Institutional Quality

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the system of oil revenues effects on the production performance of oil-rich countries in both short and long-run. To reveal new insight, a macroeconomic model is designed to hypothesize long-run structural relations in the economies of the oil-rich countries including three long-run relationships of real output, real money balance, and the adjusted purchasing power parity and short-run dynamics of variables within the framework of a Vector Error Correction Model. The model is estimated based on the annual data of 33 oil-rich countries during the period of 1992 to 2016. The existence of three long-run relationships in the economies of oil-rich countries is confirmed. Based on the estimated model, the net effect of oil revenues changes on production is directly related to the institutional quality index. In countries with the institutional quality lower than the threshold, the net effect of increasing oil revenues on production in the long-run is negative, and in contrast, in countries with higher institutional quality, this effect is positive and will be strengthened by increasing institutional quality. The institutional quality threshold is estimated to be 0.23.

Understanding the impact of financialization on the economy is crucial for policymakers seeking to design strategies that enhance social welfare. This study examines the effect of financialization on economic welfare in Iran from 1990 to 2023, employing a threshold regression approach to account for nonlinear dynamics. The results reveal a threshold level of institutional quality at 57%. Across both, i.e., low and high institutional quality regimes, financialization exerts a negative and significant influence on economic welfare. However, once institutional quality surpasses the threshold, the adverse impact of financialization intensifies markedly. Findings highlight the paradoxical role of institutional quality, showing that greater financialization consistently undermines welfare in Iran, with stronger institutions amplifying rather than mitigating its negative effects. It means that in environments with higher institutional quality, advanced financial instruments and capital markets develop; however, access to financial development is usually asymmetrical. Consequently, wealthy individuals and large corporations benefit the most, while low-income households receive minimal benefits and may even suffer from asset inflation or consumer debt. Thus, strong institutions do not necessarily prioritize public welfare. Policymakers may regulate to develop financial markets in a way that prioritizes the financial sector’s profitability over social interests. This mechanism can lead to financial sector growth occurring faster than the real economy’s capacity, ultimately undermining welfare.