زیست بوم خیریه و مطالعات خیریه
آرشیو
چکیده
«مطالعات خیریه» به رشته دانشگاهی مشخصی محدود نیست و به سختی می توان مرزهای آن را معلوم کرد؛ اما شاید بشود تصویری نظام مندتر از نقش این مطالعات را در عرصه خیریه فراهم کنیم و به این ترتیب، ارزیابی بهتری از وضع پژوهش ها در این زمینه داشته باشیم. در اینجا، سعی می کنم ابتدا پیشنهادی اولیه درباره بازیگران اصلی زیست بوم خیریه طرح کنم. به این وسیله، می توانیم پرسش های عرصه خیریه را به نحوی دقیق تر طرح کنیم. سپس، می توانیم ببینیم نقش مطالعات خیریه در هر بخش به چه صورت است. در حین بحث، به بعضی از نمونه های موردی، مانند کلیشه های رایج در گفتمان خیریه و مسئله اولویت بندی، اشاره خواهد شد. این نوشته به جای دفاع از یک موضع مشخص در حوزه خیریه، می کوشد تا چارچوبی برای صورت بندی دیدگاه های مختلف فراهم کند. سپس، پیشنهاد طرح شده بر اساس یک نمونه، یعنی «دیگردوستی مؤثر»، بسط می یابد. در مجموع، دو هدف عمده مدنظر است. نخست، به نظر می رسد می توان نگاهی موسع تر به مطالعات خیریه داشت و بسیاری از پژوهش های معمول دانشگاهی را نیز در این دسته دید. تلقی «خیریه به مثابه غیرانتفاعی» دقیق نیست و حتی در عمل مشکل ساز است. دوم، بخشی از پرسش ها در این حوزه سرشت هنجاری دارند و ناگزیر باید به آن ها توجه کرد؛ به این ترتیب، اگرچه پاسخ به بسیاری از پرسش های حوزه خیریه مستلزم پژوهش های پژوهشگران علوم اجتماعی و طبیعی است، بدون بحث های مستقل فلسفی (به طور مشخص فلسفه اخلاق)، نمی توان مسائل حوزه خیریه را به درستی دید، فهمید و در جست وجوی راه حل برآمد. رویکردهایی که می کوشند ابعاد هنجاری را نادیده بگیرند، ناگزیر صرفاً مواضعی (احتمالاً نسنجیده) را مفروض می گیرند و از این نظر مستعد نقد هستندCharity Ecosystem and Charity Studies
IntroductionCharity studies are not limited to some specific academic disciplines, and their boundaries are hard to determine. How should we understand the area? Thinking about the charity ecosystem is a way to get a clearer view of it. Here, I aim to propose a tentative classification of the six main players of the charity ecosystem, illustrating how each faces different kinds of questions and challenges.This will help to broaden our understanding of charity studies. Furthermore, with this broader conception at hand, we can evaluate the current state of research in this area and the kind of questions in need of further attention. For one, I wish to explain how a main part of charity studies involves normative questions, relevant to moral philosophy broadly understood, and that there is no way to get around such issues. This is crucial since, without a clear understanding of these normative aspects and acknowledging their role, the hope for being “evidence-based” and “scientific” may lead to leaving major assumptions unexamined, which would turn out to be problematic after further assessment.Six Players of the Charity EcosystemThe six players in the charity ecosystem are as follows:Agents: individuals who do, say, volunteer work or donate to charities.Patients: those who are targeted to provide help, either by individuals or organizations.Organizations: generally, the familiar kind of charities we know. However, there can be various kinds of charity organizations.Researchers: those who can help both individual agents and organizations in answering questions relevant to charity.Activists: the role of connecting different players of the ecosystem, which is usually played by agents, researchers, and else.Policy-makers: those who play main roles in regulations, which can (and should) be done collectively, not in a top-down fashion.For example, consider the question of wellbeing (see Heathwood, 2021). If the goal of charities is to improve the lives of the patients of charity (or improve their lives to make things better in general), the nature of wellbeing hugely influences the decisions of many players. Or, when thinking about the ways organizations can advertise and connect with their audience, it matters which ways are effective and defensible more generally (Broom, 2016; Thaler & Sunstein, 2021).Two points are due. First, in this framework, I do not determine the way these players should interact, because that would require a specific position. However, here I wish to propose a rather neutral framework. Plus, I cannot determine how these players do interact, because that is a question to be studied in different societies and focused on different kinds of charities. Second, this framework illustrates how the charity ecosystem is broader than it might at first appear. For example, much conventional research in academia can be considered relevant to charity since it can benefit some players in the ecosystem. Relevantly, what counts as “charity” is not (merely) a matter of intentions of people involved or (necessarily) being non-profit.The Case of Effective AltruismEffective Altruism (EA) is an interesting case as it provides a rather simple, straightforward approach to charity in general and potentially answers questions faced by different players of the ecosystem (for a review, see: Chappell, 2024). A main feature of EA is its roots in moral philosophy, especially work by Peter Singer (1972; 2015). Yet, the simplicity of the approach may turn out to be both its strength and weakness. For example, consider the issue of (im)partiality and its implications in charity (for introductory remarks, see: Shafer-Landau, 2019, Ch. 5). Be that as it may, it helps to see the kind of answer required in each case.Some main positions of EA are as follows. First, with regard to patients of the charity, there are two targets that are neglected by many approaches by are central to EA: non-human animals and future generations. The latter leads to the recent version of the view which emphasizes long-termism (McAskill, 2022).Second, about organizations, EA takes it to be essential for charity organizations to be effective. This is to be understood both morally (in choosing targets) and operatively (in using resources). Therefore, EA doesn’t take it to be essential for charity organizations to be run by volunteers, as doing volunteer work may not be the most effective way of doing good for agents.Concluding RemarksAs noted, rather than defending a specific view about charity, I wish to propose and illustrate a framework in which we can formulate different questions and debates about what charity is and how it should work. Without getting into evaluation, I also used the case of EA to illustrate some examples of the kind of answers needed concerning different questions. Now, here are the three concluding remarks.First, the domain of charity studies must be seen as broader than what it may appear at first. Thinking of “charity” merely as “non-profit” is neither accurate in theory nor helpful in practice. The broader conception helps the ecosystem and increases its resources.Second, the normative aspects of charity studies are essential, as many questions faced by the players of this ecosystem are normative at some level. Although many questions in charity studies need research in social and natural sciences, without independent philosophical (and specifically ethical) inquiries we cannot have a clear understanding of the problems and possible ways to solve them. Those who tend to ignore the normative aspects have no way but to merely presuppose some unexamined views. This would be on shaky grounds, where the stakes are high.Third, one lesson to be learned from all this, which is the result of the two previous remarks, is that all charity ecosystems need second-order charities. First-order charities are the ones who are in touch with the patients, provide them with good, or save them from harm. In contrast, second-order charities are directly working with other players than patients themselves. These are not charities of the standard form but are to evaluate the current state of the ecosystem, support charity studies, provide advice for agents, and give consultation to first-order charities.
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