علی کریمی مقام

In the wake of the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran and the ensuing dominance of political Islam discourse and its impact on Pakistani society, the ground was prepared for the spread of Wahhabism and anti-Shiism in that country due to the failure of the Islamabad government to manage the reactive conduct of extremist Salafist groups as well as its engagement in internal disputes. Consequently, plots and threats from Salafist extremism in Pakistan led to the emergence of a confrontational ideological identity against the Islamic Revolution. In response to the question about the main root of Pakistani extremist groups’ security threats and plots against the Islamic Revolution, the hypnosis of this paper is that efforts made by radical Salafist groups for constructing an extremist identity based on authorization triggered the confrontational identity formation against Iran’s Islamic Revolution. This research will first analyze the impact of the Islamic Revolution’s influence on the reaction of extremist groups in Pakistani society. Then, it will study the impact of such factors as poverty, political instability, religious schools and regional machinations on the growth and creation of extremism in Pakistan. The third section will explain Pakistani extremist groups’ security threats and plots targeting the Islamic Revolution.

China is actively engaged in Afghanistan, especially with the Neo-Taliban, which indicates significant changes in China's foreign policy. The Chinese government invited the Neo-Taliban delegations several times and tried to expand their role in their country. The present study examines the impact of China's active engagement with the Neo-Taliban, using Ibn Khaldun's Social Theory and Discourse Analysis. Questioning the nature of the active engagement of China with Neo- Taliban, we hypothesized an increase in insecurity overflow from Afghanistan to China, as well as an increase in insecurity complications in Afghanistan against China’s interests. It became clear that the Neo-Taliban's increasing interaction with China was to the detriment of Taliban and ultimately China. The Doha Peace Agreement requested the control and restriction of foreign fighters residing in Afghanistan, which for the foreign fighters, including the Uighurs, were a reminder of the restrictions imposed on them before the fall of the Islamic Emirate. However, Mullah Omar did not openly engage with China. This will delegitimize the Afghan Neo-Taliban and ultimately create a disperse Neo-Taliban with a fragile legitimacy, whose fragility does not seem to collapse, but will not serve China's interests either.