Knowledge by Presence

Asking from the truth of Cogito as the basis of knowledge, this paper tries to analyze all possible answers in Descartes’ philosophy. Inductively, four possible answers are open to consideration: either Cogito is true 1) based on argumentation, 2) because it is clear and distinct, 3) because of being innate, or, lastly, 4) because of intuition. All of these explanations either entail accepting some prior knowledge to Cogito or fall in a vicious circle. A proper way to explain Cogito’s truth is a new perspective to the meaning of intuition in Descartes’ philosophy. Through this perspective Cogito is a presential experience. Lack of any gap, separation, and disjunction in this presential experience is the reason for the truth of Cogito because this lack is the lack of error’s cause.

 SUBJECT & OBJECTIVES: The truth and significance of knowledge are indisputable, as they represent one of the most critical metaphysical questions. This is why numerous philosophers globally have engaged in discussions on the topic. A prominent contemporary philosopher, ʿAllāma Ṭabāṭabāʾī, has extensively examined knowledge, its classifications, truth, scope, and the associated issues. This paper concentrates on one specific category of knowledge, namely al-ʿIlm al-Ḥuḍūrī (knowledge by presence), as articulated by ʿAllāma Ṭabāṭabāʾī and various Western philosophers.METHOD & FINDING: This article presents a comparative analysis of the concept of knowledge by presence, focusing on the perspectives of ʿAllāma Ṭabāṭabāʾī and various European philosophers. The research methodology employed in this study is a descriptive-analytical approach.CONCLUSION: The issue of knowledge by presence and its significance for ʿAllāma Ṭabāṭabāʾī and René Descartes is a definite and obvious matter. Baruch Spinoza is a philosopher who adeptly employed mathematical and geometric methods to articulate philosophical concepts with remarkable clarity and precision. The eminent German philosopher Immanuel Kant regarded the issue of knowledge as the central theme of his philosophical inquiry. From Heidegger's perspective, the inquiry into the provability of an external world is devoid of meaning