Reward

The asymmetry of information between managers and shareholders significantly affects the company's investment decisions and exacerbates the problems of agency. It seems that these problems in developing markets such as Iran are more than developed markets. This research is an exploratory study, and it aims at reviewing the theory of agency in Iran. In the present study, based on the research paradigm, first, data acquisition strategy is selected based on a qualitative approach, and then qualitative study and analysis, quantitative approach, and factor analysis approach have been used to confirm the validity of the extracted model. Statistical analysis of research data shows that among the hypotheses of agency theory, risk aversion, supervision, and reward are revised dimensions in Iran like examples of developing countries.The results confirm the existence of assumptions; 1. Conflict of interests of manager and owner, 2. Information asymmetry, 3. Reverse choice, 4. Ethical risk, 5. Maximizing the expected utility, 6. Forcing and 7. Failure to confirm the assumption is the ability to predict the future and receive information. due to the existence of information asymmetry, higher investment risks of minority shareholders and transparency problems, the lack of ability to predict the future and receive information is necessarily confirmed.

Background and Theoretical Foundations: In today's world, with the increasing dependence of countries on meeting their most basic needs through maritime transport, the use of vessels and shipping lines has increased so that more than 90 percent of goods and raw materials are transported worldwide by maritime transport. Hence, this situation has led to the growth of maritime accidents such as collisions, fires, Stranding, etc. Hence, one of the most important principles that has always been of concern to seafarers has been the issue of saving lives and property at sea. so, the international community has sought to create an international legal system to encourage as many vessels as possible to help each other in emergencies to reduce losses caused by maritime threats and dangers under the Brussels and London conventions. Methodology: In this research using Descriptive-Analytical and Comparative methods. This research aims to examine the position of international law regarding the performance or refusal to perform rescue and rescue operations at sea and, in general, the international legal system governing the allocation and payment of rewards resulting from these operations. Finding and Conclusions: Although the allocation of rewards resulting from the operation is contingent on its success, the amount of the reward depends on several factors. However, in international law, the responsibility and duty to carry out rescue operations, subject to specific conditions, lies with the vessel's commander.