Teh Teik Kuan

Economic sanctions have evolved into a pivotal instrument of foreign policy, enabling states to exert pressure without direct military confrontation. Traditionally viewed as tools for punishment or coercion, their strategic function as instruments of economic leverage is receiving growing scholarly and policy attention. However, a conceptual gap persists in understanding how sanctions operate not only as punitive measures but as proactive mechanisms for shaping global behavior and diplomacy. This study aims to bridge this gap by critically examining sanctions as instruments of economic statecraft, focusing on their ability to influence state behavior, uphold international norms, and serve long-term strategic interests. Adopting a qualitative, doctrinal methodology, the article analyzes key international legal frameworks, sanctions regimes, and historical case studies involving major powers such as the U.S., EU, and China. The findings reveal that while sanctions are often framed within legal and moral justifications, their effectiveness depends heavily on multilateral coordination, economic integration levels, and the credibility of enforcement. Ultimately, the study concludes that sanctions, when strategically designed and legally grounded, can serve as effective tools of economic leverage, but their overuse or misuse risks undermining their legitimacy and the broader international legal order.