Relativity

Rationality or relativity? In which one does Farabi believe? How does it relate to imagination and the permanent, if at all? For Farabi, people come to grasp rational truths mostly through the use of their imagination. Furthermore, the arousal of people’s feelings and emotions often originates in their imagination via imagery forms. The ultimate utopian goal is to drive the public to achieve rational happiness. Since the public, based on their nature and general habits, in effect cannot perceive the rational truths, the path to rational happiness must be represented via their imagination. Moreover, their imaginary concepts and forms should be made the permanent. So bringing rational happiness to people's minds through their imagination, the media of each society should represent rational truths through the sensory and imagery forms familiar to that society. The Farabian theory of cognition shares aspects of relativity as well as rationality. To Farabi, rational truth and rational happiness is fixed and one, having only one denotation, while its connotations, say, images and imagery forms are various and sundry. That being the case, different communities can have different ways to perceive the same truth, working toward the same goal.

This paper revisits the famous 1922 debate between Einstein and Bergson on the nature of time, outlining its central philosophical and scientific points of contention and re-evaluating them in light of developments in quantum physics. Einstein’s conception of time is that of an objective, measurable, and relative dimension within a static four-dimensional “block universe.” In contrast, Bergson conceives of time (durée) as a qualitative, continuous, and creative flow of consciousness that resists reduction to quantitative measurement. The emergence of quantum mechanics, particularly the Heisenberg time–energy uncertainty principle, introduces new complexities that challenge this dichotomy. Quantum features of time, such as intrinsic uncertainty, the indeterminacy of precise moments, and the relational role of the observer, undermine the deterministic framework of classical and relativistic physics and appear, at least superficially, to resonate with Bergson’s critique of spatialized, discrete conceptions of time. However, a closer examination reveals that quantum time remains a quantitative, physical construct distinct from Bergson’s qualitative durée. Drawing upon modern theories such as loop quantum gravity (as articulated by Carlo Rovelli and Lee Smolin) and the insights of contemporary philosophers, this study argues that neither a purely physical nor a purely philosophical approach can, in isolation, account for the multifaceted nature of time. Rather, a comprehensive understanding requires a synthesis of both, recognizing them as complementary perspectives on a single underlying reality.