محمدکاظم سجادپور

The geopolitical significance of Taiwan has prompted the United States to remain vigilant about the island's security, even after recognizing the People's Republic of China in 1979. Consequently, while refraining from any legally binding commitment to defend Taiwan, the U.S. Congress passed the Taiwan Relations Act, with the aim of equipping Taipei with the necessary military capabilities to deter a potential attack by China—a policy later termed "Strategic Ambiguity". However, while Taiwan’s economic development and democratic transition over the past four decades have underscored the importance of preserving the cross-strait status quo, China’s integration into the global economy has enabled the People’s Liberation Army to challenge it. Although conventional debates suggest the United States must choose between strategic clarity and traditional ambiguity, this paper moves beyond such a dichotomy, arguing that U.S. foreign policy behavior toward Taiwan exhibits elements of both. Building on the new conceptual framework of "Adaptive Strategic Ambiguity", this paper categorizes the U.S. policy toward Taiwan into three distinct dimensions: the reinvigoration of regional balance of power, the transition toward political clarity, and the advancement of economic de-risking.

The religious nationalism in Neo-Taliban era implies a process of distancing from tribal legitimacy toward a more nationalistic narration. The research aims to understand the Religious nationalism in the approach of Neo- Taliban toward state-building and the peace process. In this regard, the social theory of Ibn Khaldun is employed to measure the process, the logic and the consequences of the birth of its religious nationalism. It becomes clear that the group spiced its religious narration with nationalist changes to win more social support and legitimacy by overcoming ethnonationalism and emphasizing on nationalistic notions that ultimately weakened its traditional legitimacy.

The India-Pakistan conflict is one of the longest disputes in the Indian subcontinent, dating back to 1948. During this period, the dispute between the two countries has many times been to the brink of a war, and has led to it four times. The deterioration of the conflict required that several meas-ures be taken at various levels of diplomacy to resolve it. Simultaneously with the activities in the field of official diplomacy, and even at the time of the severance of official relations between the two countries, Track two activities have been running between the elites along the borders. The article will briefly review the most important activities of Track Two Diplomacy to resolve this dispute, one of the most important of which is the activities of the Pakistan-India Peoples' Forum for Peace and Democracy. This activity was successful to show a different dimension of the con-flict to public and elites along the borders, however, was not able to manifest long lasting peace. The most important achievement to be counted for PIPFPD is reducing the tensions, especially at the time of diplomatic deadlocks. The article answers to the question of why PIPFPD has failed to achieve some of its defined goals after nearly 25 years’ activity? Describing various aspects of the conflict, besides limitations PIPDPD has been faced, the article concludes that complexity of the dispute caused by the multiplicity of actors and interest which is affected by regional and interna-tional issues won’t let the conflict ripen. Sinceactors involved in the conflict don’t come to this logic that consensus over resolving dispute is more beneficial than continuing it.