زینب دهقانی نیستانی

Among conventional approaches to abortion, the conflict between the fetus's right to life and the woman's right to control her body is central to many ethical debates. In contrast, a novel approach in the ethics of pregnancy reexamines this issue through moral intimacy and interpersonal relationships. Margaret Olivia Little, in her influential article "Abortion, Intimacy, and the Duty of Pregnancy" (1999), offers a distinctive framework that moves beyond rights-based and utilitarian perspectives. She argues that pregnancy is not merely a biological process but a deep personal relationship. Therefore, moral duties toward the fetus cannot be understood independently of the pregnant woman's attitudes and assessment of that relationship. Little redefines abortion as a question of moral intimacy and the woman's evaluative authority. However, her theory faces serious criticisms: conditioning moral duty on individual assessment invites relativism; focusing on intimacy overlooks the role of causal responsibility in shaping moral duties; and it neglects the moral weight that secular and religious traditions assign to fetal life. This article acknowledges the value of Little's relationship-centered approach as an important corrective to overly abstract theories but aims to show that her perspective does not provide sufficient grounds for explaining the moral duties associated with pregnancy.