CEO power

In recent years, corporate sustainability reporting and its effective dimensions on it have always been considered from the perspective of users of financial reporting. Sustainability reporting is the environmental, social, and economic achievements of a company and shows how the organization implements its development plans in the future, taking into account these issues. In this study, the relationship between CEO power, life cycle, and sustainability reporting has been investigated and the effect of international relations has been considered. To investigate this issue, 4 hypotheses were developed and tested with a sample consisting of 119 companies listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange in the period 2012 to 2019. The results showed that CEO power has a negative effect on sustainability reporting and life cycle has a positive effect on the relationship between CEO power and sustainability reporting. The results of the study did not confirm the adjusting effect of international relations on the relationship between CEO power and sustainability reporting, while the results showed that international relations hurt the relationship between life cycle and corporate sustainability reporting.

"Corporate governance" includes mechanisms to monitor CEO's performance to assure efficient decision adoption and maximize firm value. One of the most effective aspects of firm performance is the degree of risk-taking. This study investigates the relationship between CEO power and institutional ownership with risk-taking behavior of member firms of Tehran Stock Exchange and Iran Fara Bourse during 2010-2019 by utilizing quintile regression. According to the results, by the increase of CEO's power and the company's benefit from powerful managers, the company risk (total risk and systemic risk) will decrease. As a result, managers are eager to safeguard their reputation as expert decision-makers and, as a result, they try to reduce company risk. In addition, the existence of institutional ownership among the shareholders of the company will reduce the risk, which can be referred to in the agency theory. Also, if the impact of these two variables is considered together, the risk will increase significantly. This very fact reflects the exercise of the power and influence of institutional owners. As a result, large shareholders have a supervisory role in the discipline of managers, but despite their impact on the relationship between managers' power and corporate risk, they do not alter the main negative relationship.