حمیدرضا علومی یزدی

The resignation of an arbitrator constitutes one of the grounds for the termination of an arbitrator’s mandate, as provided for in most national arbitration laws and institutional arbitration rules. However, the legal dimensions and implications of such resignation- including its effects on the parties’ rights and the arbitral proceedings- may vary depending on the arbitrator’s motives for resigning and the justifiability (or lack thereof) of those motives. For instance, the acceptance of a resignation, the method of appointing a substitute arbitrator, the possibility of continuing proceedings before a truncated tribunal (i.e., without replacing the resigning arbitrator), and even the arbitrator’s potential civil liability may be subject to differing legal determinations based on whether the resignation is deemed justified. Domestic and international arbitration laws and rules have addressed arbitrator resignations through divergent approaches, often focusing solely on the replacement of the arbitrator while neglecting broader legal and ethical challenges. These challenges include the permissibility of resignation, its acceptance, its impact on the continuation of proceedings, and the prevention of its abuse. The unique characteristics of the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal have rendered the issue of arbitrator resignation particularly significant within its framework. Notable in this regard are the Tribunal’s jurisprudence and its modifications to the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules- aimed at mitigating procedural delays arising from resignations. One of the most consequential procedural rules derived from the Tribunal’s experience is the addition of Paragraph 5 to Article 13 of the UNCITRAL Rules, which imposes an obligation on the resigning arbitrator to continue participating in proceedings (post-resignation) in cases where they have already taken part in the merits hearing. This provision, known as the Mosk Rule, has introduced a distinctive mechanism to safeguard procedural integrity. This article examines the rationale behind the Mosk Rule, its legal effects in light of general principles governing arbitrator resignation and replacement, its implications on the parties’ rights, the imperative of ensuring fair and equitable proceedings, and the preservation of arbitration’s legitimacy and credibility. Furthermore, the study proposes measures to deter unjustified resignations and mitigate their adverse impact on arbitral proceedings.

Natural gas infrastructure is growing and global LNG volumes are set to expand substantially. This results in more trade between different regions of the world and emergence of a more competitive and relatively more integrated global gas market. In addition, several key markets are currently undergoing structural reform with the aim of opening them to competition. In line with these changes in the global market, gas pricing methods also need to be adapted. This paper discusses the challenges of natural gas pricing and price review in this new market environment. Firstly, the current structure of the global and regional gas markets is analyzed. Secondly, challenges in natural gas pricing and price review are discussed, and in this context oil-indexation and hub-indexation are analyzed in detail. Thirdly, the recommended framework for pricing and price review in the more competitive global market are presented. The pricing mechanism and price review framework should be tailored to the characteristics of the gas market and the stages of growth and maturity of the market.

International oil and gas investment disputes constitute an important part of Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) system. Investment arbitration which considers as a prevalent dispute settlement mechanism in this area is under serious criticisms, since it endures huge costs, causes length of process and devastates the parties’ long-term investment relationship. In the recent years, possibility of applying Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) and hybrid dispute settlement mechanisms have largely discussed. Mediation-Arbitration (“ Med-arb”) ; is one of the hybrid and integrated dispute settlement mechanisms which embodies flexibility, non-judicial and negotiate-oriented benefits of mediation and finality advantage of arbitration simultaneously and in a single process ( not in separate processes). In this method, mediation is first attempted by the parties before arbitration could be started, If no settlement is reached during mediation phase, then the appointed neutral or mediator, will act as independent arbitrator(s) and proceed the case under the arbitration process and will render a binding arbitration award. In this method, if parties reach an agreement during the first phase (mediation process), they will not incur huge costs of lengthy investment arbitration. In this method, even If the first stage (mediation process) fails, since mediation process made the disputes more clarified and narrower, then the arbitration process is less lengthy and arbitration will be proceeded more efficiently. Moreover, both investors and host- states in oil and gas investment area, do have strong ambitions to maintain the investment relationships. These goals are achieved better via adopting med-arb proceedings.