Board Independence

However, the free cash flows scale is important for the financial health of the company, but it has also its own limitations. Moreover, it’s not immune from accounting tricks. Free cash flows can be considered as a measure of value for shareholders of listed companies on Tehran Stock Exchange. The managers of these companies have tended to use the earnings management for managing the free cash flow and ultimately shareholder value and wealth. The main objective of this study is to investigate the interactive effect of institutional ownership and board independence on the relationship between excess free cash flow and earnings management in the Tehran Stock Exchange. The study is applied and correlation research by its objective and nature. The variables used in this study have been extracted from the financial reports of listed companies in Tehran Stock Exchange and the web page of Tehran Stock Exchange in the period of 2009 to 2015. The results suggest that, "institutional ownership" and "board independence" on the relationship between "surplus free cash flow and earnings management" had no significant effect.

This study postulates the relationships between earning quality and investment efficiency among Tehran Stock Exchange-listed companies with an emphasis on the moderating role of board characteristics including independence, the duality of executives and the financial expertise of members. The research is applied in terms of purpose and takes a correlative-descriptive approach. The statistical population is comprised of TSE listed companies from 2008 to 2018 and, the final sample consisting of 78 companies was selected using systematic (purposeful) elimination. To test the hypotheses, two regression models were estimated using Ordinary Least Squares method through Eviews software. The empirical results revealed a positive and significant relationship between the quality of earning and investment efficiency in TSE publicly-traded companies. As well as, the board members' independence and financial background can significantly exaggerate such a relationship. Based on our findings, capital market legislators, regulators, and policymakers may reinforce the governance role of the board of directors in monitoring the behavior of firms, and as a result, increase the efficiency of allocating capital among companies listed in TSE and also in macroeconomic levels. The findings can persuade corporate shareholders to pay more attention to the degree of independence and expertise of their board of directors to gain more return on their investment opportunities.