symbolic propositions and symbolism

Sperber, trained in the Durkheimian sociological tradition, has pursued his intellectual project inspired by Lévi-Strauss’s structural anthropology. However, he has not confined his studies to Durkheim’s semiological and Lévi-Strauss’s linguistic views. Instead, he has provided innovative explanations of how symbolic systems and symbolic propositions function. Sperber initially extracted principles from logical positivism to demonstrate how semantic and encyclopedic knowledge shape our understanding of propositions. Nevertheless, he discovered that symbolic propositions do not adhere to these principles. Their verifiability hinges on a distinction between the objective and mythological levels, allowing the primitive mind to simultaneously experience reality and myth without conflating them. This study aims to trace the sources of Sperber’s intellectual trajectory and analyze his arguments. It reveals that symbolic propositions cannot be defined as merely mental but not rational, as proposed by Frazer or Lévy-Bruhl. Sperber’s theory posits that symbolism is an autonomous field of cognition, independent of any semiological framework, and is more credible than the dominant theories of his time. Ultimately, the author contends that Sperber’s propositions, despite his claims, lack the universality required to explain the mechanism of symbolic propositions. This is because implicit knowledge, along with the specific experiences of individuals or societies, plays a unique role in understanding symbolic propositions.