Mulla Sadra

Subscribing to the principles of logically valid reasoning and parsimony of presuppositions in the framework of a religion that hinges on a revealed eschatological message, the medieval Islamic philosophers were bound to interpret the Qurʾānic account of the afterlife in ways that may have compromised at least some of its literal meanings. However, to what extent precisely do these interpretations go against the grain of Revelation has to be determined separately in each particular case. Wholesale statements regarding the alleged coherence or incoherence of general types of philosophical theories with Revelation risk neglecting important variations between theories, and thereby rendering us blind to the scope of possibilities in the concepts involved. From this perspective, I will consider the eschatological implications of the psychological theories of Avicenna and Mullā Ṣadrā, who both subscribe to a dualistic view of human being and consequently claim that the afterlife does not concern one's body. Two questions will then emerge as especially central to dualistic accounts of the afterlife. (1) How do we make sense of the kind of first-personality that must be an irreducible constituent of existence in the hereafter, provided that the latter fulfills the eschatological promise given in the Revelation? For in order to be a justified reward or punishment for my acts in this life, the afterlife must be in an equally strong sense mine. In the Arabic Peripatetic tradition, many of the central doctrines of which Avicenna and Mullā Ṣadrā subscribe to, individuality entails materiality, which seems to suggest that human being can have a distinctly first-personal existence only when some kind of connection is preserved to the body as the necessary condition of one's individuation. (2) How do we account for the emphatically sensual descriptions of the hereafter in the Revelation? Again, in the Peripatetic tradition all cognitive acts that involve objects with sensible characteristics require bodily instruments of cognition, in the absence of which the revealed account is in danger of becoming a mere metaphor. In the light of these two questions, I will argue that Avicenna's dualism ends up with a rather narrow conception of the afterlife. He does try to give an account of a genuinely first-personal afterlife, and thereby presents a carefully argued departure from the Peripatetic tradition. But because of the way in which Avicenna separates the soul from the body, Avicennian afterlife is bound to remain exclusively intellectual. Thus, with regard to the second question Avicenna seems forced to interpret the Revelation in almost exclusively metaphorical terms. On the other hand, while following Avicenna in the first question, Mullā Ṣadrā conceives of the separate existence of the human soul in much broader terms than his predecessor. By means of the concepts of mental existence ( wujud dhihniyy ) and the world of images ( 'ālam al-mithāl ), he ends up with a conception of human afterlife that is rich in terms of experiential content, and thereby potentially more coherent with the revealed account.

Muslim philosophers and theologians have disputed over the animal afterlife. Most Muslim scholars hold that the Quran, Islamic narrations and rational arguments affirm the resurrection of animals in the afterlife, though there is a dispute concerning how they will be resurrected and whether they will be rewarded or punished as humans will. Beside the controversies and disputes, several reasons suggest that they have their own afterlife. To prove the animal afterlife, it is necessary to prove primarily that they have soul. Mulla Sadra has attempted to prove that animals have soul, based on the immateriality of the faculty of imagination ( al-Khayal ). Likewise, most of the reasons provided for the immateriality of human soul could be employed for the animal afterlife. The second stage is to explain the purpose of animal afterlife. Two goals could be mentioned regarding this issue: first, the compensation of evils harming them requires the afterlife. Second, some Quranic verses and Islamic narrations establish the fact that at least some animals have the intellectual faculty and thus have responsibly for their actions. Though these Quranic verses and Islamic narrations are not explicit, they can be a probable evidence for the animal afterlife. Finally, two points must be noted: first, though there are several arguments in favor of animal afterlife, there is no general agreement on it in the Islamic world. Second, the above arguments are not general, but they include merely those animals that have the faculty of sensation and have been inflicted by evils.

Predication is one of the significant issues in Islamic philosophical logic. “Essential Primary Predication” (al-ḥaml al-awwalī al-dhātī) is a new type of predication found mainly in late Islamic philosophers. The historical background of this predication is one of the controversial topics among post-Ṣadrīan thinkers, but it seems that it must be sought in Avicenna’s discussions on the meaning of predication. To show this, I will focus on two fragments in which Avicenna talks about the meaning of predication; one in al-Ishārāt wa al-Tanbīhāt (Pointers and Reminders) and the other in Manṭiq al-Mashriqīyyīn (The Logic of the Easterners). In Ishārāt, we read that in a proposition like “A is B”, what we mean is that “What is A is B”, not that “The ḥaqīqa of A is the ḥaqīqa of B”.

The afterlife (also the world to come) has been one of the major humans’ concerns throughout history. Although heavenly religions and Islamic philosophy have recognized the very foundation of the Hereafter, there are questions surrounding the existence and characteristics of that world. In the meantime, there is a myriad of theories about it, and Mulla Sadra’s view is a key theory here. This research analyzes the philosophical basics of Mulla Sadra’s views to distinguish his perspective from those of others and to portray a different aspect of the world-to-come observations. The findings suggested that Mulla Sadra argues that man achieves actualization over time and transfers to the world to come by abandoning the matter. In that world, there are no objects for man to observe; rather, he will create all his observations by himself, with every human creating a more transcendental world made of imaginary perceptions which, unlike imaginary observations in this world, assumes an external reality which is also formed in the existence and life of the human psyche.

SUBJECT & OBJECTIVES: Moral realism means that moral values are real regardless of feelings and emotions, collective agreement, and the orders of anyone. This article aims to explain the relationship between Mulla Ṣadrā's viewpoint and moral realism, as well as the influence of his thoughts on our lives.   METHOD & FINDING: The research benefitted from an analytical-descriptive method. At first, by referring to all the works of Mulla Ṣadrā, his moral ontological foundations were deduced, and based on his statements and foundations, it was analyzed in an integrated manner and finally, its effect on pure life has been explained. We have concluded that based on Mulla Ṣadrā's idea, he is a realist. We can enumerate the following shreds of evidence to prove this claim: 1) The reality of the moral criterion, 2) The criticism of divine command theory, 3) The real basis of moral judgments, 4) The consequences of moral judgments, and 5) The manifestation of inner attributes. Additionally, we have demonstrated that action based on the realistic foundations of Mulla Ṣadrā will direct life towards a divine life with true happiness and will suggest a different way of life.CONCLUSION: Action based on the realistic principles of Mulla Ṣadrā will guide life towards a divine life with true happiness and will suggest a different way of life.