بررسی انتقادی تجرد حافظه در فلسفه ی صدرایی (مقاله علمی وزارت علوم)
درجه علمی: نشریه علمی (وزارت علوم)
آرشیو
چکیده
می دانیم فلسفه ی صدرایی حافظه را مجرد و غیرمادی به شمار می آورد و از این جهت در برابر فلسفه های پیش از خود و نیز دانش های امروزی قرار می گیرد. در این نوشتار درصددیم به نوعی به داوری میان این دو دیدگاه مخالف بپردازیم. بدین منظور نخست به گزارش ادله ی فلسفه ی صدرایی پیرامون تجرد حافظه می پردازیم – خواه در فلسفه ی خود صدرا خواه در فلسفه ی شارحان او. پس از گزارش ادله ی تجرد حافظه، نشان خواهیم داد دیدگاه علمی رایج در مورد حافظه و چگونگی بقای صورت های حسی و خیالی بر تجرد صدرایی ترجیح فراوان دارد و پذیرفتنی تر است. پس با پیش نهادن یک تبیین مادی ساده ی بدیل به نقد ادله ی پیروان فلسفه ی صدرایی در این زمینه پرداخته و مغالطه های آن ادله را نشان خواهیم داد. هم چنین نشان خواهیم داد که اشکال خطای حافظه اشکالی است که حافظه ی مجرد و حضوری بودن یادآوری را به جد به چالش می کشد. در پایان خواهیم دید خود صدرا و برخی از شارحان او نیز همواره به لوازم تجرد این امور پای بند نمانده اند. بدین سان به روش عقلی و با ابزارهای منطقی دیدگاه ها را تحلیل کرده و سنجیده ایم و هر از گاهی به دستاوردهای دانش های امروزی نیز استناد کرده ایم.A Critical Study of the Immateriality of Memory in Ṣadrīan Philosophy
Introduction Ṣadrīan philosophy holds that all kinds of memory, as well as all kinds of perception (sensory, imaginary, or rational/intellectual), are non-material. On this account, perceptual forms are identically retained. They remain in the core of our souls and never go out of existence. Remembrance or recollection is to give attention to and recognize the very same initial forms. In this way, when it comes to memory, Ṣadrīan philosophy fundamentally diverges from its predecessors as well as modern sciences. Because, these modern sciences do not see the need to assume the immateriality of memory. They often suggest that information is stored in the material brain through a kind of encoding, attributing the constancy of memory to the constancy of genetic and neuronal encoding. In this article, I adjudicate these opposing views. To do so, I overview arguments presented for the immateriality of memory both in Ṣadrā’s own works and those of his commentators. I then show that, pace Ṣadrīan philosophy, materialism about memory is more plausible than the immateriality view. I propose a simple materialistic explanation as an alternative—i.e. an explanation in terms of a distinction between the epistemic mind and the non-epistemic brain memory—to criticize Ṣadrīan arguments and unveil their fallacies. Method In this research, I analyze and then appraise the relevant views by drawing on a philosophical method and logical tools. On occasion, we cite the achievements of modern sciences as well. Discussion For Ṣadrā, sensory and imaginary perceptions are immaterial. These immaterial forms are identically retained in memory, and then the same identical immaterial forms are recollected. In his discussion of the “traversing movement” (al-ḥarakat al-qaṭʿiyyah), he makes it explicit that the mind, unlike the changing physical external world, has the following characteristic: whatever occurs moment by moment in it remains the same and in an instantaneous, rather than gradual, way. Ṣadrīans hold that when, say, a lunar eclipse happens, a form is present to me, and when the eclipse ends, another epistemic form is created in me, while the first form still remains in my mind. In this way, the initial form does not go away, but rather a new form is added. Another argument presented by Ṣadrīans is that, when dying, people “instantaneously” remember everything they perceived throughout their lives. Moreover, memory is characteristically recognitional; that is, it involves the recognition that the remembered thing is identical to what was initially perceived. However, “identity” is incompatible with the materiality of memory. Changes in the brain also demonstrate that memory is not material: brains and their nerves change with all of their material contents, while psychological memories remain in the mind after years. I think all of these arguments are objectionable. Suffice to say, Peripatetic philosophers believe that sensory and imaginary mental forms are material, and then assume that no mental form goes away, but remains in its own realm. Such constancy does not necessarily have to do with immateriality, since such constancy of the material is conceived in modern philosophy and physics in terms of the growing block view of time. In critique of the recognition argument for the immateriality of memory, for example, we might say that it proves too much: The basis of this argument is the very paradox of Meno, which challenges not only the memory but also any kind of knowledge. Similarly, the identity argument proves too much and therefore it is objectionable in that if identity could show the immateriality of memory, it could establish the immateriality of the material world as well. For instance, the mountain I see today is identical to the one I saw yesterday. So, these are identical, without the mountain being immaterial. Since identity does not imply immateriality in these cases, it does not imply the immateriality of memory either. In re
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