Personal Identity

The problem of personal identity among others may stem from the following question—what does be the person that you are, from one day to the next, necessarily consist of? The diachronic problem of personal identity raises question on the necessary and sufficient conditions for the identity of the person over time. The synchronic problem is grounded in the question of what features or traits characterize a given person at one time. To answer these questions, John Locke discarded the soul and the body as necessary and sufficient substances for personal identity over time. He accepted consciousness as the only criterion for personal identity; the only thing capable of remaining the same and preserving personal identity through change. Though Locke’s argument is somewhat clear and coherent but what remains vague and incoherent is embedded in the question—what exactly is consciousness? How and why should it be the basis or criterion for the determination of personal identity? Using the method of critical analysis, I argue that Locke’s choice of consciousness as the determinant of personal identity, though quite novel, is incoherent and vague. Secondly, Locke had already presumed and anticipated clearly though fallaciously the very thing he wishes to substantiate. I therefore conclude that Locke’s argument is just another way of trying to escape but inadvertently prolonging the difficulty of apparently articulating a distinction between the psychological approach and physiological approach to the problem of personal identity. However, in my submission, I propose the concept of the “other” as alternative approach— a sort of an extrinsic-intrinsic approach to the problem of personal identity.

This paper explores early and Reformation-era Christian attempts to render the idea of an afterlife coherent. The specific focus is on early Reformed Christians’ unequivocal belief in a bodily criterion of personal identity and a physical afterlife. This article shows how Jewish divisions are partially responsible for the differences from this endeavor. Lending focus and structure to this broadly reconstructive project is a sustained critique of Princeton philosopher Mark Johnston’s recent agenda-setting series of lectures published as Surviving Death. My general conclusion is that Christian resurrectionism—or at least, the most persuasive forms of it as presented by some of the more astute Reformed Christian thinkers—is at least a coherent idea regardless of whether or not it is true. 

SUBJECT & OBJECTIVES: Throughout history, the concept of human identity has been a challenging topic in philosophy, with the responses of philosophers influencing various branches of science. In contemporary Western philosophy, there has been a shift towards viewing humans solely as physical beings. However, Islamic philosophy takes a different approach, rooted in rationality and the teachings of Islam. The Misbah Yazdi is a prominent Muslim philosopher who greatly contributed to the field and shed light on many philosophical issues. He derived the concept of human identity from Islamic philosophy, enriching it with Islamic teachings and offering a solution to the puzzle of human identity.  He defined human beings based on their soul, rather than simply considering humans as a combination of body and soul. METHOD & FINDING: This research applies a qualitative approach with a critical analysis method. The primary finding of this article is to elucidate the key differences between Islamic and Western philosophy, focusing on Misbah Yazdi's perspective. CONCLUSION: The fundamental disparity between Islamic and Western philosophy concerning human identity lies in the concept of the soul. According to Islamic philosophy, the soul defines an individual's uniqueness, providing them with a clear and stable personality and identity. In contrast, Western philosophy leaves the identity of human beings shrouded in deep ambiguity. Misbah Yazdi presents a distinctive approach to this topic, offering insights and solutions that warrant further exploration.