Investor protection

Managers are responsible for providing financial statements and they might try to make a good picture of their firm's conditions. Therefore, they try to delay the disclosure of bad news and release the good news as soon as possible. The ten-dency of managers toward hiding bad news increases the stock price crash risk. The protection of investor is one of the factors that can prevent from falling stock price, because it restricts the managers and majority shareholders in frauding and hiding bad news. Thus, the main purpose of the present research is to study the effect of investor protection on future stock price crash risk. In this research, 89 companies from listed companies in Tehran Stock Exchange during 2011-2017 were tested. The results obtained from the research's hypothesis test showed that protecting the rights of investors has a negative effect on the stock price crash risk. In fact it can be concluded that with the increase of the investor protection, the firms are obligated to disclose the high-quality accounting information and present more transparent financial reporting, as a result, the information asym-metry will be reduced and by creating a flow of information between the manag-ers and the investors and thus failure to accumulate bad news in the company, the risk of the stock price crash will be also reduced.

Protecting the interests of shareholders is considered one of the main pillars of any capital market, which, while increasing the level of financial transparency, prevents the loss of their interests to those in power in companies. Consistency of laws and regulations on the one hand and the effectiveness of the corporate governance system in supervising the financial and legal operations of the company is considered important factor in respecting contracts and supporting the investments of minority and majority shareholders of companies, which makes investors confident in protecting their investments. Governance structural keywords in the corporate governance system can lead to Investor Protection by arranging effective board oversight mechanisms and motivating investors to have confidence in the structures of capital market companies. The purpose of this study is to interpret Investor Protection under the existence of a Governance Civilization based on interpretive prioritization analysis. In this study, theoretical screening based on similar studies was used to identify the components (Investor Protection) and research propositions (themes of corporate governance civilization). Then, in order to determine the reliability of research components and propositions through the participation of 14 experts and experts in the field of accounting and financial management, Delphi analysis was used. In the quantitative part, the components and propositions identified in the form of matrix questionnaires were evaluated by interpretive analysis by 20 managers of the top 50 companies of the Tehran Stock Exchange in 2009. The results showed that the proposition of sociocracy is considered the most influential theme of corporate governance civilization in capital market companies, which strengthens the effectiveness of internal control as a component of protecting the interests of shareholders. This result shows that the theme of sociocracy enables corporate governance mechanisms by promoting the level of sharing and participatory discourses to increase the effectiveness of board oversight, strengthen the weaknesses of internal controls to enhance the effectiveness of control over financial performance, and enrich the capacity to build trust and confidence in the performance of companies.