Robin Attfield

The coronavirus pandemic has had some unexpected benign effects (including a large drop in air pollution and levels of nitrogen oxides in UK and elsewhere, and a smaller drop in global carbon emissions), which raises the problem of how to sustain and build on these unexpected gains. These gains could easily be lost when economies and road transport return to something like their previous condition. But if governments and industries are inspired to reduce automobile emissions to match the levels of the spring of 2020, gains such as these could become recurrent, and many more lives could be saved. Further, if (with greater effort) carbon emissions could remain reduced, then future generations could be saved from sea-level rise, extreme weather events, and even from the spread of tropical diseases. Such a prevention of disease would be an ironic but welcome gain from a pandemic.

What confers their value on genuine virtues, it is argued, consists in the intrinsic value that instantiating them in thought and action standardly brings about. This granted, virtue theory is argued to be capable of plugging a gap in consequentialist theories of the kind that make actions right which either exemplify optimific practices or are directly optimific. Compliance with optimific practices like truth-telling makes the relevant actions right, subject to certain exceptions. But even if such compliance is combined with the optimificity of beneficent actions, considered singly, that do not exemplify these practices, the resulting theory of rightness remains gap-ridden. The gap can be filled if it is granted that virtuous actions are generally optimific, and this knowledge is incorporated into consequentialist theories of rightness. Thus where no optimific practices are relevant, and no actions are manifestly directly optimific, dispositions of a generally optimific character (virtues) can rightly be adopted.

I have previously argued that human flourishing partly consists in the ability to exercise essential human capacities, many of which are non-distinctive and shared with other animals. The concept of flourishing is itself species-specific. Thus, the development of essential capacities (human and nonhuman) comprises a large part of the goods that we ought to promote. Problems about the definition of ‘essential’ are discussed, as are related issues about whether there are necessary and sufficient conditions for the correct use of sortal universal terms. The relation of the exercise of essential capacities to basic needs is investigated, and the essential nature of the human capacity for meaningful work, which has been disputed by John White, is defended. Finally, some suggestions are offered about what the proponents of the capabilities approach might derive from that of essential capacities.