

## A RECONSIDERATION OF LAND REFORM\*

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### Part 1- A Theoretical Reconsideration of Land Reform

The study of land reform has been in fashion for the past twenty years. Many books and articles on developing countries appeared in this period which directly or indirectly touched this topic. However, we have to admit that we neither have an uniform concept nor a standardized method of evaluation as yet. Therefore, the differences in approach, analysis, and appraisal are substantial among these works.

The purpose of this paper is to reconsider the contributions in the past and to set forth hypothetically a comprehensive approach to land reform. A case study of land reform in West Pakistan is presented to show the empirical validity of our new approach.

#### The concept of land reform - a new interpretation

Land reform may be defined simply as a change in the status associated with landed property. But more realistically, land reform could be defined as a change in the status associated with landed property enforced by existing political forces as a means of achieving their political ends. Existing political forces here include not only the existing

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government, but also foreign powers and internal forces that are gaining political support from the masses of a society. Theoretically, therefore, the character and the degree of land reform are primarily determined by the social character of the introducer of land reform or existing political forces. Social character here means the class character of a society. We use the socio-economic status of the introducers as an indirect indicator to judge their class character.

Land reform is used by its introducers to achieve their political objectives. That is why land reform is usually accompanied by a change in political structure. It is important to notice here that the reverse is not necessarily true. A change in political structure is not necessarily accompanied by land reform. The distinction between land reform and political reform, therefore, should be clear.

Land reform is often regarded as a means toward agricultural development, or as a device to attain social justice. However, these are one of the functional aspects of land reform that deserve attention only if land reform is implemented and never an essential character of it. Therefore, land reform should not be understood and treated as an agricultural policy or an agricultural development programme.

It should be clear by now that any recommendations for land reform introduced by planners, or foreign advisors will be either totally ignored or inadequately implemented unless the ideas underlying them are consonant with those of the existing political forces. The essential point to notice in the discussion of land reform is, therefore, who introduces land reform, and for what purpose and under what conditions it is introduced.

### Comments on conventional concepts

It would be useful to make a comment on two conventional definitions of land reform in order to clarify our new approach.

One is a classical definition which was widely adopted before the end of World War II. According to this definition,

land reform means "the redistribution of land or rights in land," and it recognizes implicitly that the underlying objective is "the redistribution of property in land for the benefit of small farmers and agricultural workers."<sup>1</sup> D. Warriner, T. Takigawa, and K. Parson adopt this definition.<sup>2</sup>

In contrast to this, the definition widely used in the study of land reform after World War II is very broad in concept and highly economically oriented. The United Nations' definitions which appeared in 1951 and 1956 are authoritative versions of this definition.<sup>3</sup>

Land reform is treated more broadly as equivalent to agrarian reform and agrarian institutional reform. It clearly includes change in land tenure, but also includes the establishment or strengthening of essential governmental, co-operatives or commercial agencies, or services relating to agricultural credit, supply, marketing, extension, and research. So conceived, the ideal land reform programme is an integrated programme of measures designed to eliminate obstacles to economic and social development arising out of defects in the agrarian structure.

It is usually said that the definition of the United Nations and that of the United States are identical, and some experts explicitly assert that land reform is an important diplomatic policy of the United States.<sup>4</sup>

There are many supporters of this new definition; or perhaps it is better to say that it is extremely difficult to find an advocate of the classical definition. Most of these supporters recognize, however, that "land tenure change" is the central issue of land reform.<sup>5</sup>

The difficulties of these conventional definitions are as follows. There is nothing wrong with the classical definition, but it seems to be too restrictive in the sense that it is concerned only with a redistribution of property for the benefit of peasants and agricultural workers. The creation of peasant proprietorship seems to be the sole objective of land reform. Also it does not reflect the essential character of land reform as we pointed out already.

The definition of the United Nations seems to contain

many more difficulties. First, land reform and agrarian reform have lost their own definitions. Since the United Nations started using the term land reform as if it were a substitute of agrarian reform, land reform has been frequently regarded as a means to increase productivity, or to strengthen the capitalistic frame of production and institutions. In fact, agrarian revolution, a radical form of agrarian reform, is a historical concept and the total effect of it is measured by a radical shift in the production function, which involves both an institutional effect and a technological effect.<sup>6</sup> Agrarian revolution is also understood by economic historians to be an essential pre-condition for the capitalist mode of production. It is also important to notice that agrarian revolution is a "process", not a one-shot injection of agricultural policy.<sup>7</sup> Second, land reform is treated as an agricultural policy. As we pointed out, land reform is more than agricultural policy. Reforms in rural credit, marketing system, etc. may be necessary in order to secure the social and economic benefits of land reform. In other words, they are important as supplementary measures to facilitate tenure change. Therefore, they should be distinguished from the central idea of land reform. Third, the United Nations' definition emphasizes the operational aspect of land reform and fails to reflect the political factors in it.<sup>8</sup>

The unsuitability of using the term land reform in terms of the United Nations' definition may be clear by now. We do not confine ourselves to analyzing land reform in the capitalistic societies.<sup>9</sup> What we need is a clear concept of land reform so that we can minimize misunderstanding and misinterpretations.

### Methodology and appraisal of land reform

The methodology and appraisal of land reform vary according to its definition. Then what would be a proper criterion for the evaluation of the effect of land reform? This is a problem related to the methodology of studying land reform as well.

When we see statements such as "land reform is often

regarded as a surgical measure, to remove obstacles, but it is not surgery, but preventive medicine," or "reform is sometimes drastic, but the slow, evolutionary impacts of measures taken after the reform decide ultimate success or failure," we can guess what the writer means by the term "preventive medicine" or "ultimate success or failure."<sup>10</sup> In most cases the evaluation of land reform is made through the analyst's own judgments or beliefs. For instance, those who emphasize the political aspects of land reform often fail to recognize its economic effects. If the increase of agricultural production is the sole criterion of appraisal, the analysis of a land reform that is not implemented is of no use.

As mentioned already, the first thing to do is to examine who introduces land reform, in what circumstances, and why. Then, the appraisal should be made, first of all, according to the real intention of those who introduce land reform. It is a hard task to judge, as objectively as possible the real intention of the introducer. However, we could use the analysis of the land reform draft, a socio-economic survey of the existing political forces, and any general judgments or insights that may be obtainable, to a certain extent, after studying the country concerned.

Appraisal of land reform according to the objectives written into land reform drafts is also necessary. However, it should be recognized that the objectives recorded in the draft and the real intention of the introducer may not be identical.

Land reform, regardless of its real objectives, has a certain impact on the socio-economic and political life of the people. Above all, evaluations of the economic effect of land reform are inevitable, since it affects the most important factors of production or production-base in a developing agriculture, which basically influences the socio-political life of the rural people. The time element is crucially important in the evaluation work. It is desirable to make an evaluation after a certain time lag, but its pure effect would become obscure.

We adopt a two-way evaluation: the macro-effect and micro-effect of land reform. The macro-effect deals with the economic effect of land reform on the overall economy.

Therefore, the conclusion is simple if a land reform is not implemented. The micro-effect concerns the specific responses of those who are affected by land reform under specific conditions.

A word of warning must be given about the interpretation of the economic effect of land reform. That is, even if some macro and/or micro-economic effects are desirable to someone, these effects simply show a possible outcome under certain conditions provided such reform is implemented.

## Part II- A Case Study of Land Reform in West Pakistan

### The introducer of land reform and its social character

The President and Chief Martial Law Administrator, General Mohammad Ayub appointed the Land Reform Commission on October 31, 1958. It was only four days after he came into power through a bloodless coup d'etat. The Commission was asked to "consider problems relating to the ownership and tenancy of agricultural land and to recommend measures for ensuring better production and social justice as well as security of tenure for those engaged in cultivation." The Commission concluded its deliberations on January 20, 1959 and the recommendations of the Commission were authenticated by the President on January 24, 1959.

In order to examine the social character of the Ayub regime, the introducer of land reform in 1959, a socio-economic analysis of the Members of Provincial and National Assemblies was made. This survey can be used to judge the class character of the introducer, since these members were elected for the first time after the coup d'etat and some of them became ministers later.<sup>11</sup>

### The MPA and MNA

All of the MPA and MNA are Muslims and the majority of them (91 per cent) are members of the local population which

means they were not refugees from India at the time of partition. More than half of them are new members (53 out of 95) and 96 per cent of them are *zamindārs*. They were first Members of Assemblies after the withdrawal of Martial Law. The replacement of more than half of the members may give the impression that the character of the political leadership might have changed considerably. However, this change over is mostly attributed to the fact that the old and powerful politicians were disqualified by Martial Law and that many old politicians were retired. In fact, most of the new members are from the same social class and many are the sons of the ex-politicians or related to them.

It has been said that the *zamindār* and the politician were identical in Pakistan. This statement is relevant as yet. But one significant change in this connection is the decrease of the number of so-called "professional *zamindār* politicians". In other words, the members who have more than two occupations have increased (Table 1). In fact, those who have only one occupation number only 42 out of 95. The remainder have more than two occupations, for instance, *zamindār*-cum-businessman, or *zamindār*-cum-lawyer-cum manufacturer. This tendency is a reflection of the development of the non-agricultural sectors on the one hand and the response of *zamindārs* to this development, especially after the land reform, on the other. However, it may not mean that the electorate voted for them as industrialists or businessmen. It may be more realistic to say that the prestige, influence, and power of members as *zamindārs* were strengthened by their participation in the non-agricultural sectors.

Most of the members are well educated (Table 2). About 50 per cent of them are above the college graduate level. Only 6 members have no formal education. Generally speaking, the education level is higher among MNA than MPA, and the members who engaged only in agriculture show the poorest educational standard.

Most of the members (89 per cent) were born in villages. They might have spent most of their time in the villages in their childhood, but by the time they were in the 10th grade, 76 per cent of them lived in the cities. Now, 88 per cent (83 out of 94 respondents) of them have their own houses in the cities, 84 per cent have foreign cars, 72 per cent of them

speak fluent English; and 98 per cent of the married members send their children to schools in the cities.

### Land, income and power

Table 3 shows the land members own, the villages in their possession, and the number of tenants and permanent labourers working under them. According to this table, the total land possessed by the 86 members comes to 196,660 acres, which gives an average of 2,287 acres per member. The MNA owns more than the MPA. The average holding of the former is 3,362 acres and the average of the latter is 1,107 acres. The average number of villages under their control is 3.1 (MNA = 3.3, MPA = 3.0), and the average number of households depending on them economically is 211 (MNA = 324, MPA = 87). About 10 per cent of the members are resident *zamindars* and the remainder are more or less absentee *zamindars*. Table 4 shows the size of the holding they possess. Approximately 73 per cent of them have more than 400 acres of land and 34 per cent have more than 1,000 acres.

Besides being *zamindars*, 58 per cent of the members are engaged in other occupations. If the non-*zamindars* are taken together, they control 21 manufacturing plants, and 7 transport companies. Six members are engineering and forestry contractors and 8 members are in other businesses. Twenty-four members are engaged in legal practice.

With respect to the monthly income of the members, about 40 per cent of them earn more than Rs.5,000/- and about 70 per cent earn more than Rs.2,000/- (Table 5). This level of income should be compared with the average monthly income of the nation in the corresponding year, that is Rs.27. Generally speaking, the MNA are much better off than the MPA. From these figures, we can judge the social character of the Ayub regime. This social character is apparently reflected in the recommendations of the Land Reform Commission.

### Major recommendations of the land reform commission

The following are the views and the recommendations of



the Commission which appeared in the *Report of the Land Reform Commission for West Pakistan*.

*Problems arising from the present tenure system.* In Chapter III and VI of the Report, the Commission analysis the existing situations associated with the land tenure system, and also presents the basic notions on which the recommendations were made. To be brief, this analysis can be summarized into six headings.

- (i) Limited expansion of land
- (ii) Inequitable distribution of land
- (iii) Fragmentation of holding
- (iv) Slow development of large estates
- (v) Lack of initiative and enterprise
- (vi) Concentration of power into the hands of a few  
(Table 6).

*Approach to solution.* In order to remedy the defects mentioned above arising from the present land tenure arrangements, the Commission felt it was a minimum requirement to adopt the following measures. (pp. 22-23).

- (a) Ceiling on individual ownership, in order to break concentration of landed wealth, to narrow down inequalities of opportunity and to encourage a more intensive land-use and productive investment.
- (b) Acquisition of the land in excess of the ceiling for re-distribution to landless tenants and holders of uneconomic holdings on payment of a fair price, along with an active programme of resettlement of this class on newly reclaimed Government land with a view to improving their social and economic status and enlisting their energies for greater production.
- (c) Conversion of occupancy tenancies into full ownership.
- (d) Abolition of *jagirs* and elimination of other adventitious and intermediary interests, in order to simplify the tenure system and to relieve the

present crowding of interests in land.

- (e) Security of tenure to the tenants, fixation of fair rent, elimination of illegal exactions, compensation for improvements in case of premature disturbance, in order to provide the incentive for a fair return proportionate to effort.
- (f) Encouragement of the creation of a strong middle class and laying the foundation for owner-operated farms on holdings of economic size through consolidation of existing holdings, prevention of fragmentation by making holdings below a certain size indivisible and elimination of small indifferently managed farms.
- (g) Expansion of co-operatives and strengthening of credit and marketing facilities with a view to increasing production.
- (h) Improvement of the conditions of employment of agricultural labourers.

*Actual recommendations to be implemented.* The actual recommendations are based on the lines of discussion mentioned above, but all of these points are not necessarily reflected in the recommendations as will be seen.

(a) *Ceiling on holdings.* The ceiling on individual ownership was set at 500 acres of irrigated land and 1,000 acres of unirrigated, or the amount of land equivalent to 36,000 Produce Index Units.<sup>12</sup>

(b) *Exemption.* Orchard land up to 150 acres could be retained in addition to the ceiling as long as it was in a compact block of not less than 10 acres and also was registered as an orchard in the revenue records at least since Rabi, 1956/57. The land owned by recognized teaching institutions and universities for the purpose of research and demonstration, and the land possessed by charitable and religious institutions, was exempted from resumption. The land under existing stud and livestock farms might be retained over and above the ceiling, if the government thought it would be in the national interest. An area equivalent to

12,000 P.I. Units was allowed to be retained by all or any of the heirs.

(c) *Choice of area.* The first opportunity to select the land to be retained was given to the owner of such land. It was provided that he should have to select, as far as possible, a compact block of land not less than 64 acres in the Divisions of Khairpur and Hyderabad, and not less than 50 acres in other Divisions.<sup>13</sup>

(d) *Compensation.* Compensation for the resumed land, it was decided, should be paid on a progressively diminishing scale using Produce Index Unit as shown below:

- (i) For the first 18,000 P.I. Units --- Rs.5/-per Unit
- (ii) For the next 24,000 P.I. Units --- Rs.4/-per Unit
- (iii) For the next 36,000 P.I. Units --- Rs.3/-per Unit
- (iv) For the next 72,000 P.I. Units --- Rs.2/-per Unit
- (v) For the balance --- Rs.1/-per Unit

Payment for the resumed land was to be made by the non-negotiable and non-transferable, but inheritable, bonds bearing a taxable simple interest at the rate of 3 per cent per annum and redeemable in 25 years.

(e) *Redistribution of the resumed land.* The Commission recommended that the resumed land "should first be offered for sale, in blocks of not less than the size of a subsistence holding and more than that of an economic holding." (p. 48). Any land left over might be sold to other deserving persons. The sale price was regulated and was not to exceed Rs. 8/- per P.I. Unit in any case. Repayment was to be made by installment over a sufficiently long period. The money realized by the sale of such land was to be pooled and used to pay compensation, interest, administrative charges etc.

(f) *Restraint on partitioning.* One of the unique measures which appeared in the land reform is the restraint on partitioning of holdings regulated as follows:

- (i) A joint holding comprising an area larger than an economic holding cannot be partitioned if as a result of the partition no part of the holding taken together with the area which the owner may

possess already remains equal to an economic holding or any of its parts falls below the size of the subsistence holding;

- (ii) An economic holding should not be partitioned;
- (iii) A joint holding with an area less than an economic holding but greater than a subsistence holding cannot be partitioned if thereby the size of the holding of each individual, taken together with the area he may possess already, becomes less than the subsistence holding;
- (iv) A joint holding with an area equal to the subsistence holding or less should not, in any case, be partitioned (p.67).

The Commission not only recommended restraint on partitioning, but also restraint on the management of the joint holdings comprising an area equal to or more than an economic holding, and on the alienation of such holdings by sale, gift, and mortgage. In order to encourage farming on an economic scale of land, the Commission suggested that, in case of such joint holdings, one person should be selected to be a manager of the farm and the other members should receive their shares of income; or they may sell their shares to the manager to whom a government loan would be available. If this procedure is not workable, the Commission may acquire the holding on payment of compensation. As regards the restriction on alienation, they ruled that no-one who owns land equivalent to an economic holding, or more, should be allowed to alienate any portion of it which reduces the size below the limit of the economic holding, but he may alienate it as a whole.

(g) *Abolition of Jagir.* Jagir of whatever kind, *ala-malkiat* or intermediary interests, and other such interests were abolished. However, those who wanted to remain the owners of such land were allowed to do so. Any *Jagir* lands in excess of the ceiling were resumed without any compensation. By this reform, even *jagir* in favour of religious, charitable, or educational institutions, and *jagir* created for general public utility purposes, were abolished.

(h) *Security of tenure.* As for the security of tenure to the tenants, the Commission recommended the following:

- (i) No tenant should be ejected unless it is established in a revenue court that he has: (a) failed to pay rent; or (b) used the land in a manner which renders it unfit for the purpose for which he held it; or (c) failed to cultivate the land without sufficient reason; or (d) sublet his tenancy.
- (ii) The right of ejection on the plea of *khud- kasht* where it exists should be withdrawn.
- (iii) A tenant shall not be ejected from a house provided by the landlord so long as he continues to be a tenant of any part of the land under that landlord.
- (iv) In case of ejection the tenant should be entitled to get compensation for "improvements" and "disturbance."

As far as the rental arrangement is concerned, it was decided that "the existing basis on which the produce of land and government dues are apportioned between the landlord and the tenant under the law or custom prevailing in the locality should continue. The landlord should be debarred from increasing the rent or the tenant's share of government dues if any, unless he can establish that he is entitled to a higher rent, on account of change in the complexion of the tenancy due to the introduction of irrigation or change in the burden of taxation, etc. Similarly, the tenant should also have the right to obtain reduction in rent if warranted on account of change in the burden of taxation, etc." (p. viii)

The Commission also prohibited *abwab* (cesses) in excess of rent and *begar* (free labour) to be imposed in any shape on the tenants.

(i) *Utilization of uncultivated culturable land.* The Commission recommended a law to stimulate the landlords' initiative to develop their uncultivated culturable land. This was

subsequently enacted as the West Pakistan Land Utilization ordinance in 1960. Under the law, if the Controller (Officer of the Revenue Department) finds any cultivable land left undeveloped for two years, he is entitled to order the landlord to develop it within two years. If the landlord fails to do so, it is offered by the government to another on a long-term lease.

(j) *Other.* The Commission recommended that the existing laws concerning the conversion of occupancy tenants into full owners should run their course. It was also recommended that the agricultural credit institutions should be strengthened in order to facilitate the obtaining of initial capital by the new owners.

#### Micro-economic effect of land reform (1) - reactions of the beneficiaries<sup>14</sup>

*About beneficiaries.* Those who received the allotment of land were the tenants-at-will who worked on the land resumed by the government. They were mostly illiterate; only 18.5 per cent of the male population of the sample families had attended or were attending school (Table 7). These beneficiaries had been working under their landlords from their forefathers' generation and were generally regarded as second class tenants by both fellow farmers and the landlords. The best tenants were cultivating the land of the landlords which was not surrendered to the government.

Two types of beneficiaries were found in the sample villages. One consists of those who became independent owner farmers and the other of those who became part owners. Part owner here means one of those who were allotted as much land as those who became independent owner farmers, but who kept the tenant relationship with the landlords on other land after the reform. The farmer type of beneficiaries constituted 57 per cent of the total.

The average size of land allotted was 8.7 acres, but only 16 per cent of the beneficiaries were given land equal to or more than a subsistence holding, 12.5 acres. Moreover, it became clear that the per capita holding of 58 per cent of the

total beneficiaries was less than one acre.

*Income redistribution effect.* Accurate calculation and precise comparison are very difficult in respect to the income redistribution effect of the land reform. Lack of farm records and the inaccuracy of the memory of the farmers are the major reasons. The simplest way of estimation would be to compare the amount of rent that the beneficiaries used to pay minus the amount of land revenue and land installment they have to pay after becoming the owners of the land.

All beneficiaries were examined on the basis of this simple method of estimation. As a result, it was found that 89 per cent of the new owners were better off at the time of interview than before the reform. If, however, the present part owners lose the right to cultivate the rented land, and all the beneficiaries become independent owners of their allotted plot of land, 56 per cent would benefit economically from the land reform. In fact, some of the part owners were going to be evicted from their rented land because the term with their landlords had run out.

It is true that the social and psychological gain, that is, the rise in social status from tenant-at-will to owner of land, was felt much more than economic gain at the time of interview; however, sooner or later they will realize that such a non-economic gain could be maintained only by the establishment of a sound economic basis.

Four different cases are illustrated in Table 8. From this table we know the amount of land revenue plus land installment is much less than the rent the beneficiaries used to pay to their landlords.

The income redistribution effect is, therefore, primarily determined by the productivity and the rental arrangement in our sample villages. Above all the level of land productivity seems to be the most important indicator to judge the ability of the beneficiaries to become independent after land reform. Assuming the constant prices of products, inputs and services, productivity would be determined by the morphological characteristics of land or previous capital investment on land, cultural practices and cropping patterns. Capital stock among the beneficiaries was almost homogeneous at a

Table 11 shows the level of land productivity of our sample village. Productivity was lower in the *khariif* (summer) period because the water supply had become unstable and scanty. Except for this fact it would not be the time to make any judgement on productivity change.

*Marketing, credit, and the payment of installments.* After the reform, it was expected that the beneficiaries might begin to place their produce on the market directly, since they had to obtain cash in order to pay land revenue, land installments, water rates, etc. About 57 per cent of them obtained cash by selling fodder for the payment of land installments. Cotton, sugar-cane, and rice, which are the traditional cash crops in this area, are still a major source of cash income (about 30 per cent). Some beneficiaries obtained cash by selling labour (20 per cent) or by selling livestock (17 per cent), and wheat (8 per cent). A relatively high percentage of commercialization, however, was not yet sufficient to change their marketing practices. Most of the surplus was still purchased by the established professional grain merchants such as *kachcha arthia*, *beopari*, or the village shopkeeper (*bania*). It will take sometime before they start approaching the market since many of them are in debt to such grain merchants.

Demand for credit from the new owners had increased and the government gave priority to them in obtaining credit. As a result, about 40 per cent of the beneficiaries obtained credit from government sources at the average of Rs. 392. On the other hand, 50 per cent borrowed money from private sources at the average of Rs. 722. The latter was still preferred because private loans usually bear a much lower interest, if any; have no rigorously fixed period of payment; have no restriction on its use; and are less complicated to obtain. In fact, the majority of the borrowers (92 per cent) from the government sources spent the loan on productive purposes and the rate of repayment was 47 per cent. In contrast to this, a considerable portion of credit from private sources was spent on non-productive purposes and the rate of repayment was only 6 per cent of the amount borrowed.



## Micro-economic effect of land reform (2) - Reactions of the Landlords affected<sup>15</sup>

*About landlords.* On the basis of the limited survey, the following can be said quite safely: there is a high rate of absentee landlordism (63 per cent), high standard of education (40 per cent are college graduates and only 8 per cent had no formal education), and a high correlation between education and absentee landlordism. About 60 per cent of the landlords had no alternative source of income to agriculture and they were relatively less educated.

Average land held by the sample landlords before the reform was 3,108 acres per landlord. It was reduced to 1,821 acres after the reform, although the income generating capacity had apparently not reduced in the same proportion. They controlled more than three villages per landlord even after the land reform. Since the average size of the landlord's family was comparatively small (6.1), rent from 1,821 acres of productive land was sufficient to maintain a reasonable standard of living. Yet, it was true that they suffered a loss of prestige which came from possessing large areas of land regardless of its quality. The psychological unrest was especially great because they never imagined that their land was actually going to be taken away.

Two reactions are important to mention. One is the expansion of the area under *khud-kasht* (self-cultivated) and orchards accompanied by the mechanization of agriculture. The other is the mobilization of savings toward productive investment.

*The expansion of khud-kasht.* Before the land reform, about 80 per cent of our sample landlords had *khud-kashts* that occupied 11 per cent of the total holdings. After the reform the area under *khud-kasht* had increased and some landlords who had not in the past had *khud-kasht* land now created it. Since the average holding was reduced by 41 per cent and *khud-kasht* increased by 36 per cent after the reform, the percentage of *khud-kasht* in the total holdings per landlord became 21 per cent. The landlord's opinion was that it would increase within a year or two up to 31 per cent of the total holdings.

low level. Under landlord-tenant relationships these determinants of land productivity can be regarded as a function of the landlords attitude toward farming. Under a conservative landlord, tenants have to use traditional inputs and cultural practices. Consequently, productivity is generally lower. This tendency seems to be accentuated where such a landlord is a resident landlord and has a strong influence over his tenants.

*Determinants of productivity.* The measurement adopted by the Land Reform Commission to evaluate the land was the Produce Index Unit. The higher the P.I. Unit, the higher will be the productive capacity. The P.I. Unit of the best land in the Lahore District, our sample district, is said to be 80. Since the landlords were given the first chance to select the land they wanted to retain, the quality of the land resumed became very low. The average P.I. Unit of retained land in our sample village was 76 and that of resumed land was 49. Unavailability of a stable water supply was the single most important factor of this low P.I. Unit. The resumed and redistributed land was usually located far from the canal and the centre of the village. Those beneficiaries who depended on a supplemental water supply from tubewells or a stable supply of canal water and thus on the good-will of their landlords were in a difficult situation at the time of our survey.


As to the cropping pattern, we could not find any drastic change before and after land reform, especially among those who became independent owner farmers. However, we found a difference between the cropping pattern of the independent owner farmers and that of the part owners as Table 9 shows. These two villages belong to the same landlord, but 83 per cent of the beneficiaries in the village A are part owners and 89 per cent of the beneficiaries in the village N are independent owner farmers. The desirable cropping pattern from the point of view of the landlord is known by looking at the cropping pattern on the rented land. The change in cropping pattern - concentration on cash crops such as rice and fodder - is observed only among the part owners, not by the independent owners. However, it would be worthwhile noticing that the owner farmers could take risks on their own land by concentrating rice and fodder at the cost of other

The expansion of *khud-kasht* has a special meaning in West Pakistan, because the ways of management and the distribution of profit are entirely different. In *khud-kasht*, the landlords have to bear all risks involved in the investment. Naturally, all the fruits of their investment will be returned to them which is not true in the tenant system. Therefore, they grow highly commercialized crops in *khud-kasht* and grow foodgrains crops on their rented lands. In *khud-kasht*, the landlord supplied productive means - livestock and implements and necessary inputs. Permanent labourers with fixed wages in kind were employed. After the reform, livestock began to be replaced by tractors; and in rural areas highly skilled labourers like mechanics and tractor drivers were employed in *khud-kasht* with money wages. A part of the wages obtained by the unskilled labourers was paid in cash. We can observe a capitalistic type of farming in it, though it has many transitional characteristics. It is also important to notice that the tractor was introduced as a set with the tube-well in *khud-kasht*.

Farm mechanization is not a new phenomenon. Some landlords had tractors and tube-wells before the land reform. As Figure 1 suggests, the number of tractors increased in 1952. This was mainly due to the enactment of the tenancy laws which justified the ejection of tenants on the plea of mechanization. However, due to the lack of spare parts, technical hands, etc., farm mechanization was not spread. The same figure suggests the rapid increase of farm mechanization after 1959. The basic motivation was to have mechanized farms as a safeguard against the prospective land reform. Accumulated experiences of the successful mechanized farms, standardization of the desirable types of tractors in 1960, relaxation of the import restriction in 1959, and the expansion of credit facilities, facilitated the rapid increase of mechanized farms.<sup>16</sup>


The expansion of *khud-kasht* with the tractor and tube-well, or the emergence of a capitalistic type of farming, was economically justified among landlords for another reason: the distribution of benefit derived from new techniques under the tenancy system. This can be explained by the following simple figure (Figure 2).

Figure 1. West Pakistan (1951-63/64): Import of farm tractors (1 million rupees)



- (a) Private account (annual)
- (b) Private account (cumulative)
- (c) Government account (annual)
- (d) Government account (cumulative)

Figure 2. Distribution of profit under tenant system



In this figure, we assume constant prices of products and input for the sake of simplicity, and also assume that the major input on the part of tenants is their labour. Curve (1) is an average revenue product derived from the production function under the traditional technique. Curve 2 indicates ARP derived from the new production function under the improved technology. Suppose that the rent is one half of the products under a tenant system, and also suppose a landlord or a tenant introduces a new technique that brings a

higher return per unit of labour input. The incremental revenue represented by the area AB EF should go to the introducer of such technique, since the input level holds constant. However, only one half of it (AB CD) goes to the introducer, say, landlord, and CDEF goes to the tenant under such an institutional arrangement. In this case, CDEF is an "institutional cost" to the introducer or an "institutional gain" to the non-introducer of new techniques. If the rental arrangement is flexible, investments in the rented land would be increased. However, the incentive is spoiled because of the institutional rigidity. This is an explanation of the expansion of *khud-kasht*, increased investments in *khud - kasht* and the stagnant productivity of the rented land in West Pakistan.

*Mobilization of savings into productive investment.* Another notable preventive measure and also one of the most unique reactions to the impact of the land reform is that the landlords started investing their rental income and/or profit in the non-agricultural sectors. There were two reasons. One was to minimize the loss at the time of the prospective land reform. The other was that the opportunity cost was higher in the non-agricultural sectors, especially in the industrial sector which has been developing rapidly since 1952. It was evident that the landlords were greatly disturbed and embarrassed by the emergence of the industrial capitalists as a new economic, social and even political power.

When we interviewed them, 78 per cent of the landlords expressed the desire to invest in the non-agricultural sectors. Unlike the farm mechanization, the follow up study has not yet been carried out in this respect, but the direction of change pointed out as above seems to hold good as yet.

### Macro-economic effect of land reform

*Total effect of land reform.* The extent to which the present land reform in West Pakistan was significant in the context of the overall economy should be considered now. We examine the total effect of land reform first and then we consider in what way the land reform would contribute to the role of the agricultural sector.

Total effect of land reform<sup>17</sup>

1. <u>Total number of declared landlords</u>	5,218
i) Number of affected landlords	755
ii) Number of unaffected landlords	4,463
2. <u>Total area declared (acres)</u>	4,313,940
i) Area declared by affected landlords	3,986,286
3. <u>Total area resumed (acres)</u>	2,195,304
i) Total area cultivated	939,450
ii) Total area uncultivated	1,255,854
a. Culturable waste	699,438
b. Forest	196,675
c. Under hills	131,170
d. Under river	100,080
e. Other area unfit for cultivation	128,491
4. <u>Total area disposed of (acres)</u>	762,539
i) Sold to tenants	651,411
ii) Sold to other small owners	25,708
iii) Area auctioned	85,420
5. <u>Total number of beneficiaries</u>	59,468
i) Tenants	56,906
ii) Small owner farmers	2,562
6. <u>Total number of Jagirdars</u>	147
i) Total area declared (acres)	682,205
ii) Total area resumed (acres)	352,469

From the data presented above it can be seen that only 755 out of 5,218 landlords who had land over and above 500 acres were affected. This is just 14.5 per cent of the total declared landlords and only 0.015 per cent of the total farm households in West Pakistan. The average holding of the affected landlords before the land reform was 5,280 acres and it was reduced to 2,372 acres (a 45 per cent reduction) after the land reform. The average holding of the 147 *jagirdars* before the reform was 4,641 acres, which was reduced to 2,243 acres by the reform. About 43 per cent of the total resumed land was under cultivation and 25 per cent of the land was useless land. Approximately 30 per cent of the total

resumed land or 69 per cent of the land under cultivation in the resumed land was disposed of to the tenants. Auctioned land which was not redistributed to the tenants accounted for 13 per cent of the land which was allotted to the tenants. The number of tenants who became new owners by this reform was only 56,906. There were still two million tenants and 0.83 million part owners after the reform (1961).

To those who regarded and expected the land reform to be a means of eliminating feudalistic elements, establishing social justice, providing equality of opportunities, and creating a strong middle class as stated in the Report of the Commission, the result must be disappointing. As discussed earlier, the reactions of the tenants benefited are not impressive and the economic effect of these reactions on the agricultural sector seems to be small. From these findings and the data concerning the total effect of the land reform just presented, one may easily draw the conclusion that the land reform in West Pakistan was meaningless.

### Land reform and the planned economy - An evaluation

The present land reform did not give much benefit to the tenants in West Pakistan, not only because the number of beneficiaries was small, but also because of the various reasons discussed already. The beneficiaries were happy and satisfied with the reform, but as far as the contribution toward increase in productivity is concerned, they were not fully prepared to respond except for increasing fodder production. Hypothetically it can be said that this was due to the stagnant productivity of the peasant proprietors who hold equivalent land and by whom the tenants are most influenced.

The most unique effect of the land reform in question on the role of agriculture in the planned economy is that it gave strong stimulus and incentive toward the creation of a "capitalistic type of farming" symbolized by the introduction and expansion of *khud-kasht* operated with tractors, tube-wells, and wage labour. As a result of such "capitalistic type of farming", the intensity of land use and of cropping, and the yield per acre in those farms have been

increased. Tractors with blades and tube-wells enabled the owners of these devices to level the land for efficient utilization of water and to reclaim the wasteland. The installation of tube-wells in the canal irrigated area with a serious scarcity of water made possible a change of the cropping pattern to something other than the traditional one (with given knowledge and techniques). A stable and sufficient water supply enabled the agriculturists to increase resource inputs more safely and also enabled them to increase the acreage under profitable but water consuming crops. Moreover, the introduction of such "modern" devices induced more widespread use of fertilizer and improved varieties of seed. The aggregate output as well as yield per acre on such farms has definitely increased. The marginal output thus achieved was likely to be placed in the market, partly because of the increase in the cost outlay in each for fertilizer, wage, fuel, etc., and partly because the marginal propensity to consume was relatively low. The modernization process of this kind was observed only in the *khud-kasht* belonging to the big landlords initially, but now it is being introduced among the owner farmers with fairly large holdings.<sup>18</sup>

The reason why the land reform gave much more impetus to the landlords than to the tenants is hypothetically that the productivity of a comparable class of people - industrialists and businessmen - has been rapidly increasing as was discussed earlier. Then what is the rationale that such a "capitalistic type of farming" has been expanding after land reform in a society where foreign exchange is scarce, the labour force is presumed to be abundant, the technical level is low, institutional arrangements seem to be unfavourable, and parcels of lands are generally small in size and fragmented? This question can be answered in the context of the planned economy of this country. What is expected most urgently by the agricultural sector from the planners, I believe, is the maximization of aggregate output and of marketable surplus. If this is a relevant idea, then it can be said that those who will satisfy this end in this sector will not be the petty owners of the land. In fact, the method of distribution of scarce resources such as fertilizer, insecticides, machinery rented for reclamation, etc., is concentrated in the hands of a relatively few influential landlords and progressive owner farmers with large holdings. It



may be the view of government that it can expect much higher returns in terms of the increase in aggregate output and marketable surplus by the allocation of such scarce resources to such agriculturists. The fact that the land use and farming of such big *zamindārs* are extremely underdeveloped in terms of their potential capacities seems to justify the expansion of the "capitalistic type of farming" from the macro-economic point of view.

Land reform did not give much impetus to the mobility of the labour force beyond the sector, but it is interesting to note that the "capitalistic type of farming" caused some changes within the sector. This type of farming expelled a considerable number of tenants (medium skilled labour in this sector), and instead employed a few mechanics and tractor operators (highly skilled labour in this sector), a moderate number of wage labourers (unskilled labour), and an increased number of seasonal labourers (unskilled labour) and labourers for special crops (highly skilled labour in the traditional context). Expelled tenants had to be absorbed by the traditional part of this sector. As against the arguments made by the classical economists, empirical evidence suggests that the industrial sector does not need the so-called unlimited flow of labour force of present quality, but needs a highly skilled labour force.<sup>19</sup> Therefore, the employment opportunities for the evicted tenants are much higher in the agricultural sector than in the other sectors.

The change in the type of farming itself is an indicator of the investment activities within the sector, something which did not occur so extensively in the past. Moreover, the land reform stimulated the landlords to mobilize their savings from unproductive expenditures to productive investments in the non-agricultural sectors. The government also benefited, though very moderately, from the expansion of the tax base by the abolition of "*jagir*".

A "capitalistic type of farming: induced the establishment of two tractor manufacturing industries (the first one was set up in 1961) and stimulated the tube-well manufacturing industries (most of them now run by electricity are made in Pakistan) and other related industries. This is a by-product of the land reform of 1959.

## Conclusion

Land reform, regardless of its objectives, implies a change of status associated with landed property. This holds true whether land reform is used to transfer a society from capitalism to socialism, or from a feudalistic to a modern society based on private ownership, or even if it is used as a means to maintain the established old social order.

In the case of West Pakistan, land reform was not intended to change the direction of society, but was designed to establish the political power of the military regime by setting a ceiling on holdings and distributing the resumed land in excess of this ceiling to tenants and small peasant proprietors. By affecting the most extreme portion of the society, the military regime could successfully establish political power, and this political stability served the purpose of stabilizing the society as well. To establish themselves was the most urgent task for the military regime because its members had little previous interest in stepping out of the military world and therefore, had no experience in politics and administration. This is the reason why they had to set up the Land Reform Commission only four days after they came into power and had to introduce and implement it in a hurry under Martial Law.

Land reform in West Pakistan has served as a means of stabilizing society at least politically. Political stability itself is not a sufficient condition for economic development. However, it is an essential factor for the sustained growth of a society. In this respect the land reform of 1959 will be evaluated for its contribution. The fact that land reform was put into practice for the first time in this part of the country is meaningful along with the fact that it was possible only through political change and under Martial Law. These facts suggest that the political power structure vested in land was so rigid and strong that even a moderate change in the tenure arrangement required strong exogenous power.

This experience of West Pakistan reveals one example of how the character and the degree of land reform is determined

conventional crops, partly because they were set free from the crop restrictions imposed by the landlord, but more fundamentally because a considerable portion of the minimum requirements for subsistence was secured by the share from the rented land.

It is a general expectation that a person works harder or is more careful on his own land than on another's land, because a man feels incentive only when he feels himself in a better position than in the past. Some beneficiaries increased the number of ploughings and amount of fertilizer input. Some of them reclaimed cultivable waste land. These are the changes within the traditional context, but we have to know who feels incentive and who does not.

This was tested in connection with the change in tenure arrangement and the size of holdings. First, all beneficiaries were grouped into independent owners and part owners. Second, these two groups were further classified into four subgroups according to the size of the landholding they were allotted. Subgroup A is the group of farmers who were allocated the land equal to or more than 12.5 acres per family, and also 2 acres per capita. Subgroup B consists of the beneficiaries who got land equal to or more than 12.5 acres, but less than 2 acres per capita. Subgroup C represents the farmers who were allotted 2 acres or more per capita, but less than 12.5 acres. The last subgroup D is a group of beneficiaries who got less than 12.5 acres and also less than 2 acres per capita.

Table 10 shows which group of beneficiaries made efforts to improve the production process. Two results are important. First, the independent owners tried to make greater efforts than the part owners. It is probably due to the fact that they were upgraded socially from tenant to owner, and that since they were cut off from all sources of traditional security given by their ex-landlords, all kinds of risk and uncertainty had to be borne by them. Second, the distribution of land equal to 12.5 acres per family, not a per capita allotment, did give a great incentive to the beneficiaries. This result suggests that the beneficiaries were not informed about the reasoning behind the subsistence holdings of 12.5 acres.

Table 2. West Pakistan: Educational level of MNA and MPA members

	No regular education	Below matriculation	Matriculation	F.A./ F.S.	B.A./ B.S.	M.A./ M.A.	Foreign degree	Total
MPA	4	10	4	3	21	1	0	48
MNA	<u>2</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>11</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>22</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>47</u>
Total	6	15	20	8	43	3	5	95

Table 3. West Pakistan: Command over land, villages and farms of MNA and MPA members

	Total land (a)	Average	Total village command (b)	Average	Total farm household working under them (a)	Average
	<u>Acres</u>		<u>Village</u>		<u>Farm households</u>	
MPA	45,376	1,107	118	3.0	3,553	87
MNA	<u>151,284</u>	<u>3,362</u>	<u>127</u>	<u>3.3</u>	<u>14,586</u>	<u>324</u>
Total	196,660	2,287	245	3.1	18,139	211

(a) Number of respondents = 86.

(b) Number of respondents = 78.

Table 4. West Pakistan: Size of holdings of MNA and MPA members

(acres)	-99	100-399	400-999	1,000-1,999	2,000-4,999	5,000-	No response	Not applicable	Total
	(Members)								
MPA	9	5	15	6	5	1	3	4	48
MNA	<u>8</u>	<u>7</u>	<u>13</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>47</u>
Total	17	12	28	12	11	6	5	4	95

Table 5. West Pakistan: Monthly income of MPA and MNA members

(rupees)	-499	500- 999	1,000- 1,999	2,000- 2,999	3,000- 3,999	4,000 4,999	5,000-	No response	Total
MPA	2	5	12	12	2	3	9	3	48
MNA	0	3	3	8	2	2	26	3	47
Total	2	8	15	20	4	5	35	6	95



Table 6. West Pakistan: Land ownership pattern (1,000 owners, 1,000 acres)

Size (acres)	Punjab <sup>a</sup>		Bahawalpur <sup>b</sup>		N.W.F.P. <sup>c</sup>		Sind <sup>d</sup>		Quetta		Khairpur <sup>e</sup>		Total	
	No.	Area	No.	Area	No.	Area	No.	Area	No.	Area	No.	Area	No.	Area
5	2,313	4,333	40	106	771	2,507	93	344	37	115	8	22	3,266	7,426
5- 25	699	10,286	60	756	237	1,985	142	1,787	31	475	13	150	1,452	15,438
25-100	132	5,642	15	556	76	1,547	52	2,312	9	481	3	79	286	10,616
100-500	18	3,494	2	349	12	855	52	2,312	9	481	3	79	286	10,616
500-	1.7	2,566	0.2	222	0.7	976	3	2,963	0.4	735	0.06	28	6	7,491
Total	3,433	26,321	122	1,988	1,097	7,868	314	9,930	78	2,179	24	355	5,068	48,643

a. 1954/55

b. 1952/53

c. Figures collected in 1955, but year to which these pertain, not mentioned

d. 1946/47

e. as in (c) above

Source: Report of the Land Reform Commission, 1959.

Table 7. West Pakistan: Population and educational level of all sample villages

	Total population	Below school age	Above school age	Can read Koran	Below matriculation	Above matriculation
Male	451	90	361	73	67	7
Female	<u>386</u>	<u>101</u>	<u>285</u>	<u>110</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>0</u>
Total	837	191	646	183	69	7



Table 8. West Pakistan: Income redistribution in sample villages

	Case 1	Case 2	Case 3	Case 4
<u>Before the reform</u>				
1. Land cultivated (acres)	10	10	25	11
2. Total value of produce (Rs.)	1472	2422	4144	2560
3. Rent (Rs.)	517	1211	2072	857
4. (2) - (3) (Rs.)	955	1211	2072	1703
<u>After the reform</u>				
5. Land allotted (acres)	10	10	12.5	8.6
6. Total value of produce (Rs.)	1784	2422	2155	1250
7. Land installment (Rs.)	390	340	400	290
8. Land revenue (Rs.)	80	80	70	56
9. (6) - (7) - (8) (Rs.)	1314	2002	1685	910
10. (9) - (4) - (Rs.)	+359	+791	-387	-793



by the social character of the existing political forces of the society. It seems highly improbable that a radical land reform would be introduced in the existing political setting as our survey on the social character of the military regime shows. This survey may suggest the reason why the land reforms that have been effectively implemented were usually accompanied by political change in the past.

Regardless of the political factors in land reform, it has some effects on the economy of the society. In the case of West Pakistan, the reactions of the landlords are significant for the short-run development of the economy. Perhaps, looking from a purely economic point of view, this response of the landlords might have been the most efficient way to develop the short-term potential capacity of the agricultural sector. This is not an unusual phenomenon. This has been experienced already in some countries like England at the time of the Industrial Revolution, Japan after the Meiji Restoration, Taiwan in the 1920's, etc., where landlords played an important role in the development of the agricultural sector and also of the industrial sector by releasing the labour force and pumping out the rural savings. Land reform was highly successful if we evaluate it from the real intention of the military regime. However, if we evaluate it in terms of the objectives set forth by the Commission such as the "establishment of social justice", the "elimination of feudalistic elements", the "provision of equal opportunities", the "creation of strong middle class", the "establishment of fair rent", etc., the result must be disappointing.

#### Notes

1. D. Warriner, *Land Reform and Development in the Middle East*, London, 1962, pp.3-5.
2. See. D. Warriner, *op.cit.*, K.H. Parson, *Land Reform in the Post-War Era*, August, 1957; T. Takigawa, "A Consideration on the Fundamental character of Land Reform in Contemporary Asia", In Takigawa & Saito, eds., *Land System and Social Structure in Rural Asia*, 1968.
3. United Nations, *Land Reform - Defects in Agrarian Structure as Obstacles to Economic Development*, 1951. United Nations, *Progress in Land Reform*, Fourth Report, 1956.



4. See D. Warriner, *op.cit.*, p.3; J.P. Gillanger "United States Policy Toward Agrarian Reform in Underdeveloped Nations", *Land Economics*, August 1961; V.W. Johnson and B.H. Kristjanson, "Programing for Land Reform in the Developing Agricultural Countries of Latin America", *Land Economics*, November 1964.
5. See V.W. Johson "Significance of Land Ownership in Land Reform", *Land Economics*, May 1961, A. Eckstein, "Land Reform and Economic Development", *World Politics*, July 1955.
6. In this respect Takigawa's pioneering article is important. See T. Takigawa, *op.cit.*
7. The most typical case is England, where the land reforms (in our definition) of the Glorious Revolution in 1688 and the Second Enclosure Movement provided an institutional base for technological changes - from the three field system to the scientific rotation system. Agrarian revolution was a long process that started from the late 17th century to the early 19th century when the scientific rotation system was widely diffused.
8. There are a few articles in which the importance of political factors is pointed out, though not sufficiently. Barraclough and Domieke say, "that capacity of governments to adopt and enforce tenure reform, given the clear case for their urgency, measures their own ability to survive." Ladejinsky points out that "the content and implementation of agrarian reform are a reflection of a particular political balance of forces in a century." Takigawa persistently asserts the political elements in land reform and I pointed out this in another report. See S. L. Barraclough and A. L. Domieke, "Agrarian Structures in Seven Latin American Countries," *Land Economics*, November 1966. p.410. W. Ladejinsky, *op.cit.*, p.456, T. Takigawa, *op.cit.*, S. Hirashima, *Land Reform in West Pakistan*, 1964.
9. Ladejinsky distinguishes the land reform in communistic societies and the reform in non-communistic societies. See W. Ladejinsky, *op.cit.*
10. R. M. Raup, *op.cit.*, p.267.
11. These were 149 members of the West Pakistan Provincial Assembly (MPA) and 76 members of the Pakistan National Assembly (MNA) from West Pakistan. They were divided in to 12 electoral divisions and 35 per cent of the MPA and 65 per cent of MNA were randomly selected in each

division. The total number of MPA and MNA interviewed was 95 (48 MPA, 47 MNA). Interviews were carried out by the author in English, Punjabi, and Urdu during two sessions held in December 1962 and March 1963.

12. Produce Index Unit =  $\text{Gross Value} / \text{Total Matured Area} \times \text{Ratio of the District.}$
13. The Nutritional Advisory Committee calculated (1955 prices) that the cost of a well-balanced diet was Rs.425 - per adult per annum. The Six Year Development Plan proposed that the money income of a family of four adult consumption units should be about Rs.1200/-per annum. The Commission figured out that 16 acres of land in the Khairpur and Hyderabad Divisions, and 12.5 acres in other Divisions would yield such an income. They called it a subsistence holding. An economic holding was considered four times the size of a subsistence holding.
14. This is based on the findings of the field survey conducted in the seven villages of the former Panjab. The validity of the findings was tested in another seven villages in the same area and eleven villages in the former Province of Sind and North West Frontier Province. All beneficiaries of the seven villages were surveyed. The total number of benefited farmhouseholds is 97. The total population of these 97 farms was 837, of which 451 were male. The average size of a farm was 8.6. The survey was conducted in 1962/63.
15. In this survey, the most important districts (Lahore, Multan, Montgomery) of the former Province of Punjab were selected. There were 51 affected landlords in total and we interviewed 31 landlords (60 per cent). Moreover, 30 per cent of the landlords who were not affected but owned land almost equivalent to the affected landlords in the Lahore district were surveyed (10 landlords). The number of landlords interviewed was exceedingly small (41 landlords), but the survey of the MPA and MNA and an extensive observation tour during 1961-63 and 1965 tend to support the general findings appearing in this section.
16. See S. Hirashima, *Farm Mechanization in West Pakistan*, Institute of Developing Economies, 1966.
17. Data were compiled from the original unpublished statistics at Land Commission, Lahore, in December 1964.
18. S. Hirashima, *op.cit.*
19. H. Matsuo, ed., *Labor Conditions in Pakistan*, The Institute of Asian Economic Affairs, 1960.

APPENDIX

Table I. West Pakistan; Occupation and educational level

Occupations	Total number	Below F. A.	Above B.S/B.S.
1. Agriculture only	38	31	7
2. Business only	3	1	2
3. Legal practice only	1	0	1
4. Agriculture plus business	15	8	7
i. Agriculture-cum-business	13	8	5
ii. Agriculture-cum-business-cum-legal practice	1	0	1
iii. Agriculture-cum-business-cum-military service	1	0	1
5. Agriculture plus manufacturing industries	14	5	9
i. Agriculture-cum-manufacturing	10	5	5
ii. Agriculture-cum-manufacturing-cum-civil service	1	0	1
iii. Agriculture-cum-manufacturing-cum-legal practice	3	0	3
6. Agriculture plus legal practice	17	1	16
7. Agriculture plus service	6	3	3
i. Agriculture-cum-civil service	2	1	1
ii. Agriculture-cum-military service	3	2	1
iii. Agriculture-cum-civil service-cum-legal practice	1	0	1