



In Defense of Integrative Dualism; Placing Values at the Heart of Philosophy of Mind

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Abstract

"Substance dualism" or the thesis that a person is an embodied nonphysical being (mind or soul) is systematically caricatured in philosophy of mind literature as involving an untenable bifurcation. Instead of such a splintered, divided concept of the person, I defend integrative dualism, the thesis that a person, while he is a nonphysical subject (and thus a being that can survive the death of the body), functions as a united, embodied being in this life. Embodiment consists of six nonmoral goods (they are good but not as in "moral goods" such as justice and courage): the virtues of sensations, agency, causal constitution, cognitive power, intelligible coherence, and affective incorporation. This united concept of an embodied person places values at the heart of the philosophy of human nature. This value-oriented concept of embodiment can be a rich, common resource for Christian-Muslim dialogue.

Keyword

Integrative Dualism, Philosophy of Mind, Value, Embodiment.

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Introduction

"Substance dualism" or the thesis that a person is an embodied, nonphysical being (mind or soul) is systematically caricatured in philosophy of mind literature as involving an untenable bifurcation. It has been claimed that such a bifurcation or division of the mental and physical causes havoc in accounts of causation (how can the physical and non-physical interact?); it is at odds with common sense (don't we actually see and interact with people, rather than bodies that are linked to souls?); it is in tension with the unity of nature (does dualism entail that there is something non-natural about the person or soul?); it is either unscientific or anti-scientific.

The central aim of this paper is to articulate a version of substance dualism called *integrative dualism* which is supported by common experience and philosophical argument, and not guilty of the above charges. According to integrative dualism, the person is nonphysical but (under healthy conditions) a human person functions as an integrated or unified embodied being. Although it is different from Lynne Baker's constitutional account, integrative dualists understand a human being as *constituted* by a fully functioning embodied person. Like Baker's account, integrative dualists claim that persons are not metaphysically identical with their bodies and persons can exist without their current bodies but, unlike Professor Baker's constitutionalism, integrative dualists claim that the person can exist without any physical body and that a person is a substantial individual thing whose identity condition is basic and not further accounted for by a person's relationship to their body or constituted by a person's first person point of view. (The difference between integrative dualism and the constitutional theory will be highlighted later in this paper.) In integrative dualism, embodiment is further articulated in terms of six non-moral goods involving sensations, agency, causal interdependence and more.

In the confines of a single paper, this project will have to be developed with a very broad brush! But it is my hope that enough can be said here to foster on-going Christian-Muslim dialogue on the self.

Redeeming substance dualism

Probably the most brutal caricature of substance dualism is from Gilbert Ryle's *Concept of Mind*. Because Ryle's views are still widely represented, especially by some Christian theologians, his portrait of dualism is worth citing at length:

"The official doctrine [of dualism], which hails chiefly from Descartes, is something like this. With the doubtful exceptions of idiots and infants in arms every human being has both a body and a mind. Some would prefer to say that every human being is both a body and a mind. His body and his mind are ordinarily harnessed together, but after the death of the body, his mind may continue to exist and function. Human bodies are in space and are subject to the mechanical laws which govern all other bodies in space. Bodily processes and states can be inspected by external observers. So a man's bodily life is as much a public affair as are the lives of animals and reptiles and even as the careers of trees, crystals and planets. But minds are not in space, nor are their operations subject to mechanical laws. The workings of one mind are not witnessable by other observers; its career is private. Only I can take direct cognisance of the states and processes of my mind. A person therefore lives through two collateral histories, one consisting of what happens in and to his body, the other consisting of what happens in and to the mind. The first is public, the second private. The events in the first history are events in the physical world; those in the second are events in the mental world." (Ryle, 1949, pp.11-12)

Ryle goes on to portray dualism as fostering a radical division:

"It is customary to express this bifurcation of his two lives and his two worlds by saying that the things and events which belong to the physical world, including his own body, are external, while the workings of his own mind are internal. This antithesis of outer and inner is of course meant to be construed as a metaphor, since minds, not being in space, could not be described as being spatially inside anything else, or as having things going on spatially inside themselves. But relapses from this good intention are common and theorists are found speculating how stimuli, the physical sources of which are yards or miles outside a person's skin, can generate mental responses inside his skull, or how decisions framed inside his cranium can set going movements of his extremities."(Ryle, 1949, p.12)

Ryle's withering caricature of dualism was well received in many philosophical circles in the English-speaking world. According to Ryle, we are clearly a unified whole, not something "invisible, inaudible and [having] no size or weight" (Ryle 1949, p.20). We actually see, hear, and touch each other, whereas the traditional view of the soul, or at least the Cartesian tradition, denies this. According to Cartesianism, "The mind is its own place and in his inner life each of us lives the life of a ghostly Robinson Crusoe. People can see, hear and jolt one another's bodies, but they are irremediably blind and deaf to the workings of one another's minds and inoperative upon them" (Ryle, 1949, 13). Antony Flew made a similar point when he once observed that in ordinary life we meet people, not their containers (Flew, 1965). P.M.S. Hacker similarly characterized dualism as positing a little invisible person in the brain (Hacker, 1987).

As part of his critique of dualism, Ryle proposed that belief in the soul/mind as a separable entity from the body is a category

mistake; it involves reification, as when one treats a thing as an independent subject when it is no such thing. Here is Ryle's famous example of a category mistake:

"A foreigner visiting Oxford or Cambridge for the first time is shown a number of colleges, libraries, playing fields, museums, scientific departments and administrative offices. He then asks, 'But where is the University? I have seen where the members of the Colleges live, where the Registrar works, where the scientists experiment and the rest. But I have not seen the University in which reside and work the members of your University.' It has then to be explained to him that the University is not another collateral institution, some ulterior counterpart to the colleges, laboratories and offices which he has seen. The University is just the way in which all that he has already seen is organized. When they are seen and when their co-ordination is understood, the University has been seen. His mistake lay in his innocent assumption that it was correct to speak of Christ Church, the Bodleian Library, the Ashmolean Museum and the University, to speak, that is, as if 'the University' stood for an extra member of the class of which these other units are members. He was mistakenly allocating the University to the same category as that to which the other institutions belong." (Ryle, 1949, p.16)

In summary, according to Ryle, Flew, and Hacker, dualism and the Platonic-Cartesian tradition of the soul or substance dualism do not express or reflect a general, common-sense approach to ourselves and the world. They also imply that something has gone wrong with values when it comes to dualism. We have distracted ourselves from what is truly valuable: the visible, observable person we meet. Dualism winds up with an abstruse, distant concept of the self. Are they right?

Consider Ryle's example of the visitor to Oxford. He is surely

correct about the University not being a substance in its own right apart from the buildings, playing fields, etc., but is there any reason to believe that Oxford University is like a person with regard to the category of being a substance? The difficulty of aligning an institution like Oxford with a person is that it appears that persons actually think and feel, whereas institutions may be described as thinking (Oxford University thinks its students should have ample opportunities to study Shakespeare) and feeling (Oxford mourned the death of its students during the World War II) only as a metaphor. It is not literally the case that Oxford engages in reflection, though its individual members do, and they can treat their University as a distinct entity (metaphorically in law, institutions are sometimes called legal fictions).

So, persons do not seem to be akin to institutions or somewhat muddled abstractions. What of Ryle's claim that dualism is guilty of a radical bifurcation that seems completely at odds with common sense?

I suggest that what Ryle (and Hacker and Flew) miss is that human persons are actually capable of the radical bifurcation they describe. A person may be so traumatized and damaged that there is a sense in which the person is not visible; you do not see his actual feelings and desires. Some people are so psychologically withdrawn that they are like Robinson Crusoe or a ghost in a machine. But what Ryle and others miss is that a dualist may (and I think should) hold that under healthy, ordinary conditions, the embodied person functions as a unity. When you genuinely express and embody your actual thoughts and feelings, there is a singular reality, not two remote worlds being "harnessed" together. This point can be clarified by reference to a remark by the philosopher Trenton Merricks, which is very much in the spirit of Ryle. The illustration may seem a little too

personal for a philosophy conference, but perhaps it makes the relevant points at issue especially vivid. Merricks launches the following line of reasoning: he, Merricks, kisses his wife. If dualism is true, then his wife is an immaterial soul and cannot be kissed. Dualism allows that only bodies can kiss. Hence dualism is false. (Personal, email correspondence; but see Merricks, 2007, p.286 for a similar argument in print).

According to substance dualism, in a strict sense it is true that Merricks does not literally kiss his wife if “his wife” is understood to refer only to his wife’s immaterial soul. However, in that sense of “his wife”, Merricks also neither experiences (is directly aware of) his wife’s pleasures and pains, nor does he have immediate awareness of her hopes, fears, and thoughts, etc. All of these psychological events are accessible to him only as expressed in and through her body. And when Merricks thinks of kissing his wife, the words “my wife” normally have as their referent his wife which (according to integrative dualism) is an embodied, unified person. So, in the ordinary sense, Merricks does literally kiss his wife just as he also experiences her pleasures and pains and is aware of her hopes, fears and thoughts as they are manifested in the soul/body unity that is his wife. For better or for worse, then, kissing someone requires proper, coherent embodiment. If the person you kiss is utterly affectively absent, has ill feelings for you, and is merely pretending to be affectionate, there is a sense in which you have not kissed the one you are thinking about; you are instead unwittingly being prey to a charade.

I propose, then, that unfortunately human beings can fracture and (sometimes because of brain damage or ill will or through being victims and so on) wind up with their bodies in one world, and their inner identity in another, but this is not a view that dualists should accept in cases of a healthy, integrated embodiment.

Because of the need to do justice to the unity of being a valued embodied person (to use Merrick's case, a person one might greet with a kiss!), I think it would be misleading to describe integrative dualism as a form of "immaterialism," though perhaps other forms of dualism deserve this title. Also because of the centrality of functioning as a unity, it would be misleading to describe integrative dualism as the view that "a human person is (or has) an immaterial soul and a material body," though again other forms of dualism may deserve this title. The fully functioning embodied person (according to integrative dualism) is an integrated, unified, acting, sensing, thinking person, not a conjunct (immaterial person plus body) nor in a case of possession or ownership (an immaterial person has a body).

Dualism and the natural landscape, scientific, and more

In addition to dualism being caricatured as excessively bifurcated, there is also a failure in the literature to appreciate that, historically, what is known as "dualism" begins with an affirmation of the reality and value of the person (soul, mind, thinking or the mental). Plato, Augustine, Descartes and other dualists then argue that there is good reason to not identify the soul, mind, person, thinking, etc. with the body, bodily states and processes. Dualists are therefore not so much "dualists" or adherents to the supposition that there are only two kinds of things (material or immaterial) as much as they are "pluralists" or advocates of the view that monism (in the form of materialism / physicalism) is not justified or, more forcefully put, monism is too narrow to cover all that is. It is worth noting as a side point that Plato, Augustine, Descartes and other early adherents of "dualism" never used the word "dualism" (there is in fact no Greek term for "dualism") and the word "dualism" was first introduced in the late modern era to describe Zoroastrianism.

Once one affirms the reality of the person or the mental, why not identify persons and mental states with physical things and processes? The same reason why we do not identify other things that appear to be distinct such as the difference between seeing and hearing or the difference between the concept of justice and the number 7: we may conceive of the one without the other. Moreover, it appears that one may know all about one without any idea of the other. So, in the case of the mental and physical, it seems that we may know all about the mental without any knowledge about the physical and vice versa. If the two are identical, to know and reflect on the physical would be to know and reflect on the mental. Of course, cases may arise when the same thing is known by different descriptions and concepts; you may know the same famous boxer as Muhammad Ali and I know him as Cassius Clay. But given that the two are referring to the same person, then whatever is true of Muhammad Ali is true of Cassius Clay: to shake hands with one is (as it were) to shake hands with the other. Arguably, in the case of the physical, we may observe and know all about the brain and behavior of a subject and yet not thereby observe and know all about her mental states and activities. Colin McGinn states the problem succinctly:

"The property of consciousness itself (or specific conscious states) is not an observable or perceptible property of the brain. You can stare into a living conscious brain, your own or someone else's, and see there a wide variety of instantiated properties –its shape, colour, texture, etc. –but you will not thereby see what the subject is experiencing, the conscious state itself." (McGinn 1990, 10-11)

Michael Lockwood states the problem facing contemporary materialism:

"Let me begin by nailing my colours to the mast. I count myself a materialist, in the sense that I take consciousness to be a species of

brain activity. Having said that, however, it seems to me evident that no description of brain activity of the relevant kind, couched in the currently available languages of physics, physiology, or functional or computational roles, is remotely capable of capturing what is distinctive about consciousness. So glaring, indeed, are the shortcomings of all the reductive programmes currently on offer, that I cannot believe that anyone with a philosophical training, looking dispassionately at these programmes, would take any of them seriously for a moment, were it not for a deep-seated conviction that current physical science has essentially got reality taped, and accordingly, something along the lines of what the reductionists are offering must be correct. To that extent, the very existence of consciousness seems to me to be a standing demonstration of the explanatory limitations of contemporary physical science. On the assumption that some form of materialism is nevertheless true, we have only to introspect in order to recognize that our present understanding of matter is itself radically deficient. Consciousness remains for us, at the dawn of the twenty-first century, what it was for Newton at the dawn of the eighteenth century: an occult power that lies beyond the pool of illumination that physical theory casts on the world we inhabit." (Lockwood 2003, 447)

Here is another version of the problem I am highlighting that is formatted in the so-called Mary or knowledge argument, first made popular by Frank Jackson, but there are earlier versions of it in the work of Goethe. Consider the following state of affairs:

Mary is a hypothetical scientist who, for whatever reason, has spent her entire life up until now locked in a room and has never experienced pain. While locked in the room, Mary has devoted her life to learning all the physical facts that can be known about pain, such as that pain is produced by such-and-such physical objects that cause so-

and-so neural happenings that lead people to utter expletives, etc. Her knowledge is exhaustive. One night, Mary is freed from the room and is invited to go bowling. As she picks up the bowling ball, she accidentally drops it on her foot and bleeps out an expletive. She asks her host what it is that she has just experienced and he informs her that she experienced pain.

Did Mary learn something new about pain? The obvious answer is “Yes.” She learned for the first time what the intrinsic nature of pain is. While in the room, she only learned about extrinsic, relational, features of pain. The conclusion of the Mary argument is that there are more facts (non-physical or mental/psychological facts) than physical facts and, therefore, that physicalism is false. Why could not Mary learn from her studies about the intrinsic nature of pain during the time that she was in the room? Part of the answer seems to be that (to use an awkward expression) the ouchiness nature of pain (the sensory feel of pain) can only be known from the first-person perspective that Mary lacked with respect to pain. None of the features of the physical world as identified by the physical sciences (mass, size, weight, electric charge, physical structure and constitution) captures what it is to experience pain (or to think, feel, smell, taste, etc.)

In brief, one of the deep problems with physicalism is the (at least apparently) profound difference between subjective experience and what we discover from the brain sciences. One materialist strategy that seems particularly unhelpful (though it is adopted by Daniel Dennett and Paul Churchland) in overcoming this difference is to contend that the mental and physical only appear to be different. Once one recognizes the reality of subjective appearing --what it feels like or the reality of conscious seeming-- it seems that we need to recognize appearing itself as a fundamental datum to be explained.

Thomas Nagel aptly summarizes the problem with trying to reduce the mental to the physical sciences:

"The concepts of physical science provide a very special, and partial, description of the world that experience reveals to us. It is the world with all subjective consciousness, sensory appearances, thought, values, purpose, and will left out; what remains is the mathematically describable order of things and events in space and time. That conceptual purification launched the extraordinary development of physics and chemistry that has taken place since the seventeenth century. But reductive physicalism turns this description into an exclusive ontology. The reductionist project usually tries to reclaim some of the originally excluded aspects of the world, by analyzing them in physical (e.g., behavioral or neurophysiological) terms, but it denies reality to what cannot be so reduced. I believe the project is doomed—that conscious experience, thought, value, and so forth are not illusions, even though they cannot be identified with physical facts." (Nagel 2010, 25-26)

This problem of identity and reduction impacts not just the problem of a physicalist account of human nature but the physicalist view of nonhuman life that appears to involve mental, psychological states. (For an extension of these points and a detailed response to materialist alternatives see Goetz and Taliaferro, forthcoming, Taliaferro 1994 and 2011.)

Beyond the problem of identity, materialism faces the difficulty of addressing what appears to be the contingent relationship of the person and body. We seem to be able to picture ourselves with very different bodies. This ability to imagine ourselves in different bodies may even be a component in ordinary cases of when we apply the golden rule of imagining what the world would be like if we were other persons. In a recent article in the New York Times entitled

“Standing in Someone’s Else’s Shoes, Almost for Real,” the author, Benedict Carey, reports that neuroscientists can create “body swapping” experiences in which a subject can be “tricked” into adopting “any other human form, no matter how different, as [his or her] own. ‘You can see the possibilities, putting a male in a female body, young in old, white in black and vice versa,’ said Dr. Henrik Ehrsson of the Karolinska Institute in Stockholm. ... [T]he Karolinska researchers have found that men and women say they not only feel they have taken on the new body, but also unconsciously cringe when it is poked or threatened” (Carey 2008). Merely picturing or visualizing a state of affairs as possible is not sufficient to know with absolute certainty that it is a bona fide possibility, but I have defended elsewhere a modal principle in which imagining a state of affairs as actual does give one prima facie reason for believing it to be possible (Taliaferro 1994, 1997, 2009). If this is acceptable, then imagining body-switching or existing disembodied or your body existing without you would provide some prima facie evidence that you and your body are not identical.

I have defended in several places a modal argument for dualism, an argument made famous by Descartes, defended today by Richard Swinburne and others, and hints of the argument may be traced to Plato (Swinburne 1997). Here is a version of the argument:

1. If you are your body, then anything true of you is true of your body. (This is an application of the principle of the indiscernibility of identicals)

2. One has reason to believe that some things are true of you that are not true of your body. In particular, there is some reason to believe it is possible that your body can exist without you and you can exist without your body. Similarly, it appears you may switch bodies and exist disembodied. We are justified in accepting this premise on

the grounds that one may conceive or imagine or consistently describe these states of affairs and they are not incompatible with what we know to be necessarily true.

3. There is reason to think that you are not your body.

A few quick observations: One may adjust the second premise to not include body-switching and all out disembodiment. All the argument needs is that there is something true of the body, not true of the person.

Second, Lynne Baker's constitutionalism is an interesting case in which one might accept the argument and yet resist integrative or any form of dualism based on her constitutional account which insists that a person is not identical with her or his body.

Given the brevity of space, in what follows I will take on the objection that this whole line of reasoning lands us with something profoundly anti-scientific. According to this objection, even if the above modal argument has some force, it should be resisted because of what we know from the physical sciences. I shall then go on in the next section to compare the merits of integrative dualism and constitutionalism and then finally come to the heart of the paper: an account of the values that comprise a healthy, human embodiment.

Is dualism –and especially integrative dualism- anti-scientific at all? It is hard to see why. The charge that dualist interactionism is in violation of the law of the conservation of energy has been effectively rebutted (Broad 1960, Collins 2008). The fact of causal interaction and the dependency (in this life) of consciousness and the brain and bodily events is quite unsurprising from a dualist point of view. C. Stephen Evans offers a useful overview of the dualist response to the problem of interaction:

"What, exactly, is it about these findings that are supposed to

create problems for dualism? Presumably, the mere fact that the mind is causally impacted by the brain is not a problem, since most dualists have been interactionists eager to maintain that the body (and indeed the wider physical world), can in some way affect the mind. Is it a problem for dualism that this causal action takes place through the brain, rather than, say, the heart as Aristotle thought? It is hard to see why this should be a problem. Is it a problem that the causal effects should be the product of specific regions of the brain? Why should the fact that the source of the effects are localized regions of the brain, rather than the brain as a whole, be a problem for the dualist? It is hard for me to see why dualism should be thought to entail that the causal dependence of the mind on the brain should only stem from holistic states of the brain rather than more localized happenings. . . . We did not need neurophysiology to come to know that a person whose head is bashed on with a club quickly loses his or her ability to think or have any conscious processes. Why should we not think of neurophysiological findings as giving us detailed, precise knowledge of something that human beings have always known, or at least could have known, which is that the mind (at least in this mortal life) requires and depends on a functioning brain? We now know a lot more than we used to know about precisely how the mind depends on the body. However, that the mind depends on the body, at least prior to death, is surely not something discovered in the twentieth century. (Evans 2005, 333-334; Evans' emphases)

Unless a materialist is prepared to embrace an extreme form of eliminativism (denial of sensations, for example), it seems that dualism has no disadvantages over non-reductive or even identity forms of materialism. These latter forms of materialism might claim to be simpler (they think there is only the physical and nothing more) but they still seem to recognize a kind of interaction (brain states qua sensations interacting with non-mental physical states) along with (in

my view) not being able to offer an account of the mental that overcomes their apparent difference and the contingency of the mind-body relationship. To see the importance of all parties trying to accommodate an apparent interaction, consider A. C. Ewing's response to eliminative behaviorism.

"In order to refute such views I shall suggest you to try an experiment. Heat a piece of iron red-hot, then put your hand on it, and note carefully how you feel. You will have no difficulty in observing that it is quite different from anything which a physiologist could observe, whether he considered your outward behavior or your brain processes. The throb of pain experienced will not be in the least like either the act of withdrawing your hand or the movement of your vocal organs to say whatever you do say, nor would it be like anything described in textbooks of physiology as happening in the nervous system or brain. I do not say that it does not happen in the brain, but it is quite distinct from anything that other people could observe if they looked into your brain. The behaviorists pride themselves on being empiricists, but in maintaining their view they are going clean contrary to experience. We know by experience what feeling pain is like and we know by experience what the physiological reactions to it are, and the two are totally unlike." (Ewing 1985, 101, 102)

I suggest that contemporary science has not established that a single mental state is the very same thing as a brain or other bodily state (correlation yes, but identity is another matter), and therefore contend that the success of the sciences in general is no reason to think that integrative dualism should be deemed unworthy compared to its closest competitor, constitutionalism.

One more minor point: against the charge that dualism (integrative or not) works with the idea that persons are unnatural or not part of the natural world or nature, there are two replies to

consider. First, most dualists today think that consciousness and the mental in general is pervasive throughout the animal world. It is not as though human persons are the sole conscious beings set apart from nature. Second, some dualists are atheists (e.g. C.J. Ducasse, Peter Unger), but many are theists. On theism, the natural world itself rests on the abiding, incorporeal divine reality. Of course classical theists do not hold that God is a part of creation in the sense that God is a creature or part of creation, but many of us hold that God does have a nature. On this view, if being incorporeal and intentional is somehow not natural, then the divine nature itself turns out to be unnatural or not natural, surely an undesirable conclusion for a Christian or Muslim philosopher.

Let us now briefly consider integrative dualism versus the constitutional account of persons

Red herring or in the red philosophically?

Lynne Baker takes up the question of what a soul is identical to and contends that “a person is identical to herself and not another thing.” And she recognizes the existence of the person as a subject. I believe this comes close to being committed to believing that a person is a substantial individual and if that individual is not identical with her body, then it seems she is identical with something that is not the body. Moreover, I think we need to understand the person as metaphysically separable from the body to accommodate the contingency of the person-body relationship, and to allow for disembodiment (for those of us who, like myself, accepts the belief in an intermediate state). Is there a problem with individuating nonphysical selves? I do not think so. This can be treated as primitive and analyzed in a Cartesian manner (e.g. to affirm that Paul is not Peter involves recognizing that Paul can exist without Peter). I have argued elsewhere that the individuation of physical objects must ultimately be seen as primitive and not further

accounted for (see Taliaferro, 1994), and I do not see why one can recognize primitive individuation among physical things and not among non-physical. If spatial relation is the key (and see Taliaferro, 1994 for contending that spatial relations do not permit avoiding the primitive nature of physical individuation), one can always adopt the view that persons (in a dualist framework) are in space, as the Cambridge Platonists did. Richard Swinburne summarizes the ultimate nature of personal identity on dualist grounds:

"Personal identity is something ultimate. It is unanalysable into conjunctions or disjunctions of other observable properties. Bodily continuity, continuity of memory and character, are, however, the only evidence we have of its presence; it is observable only by observing these. In general, there is plenty of evidence, normally overwhelming evidence, of bodily continuity, memory and character, as to whether or not two persons are the same, which gives very clear verdicts in the overwhelming majority of cases. Yet while evidence of continuity of body, memory, and character is evidence of personal identity, personal identity is not constituted by continuity of body, memory and character. Hence the evidence may on occasion mislead, and two persons be the same, although our best evidence shows that they are not and conversely. Also on occasion, the evidence of observable characteristics may give no clear verdict as to whether P2 is the same person as P1; but that does not mean that there is no clear answer to this question, merely that we do not know and cannot even make a reasonable guess at what it is." (Swinburne 1977, 119-20)

Integrative dualism thereby allows that there can be personal identity even in the face of radical shifts in first person points of view or even in the case where a person survives and yet without any mental properties or states.

Bet that as it may, I think Professor Baker's constitutionalism is an important, philosophically exciting alternative to dualism (integrative or not), and one that I myself would adopt should I be convinced that integrative dualism is implausible. (Though I do have some hesitancy about the analogies employed about statues and other such objects. I suspect a statue might be an entia rationis or creature of reason and elaborate intentional institutions and relations and not a concrete individual thing in its own right.) In any case, my paper / presentation closes with what I hope is a friendly suggestion about how it is important to recognize values in philosophy of mind and accounts of embodiment. The following account can, I believe, be embraced by integrative dualists and constitutionalists and anti or non-reductive materialists.

Virtues of Embodiment

What is involved in being embodied? Most of the philosophy of mind literature understand embodiment in terms of three factors: sensations, agency, and causal constitution (the brain and body support sensations, agency, cognitive powers). I suggest that three other factors are involved and that all these factors together should be recognized as goods, what may be called non-moral virtues. Let me briefly highlight the six goods making up embodiment and then make a case for recognizing them as non-moral virtues.

The first three factors seem straightforward. To have the body you have is to be able to sense through and with the body in multiple ways, including have the power of proprioception (awareness of one's location from within, so to speak). The extent that one loses such powers, one ceases to be fully embodied. Agency seems also straightforward. If I lose the power to move my arm directly, it ceases to function as my arm.

In terms of causal powers, if brain damage causes me to develop prosopagnosia I will lose the power to recognize familiar objects and my embodiment will become impaired.

The three additional goods that comprise healthy embodiment consist in powers of cognition, coherent reason, and affective appropriation. I suggest that one's embodiment is impaired to the extent that one lacks the power to know where you are and your current state of affairs. This is why most skeptical arguments take aim at the mind-body relationship: how do you know you are where you think you are? Could you be subject to a powerful, demonic hallucination (Descartes' argument) or perhaps you are a brain in a vat (contemporary Cartesian skeptical argument)? Coherent reason is also essential for embodiment. If I cannot coherently relate my desires to instrumental reasoning (if I desire to head north, I should not head south, etc.) or understand my desires and needs coherently, my embodiment will be dysfunctional and perhaps disintegrate altogether in extreme cases. Finally, if I hate my body, really loathing its very nature, it seems that embodiment will also be taxed. Being embodied requires a kind of affective appropriation or acceptance of oneself as an embodied being.

I suggest that all of these powers be recognized as non-moral virtues. They are non-moral to the extent that they are not moral virtues such as courage, temperance, and so on, though they are essential preconditions for moral virtues. They are "virtues" in the ancient Greek sense of being excellences or good powers. In all, then, embodiment that is healthy and not subject to the splintering that Gilbert Ryle laments (as cited at the beginning of this paper) consists in the virtue of sensations, the virtue of agency, the virtue of a sustainable causal constitution, cognitive virtues, the virtue of rational coherence, and the virtue of affective appropriation.

If we adopt this more robust understanding of embodiment, we can link philosophy of mind with value theory. We will thereby do greater justice to common sense and to an ancient precedence. I suggest it is common sense to recognize that the loss of any or all of these virtues would count as damage to a person. Such a view also has a good heritage. There is space for only one last citation. Consider this amusing account of embodiment from Augustine's *The City of God*:

"If anyone were to hang upside-down, the position of the body and arrangement of the limbs is undoubtedly perverted, because what should be on top, according to the dictates of nature, is underneath, and what nature intends to be underneath is on top. This perverted attitude disturbs the peace of the flesh, and causes distress for that reason. For all that, the breath is at peace with its body and is busily engaged for the latter's preservation; that is why there is something to endure the pain. And even if the breath is finally driven from the body by distresses, still, as long as the framework of the limbs hold together, what remains retains a kind of peace among the bodily parts; hence there is still something to hang there." (Augustine 1993, XIX.12)

In closing, one may well wonder what the implications of such a portrait of embodiment in terms of integration and value are for a Christian or Muslim thinker. I propose that integrative dualism offers a compelling view of the wholeness of human life (when it is healthy) while also allowing for the coherence of an afterlife after death and the annihilation of the body. And I suggest that the further articulation of embodiment in terms of virtues would let the world know that Christians and Muslims affirm the rich, intrinsic goodness (even preciousness) of embodied life.

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