باز خوانی تحلیلی نقدها و توجیهات وارد شده بر دیدگاه علامه طباطبایی درباره کابرد برهان لمی در فلسفه (مقاله علمی وزارت علوم)
درجه علمی: نشریه علمی (وزارت علوم)
آرشیو
چکیده
یکی از مسائل مهمی که در دوران معاصر توسط علامه طباطبایی در مباحث فلسفی راه پیدا کرده است، کاربرد برهان لمّی در دانش فلسفه است. دیدگاه علامه طباطبایی دو رویکرد مختلف از سوی فلسفه پژوهان معاصر را پدید آورده است. برخی دیدگاه ایشان را پذیرفته اند و در مقام دفاع از آن برآمده اند و گروهی دیگر دیدگاه ایشان را مورد نقد و ارزیابی قرار داده اند. در جستار حاضر، تلاش شده است با روش توصیفی - تحلیلی و با رویکردی انتقادی، دیدگاه دو گروه یادشده، مورد ارزیابی و تحلیل قرار گیرد. در پایان این نتیجه بدست آمده است که دیدگاه علامه طباطبایی با وجود نوآوری هایی که دارد، بر مبانی استوار شده است که خالی از اشکال نیست. افزون بر آن، این دیدگاه بر تعریف جدیدی از برهان لمّی و إنّی استوار است که برخلاف دیدگاه رایج در دانش منطق می باشد.A Rereading of Arguments for and against ʿAllāma Ṭabāṭabāʾī’s Account of the Deployment of Demonstrations Propter Quid in Philosophy
A major problem introduced to the contemporary Islamic philosophy by ʿAllāma Ṭabāṭabāʾī is whether propter quid demonstrations (al-barāhīn al-limmiyya) can be deployed in philosophy. ʿAllāma Ṭabāṭabāʾī’s account has given rise to two responses by contemporary scholars of Islamic philosophy: some have endorsed and defended his view, and others have criticized the account. In this article, we draw on a descriptive-analytic method and adopt a critical approach to assess the two responses. We conclude that, notwithstanding its novelties, ʿAllāma Ṭabāṭabāʾī’s account rests on problematic grounds. Moreover, it is founded upon a redefinition of demonstrations propter quid and quiatic demonstrations (al-barāhīn al-inniyya), which go against the common conception of these demonstrations in Islamic logic. Keywords: ʿAllāma Ṭabāṭabāʾī, critique, propter quid demonstration (al-burhān al-limmī), quiatic demonstration (al-burhān al-innī), general implications Introduction Propter quid demonstration (al-burhān al-limmī) and quiatic demonstration (al-burhān al-innī) are major issues in Islamic logic, which are deployed in other fields of study, including Islamic philosophy. In the contemporary Islamic philosophy, ʿAllāma Ṭabāṭabāʾī was the first to propound the idea that propter quid demonstrations are not legitimate in dealing with philosophical problems. On his account, the demonstrations or proofs used in coping with philosophical questions are general implications (al-mulāzamāt al-ʿamma), as it is indeed impossible to use propter quid demonstrations in philosophy. ʿAllāma Ṭabāṭabāʾī’s account has been criticized by some of his students and contemporary scholars of Islamic philosophy. Some have endorsed and defended his view, whereas others have criticized its foundations or raised objections against it by its own merits. The basic question of the present research is as follows: How to assess the arguments for and against ʿAllāma Ṭabāṭabāʾī’s view of the deployment of propter quid demonstrations in philosophy? Method of Research In this research, we provide an accurate rereading of the definitions of propter quid and quiatic demonstrations in Islamic logic, and then assess the views of both camps. We begin with an account of ʿAllāma Ṭabāṭabāʾī’s view as well as the positions of his proponents and opponents. Finally, having evaluated both views, we elaborate upon our espoused account. This research is done with a descriptive-analytic method and a critical approach. Discussion In some of his works, ʿAllāma Ṭabāṭabāʾī suggests that propter quid demonstrations do not apply to philosophy. Indeed, all demonstrations or proofs in philosophy are quiatic demonstrations based on general implications. In his view, propter quid demonstrations cannot be deployed in dealing with philosophical problems. This is because the absolute existence (al-wujūd al-muṭlaq) as the subject-matter of philosophy is general, and since there is nothing beyond the absolute existence, it cannot have a cause, which implies that it cannot be subject to propter quid demonstrations, in which causes are adduced. With a survey of the debates over ʿAllāma Ṭabāṭabāʾī’s account among contemporary scholars of Islamic philosophy, we find two major approaches: some have criticized ʿAllāma Ṭabāṭabāʾī’s view, and some have defended and justified the view. Javadi Amoli raises two objections against ʿAllāma Ṭabāṭabāʾī’s position. He holds that the predicate of existence is predicated of both absolute and qualified (muqayyad) existences, and when it is predicated of the latter, it can be subject to propter quid demonstrations, since qualified existence needs a cause. In addition, if propter quid demonstrations did not apply to philosophical problems, then all demonstrations in philosophy would be undermined and there would be no conclusive argument in philosophy, because quiatic demonstrations are grounded indeed in propter quid demonstrations. Given ʿAllāma Ṭabāṭabāʾī’s response
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