.Avicenna

Plato maintained that God's knoivledge of things consisted of se!f existent externalforms, i.e. Ideas. Plato's belief has been criticized lry Mui/a 5adra and others. Avicenna believes since God is the knower of His own essence which is the complete cause of things, He is the knower of things. His knowledge of things is a general kn01v!edge and general, in this sense, means lack of transformation of knowledge in accordance witb the transformation of knmvn object. The philosophers after Avicenna criticized him, because his belief necessitates the obstacle of the evacuation of the essence of God from peifection and the dread of subsistence of the empirica! knowledge is essentialfor one who is by essence and act non-material. 5hqykh Ishraq maintains that things, whether material or non-material, are presentfor God, the Exalted, by their own concrete existence. There are also criticisms on 5hqykh Ishraq 's notion, among them is that his opinion on the presence of material things is prohibitedfor God, the Exalted, because materiality and presence do not aggregate. 5adr ul-Muta'alehin has affirmed the detailed kno1vledge of God through the principle of "simple reality is all things" i.e. the knowledge of the Necessary Being of all things is actualized in the stage of His essence before the existence of those things. Allameh Tabatabaii rationalizes the detailed knoivledge of God by the existential application of God which is essential for the assumption of necessity of the existence in• itse!f.