تأثیر رفتار خوش بینانه و کوته بینانه مدیران بر عدم تقارن رفتار هزینه و استراتژی های متفاوت شرکت (مقاله علمی وزارت علوم)
درجه علمی: نشریه علمی (وزارت علوم)
آرشیو
چکیده
هدف از این پژوهش، بررسی تأثیر رفتار خوش بینانه و کوته بینانه مدیران بر عدم تقارن رفتار هزینه و استراتژی های متفاوت شرکت در شرکت های پذیرفته شده در بورس اوراق بهادار تهران است. برای بررسی استراتژی های متفاوت شرکت از سه استراتژی (شامل استراتژی رقابتی، استراتژی تأمین مالی و استراتژی سرمایه گذاری) استفاده شده است. بدین منظور هشت فرضیه برای بررسی این موضوع تدوین و داده های مربوط به 174 شرکت پذیرفته شده در بورس اوراق بهادار تهران برای دوره زمانی بین سال های 1387 تا 1397 تجزیه و تحلیل شد. الگوی رگرسیون پژوهش با استفاده از روش داده های تابلویی با رویکرد اثرات ثابت، بررسی و آزمون شد. یافته ها نشان دهنده آن بود که پدیده عدم تقارن رفتار هزینه در شرکت های پذیرفته شده در بورس اوراق بهادار تهران وجود دارد و رفتار خوش بینانه مدیران سبب افزایش شدت رفتار نامتقارن هزینه ها خواهد شد؛ اما رفتار کوته بینانه مدیران تأثیر معناداری بر عدم تقارن رفتار هزینه ندارد. علاوه بر این، یافته ها مؤید آن است، رفتار خوش بینانه مدیران بر استراتژی رقابتی و سرمایه گذاری شرکت اثرگذار است؛ اما رفتار کوته بینانه مدیران تأثیری بر استراتژی رقابتی و سرمایه گذاری شرکت ندارد. از سوی دیگر، یافته ها نشان دهنده آن است که رفتار خوش بینانه و کوته بینانه مدیران بر استراتژی تأمین مالی شرکت اثرگذار است. با توجه به یافته های به دست آمده، نتایج نشان دهنده ویژگی های رفتاری مدیران بر عدم تقارن رفتار هزینه و استراتژی های متفاوت شرکت اثرگذار خواهد بود.Effects of Managers' Optimistic and Myopic Behavior on the Asymmetry of Cost Behavior and Various Companies’ Strategies
This study aimed to examine the effects of managers' optimistic and myopic behaviors on the asymmetry of cost behavior and various companies’ strategies in the firms listed on Tehran Stock Exchange (TSE). For this purpose, 8 hypotheses were developed and the data from 174 companies listed on TSE were analyzed for the period of 2008-2018. In this research, 3 strategies, including firm competitive strategy, corporate finance strategy, and corporate investment strategy, were used as proxies for the companies’ different strategies. To test the hypotheses, the panel data and fixed effects regression models were tested. The results showed that there was an asymmetric cost behavior phenomenon in the firms listed on TSE and the managers’ optimistic behaviors increased the severity of asymmetric cost behavior, but the myopic behavior did not have a significant effect on the asymmetric cost behavior. Also, the findings confirmed that the managers' optimistic behaviors affected the companies' competitive strategies and investments, but the managers' myopic behaviors had no effects on the companies' competitive strategies and investments. On the other hand, the findings indicated that the managers’ optimistic and myopic behaviors affected the companies' financing strategies. The results showed that the managers’ behavioral characteristics affected management of cost behavior and the companies’ different strategies. Keywords : Cost Behavior Management, Manager’s Optimistic Behavior, Manager’s Myopic Behavior, Company’s Strategy. Introduction Some behavioral and psychological factors, such as manager’s overconfidence and short-sightedness, can affect entity strategies and cause significant changes in them (Duellman, Hurwitz & Sun, 2015). Manager’s overconfidence is one of the newest behavioral financial concepts, which has achieved a special position in financial and psychological theories. Overconfidence causes a person to estimate his abilities more than usual, risk less than usual, and imagine that he/she can control the events, while this may not be the case (Nofsinger, 2001). Managers' overconfidence can also affect the way financial information is provided by them for the capital markets because they believe that the shareholders’ values will be maximized in the long term by continuing investment projects; therefore, they will not have a desire to disclose confidential information that has a negative investment feedback, but use positive accruals to convey their optimistic beliefs (Scherand & Zechman, 2011) or even delay their recognition of losses (Ahmed & Duellman, 2013). In addition, short-sighted activities have favorable temporary results and their negative consequences are visible in the long run because capital markets are not able to correctly understand the consequences of short-sightedness at the time of occurrence. When managers with a short-sighted attitude face a lower profit than expected, they may temporarily remove this defect by cutting research and development and marketing expenses, while this type of manipulation will not be effective in the long term. Its effects on the companies’ different strategies will vary (Lehman, 2004). Managers’ short-sighted behaviors, such as reducing research and development and marketing costs can also affect the cost management strategy in a long-term period. As a result, according to the mentioned effects, the main problem of this research was to investigate the effects of managers' short-sightedness and optimism on the asymmetry of cost behavior and different strategies in the companies listed on TSE. Method and Data Due to the impossibility of controlling all the related variables, this research could not be a pure experimental research, but it was a semi-experimental research according to the analysis of past information. In addition, considering that the results obtained from the study-specific problem or issue, it was a type of correlation analysis with a regression approach in terms of its applied goal and method (Aflatooni, 2013). Also, 174 companies were selected as the sample for this research. Findings The findings obtained from estimation of the model showed that the coefficient of the sales ratio of the current year to the previous year was -0.371 for the two-valued variable of sales decrease and its p-value was 0.007. In addition, the coefficient of adjustment variable of manager’s optimistic behavior based on the sales ratio of the current year to the previous year was equal to -0.413 for the two-valued variable of sales decrease and its p-value was 0.004, which was less than the 0.01. Therefore, considering the increase of a negative coefficient (-0.413 compared to -0.371) in the companies, it could be claimed that the managers’ optimistic behaviors had a significant positive effect on the asymmetry of cost behavior (increased negative coefficient) at the 1% significance level. According to the results obtained from estimation of the model, the coefficient of multiplication of the sales ratio of the current year to the previous year decrease was equal to -0.371 for the two-valued variable of sales and its p-value was 0.007. In addition, the coefficient of the adjustment variable of manager’s short-sighted behavior based on the sales ratio of the current year to the previous year was equal to 0.268 for the two-value variable of sales decrease and its error level, which was equal to 0.449, was less than the 0.01 significance level. Therefore, according to the positivity of the coefficient and p-value, it could be claimed that the managers’ short-sighted behaviors had an insignificant negative effect on the asymmetry of cost behavior at 1%, significance level thus causing positivity of the negative coefficient. Therefore, according to the probability value, the 5 th hypothesis of the research was rejected at 1% significance level. In the 2 nd , 3 rd , and 4 th hypotheses, the effects of manager’s optimistic behavior on the competitive strategies, investments, and financing in the companies listed in TSE were investigated. According to the results the variable coefficients of the managers’ optimistic behaviors were equal to 0.035, 0.011, and 0.021, and their p-values were 0.016, 0.001, and 0.000, respectively. Therefore, according to the positive coefficient of this variable and its p-value, it could be claimed that the managers’ optimistic behaviors had significant positive effects on the competitive strategies, investments, and financing of the companies at 5% significance level, which was in line with the results of Redge et al. (2014), Engelmeier (2010), and Adam and Kissen (2014). On the other hand, in the 6 th , 7 th , and 8 th hypotheses, the effects of manager's short-sighted behavior on the competitive strategies, investments, and financing of the companies listed in TSE were investigated. According to the results the coefficients of manager’s short-sighted behavior were equal to -0.002, -0.006, and 0.011 and their p-values were 0.931, 0.305, and 0.037, respectively. Therefore, according to the negative coefficient of this variable and its p-value, it could be claimed that the managers’ short-sighted behaviors had significant positive effects on the companies’ financing strategies at 1% significance level, which was consistent with the results of Redge and Whites research (2014). However, the managers’ short-sighted behaviors had no significant effects on the companies’ competitive and investment strategies. Conclusion and discussion The results showed that the phenomenon of cost behavior asymmetry existed in the companies listed on TSE and the managers’ optimistic behaviors would increase the severity of the asymmetric behavior of costs, but the managers’ short-sighted behaviors had a significant effect on the asymmetry. In addition, the results confirmed that the managers’ optimistic behaviors had an effect on the companies’ competitive strategies and investments, but the managers’ short-sighted behaviors had no effects on their competitive strategies and investments. On the other hand, the results showed that the managers’ optimistic and short-sighted behaviors affected the companies’ financing strategies. According to the findings, the results revealed that the managers’ behavioral characteristics would affect asymmetry of the managers’ cost behaviors and the companies’ different strategies.
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