Although the 2011 uprisings in Egypt led to the fall of Hosni Mubarak, they have not yet been able to change the nature of the country’s political system. A year after the country’s first non-military president took office, Egypt’s political situation became more or less similar to the way it had been before 2011. The structure of the relationship between the state and the society in Egypt, highly affected by vast military influence, could be explained through Guillermo O'Donnell’s model of “Bureaucratic Authoritarianism”. The Islamists’ weakness in establishing a powerful government granted a proper excuse for the military to obtain direct rule over the country through a modern 21st-century coup d’état. The basis for legitimizing this move, in addition to the Islamists’ weakness, was the claim that the 2011 coup d’état had the same public support as the 1952 coup d’état. Consequently, the military enacted legal mechanisms and introduced a presidential candidate who ultimately won the elections, giving back the military its previous position. It seems that the military authoritarian government in Egypt would enjoy relative legitimacy by focusing on providing economic and political stability, while paving the way for preserving its own long-term politico-economic interests. Therefore, it is likely that if the status quo– which relies upon widespread repression of the Islamists and the weakness and passivity of the liberal movements– is maintained, the authoritarian military rule over Egypt will continue.
مطالب مرتبط با کلید واژه " Egypt "
منبع: World Sociopolitical Studies, Summer ۲۰۱۸, Volume ۲, Issue ۳ 483 - 506
Nearly four decades after Iranian-Egyptian diplomatic relations were severed, the two countries are yet to restore them. This is a result of the predominance of certain negative emotional attachments embedded in Iranian and Egyptian identities, which have clouded their respective attitudes toward one another. Mired in resentment against Arabism, the national component of the Iranian state identity catalyzes a disinclination to resolve problems with Egypt; in addition, Iran’s religious component carries resentment against Egypt as a state against Shia identification. The anti-western dimension of the Iranian state identity strengthens Iran’s negative emotional attachment to Egypt as a country allied with the United States and recently reconciling with Israel. On the Egyptian side, the Arab nationalism as the defining feature of the Egyptian state identity dictates estrangement from Iran and reluctance to engage with that. These negative emotional predispositions shape Iran and Egypt’s understanding of one another and, in the absence of pressing material interests, explain the continuous failure of the two countries to rebuild their relations.