نقد گفتمانی پاسخ های فلسفه اسلامی معاصر (علامه طباطبایی و شهید مطهری) به مسئله شر (مقاله علمی وزارت علوم)
درجه علمی: نشریه علمی (وزارت علوم)
آرشیو
چکیده
مسئله دیرپای شر، که خود شامل مجموعه ای از مسائل است، به طور کلی، به سه طریق تقریر شده است: 1. مسئله منطقی شر (ناسازگاری منطقی وجود خدا و صفات او با وجود شر)؛ 2. مسئله شاهدمحور شر (قرینه دانستن شر علیه معقولیت خداباوری)؛ 3. مسئله اگزیستانسیال شر (ناسازگاری باورهای دینی با تجربه زیسته شخص). مهم ترین دفاعیه های فلسفه اسلامی معاصر، که در پاسخ به مسئله منطقی شر مطرح شده است، عبارت اند از 1. موهوم بودن شر؛ 2. عدمی بودن شر؛ 3. نسبی بودن شر؛ 4. ضرورت وجود موجودی که خیر آن بیش از شرش است (ضرورت شر قلیل در برابر خیر کثیر)؛ 5. ماده، منشأ اثر؛ 6. ضرورت شر برای تحقق خیر؛ 7. ضرورت شر برای درک خیر؛ 8. شر، حاصل جزء نگری؛ 9. شر، حاصل دیدگاه انسان؛ 10. شر، حاصل اختیار. از نظر فلسفه دین مدرن نقدهایی گفتمانی به دفاعیه ها و تئودیسه های سنتی وارد شده است که فلسفه اسلامی را نیز در بر می گیرد. نقدهای گفتمانی همچون: 1. از جهت شخص دفاعیه پرداز و تئودیسه پرداز: نظری، سوژه محور، و غیرتاریخی؛ 2. از جهت ماهیت شرور: انتزاعی، ذات گرایانه، ناظرمحور، و درجه دوم؛ 3. از جهت زبان دفاعیه و تئودیسه: غیرتراژیک؛ 4. از جهت عمل دفاعیه پردازی و تئودیسه پردازی: در پی حرفه ای سازی و نظام مندی؛ و ... . از این رو، پژوهش حاضر با روش توصیفی - تحلیلی و انتقادی، و با رویکردی متفاوت به بررسی پاسخ های علامه طباطبایی و شهید مطهری به مسئله شر، و تحلیل و ارزیابی انتقادات پیش گفته می پردازد. بررسی این انتقادات لزوم اصلاح، تکمیل، ابداع و ارائه گونه های جدیدی از دفاعیه ها در فلسفه اسلامی را ضروری می سازد که به طور خاص به جنبه عملی شر نیز توجه داشته باشد.A Discourse Criticism of Replies to the Problem of Evil in Contemporary Islamic Philosophy (ʿAllama Tabatabaʾi and Ayatollah Motahhari)
Introduction The perennial problem of evil, which includes a set of problems, was generally formulated in three ways: (1) the logical problem of evil (logical inconsistency of God’s existence and attributes with the existence of evil), (2) the evidential problem of evil (evil as evidence against the rationality of theism), and (3) the existential problem of evil (the inconsistency between religious beliefs and one’s lived experiences). The main apologetics provided in contemporary Islamic philosophy in reply to the logical problem of evil include (i) evil as illusory, (ii) evil as nonexistent, (iii) evil as relative, (iv) the necessary of there being an existing entity whose good outweighs its evil (or the necessity of little evil to perceive the good), (v) matter as the origin of evils, (vi) the necessity of evil for the realization of the good, (vii) the necessity of evil for perceiving the good, (viii) evil as what results from an atomistic view of the world, (ix) evil as existing only from the human perspective, and (x) evil as existing as a result of human free will. From the perspective of modern philosophy of religion, discourse criticisms were raised against the traditional apologetics and theodicies, which include Islamic philosophy as well. The criticisms include the following: (a) with respect to the proponent of the apologetics and theodicy: theoretical, subjective, and non-historical, (b) with respect to the nature of evils: abstract, essentialist, observer-related, and second-order, (c) with respect to the language of the apologetics and theodicy: non-tragic, (d) with respect to the practice of apologetics and theodicy: looking for professionalization and systematization. The present research considers the replies to the problem of evil offered by ʿAllama Tabatabaʾi and Ayatollah Motahhari, and analyzes and asses the above criticisms. Method of the Research The present research adopts a descriptive-analytic and critical method to consider the replies to the problem of evil offered in contemporary Islamic philosophy (ʿAllama Tabatabaʾi and Ayatollah Motahhari) as well as criticisms raised against them. It then deals with an analysis and elucidation of discourse criticisms of their replies from the perspective of modern philosophy of religion. Finally, it evaluates their criticisms and the extent to which they apply to the replies provided by ʿAllama Tabatabaʾi and Ayatollah Motahhari. Moreover, it offers suggestions and solutions to revise or supplement their apologetics. Discussion and Results Islamic apologetics, particularly those of ʿAllama Tabatabaʾi and Ayatollah Motahhari, tend to adopt a subjective-theoretical approach. However, if we say that apologetics have practical commitments or approaches as well, then a particular approach will follow from such an interaction between theory and practice (theoretical and practical reason), which in addition to dealing with theoretical problems, will address the versions that are more specifically focused on practical concerns and solutions to the practical problems of evil. Moreover, the apologetics provided by Tabatabaʾi and Motahhari are subjective and are often focused on eliminating the feeling of evil in the subject’s mind. In this way, social and objective categorizations of the object will be warded off. Furthermore, their apologetics are non-historical, which might undermine their efficiency and might not deploy any social or political act. Evil is something non-conceptual, non-absolute, varied, and situation-dependent. For this reason, we need to think of providing practical, objective, and historical apologetics. ʿAllama Tabatabaʾi’s and Ayatollah Motahhari’s apologetics tend to be abstract and conceptual, rather than objective. They justify the evils not individually, but abstractly. That is, they do not engage much with objective evils and the realities of evil in time and place and its victims or agents. In this perspective, evil is no longer a
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