قاعده حمایت از اعتماد مشروع و تطبیق آن با اصل ظهور (مقاله علمی وزارت علوم)
درجه علمی: نشریه علمی (وزارت علوم)
آرشیو
چکیده
امروزه قاعده حمایت از اعتماد مشروع یکی از مهم ترین مبانی شناسایی حقوق و تعهدات قراردادی و غیر قراردادی محسوب می شود. گرچه در حقوق ایران و فقه امامیه قواعد متعددی ازجمله اصالت اراده ظاهری، قاعده غرور، دلالت فحوی و نظریه نمایندگی ظاهری تا حدودی هدف حمایت از اعتماد مشروع را تأمین می کند اما، فقدان قاعده کلی دراین زمینه با حدود و ثغور و شرایط مشخص، محسوس است. براساس این قاعده هر گاه رفتار یک شخص یا مقام عمومی موجد اعتقاد معقول در ضمیر جمعی افراد جامعه گردد، این اعتقاد مبنایی برای ایجاد حق، شناخته شده و شایستهحمایت است بنا براین به عنوان مقدمه ایجاد قاعده کلی، مشروعیت و جواز اعتماد به ظواهر باید به اثبات برسد. در اصول فقه اصاله الظهور در حوزه الفاظ سابقه طولانی در جهت جواز ابتنا به ظواهر کلام افراد دارد اما، تردید در شمول اصل ظهور در باره ظواهر احوال و اعمال افراد به ویژه به دلیل عدم طرح صریح این نوع ظواهر در کتب اصولی، اثبات قاعده حمایت از اعتماد مشروع را با چالش مواجه می سازد. به عنوان قاعده ای کلی دراین زمینه می توان گفت: اگر احتمال خلافی که ظاهر حال به همراه دارد پس از عمل مطابق اعتقاد راجح ایجاد شده در ذهن مخاطب به وجود آید تصور موجود از باب حجیت ذاتی قطع معتبر بوده، اعتماد حاصل از آن اعتمادی مشروع است و شایسته حمایت محسوب می شود به ویژه در جایی که متکلم در مقام ایجاد معنا و مفهومی در ذهن مخاطب باشد.Collation of the doctrine of legitimate expectations and Asala al-Zohoor
Nowdays, the doctrine of legitimate expectations is considered as one of the most important bases for identifying contractual and non-contractual rights and obligations. Although in Iran’s legal system and Imami jurisprudence, there are several rules such as the Esalate Erade Zaheri, Ghaede Ghorour, Delalate Fahva and the principle of the Apparent Authority to some extent provide the purpose of protecting legitimate expectations, but the lack of a general rule in this field is noticeable. Based on this rule, whenever the behavior of a person or a public official creates a reasonable belief in the collective mind of the society, this belief is the basis for establishing a recognized right and capable of protection. Therefore, as a prelude to establishing a general rule, the legitimacy of expectations and the permission of trusting to appearances must be proven. In the principles of Islamic jurisprudence, asala al-zohoor has a long history for the permissibility of relying on the appearances of people's words, but there is doubt about the inclusion of the principle in appearance regarding the appearance of people's circumstances and actions, especially due to the lack of explicit presentation of this type of appearances in basic books, challenges proving the doctrine of the legitimate expectations. As a general rule in this context, it can be said that if the possibility of a contradiction, which the appearance of the present entails, is created in the mind of the audience after the action according to the preferred belief, the impression created is valid and the resulting expectation is a legitimate expectation. And it is considered worthy of support, especially where the theologian is in the position of creating meaning and concept in the audience's mind. Among legal theorists, it appears that the theory of legitimate trust was first introduced by Emmanuel Lévy as the foundation and purpose of law. According to Lévy's theory, since the foundation of social relations is based on trust and the collective belief of individuals in society constitutes public trust, the law should serve to ensure and protect legitimate collective beliefs. Therefore, these beliefs are the basis for determining the rights and duties of individuals in society. In this view, Lévy believed that the law should be capable of evolving on its own, and when legitimate collective beliefs form the basis of the law, the law can align with societal changes and progress alongside the evolution of collective beliefs.In Iranian law and Imami jurisprudence, it is evident that while discussions on the philosophy of responsibility are extensively covered in some texts, the necessity of protecting legitimate trust is not explicitly mentioned. Nevertheless, one can find instances in the language of jurists and legal scholars that indicate support for the protection of legitimate trust. For example, *tadlīs* (fraud) and *ghurūr* (deception) are two different ways of compensating the damage suffered by a person whose legitimate trust has been violated. An examination of the cases related to these two principles confirms that they were precisely established with the aim of protecting legitimate trust.The content of the principle of warning (Tahdhir) exempts a person from liability when they have provided the necessary warning to those at risk while engaging in legitimate harmful behavior, even if the injured party fails to understand the warning due to reasons not attributable to the person giving the warning.By examining instances of the principle of protecting legitimate trust, the following definition can be inferred: Whenever the behavior of an individual or public authority creates a reasonable belief in the collective conscience of society, this belief is recognized as a basis for establishing a right that deserves protection. This protection may take the form of either the non-liability of the person holding the belief or the contractual or non-contractual obligations and liabilities of others toward the person holding the belief. In other words, if a person's behavior creates a reliable appearance and another party, relying on this appearance, acts in a way that does not align with reality, then the person who created the appearance is either bound by the appearance they created and must respect the rights of the other party in accordance with that appearance, or they are obligated to compensate for the damages resulting from the discrepancy between the appearance and reality.
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