Over investment

The financial anomalies, which have brought about challenges for the nature of efficient-market hypothesis, provide ample experimental evidence on the deviation of market from rationality. According to the efficient-market hy-pothesis, investors avail themselves of all the information available in the market, and then attempt a thorough and painstaking interpretation of it. The empirical evidence, however, reveals that most investors fail to imple-ment rigorous information processing, thereby rendering to a number of behavioral theories concerning market inefficiency and biased information processing. The current research sets out to identify and scrutinize the im-pact of the CEO’s perceptual biases in judgment and economic decision-making on the reporting quality of the firms listed on the Tehran Stock Ex-change. The Purpose of this study CEO Overconfidence and Overinvestment by Role of Economic moderators Tehran Stock Exchange (TSE). One hun-dred five companies were selected as the sample size by systematic removal sampling reviewed in 2012-2019. Due to its dichotomous dependent variable, this study uses probit regression to test the research hypotheses. The results indicated the significant positive effect of CEO overconfidence on overin-vestment. It was also noted that Exchange Rate strengthens the positive effect of CEO overconfidence on overinvestment. Based on these results, the CEO's decisions as a decision-maker in charge of any company, especially under inflationary conditions, can play a substantial role in future corporate investment levels. The findings reveal that the indices of the CEO’s percep-tual biases in judgment and economic decision-making exert a significantly negative effect on financial reporting reliability and competitiveness.

This study investigates the impact of the board's social capital on the investment efficiency of listed companies in the Tehran Stock Exchange. Based on the theoretical foundations, the board social capital as a social-behavioral factor can affect the problem of over or under-investment (both of which are examples of the inefficiency of investment decisions). Therefore, when the board's social capital is at a high and favorable level, company managers show less opportunistic behavior and do their best to increase cooperation and interaction within the company, which leads to the strengthening of investment efficiency. In terms of purpose, the current research is the applied-developmental type and takes a descriptive-correlational manner. We measured board social capital using the Co-Working Experience index. Investment efficiency is also measured through under- and over-investment using the Richardson (2006) model. The control variables also include the size of the board of directors, the independence of the board of directors, the size of the company, the ratio of net profit to sales, the rate of return on assets, and the level of financial leverage. The statistical population of the research includes 183 companies admitted to the stock exchange from 2016 to 2022. In order to test the research hypothesis, a multivariate regression model has been fitted using the panel data method with the fixed effects approach. The results of the research indicate that the hypotheses of the research are confirmed, and there is a positive and significant relationship between the social capital of the board of directors and investment efficiency.