پژوهش های فلسفی-کلامی

I suggest there is no such thing as “time itself.” I use this term in the same sense that philosophers of time use it. One has said, “It is important not to confuse the actual physical clock that measures time with time itself, ….” This paper is speculative, since if a time-detecting device should be found, my case would be defeated. I suggest that clocks define time.Early Christian theologians such as Augustine and Boethius, drawing from Platonists, particularly Plato and Plotinus, have argued that God is omniscient. Augustine relied on a belief that God made time and saw everything simultaneously. Boethius had a similar view of God’s eternality. Insofar as a case for God’s omniscience depends on this view of his eternality, then God is not omniscient. I suggest several reasons why some think God is omniscient and argue that they are not correct; I base this view on Scripture and other philosophical considerations. All biblical references are from the Revised Standard Version, Second Edition, 1971.

Although apophatic theology has attracted considerable scholarly attention, studies remain flawed both in terms of research methodology and fragmented analysis, neglecting in-depth examination of prominent philosophers. This study addresses this gap by exploring Ibn Sīnā’s perspective, a pivotal figure in Islamic philosophy. Exploring existential, cognitive, and linguistic dimensions of his writings, the study elucidates his approach to theology. This study argues that his theological framework remains integrative and harmonizes apophatic (negative) and positive methods, rejecting absolute negation while affirming the relative capacity of human cognition to comprehend the divine. He acknowledges both the transcendence of God and the limitations of the human intellect, integrating knowledge and ontology to demonstrate that a complete understanding of God and His attributes necessitates both negative and affirmative approaches. While recognizing the necessity of apophatic approaches due to the omnipotence of God and the constraints of human cognition, he diverges in his explanations of God and existence, rejecting the idea of attributing qualities of the Divine to His beings, attributing qualities to God, and emphasizing the apophatic discourse in the cognition of God and His attributes comprehensively.

This paper proposes a distinct realist perspective on the laws of nature, rooted in the tradition of late Islamic philosophy, which may offer a new solution to one of the difficult challenges of scientific realism, termed the ‘Central Dilemma’ by Mumford. It begins with a brief introduction to the problem of scientific realism concerning the concept of the laws of nature. Then, in the first part, we compare the realist theories of the laws of nature developed by Lewis, Armstrong, and Bird, focusing on their account of the three key concepts of causation, necessity, and law. Based on this analysis, the second part formulates a new realist theory, drawing from the doctrine of “Motion in Substance” from Late Islamic Philosophy, particularly the philosophical thought of Tabatabai. This will be done by extending the idea of motion in substance and examining some of its implications. This new account is, in some respects, similar to Bird’s view, yet in other respects Humean and similar to Lewis’s. By comparing this new approach with the aforementioned three theories, concerning their accounts of causation, necessity, and law in relation to the ‘Central Dilemma’ challenge, we conclude that it could bring a new vision that could potentially resolve this challenge.

The epistemic legitimacy of religious belief, as defended within the framework of Reformed Epistemology (RE), has been the subject of sustained scrutiny since Alvin Plantinga introduced the notion of a sensus divinitatis as a properly basic source of theistic belief. While the model purports to secure warrant without evidential support, its normative adequacy becomes contentious when considered in light of recent developments in the epistemology of disagreement. Persistent epistemic parity between dissenting interlocutors, particularly among intellectually and morally serious peers, presents a form of higher-order evidence that cannot be easily deflected by appeals to internal proper function alone. Furthermore, RE’s structural exclusion of dissenting perspectives – by regarding them as the product of cognitive malfunction or noetic effects of sin – risks epistemic insularity and violates principles of epistemic humility and testimonial justice. The analysis draws on debates concerning epistemic responsibility, the asymmetry of religious deference, and the fragility of internalist warrant under conditions of deep disagreement. In pluralistic contexts where dialogical symmetry is morally and epistemically required, the RE model struggles to sustain its claim to epistemic privilege without collapsing into circularity or dogmatism.

What does it really mean to be human? In this context, “real” refers to the most precise comprehension of human experience from a subjective and phenomenological perspective. When exploring human nature in the realm of philosophy of mind, we confront not only the mind-body problem (a fundamental challenge in substance dualism) and the hard problem of consciousness (a hurdle for eliminativism) but also the explanatory gaps that stem from an objective and partitive interpretation of human nature. What if we were to shift this perspective to one that is the aspective-holistic and subjective viewpoint? The principal aim of this paper is to argue that subjectivism requires a holistic perspective to effectively confront eliminativism. The authors propose a shift in perspective, labeling it “Subjective Holism,” which is not a definitive solution to the issues at hand; rather, it serves as a framework for understanding human nature. This approach aligns with our intuition–considering oneself subjectively as a whole–and possesses enhanced explanatory power by treating humans as integrated complex systems. It clarifies how mental and physical states emerge as properties within this system. Through a holistic-subjective approach, the query about human nature evolves into: How do I, as a unified whole with various aspects, possess qualia such as insideness and uniqueness, which are exclusive to the subject’s conscious experiences? As a human being, I exist as a complex system (whole) with real conscious experience as my high-level and emergent property.

Moral identity refers to those characteristics and attributes that play an important role in the formation of an individual’s identity. Indeed, the role performed by moral attributes in the evolution of a person’s identity is such that quite a few of today’s scholars maintain the oneness of the “self/psyche” and “moral character”. Adopting this approach, researchers have set out to produce a wide range of research works in the field of moral philosophy. The present study is an attempt to measure the effect of three components of ‘exercise’, ‘nutrition’, and ‘sleep’ on shaping moral character from Avicenna’s viewpoint. The findings of the present research illuminate the fact that the latter three elements have a direct influence on an individual’s temperament, whereby suitable grounds are created in which moral character develops. Avicenna holds that this statement may not challenge man’s will and authority. The reason is that every individual–by identifying his own physical coordinates and applying the most apt instructions–can approximate his temperament to moderation. As a result, the necessary ground for developing the most desirable moral character is created.