Kripke

Fictional names have been one of the most important and serious topics in the contemporary philosophy of language and metaphysics.Several questions such as “Do fictional names refer to any objects?” “Are fictional characters existent objects?” have resulted in a considerable literature of philosophy. In this essay, we will follow two objectives. First we will describe and elaborate the ideas of three great philosophers who believe that fictional names are genuine and proper names which do refer to existent fictional characters. Second we will criticize the theories of two philosophers (Peter Van Inwagen and Saul Kripke’s theories) and will eventually defend the third i.e. Nathan Salmon’s theory of fictional names. Through the issues we will presuppose direct reference theory as our main semantic theory for proper names .

In philosophy, many reflections and categories were the result of intuition and thought experiments. Intuition is defined as direct, immediate, and non-inferential knowledge accompanied by a sense of certainty. The thought experiment has always been a source of new insights by imagining possible situations to demarcate concepts and revise common philosophical theories. Metaphysicians usually have consensus on the informativity of intuition, but in the analytical tradition, there are severe challenges in dealing with this type of knowledge. On the other hand, some contemporary philosophers believe that the thought experiment induce the unjustified and unacceptable results in the mind of audience. In this article, by referring to some aspects of Kripke's thought, we show that his use of intuition and thought experiments in his critique of radical physicalism is defensible. By distinguishing between fixing the referent of the mental state and the physical phenomenon, Kripke has been committed to the theory of property dualism, which is a critical approach to physicalism in the realm of philosophy of mind.

kripke bas proposed a number of counteretxamples to the classic thesis, which ays that the class of necmary fropositions roincidn with the cla1ss of a priori ones. These counteretxamples involve some necessary a posten'ori trutbs as well as contingent a priori ones. Om cfbis exmnplu far the loller is the 1ta11dard metre example. In thi1 paper, after presenting a brief sketch of Kripke'1 proposal, I'll exan,ine the main ohjution1 to it and argue !hat all of them co,t!d be replied to. At the end, ho,vever,argue that the standard metre example enjoy1 much Im philosopbical significance than it appears to,and,considering the sprit,it of the clauic tbesis, it faill to rif,1tt tbiI tbesis.