Ghazālī

This paper examines some key aspects of the formal and figurative discourse on ‘nature’ as manifested in the philosophical tradition and with reference to contemporary life. Instead of building a straightforward, self-enclosed argument for the sake of argument, it will demonstrate how someone living today may arrive at certain kinds of judgments in the light both of our collective human inheritance, of which Ḥikma is a major element, and a philosophical reasoning that penetrates into areas of life with which philosophy is not directly or primarily concerned but which are of fundamental importance to all human beings. It begins by sketching a picture of the present historical moment, which many specialists consider a historical anomaly precipitated by the abrupt rise to world domination by a single geographical region. A few basic themes relating to ‘nature’, which by tradition has been approached either figurately or formally, will then be discussed. Their upshot is that for man to live ‘naturally’, he cannot reduce his own nature to that of other animals. Every being has its particular nature. Therefore, the concept of nature cannot be considered only unconditionally or as something common to all animals. Finally, this paper poses two basic questions: Why has our necessary—but equally ‘natural’—separation from the nature of other beings been allowed to go as far as it has? Are we so alone in our modern troubles that we must cast off our human inheritance and pretend to reinvent the universe at every turn?

Knowledge of logic includes the rules that govern the way of thinking and reasoning. Muslims became familiar with this science in the third century by translating Aristotle's books and immediately faced the challenge of what does this science have to do with Islam? Should Muslims use the same method as Aristotle in their religious sciences or avoid paying attention to this science? The present research, by searching the books of Muslim jurists and theologians, shows that each of these two assumptions had supporters, and of course, the number of opponents of the science of logic was more than its supporters. And those opponents used violence against the proponents of the science of logic and brought arguments to ban the science of logic and tried to show that God is not pleased with this knowledge.This article also tries to bring these two views closer together. The final result of this research is that most of the arguments of the opponen of the logic are a warning for those who may not use this knowledge correctly or are involved in the thoughts of philosophers who have distanced themselves from religion.