a theory of moral obligation that explains the obligations in terms of goodness can accommodate this feature.
۴.

In Defense of Integrative Dualism; Placing values at the heart ofPhilosophy of Mind

نویسنده:

کلیدواژه‌ها: Integrative Dualism philosophy of mind Value Embodiment

حوزه های تخصصی:
تعداد بازدید : ۴۴ تعداد دانلود : ۴۲
"Substance dualism" or the thesis that a person is an embodied nonphysical being (mind or soul) is systematically caricatured in philosophy of mind literature as involving an untenable bifurcation. Instead of such a splintered, divided concept of the person, I defend integrative dualism, the thesis that while a person is a nonphysical subject (and thus a being that can survive the death of the body), in this life he or she functions as a united, embodied being. Embodiment consists of six nonmoral goods (they are good but not as in "moral goods" such as justice and courage): the virtues of sensations, agency, causal constitution, cognitive power, intelligible coherence, and affective incorporation. This united concept of an embodied person places values at the heart of the philosophy of human nature. This value-oriented concept of embodiment can be a rich, common resource for Christian-Muslim dialogue. This value-oriented concept of embodiment can be a rich, common resource for Christian-Muslim dialogue.
۵.

Reason(s) have Weight with the Evidence of Practical Reason(مقاله علمی وزارت علوم)

کلیدواژه‌ها: Reason Value weight reason practical reason normative reason

حوزه های تخصصی:
تعداد بازدید : ۱۴ تعداد دانلود : ۹
Practical reason is the use of reason to decide how to act and perform in a social reality. When someone deliberates about what to do, one puts all the reasons for the action, and then all the reasons against the action will determine the outcome of the action. In that situation, we can describe that practical action with reason because we will determine reason with the weight of different reasons not on the weighing reasons. In this paper, we analyze that reasons have weight against the theory that weights of reasons have no role in a theory of reasoning, and defend that reasons have weight with the evidence of practical reasons. The aim of this paper is to argue that weight of reasons has a role in the process of reasoning. In every situation of life, we can use have reason and weight of reason according to the practical situation of life.