سعید آریا

The Middle East has been a region marked by profound transformations, consistently hindering the prospects for a sustainable peace that can symbolize the inclusive participation of various groups in power. Both the United States and Iran have shown a keen interest in this region, especially Iraq. Consequently, both countries have endeavored to establish influence in Iraq. Twenty years after the fall of Saddam Hussein, a suitable opportunity presents itself to evaluate state-building strategies in Iraq. Post-Saddam Iraq has been a stage for various actors involved in the state-building project. This article aims to conduct a comparative scientific evaluation of the strategies employed by Iran and the United States. The central question addressed in this study is how Iran and the United States have approached state-building in post-Saddam Iraq and what outcomes have ensued from their respective actions. Employing a descriptive-analytical methodology, the findings of this study reveal that the United States, disregarding the complexities of Iraqi society and leveraging military force, has pursued a top-down or waterfall approach to state-building, resulting in unforeseen consequences. In contrast, the Islamic Republic of Iran, with a thorough understanding of Iraqi society and strong ties to Shia groups, has successfully implemented a more effective bottom-up or base-diffusion model of state-building. Ultimately, the outcomes of Iran's and the United States' state-building efforts in Iraq are comparatively assessed.