دولت به عنوان سبب اقوی از مباشر در ارتکاب جرم (مقاله علمی وزارت علوم)
درجه علمی: نشریه علمی (وزارت علوم)
آرشیو
چکیده
حکومت، نسبت به اعمال زیانبار خود در کسوت مباشر و حتی سبب دارای مسئولیت کیفری است. مسئله ی اصلی در این پژوهش عبارت است از اینکه چگونه می توان حکومت را به عنوان سبب اقوی از مباشر، دارای مسئولیت کیفری دانست؟ زمانی می توان در حمایت از حقوق فردی و اجتماعی، دولت را مجرم دانست که سوء نیت مجرمانه یا تقصیر جزائی دولت محرز باشد. مسئولیت دولت می تواند ناشی از فعل و یا ترک فعل باشد. اعمال ارتکابی دولت سبب بسیاری از نتایج زیانباری اقتصادی، اجتماعی و فرهنگی است که در جامعه رخ می دهند؛ بنابراین نمی توان برای هر عمل زیانبار مرتبط با دولت، به سبب اقوی از مباشر متوسل شد. بلکه زمانی امکان انتساب نتیجه ی مجرمانه به دولت در مقام سبب اقوی از مباشر وجود دارد که کنترل مستقیم و البته مؤثر دولت در تحقق نتیجه، عرفاً احراز شود. مجازات توده ی مردم در این حالت بر مدار عدالت نیست و اینکه مجری عدالت، خود سبب عمل مجرمانه است. با این حال تالی فاسدی نیز برای این تصور می توان قائل شد، مانند اینکه دولت در تمامی آثار زیانبار اجتماعی، اقتصادی و ... نقش مستقیم و یا غیرمستقیم دارد و از سوی دیگر اصل قانونی بودن جرم و مجازات و فردی بودن مسئولیت کیفری و برخی اصول حقوقی دیگر نیز با این نظریه می تواند خدشه دار شود.The Government as the Principal Cause of Crime: Rethinking State Accountability in Blue-Collar Criminality
Introduction This study investigates the role and position of the state in facilitating or causing crimes committed by blue-collar offenders. It argues that many such crimes are not merely the result of individual intent, but are often shaped or indirectly induced by governmental policies and administrative conduct. By identifying these state-driven causes, the research aims to highlight unjust patterns of criminal attribution and propose a framework for mitigating the criminal responsibility of individuals who act under the influence of systemic pressures. The central premise is that assigning exclusive criminal responsibility to the immediate perpetrator—when state-induced conditions play a formative role—is both unjust and detrimental to the legitimacy of the criminal justice system. Ultimately, the goal is to foster a more equitable system that prevents violence and reinforces justice. Methodology This study adopts a descriptive-analytical approach. Through a comprehensive review of legal literature, statutory frameworks, and scholarly theories, it seeks to answer the central research question: To what extent can the government be regarded as a principal cause—rather than a mere facilitator—of crimes committed by blue-collar workers? The analysis is grounded in principles of general criminal law, causality, and the criminal liability of legal entities. Findings The study finds that, under certain conditions, the government may bear criminal liability when its actions or omissions serve not only as a background factor but as a direct and influential cause of criminal outcomes. While the concept of "government crime" remains vague in Iranian law, it is necessary to invoke established principles regarding the criminal liability of legal persons to properly assess the government’s role. A distinction is drawn between crimes committed by the government itself and crimes that occur within a state-created or state-tolerated context. The focus of this study is on the latter. A government may be deemed the stronger causal factor in criminal behavior when its policies or actions are shown to have directly influenced the criminal conduct, and where the individual agent’s material and moral contribution does not sever the causal link. Liability may stem from deliberate acts, administrative negligence, or omissions that have foreseeable consequences. In such cases, responsibility should not be placed solely on individuals—often working-class stewards who lack power and may act out of ignorance, distress, or coercion. When direct and effective governmental control over the outcome is apparent through rational analysis, attributing criminal results solely to these individuals is inconsistent with principles of justice. Moreover, this framework provides an explanation for how certain state policies—such as abrupt changes in fuel pricing, deceptive intervention in financial markets, or unprofessional decision-making during economic crises—can provoke harmful behavior in individuals, including acts of deception, aggression, or fraud. In such instances, the state’s role may be legally recognized as the principal cause. However, this attribution must be approached with caution. Holding the state criminally liable for all harmful outcomes would risk undermining key legal principles such as the legality of criminal law, the individuality of criminal responsibility, and the presumption of innocence. Innovation (Value) This research offers a novel approach by emphasizing the active and often overlooked role of the state in the genesis of criminal behavior. It critiques the traditional assumption that the state is solely a guardian of law and order, revealing how state structures, when dysfunctional or coercive, can become enablers or instigators of crime. By bringing attention to these structural factors, the study contributes to a more balanced and systemic understanding of criminal causation. It also seeks to prevent the imposition of unjust and ineffective punishments by uncovering hidden causes and shifting the focus toward collective and institutional accountability. In doing so, it integrates criminological insights with doctrines of criminal law, offering a preventative and remedial contribution to legal scholarship. Conclusion The government can be criminally liable not only as a facilitator but, in exceptional circumstances, as the principal cause of crimes committed by others. For this to be established, certain criteria must be met. The government must have exerted a direct and substantial influence on the criminal outcome, and this influence must be traceable through rational and legal analysis. Furthermore, the material and moral elements of the individual offender’s conduct must not disrupt the causal chain linking the government’s actions to the resulting harm. In such cases, criminal liability may be attributed to the state, particularly when criminal malice or culpable negligence can be demonstrated. At the same time, the state’s liability must be narrowly defined to avoid excessive generalization. The government cannot be held responsible for all criminal acts committed under its jurisdiction. Instead, a clear legal framework is needed to define the boundaries of state crime and establish when criminal liability can justifiably be assigned to governmental entities. Only then can justice be preserved for individuals acting under coercive conditions, and the broader goals of accountability and prevention be achieved.