اصل دلیل کافی ضعیف، تلاش نا فرجام گیل و پراس
آرشیو
چکیده
براهین کیهان شناختی با تمرکز بر جهان مادی، به دنبال اثبات موجودی هستند که وجود جهان را به آن نسبت دهند. «برهان مبتنی بر امکان» یکی از این براهین است که از اصل علیت به عنوان یک اصل بدیهی استفاده می کند. در قرن 17، لایبنیتس اصل دلیل کافی را به جای علیت معرفی کرد که بیان می کند هر پدیده ای ضرورتاً دلیلی دارد. گیل و پراس نسخه ضعیف تری از این اصل ارائه کردند که وجه امکان را جایگزین وجه ضرورت می کند. این برهان جدید، حقیقتی ممکن را که بازگوکننده وجودی ضروری است، نتیجه می گیرد. با این حال، این برهان اطلاعات زیادی درباره خصوصیات آن موجود ضروری نمی دهد. گیل و پراس برهان خود را با استفاده از مفهوم «جهان های محتمل» و سیستم منطقی S5 تبیین می کنند. انتقادهای زیادی به این برهان وارد شده که بیشتر به لوازم ناپذیرفتنی آن اشاره دارند. گیل و پراس نیز به این انتقادات پاسخ داده اند. به نظر می رسد که هر دو طرف بیشتر به لوازم سخن خود توجه دارند تا به براهین مخالفین. در نهایت، گیل و پراس با برهانی نادرست به نتیجه ای رسیده اند که می توان از آن دفاع منطقی کرد و تصویری شهودی از آن ارائه داد؛ یعنی حقیقتی ممکن که گزارشگر یک موجود ضروری مختار است، مانند فعل خداوند در خلقت که دلیل وجود جهان است.The principle of weak sufficient reason, the failed attempt of Gill and Pruss
Cosmological arguments, centered on the material world, try to prove an entity to which the existence of this world can be attributed. "Argument predicated on possibility" is one of those arguments. This argument, by default, uses the principle of causality as a self-evident principle. Focus of the principle of causality on the need of every being for a cause, is to explain why it exists. In the 17th century, Leibniz presented the principle of sufficient reason as a usable cognitive principle instead of causation and stated: "Every phenomenon necessarily has a reason that explains it." Gill and Pruss later presented a weaker version of the principle of sufficient reason, which replaces the aspect of possibility with the aspect of necessity. They believe that, contrary to the principle of sufficient reason (The strong version), accepting their new principle does not cost much for an atheist. The result of the new argument, in which the principle of weak sufficient reason is replaced by the principle of causality and the principle of sufficient reason, is a possible truth that narrates a necessary existence. Of course, they believe that this argument itself, does not provide much information about the characteristics of that essential being. They explain their argument with mathematical language and using the concept of "possible worlds". S5, is their logical system of the possible worlds; But contrary to what Brass has wrongly claimed in the entry of Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy, they have not explicitly used its presuppositions in their argument. Many criticisms have been written on this argument, mostly focusing on its inadmissible necessary outcomes. Gill and Pruss have also responded to them, in separate articles. It seems that similar to the critics, Gill and Pruss pay more attention to the necessary outcomes of their opponents’ claims than to the arguments of their opponents, and where the necessary outcome of Almeida and Judith’s claims is false, they rebuke their claims. on the other hand, since the result of Epi's argument is not valid, they do not notice the deviation aspect in his argument. What has led all these critics astray is the incorrect explanation of the concept of probability. Its correct explanation, as mentioned by Rasmussen, is given; Then it is shown that Gill and Pruss's responses in defense of the result of their new argument, are worthy of consideration; But this does indicate the invalidation of all the critics' claims. As a consequence, through a precise inspection on Gill and Pruss' argument, their slippage and new argument’s failure is revealed and it can be seen that all the efforts of the critics are directed towards the same error, as if the critics have not been able to correctly distinguish. Finally, we come to the conclusion that Gill and Pruss have reached a conclusion with a false argument that can be defended logically and provided an intuitive depiction; That is, the possible truth that the reporter is a necessary and free-willed being; meaning God's action like creation, on which the reason for the existence of the world is based.