theism

The "logical problem of evil" is one kind of the "problem of evil." It is claimed that there is a logical inconsistency between belief in the existence of an omniscient, omnipotent, and wholly good God and belief in the existence of evil. Alvin Plantinga argued by his "free will defense" that they are consistent. In this paper I present his argument. Then three objections against his argument are mentioned. They are based on compatibilism, God's omnipotence, and God's knowledge of counterfactuals of freedom. Plantinga's responses to these come next. They are based on a counterexample, Leibniz's lapse, and transworld depravity. It is nearly accepted by all parties that Plantinga's defense is successful. Now the problem is the evidential one. For this problem to be solved, there must be a theodicy. And Plantinga gives one. But this is not successful at all. Muslims have to pay attention to this neglected area.

This paper argues that it is not reasonable for a critical rationalist to be a religious believer in the Abrahamic tradition. The argument is distinctive, in that it takes seriously the critical rationalist view that we should abandon ‘justificationist’ argument. What this means, is that the structure of argument then becomes a matter of offering theories as resolutions of problems, and then judging how they fare in the face of ongoing critical appraisal. The paper surveys issues in several areas, including God and what is good; homosexuality; mysticism; and messianic ideas. It argues that, unless the believer engages in intellectual retreat (something that is unacceptable for the critical rationalist), the problem-situation facing the believer appears to be so daunting that it would be unreasonable for them to hope that they can overcome it.