فرامرز یادگاریان

After establishing its jurisdiction in the case of the violation of the 1955 Treaty of Amity between Iran and the United States (hereafter U.S.) on February 3, 2021, the International Court of Justice (hereafter ICJ) took a stride towards the Merits stage. In the event of a final judgment and the failure of the U.S. government to comply, the primary question that was raised was the following: What are Iran's options if the U.S. does not act upon the final decision of the ICJ? This article endeavors to address this question. The research methodology employed in this article is descriptive-analytical; through document analysis of the Court's decisions, international treaties, and relevant books and articles, specific findings have been derived. The research results indicate that Iran's options can be within the framework of the United Nations (hereafter UN) or beyond it. Options within the UN framework are predominantly theoretical, lacking effective enforcement mechanisms due to the existing power structures, including the veto power in the Security Council (hereafter UNSC), thereby lacking a guarantee of proper implementation. These options tend to be idealistic. On the other hand, options outside the UN framework, such as bargaining power and countermeasures for Iran, carry a realist aspect, allowing Iran to leverage them for the assertion of its rights.

This article explores the role of the International Court of Justice (hereafter ICJ) in the relations between Iran and the United States (hereafter U.S.), with reference to the last disputes between the two countries over the 1955 Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations and Consular Rights. The article argues that the ICJ has both jurisdiction (Ratione Materiae) and substantive competence (Merits) to adjudicate the case, based on the trans-analytical method. The article draws on the past judgments of the ICJ in similar cases between Iran and the U.S., such as the Case Concerning US Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, the Case Concerning the Aerial Incident, and the Case Concerning Oil Platforms, to support its findings. The article also discusses the implications of the U.S. decision to terminate the Treaty of Amity and to challenge the ICJ’s jurisdiction. The article predicts that the ICJ will establish its judgment based on Article 10 of the Treaty of Amity, which affirms the principle of free trade, and conclude that the U.S. sanctions violate the Treaty of Amity.

For over three decades, sanctions have been a consistent feature of United States policy towards Iran. Following the lifting of nuclear-related sanctions under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2015 and United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231, in 2018 the United States withdrew from the agreement through Executive Order 13846, reinstating previous sanctions. Consequently, Iran decided to bring its case against the United States before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) based on the 1955 Treaty of Amity. The present article analyzes the ICJ's substantive jurisdiction (Merits) over this case, as well as the political and legal implications of the United States' unilateral sanctions against Iran. The research employs an analytical methodology, utilizing library research and note-taking to collect data. The research findings indicate that the ICJ's opinion is based on the illegality of comprehensive economic sanctions imposed on national security grounds, and that the Court has substantive jurisdiction over this case. Furthermore, the findings reveal that the United States' unilateral and extraterritorial sanctions not only violate Iran's sovereignty, but also infringe upon the human rights of the Iranian people. The United States' sanctions policy aligns with liberal and realist theories of international relations.