Since two decades ago, the Iranian nuclear issue became a full-scale international conflict. Iran's main preference is to guarantee its national security. In fact, the lack of a strategy for Iran and the channels of intense conflict around it, the scarcity of conflict management strategies and mechanisms, are forcing Iran to pursue a nuclear program. Furthermore, some severe institutional and structural confinements and limitations on Iran and the immediate need to recover its vulnerable economy have forced Iran to subsidize its fortified attitudes and behave like a rational actor in the international atmosphere. But the United States’ preference is to stabilize the regional equation with regard to support of its strategic resources and allies in the Middle East. The lack of similar understandings and different levels of calculation between Tehran and Washington over nuclear politics led to long-lasting conflict. While Iran justifies its political logic with normative paradigm and consistency with international regimes, Washington’s political calculations are standing forsecurity, threat and deterrence approaches. Moreover, whereas Iran explains its nuclear activities at the regional and transregional levels, the US analyzes it at the international level disordering the global status quo. In this paper, the game theory models will be used to understand the past and current relationship between US-Iran. Furthermore, the possibility of an equilibrium movement regarding the Iranian nuclear problem will be discussed. This analysis will focus on the preferences and interests of each state, which mainly determine the foreign policy-making process.
