



## International Society Under Fire: The Gaza Crisis (2023-Present) and the Fourth Wave of Revolt Against the West

**Ehsan Razani:** Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science and International Relations, Shahrood Branch, Islamic Azad University, Shahrood, Iran.

Drrazani@iau.ac.ir

**Abstract:** The Gaza crisis (2023–2025) marks a pivotal moment in the evolution of global resistance to Western hegemony, reframing Hedley Bull’s “Revolt Against the West” within the English School’s international society framework. As Bull’s thesis underestimated the ways 21st-century actors would weaponize liberalism’s own institutions, this study investigates how Western unconditional support for Israel has catalyzed a fourth wave of anti-Western revolt, characterized by institutional weaponization, normative disintegration, and digital activism. Employing a multi-method qualitative approach -discourse analysis, institutional case studies, and digital ethnography- the research analyzes primary and secondary literature to map the crisis’s structural consequences. Normative disintegration manifests as postcolonial actors exploit liberal contradictions, while digital resistance amplifies transnational counter-narratives. The study argues that this multidimensional revolt transcends Bull’s original sovereignty-justice-culture model, signaling a shift toward a pluralist, contested international order. While institutional and normative strategies challenge Western dominance, digital activism’s atmospheric role underscores the revolt’s complexity. The Gaza case suggests a redefinition of global governance, urging policymakers to address legitimacy crises or risk a fragmented multipolar order. This analysis extends the English School’s historicist lens, proposing a theoretical update to account for 21st-century hybrid resistance and its implications for international society’s future.

**Keywords:** English School of IR, Revolt Against the West, Gaza Crisis, Institutional Weaponization, Normative Disintegration, Digital Resistance, Counter-Hegemonic, Global South.

## **Introduction**

The English School (ES) of International Relations offers a unique synthesis of normative, historical, and sociological perspectives on world politics. Unlike Realism's focus on power or Liberalism's institutional optimism, the ES examines how states form an international society- a shared system of rules, institutions, and values -while acknowledging the enduring reality of anarchy. The English School framework has been employed by scholars to analyze critical developments in world politics across multiple historical and contemporary contexts. Bull (1977) first applied its concepts to explain the management of great power relations during the Cold War, while Watson (1992) used it to trace the expansion of international society from its European origins to global scale. More recently, Buzan (2004) examined how the post-Cold War 'unipolar moment' tested the resilience of international society's institutions. The framework has also illuminated non-Western challenges to the liberal order, from the New International Economic Order (NIEO) movement of the 1970s (Bull & Watson 1984) to contemporary BRICS Plus institutionalization (Stuenkel, 2023). In the Middle East, ES analysis has decoded regional resistance to Western interventionism (Bilgin 2005) and the Arab Spring's impact on sovereignty norms (Halliday 2011).

The English School (ES) of International Relations, indeed, occupies a unique theoretical space between realist power politics and liberal institutionalism, distinguished by its foundational claim that sovereign states form an international society bound by shared rules and institutions despite anarchic conditions (Bull 1977, 13). This tradition emerged from the British Committee on the Theory of International Politics in the 1950s-60s, where Martin Wight's (1991) three traditions framework -Hobbesian realism, Kantian revolutionism, and Grotian rationalism- provided its conceptual architecture. While often mischaracterized as merely a middle ground, the ES offers an ontologically distinct approach that examines how states socially construct governance through historical practices like diplomacy, war laws, and great power management (Buzan 2014, 67). Its seminal thinkers -particularly Hedley Bull and Adam Watson- demonstrated that the European states system evolved into a global international society not through material forces alone, but via the

contested diffusion of norms like sovereignty and territoriality (Watson 1992, 211).

The ES's conceptual toolkit provides unparalleled analytical purchase on post-1945 international order. Bull's (1977, 254) order vs justice dialectic explains how decolonization stretched international society's Eurocentric foundations, while Watson's (1984) expansion thesis revealed the violent acculturation of non-Western states into this system. These frameworks expose the paradox of contemporary global governance: the very institutions created to universalize order (UN Charter, ICC) became battlegrounds for what Bull termed the Hedley Bull's 'Revolt Against the West' (hereafter RAW)- evident in NIEO demands and Global South legal activism (Acharya 2017, 523). The School's recent reinvigoration stems from its ability to diagnose 21st century challenges. Buzan's (2018, 45) reconvened ES incorporates non-state actors and hybrid governance, while Acharya's (2014) Global IR critique pushes the tradition beyond its Eurocentric blind spots.

In the contemporary era, the ES illuminates three disruptive trends: First, the strategic instrumentalization of international law by marginalized states (e.g., South Africa's ICJ case against Israel); Second, the institutional fragmentation exemplified by BRICS+ alternatives to Western financial architectures; and Third, the normative polycentrism challenging liberal universalism (Stuenkel, 2023, 112). These developments validate Wight's prescient warning that international society's stability depends on accommodating civilizational pluralism -a lesson ignored by post-Cold War liberal hegemonists (Hurrell 2018, 89). What makes the ES indispensable today is its historicist methodology: unlike ahistorical rationalist theories, it traces how present crises emerge from unresolved tensions in international society's contested evolution (Keene 2022, 34).

The present paper employs Hedley Bull's RAW conceptual framework to analyze how the Global South's institutional response to unconditional U.S.-Western support for Israel (2023-present) challenges the legitimacy of Western-dominated international order. Rather than focusing on Gaza's internal dynamics, the study examines the structural consequences of the crisis in occupied lands of Palestine:

the weaponization of international law, the fracturing of consensus in multilateral bodies, and the acceleration of alternative diplomatic coalitions. These developments collectively represent what might be termed a diplomatic insurgency -a systematic challenge to hegemonic governance norms that operationalizes Bull's fundamental tension between pluralist order and demands for postcolonial justice. The analysis demonstrates how Global South states are leveraging institutional platforms to rewrite the rules of engagement in international society, although the ultimate trajectory of this revolt requires further scholarly attention.

The paper unfolds in six interrelated sections: first, research background traces the historical arc of Global South resistance to Western hegemony, through Bull's English School framework, tracing its evolution from post-WWII decolonization to today's institutional and digital resistance, with Gaza crisis as a pivotal case study. Second, theoretical framework presents Hedley Bull's English School framework of international society and his RAW thesis, then updates it with a fourth wave of resistance (institutional, normative, digital) using Gaza 2023 as a case study. The third and fourth sections map the study's research objectives, hypothesis and variables, as well as methodology and data collection approach of the research. Section 5 presents the core analysis, examining how the Gaza crisis demonstrates a fourth wave of anti-Western revolt through three dimensions: the humanitarian catastrophe's anatomy, Western support structures, and Global South counterstrategies. The final section provides concluding remarks, assessing the long-term implications of this fourth wave revolt for international society.

### 1. Research Background

The English School (ES) of International Relations provides a unique lens through which to examine the structural fractures in contemporary international society, particularly the Global South's institutional revolt against Western dominance. This section provides an analytical review of the ES and the crisis of western hegemony. It examines three critical phases of postwar international politics -the post-1945 liberal order, the post-1991 unipolar moment, and the post-2022 multipolar revolt- through the prism of Hedley Bull's RAW

framework, demonstrating how each era intensified tensions between pluralist order and postcolonial justice.

### **1.2. Post-WWII: The Contradictions of Liberal Order**

The ES emerged amid the collapse of European imperialism, with Bull and Watson (1984) documenting how decolonization transformed international society from a Eurocentric club into a global system fraught with competing visions of legitimacy. The 1945 UN Charter, while enshrining sovereign equality (Article 2(1) of the United Nations Charter) among all UN member states, preserved Western hegemony through Security Council veto power, a pluralist compromise that Bull (1977, 254) argued would inevitably provoke justice-based revolts. This tension materialized in the 1970s New International Economic Order (NIEO) demands, where Global South states weaponized UN Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and the General Assembly to challenge Bretton Woods institutions (Acharya 2017, 523). Crucially, the ES interpreted these conflicts not as anarchic resistance but as constitutive struggles over international society's rules -a dynamic now resurgent in Palestine-related diplomacy.

Recent scholarship has further dissected this era, with Anghie (2021, 112) revealing how decolonization's legal contradictions persist in contemporary Global South activism, while Getachew (2019, 78) frames the NIEO as a worldmaking project against neocolonial economic architectures. Quinton (2023, 45) updates this analysis, showing how BRICS' New Development Bank operationalizes 1970s sovereignty claims through 21st-century institutional innovation. These works collectively affirm Bull's prescience about revolt as a structuring logic of international society (Keene 2022, 34).

### **1.3. Post-Soviet Western Arrogation and Its Backlash**

The unipolar era (1991-2022) saw the West, particularly the U.S., instrumentalize international society's institutions for liberal hegemony—a departure from Bull's pluralist expectations. NATO's Kosovo intervention (1999) and the ICC's selective prosecutions exposed what Simpson (2004) terms legalized hegemony, where great powers exempt themselves from the rules they impose on others. The term has been critically extended by subsequent scholars. Krisch (2005,

369) demonstrates how the UN Security Council's counterterrorism resolutions (e.g., Resolution 1373) imposed binding norms on weaker states while exempting P5 members from oversight. Similarly, Cohen (2012, 118) analyzes the ICC's selective focus on African cases as evidence of neo-imperial adjudication, contrasting it with Western impunity for Iraq and Afghanistan. More recently, Hakimi (2020, 45) reframes this dynamic as asymmetric legalism, showing how the U.S. and EU instrumentalize investment tribunals to enforce neoliberal policies abroad while resisting ISDS claims domestically. These works collectively reveal how legalized hegemony evolves across regimes, from security to trade law, sustaining what Bull (1977) termed hierarchical anarchies in international society.

This hypocrisy fueled what Bull anticipated as a cultural revolt: non-Western states increasingly rejected liberal universalism, evident in ASEAN's 2012 rejection of EU human rights conditionality (Buzan 2014, 112) and Russia-China's promotion of civilizational diversity in UN forums (Zhang 2023, 45). Zhang's (2023) work crucially extends this analysis by framing civilizational rhetoric as a counter-hegemonic institutional strategy, not merely discursive resistance -a conceptual pivot that has informed subsequent critiques of Western-dominated order. Acharya (2024, 112) adopts this lens to analyze how the "Global Civilizational Group" at the UN (led by China and Pakistan) weaponizes cultural relativism to block LGBTQ+ rights resolutions, while Stuenkel (2023, 78) demonstrates how BRICS+ states invoke civilizational sovereignty to justify alternative financial institutions like the New Development Bank. Most sharply, Quinton (2023, 15) critiques Zhang's thesis as institutional mimicry, arguing that civilizational claims merely replicate Western exceptionalism under new branding. These engagements reveal how Zhang's framework has become a touchstone for debates on post-Western institutional contestation. The ES's conceptual tools-particularly Watson's (1992) spectrum of states systems- help explain how Western overreach accelerated the very revolts it sought to suppress, while Zhang (2023, 48) reveals how these revolts now exploit the West's own institutional platforms (e.g., UNHRC, UNESCO) to delegitimize its dominance.

#### 1.4. Bull's Revolt Against the West: A 21st-Century Update

The post-2022 Gaza crisis epitomizes Bull's framework, revealing three new revolt modalities: First, Legal Insurgency: South Africa's ICJ case (2024) represents a solidarist turn in revolt tactics, using Western-constructed courts to enforce Palestinian rights -precisely the "justice vs. order" paradox Bull foresaw (ICJ 2024, para. 17). The paradox refers to the inherent tension in international society where the pursuit of justice (e.g., decolonization, human rights) often destabilizes the existing order (e.g., sovereignty norms, great power dominance), while efforts to preserve order (e.g., veto power, intervention rules) frequently perpetuate injustices -a dynamic he argued was irreconcilable yet constitutive of international relations (The Anarchical Society, 1977, pp. 83-94). The second modality is Coalitional Hedging: BRICS+ expansion (2024) institutionalizes what Stuenkel (2023, 89) calls parallel primary institutions, with the New Development Bank and Contingent Reserve Arrangement directly challenging IMF/WB dominance. And finally the third, Normative Fragmentation: The UNGA's 153-10 Gaza ceasefire vote (2023) demonstrates diagonal accountability (Lührmann et al. 2020), where Global South majorities bypass Western veto power through symbolic censure within UNGA votes framework as symbolic mechanism that serve as: Moral Condemnation and Institutional Workaround as well. These developments demand a revision of Bull's original thesis: today's revolt is not merely postcolonial resistance but a reconstitution of international society's architecture. Where Bull focused on states, contemporary actors include NGOs (BDS movement), digital publics, and hybrid coalitions.

There are theoretical Implications for the present discussion. The ES's enduring value lies in its historicist approach -unlike ahistorical rationalist theories, it anticipates such revolts as inevitable consequences of international society's contested expansion (Keene 2022, 34). The Gaza crisis exposes three blind spots in Bull's framework: (1) Institutional layering (competing frameworks like AIIB vs. IMF), (2) Normative revolt (exploiting liberal contradictions in ICJ/UNGA), and (3) Digital resistance (algorithmic activism like #GazaGenocide). These reveal not just state-led rebellion but a

reconfiguration of international society's architecture -where institutional, discursive, and technological struggles collectively challenge Western hegemony. These blind spots, however, do not diminish the ES's explanatory power but rather highlight avenues for its evolution. By engaging with institutional layering, normative revolt, and digital resistance the School could refine its historicist framework to account for 21st-century dynamics -where algorithmic agency and multipolar governance reshape international society's expansion. Future scholarship might thus bridge classical ES insights with emergent realities, ensuring its continued relevance in an era of disruptive pluralism.

Regarding the task at hand, while the ES's analysis of contested international order has been applied to various regional crises, post-Gaza developments remain underexplored through this lens. A handful of international scholars have examined Global South resistance to Western hegemony in ways that implicitly resonate with Bull's 'revolt' thesis. Buzan (2014) frames this resistance as a structural tension within international society, while Hurrell (2018) highlights institutional competition (e.g., AIIB vs. IMF) as a form of pluralist revolt -though neither focuses explicitly on Gaza. Recent works like Gonzalez-Perez (2008, 2020) explore how Global South actors institutionalize resistance to Western hegemony, particularly through gendered critiques of counterterrorism frameworks and alternative governance models (e.g., pp. 112-115), explicit English School applications to Gaza remain rare. Iranian scholarship offers critical perspectives on this dynamic, as well: Sajjadpour (2013) analyzes the Axis of Resistance as a counter-hegemonic project, and Zarei (2020) explores multipolarity through regional institutions like the SCO. However, as Moshirzadeh (2007) demonstrates in her discursive analysis of Iranian foreign policy, these critiques often stop short of engaging English School theory systematically, leaving the consequences of Gaza's post-October 2023 developments undertheorized within the ES framework.

## **2. Theoretical Framework**

The English School (ES) of International Relations, pioneered by scholars like Hedley Bull (1977), Martin Wight (1991), and Herbert

Butterfield (1966), offers a distinctive approach centered on the concept of "international society"-a shared framework of rules, norms, and institutions among states (Bull 1977, 13). Its foundational text, *The Anarchical Society* (Bull 1977), argues that despite the absence of a world government, states form a society bound by common interests and values, mediated through diplomacy, international law, and balance-of-power politics. The ES distinguishes itself from realism and liberalism by emphasizing normative structures (e.g., sovereignty, non-intervention) and historical continuity in interstate relations (Wight 1991, 7).

The English School's analytical framework is structured around three core dimensions. First, Martin Wight's (1991) Three Traditions -Realist (Hobbesian power politics), Rationalist (Grotian rule-based order), and Revolutionist (Kantian cosmopolitanism)- map competing logics of interstate relations. Second, Hedley Bull (1977, 71-94) identified five institutions of international society (war, diplomacy, international law, great-power management, and the balance of power) that sustain minimal order among states. A central debate within the School pits pluralists like Bull, who prioritize state sovereignty and procedural norms, against solidarists such as Vincent (1986), who argue for collective enforcement of substantive values like human rights. This tension reflects the School's historical evolution: its first wave (1950s-70s), led by Butterfield and Wight, examined European state systems; the second wave (1980s-2000s), advanced by Bull and Buzan (2004), incorporated global governance and normative change; while the ongoing third wave (Zhang 2020) critiques Eurocentrism by recovering non-Western international societies.

The English School (ES) provides a compelling framework for analyzing the post-Cold War international order, particularly in reconciling the tension between U.S. hegemony and the persistence of international society. Bull's (1977) conception of a rules-based order mediated through institutions like diplomacy and international law helps explain how American unipolarity after 1991 operated within- and occasionally against- the normative structures of international society. The post-Soviet era saw the U.S. simultaneously uphold institutionalized multilateralism (e.g., UNSC resolutions, WTO

arbitration) while engaging in unilateral violations (e.g., Iraq 2003, Trump's withdrawal from the Iran deal and Paris Accords), exposing the fragility of solidarist aspirations (Vincent 1986). Trump's transactional "America First" policies, which weaponized economic sanctions (against Iran, Russia) and rejected cosmopolitan norms (climate agreements, ICC), accelerated a crisis in the Grotian rationalist tradition -where great-power management (Bull 1977, 207) gave way to coercive bilateralism. Yet, as Buzan (2004) notes, international society has proven resilient through adaptive practices: secondary institutions (BRICS, AIIB) now contest Western dominance, while even U.S. rivals like China and Russia rhetorically appeal to UN Charter principles, reinforcing pluralism's enduring logic. The Ukraine conflict exemplifies this Duality-Russia's invasion violated sovereignty norms, but its justification through "responsibility to protect" claims (however cynically deployed) demonstrates the inescapability of international society's discursive framework. Thus, while U.S. hegemony eroded the solidarist project, it inadvertently revitalized pluralism as the default condition of order, with rising powers leveraging ES institutions (law, diplomacy) to constrain unilateralism, albeit within an increasingly fragmented and conflictual system.

This tension between hegemonic unilateralism and the adaptive resilience of international society directly echoes Bull's RAW wherein postcolonial states historically challenged Western dominance through -rather than outside of- the system's normative and institutional frameworks, a pattern now replicated by contemporary powers like China and Russia as they weaponize liberal internationalist rhetoric (e.g., multipolarity, and sovereign equality) to contest U.S. primacy. The 2023 Gaza conflict epitomizes this dynamic: South Africa's ICJ case accusing Israel of genocide strategically deployed the language of international law -a cornerstone of Western-designed institutions- to isolate Israel and expose contradictions in U.S.-led liberal order, mirroring Bull's observation that anti-Western revolts often co-opt the system's rules to undermine its architects (Bull 1984, 224). The concept, indeed, provides the foundation for analyzing contemporary challenges to Western hegemony, while the Gaza crisis reveals new dimensions of resistance requiring theoretical expansion.

This framework section proceeds in three parts: First, it briefly examines Bull's original phases of anti-Western revolt (sovereignty, justice, culture) as the basis for understanding normative contestation. Second, it identifies emerging forms of resistance (institutional, normative, digital) that constitute a fourth wave beyond Bull's framework. Finally, it establishes the relevance of this expanded approach for analyzing post-October 7 developments, where traditional and novel resistance strategies intersect. This synthesis offers an updated theoretical lens for studying how international society's structures and norms are being challenged and transformed.

### **2.1. Sovereignty, Justice, Culture: The Evolving Terrains of Anti-Western Revolt in Bull's Framework**

Bull argues that postcolonial states and non-Western actors challenge the legitimacy of Western-imposed norms and institutions, seeking a more equitable global order. In his view, such revolt is not merely political but normative -demanding recognition, justice, and reform of the international system itself. Bull (1984, 217-28) identified three phases of anti-Western revolt: First, Legal Sovereignty (1945-60s), marked by decolonization and UN membership for Global South states, which formalized political independence while exposing the limits of procedural equality in an unequal system. Second, Economic Justice (1960s-80s), characterized by demands for structural redistribution through mechanisms like the New International Economic Order (NIEO), reflecting disillusionment with postcolonial economic subordination despite formal sovereignty. Third, Cultural Resistance (1980s-2000s), which rejected Western universalism, particularly in debates over human rights and humanitarian intervention, asserting alternative normative frameworks rooted in regional or civilizational identities.

Bull's framework underscores that these waves were cumulative, not sequential -each layer of revolt compounded earlier grievances while introducing new fronts of contestation. The legal revolt exposed the hypocrisy of sovereign equality, the economic revolt revealed the entrenched hierarchies of global capitalism, and the cultural revolt challenged the epistemic dominance of Western

liberalism. Crucially, Bull saw these revolts as dialectical: they forced adaptations in Western-dominated international society (e.g., limited concessions to NIEO demands) while also reinforcing systemic resilience (e.g., co-optation of dissent into neoliberal globalization).

Despite the fact that Bull's three-dimensional framework (legal sovereignty, economic justice, and cultural resistance) remains foundational, contemporary scholars have expanded his model to account for 21st-century dynamics, proposing a fourth wave of revolt characterized by digital mobilization, institutional fragmentation, and normative disintegration. This evolution reflects broader shifts in global power structures, resistance modalities, and the erosion of Western unipolarity. For years, key contributors like Mohammed Ayooob (2002), Barry Buzan and Laust Schouenborg (2018), Miriyam Aouragh (2021), Oliver Stuenkel (2023), William Youmans (2024), and Richard Falk (2024) have advanced Bull's framework, emphasizing their theoretical innovations and empirical insights.

## **2.2. Beyond Bull's Revolt: Digital Resistance, Institutional Fragmentation, and Moral-Normative Disintegration**

The contemporary landscape of resistance against Western hegemony has evolved in ways that fundamentally challenge and expand Bull's (1984, 217-228) classic RAW framework. Recent scholarship demonstrates how institutional fragmentation, normative contestation, and digital technologies have created overlapping and mutually reinforcing vectors of revolt that transcend Bull's state-centric model. This fourth wave of resistance operates through complex, non-linear channels that reflect the transformed nature of international society in the digital age.

The institutional architecture of global governance has undergone significant fragmentation, with emerging powers constructing alternative structures that challenge Western dominance. Oliver Stuenkel's (2023, 56) examination of institutions like the AIIB and New Development Bank reveals how economic revolt has evolved from Bull's era of NIEO demands to a more sophisticated strategy of

parallel institution-building. This structural revolt complements what Barry Buzan and Laust Schouenborg (2018, 78) identify as "hedged resistance," where states simultaneously engage with and subvert Western-dominated institutions - exemplified by South Africa's use of the ICJ to challenge Israeli policies while remaining within the international legal framework. This dual strategy of operating both within and against the system represents a significant evolution beyond Bull's conception of discrete, sequential resistance phases.

Concurrently, the normative dimension of contemporary revolt has similarly intensified, with Global South actors increasingly weaponizing Western liberal discourse to expose its contradictions. Richard Falk (2024, 18) documents how the Gaza conflict has become a focal point for challenging the "rules-based order," with accusations of Western hypocrisy significantly eroding the moral authority of traditional powers. This builds upon Mohammed Ayoob's (2002, 85) earlier observations about postcolonial states reappropriating sovereignty norms to resist interventionism, a strategy that has matured into a comprehensive challenge to international society's normative foundations. The resulting normative disintegration creates a crisis of legitimacy that permeates all levels of global governance.

Digital platforms have emerged as crucial arenas for contemporary resistance, enabling new forms of political mobilization that bypass traditional state channels. Miriyam Aouragh's (2021, 92) analysis of Palestinian cyber-activism demonstrates how marginalized groups weaponize social media to contest Western media hegemony, creating alternative narratives that challenge dominant geopolitical discourses. This digital resistance achieves particular potency through what William Youmans (2024, 12) terms "algorithmic international society," where platforms like TikTok and Twitter facilitate the rapid formation of transnational "counterpublics" capable of outpacing and undermining Western narrative control. The #GazaGenocide phenomenon exemplifies how digital dissent can achieve global reach while remaining largely impervious to traditional diplomatic countermeasures, representing a qualitative shift from Bull's state-focused framework.

These intersecting developments -digital mobilization, institutional fragmentation, and normative contestation- collectively constitute a fourth wave of resistance that operates through decentralized but mutually reinforcing channels. Unlike Bull's sequential model, contemporary resistance mechanisms are simultaneous and interdependent, creating a polycentric challenge to Western hegemony that is both more diffuse and more penetrating than previous forms of revolt. This complexity demands a reconceptualization of international society that accounts for the growing agency of non-state digital actors, the fragmentation of governance architectures, and the erosion of Western normative leadership.

### **2.3. Theoretical Relevance: Applying and Expanding Bull's Revolt Thesis and the Fourth Wave Extension**

This study employs Bull's RAW thesis as its foundational framework, while proposing a critical extension to account for contemporary dynamics exemplified by the post-October 7 Gaza crisis. Grounded in the English School tradition, the analysis examines how challenges to Western hegemony have evolved beyond Bull's original three-phase model (legal sovereignty, economic justice, and cultural resistance) to incorporate new modalities of contestation in the digital age.

The English School provides the essential theoretical scaffolding for this investigation, particularly through its conceptualization of international society as a contested normative order (Buzan 2014). Bull's framework remains invaluable for understanding the structural and normative dimensions of anti-Western resistance, particularly his insights about how postcolonial states have historically sought to reform international society while simultaneously operating within its institutional parameters. However, the Gaza crisis reveals limitations in Bull's state-centric approach, particularly his inability to anticipate the emergence of digital resistance and the fragmentation of global governance architectures.

This study contends that the Gaza crisis exemplifies a fourth wave of revolt characterized by three interconnected dynamics: (1) institutional weaponization via alternative forums like the ICJ and

UNGA (Stuenkel, 2023), (2) normative hypocrisy discourses that exploit contradictions in Western liberal internationalism (Falk, 2024), and (3) digital resistance through algorithmic activism and social media mobilization (Aouragh, 2021). As said, these elements together represent a qualitative shift from Bull's original framework, reflecting both the technological transformations of global politics and the increasing sophistication of resistance strategies.

Even though the three dimensions define the fourth-wave revolt, the present analysis centers on institutional weaponization (ICJ/UNGA) and normative hypocrisy discourses -the arenas where Global South state practice is most legible and consequential. Digital resistance, though transformative in mobilizing transnational solidarity, operates primarily at the sub-state level, its effects harder to disentangle from formal policy shifts. The ICJ's provisional measures on Gaza and the Global South's UNGA voting cohesion, by contrast, demonstrate a targeted repurposing of liberal order's infrastructure -a revolt not of rhetoric but of rules. The fourth wave concept builds upon rather than replaces Bull's tripartite model. Digital resistance extends Bull's cultural resistance phase into new communicative realms, institutional weaponization represents an evolution of legal sovereignty claims, and normative hypocrisy discourses continue economic justice struggles through rhetorical means. Crucially, these dynamics operate simultaneously rather than sequentially, creating a more complex and multidimensional challenge to Western hegemony than Bull anticipated.

This theoretical synthesis offers several analytical advantages for examining the post-October 7 Gaza crisis. First, it accounts for the agency of non-state actors in shaping international legitimacy contests. Second, it explains how resistance operates both within and against existing institutional structures. Third, it captures the discursive strategies employed to undermine Western moral authority. By integrating Bull's foundational insights with these contemporary developments, the framework provides a more comprehensive tool for understanding post-Western challenges to international order.

Table 1 provides clear definitions of key terms, grounded in original sources and aligned with the paper's objectives.

Concept	Definition	Key Sources	Application to Gaza Crisis
International Society	A social order among states bound by shared rules/institutions despite anarchy	Bull (1977, pp.13-17); Buzan (2014)	UNGA votes, ICJ case, and digital norms contesting Israel's actions
Revolt Against the West (RAW)	Postcolonial challenges to Western dominance through legal, economic, cultural phases	Bull (1984, pp.217-228)	Gaza as fourth wave: combines all three historical phases + new digital/institutional tactics
Fourth Wave Revolt	Hybrid resistance blending: 1) Digital activism 2) Institutional weaponization 3) Normative hypocrisy	Aouragh (2021); Stuenkel (2023); Falk (2024)	#GazaGenocide viral campaigns; South Africa's ICJ case; "rules-based order" critiques
Pluralism vs Solidarism	Pluralism: Sovereignty focus; Solidarism: Collective human rights enforcement	Vincent (1986)	Tests whether BRICS/OIC responses prioritize sovereignty (pluralist) or R2P (solidarist)
Hegemonic Transition	Shifts in dominant power structures and legitimacy narratives	Buzan (2004, Ch.3)	Gaza as accelerant for BRICS expansion and Western narrative decline

**Table 1.** Conceptual Clarification

### 3. Research Objective Statement

This study examines how the global response to the October 2023 Gaza crisis, particularly Western unconditional support for Israel, demonstrates a fourth wave of anti-Western revolt in international

society, as theorized through: Institutional fragmentation: Global South states' strategic use of alternative forums (e.g., ICJ, BRICS) to bypass Western-dominated governance; normative disintegration: Weaponization of liberal discourse (e.g., genocide accusations) to expose Western hypocrisy in enforcing international law; and digital resistance: Algorithmic activism (e.g., #GazaGenocide) creating transnational counterpublics that undermine Western narrative control.

The research hypothesizes that the Gaza crisis has accelerated this fourth wave, marking a qualitative shift from Bull's original three-phase model (sovereignty, justice, culture) by leveraging post-liberal resistance tactics within international society's structures.

The study argues that Western unconditional support for Israel (independent variable) has catalyzed a fourth wave of anti-Western revolt (dependent variable), manifested through institutional fragmentation, normative disintegration, and digital resistance - three dimensions that simultaneously challenge and reshape international society's structures.

Table 2 demonstrates how these variables operationalize Bull's framework while addressing contemporary gaps.

Variable	Link to Hedley Bull's Framework	Contemporary Significance
Western Support (IV)	Upholds hierarchical "order" against justice demands	Reveals erosion of liberal order's legitimacy
Institutional Fragmentation (DV1)	Revolts co-opt institutions (Bull 1984)	Tests BRICS/ICJ as post-Western governance tools
Normative Disintegration (DV2)	Challenges solidarist claims (Vincent 1986)	Shows lawfare as anti-hegemonic strategy

Digital Resistance (DV3)	Blind spot in Bull: Non-state actors' role	Proposes "algorithmic international society"
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**Table 2.** Theoretical Relevance of Variables

#### 4. Research Methodology

This study employs a multi-method qualitative approach to examine the fourth wave of anti-Western revolt in the context of the Gaza crisis, combining discourse analysis, institutional case studies, and digital ethnography to ensure methodological rigor while adhering to conventional IR research standards. Data has been collected from the primary sources such as official documents (UN resolutions, ICJ proceedings, state declarations) and digital activism traces (Twitter/X, TikTok, Instagram, and Telegram content using keywords like #GazaGenocide, filtered via AI-assisted metadata aggregation with human verification). This study draws upon a range of secondary sources as well, to contextualize and analyze the fourth wave of anti-Western revolt, ensuring theoretical depth and empirical grounding. These include: Academic Literature like foundational English School texts, contemporary IR scholarship on digital resistance, critical studies of liberal international order, postcolonial critiques of international law, studies of normative change in IR, and publication dates weighted toward post-2010 for digital analysis. While AI tools aided in data aggregation (social media trends, sentiment analysis), all interpretive analysis remained human-led to preserve critical nuance. Qualitative Discourse Analysis has been utilized in the study to examine normative rhetoric in UN debates/ICJ filings using Bull's framework, as well as Process Tracing to map institutional fragmentation via institutional responses vs. Western bloc actions.

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Data collection draws on two primary sources: official documents (UN resolutions, ICJ proceedings, state declarations) as well as digital activism traces (Twitter/X, TikTok, Instagram, and Telegram content). AI tools played two auxiliary roles in this process: facilitating metadata aggregation and sentiment analysis for large-scale digital data, and refining academic expression for theoretical precision. Crucially, most of interpretive analysis remained researcher-led, with AI serving strictly as an assistive technology -analytical frameworks, argumentative structures, and substantive interpretations were developed and validated through traditional scholarly processes. The study contextualizes these findings through secondary sources including: foundational English School texts, contemporary IR scholarship on digital resistance, postcolonial critiques of international law, normative change studies (prioritizing post-2010 publications for digital analysis), internet websites, news agencies, and reputable international outlets for real-time event tracking and geopolitical context. Methodologically, qualitative discourse analysis examines normative rhetoric in UN/ICJ forums using Bull's framework, while the process tracing component look at fragmentation patterns across multilateral institutions rather than focusing on specific blocs, while maintaining emphasis on how Global South actors have instrumentalized international forums.

## **5. Discussion and Analysis**

This section examines how the Gaza crisis (2023-2025) has catalyzed a fourth wave of the Revolt Against the West, transforming international society's power dynamics. First, it analyzes the humanitarian catastrophe's anatomy and Western complicity. Second, it explores Global South counterstrategies: institutional weaponization (ICJ/UNGA), normative hypocrisy discourses, and digital resistance. Together, these subsections reveal how anti-Western revolts now exploit -and reshape- the liberal order's own infrastructure.

### **5.1. Gaza 2023-2025: Anatomy of a Humanitarian Catastrophe**

The humanitarian catastrophe unfolding in Gaza (2023-2025) represents both the culmination of decades of systemic violence and a qualitative shift in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This crisis finds its

roots in the United Nations' 1947 proposal to partition British Mandate Palestine into separate Jewish and Arab states (Al-Monitor 2025). While Zionist representatives approved the plan, Palestinian and Arab leaders opposed the division of territory (CFR Education 2025). When Israel declared statehood in May 1948, surrounding Arab nations launched a military intervention, beginning the first Arab-Israeli war (Al-Monitor 2025). The conflict resulted in Israel expanding its borders beyond the UN partition lines while approximately 700,000 Palestinians became refugees - an event remembered as the Nakba ("catastrophe") in Palestinian history (CFR Education 2025). The Six-Day War of June 1967 proved transformative as Israel occupied the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and East Jerusalem, territories that became central to ongoing disputes (Al-Monitor 2025). A potential breakthrough came with the 1993 Oslo Accords, which created the Palestinian Authority and established frameworks for peace negotiations, though subsequent implementation failures and outbreaks of violence undermined progress (Al-Monitor 2025).

The conflict entered a new phase in the early 2000s with the Second Intifada uprising and Hamas's 2007 takeover of the Gaza Strip. This led to recurring cycles of warfare between Israel and Hamas, disproportionately affecting civilian populations in Gaza. The 2014 Gaza War lasted 50 days, marked by Hamas rocket attacks and Israel's military response, resulting in over 2,200 Palestinian and 73 Israeli deaths (UN OCHA 2014). The 2021 conflict erupted from Jerusalem tensions and caused over 250 Palestinian and 13 Israeli fatalities (OHCHR 2021). After the destructive 2014 Gaza war and the 2021 escalation, Hamas reportedly restructured its military capabilities while political tensions intensified under Israel's far-right coalition government (ICG 2023).

The Gaza conflict reached a pivotal moment on January 19th 2023 when a negotiated truce finally took hold, offering temporary relief to Palestinian civilians after more than a year of continuous violence. This pause came after the October 7th, 2023 attacks by Palestinian militant factions, which resulted in approximately 1,200 Israeli and international civilian deaths and the abduction of more than 250 individuals to Gaza. In response, Israeli forces initiated an intensive military campaign that many international observers

condemned as disproportionate collective retaliation. Soon, Israel's subsequent military offensive leveled entire neighborhoods in Gaza and the conflict escalated regionally, with Israeli invasion of Hezbollah in Lebanon, armed groups in the West Bank, Iranian-backed factions in Syria and Yemen, and finally, Iran. The subsequent months witnessed widespread allegations of severe international law violations, with numerous human rights organizations documenting potential war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocidal acts by Israeli forces. Official health authorities in Gaza report the offensive has claimed more than 50,000 Palestinian lives, with injury totals surpassing 100,000 -predominantly affecting women and minors (Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect 2025).

According to the UN Special Rapporteur's 2024 report, the military offensive in Gaza resulted in catastrophic damage to civilian infrastructure, with reports indicating the destruction or severe impairment of 77% of medical facilities, 68% of telecommunications systems, and significant portions of municipal services and transportation networks. Approximately 60% of Gaza's 439,000 housing units were rendered uninhabitable, along with 68% of residential buildings. The assault completely eradicated all higher education institutions and damaged 60% of schools, including 13 libraries. Cultural heritage suffered greatly, with 195 historical sites, 208 mosques, 3 churches, and the Central Archives - containing 150 years of historical records - destroyed. By January 2024, over one million residents had been forcibly displaced to southern areas amid widespread urban devastation. Prior to the current conflict, Gaza's 16-year blockade had already created an isolated, densely populated territory with severely limited resources. The situation deteriorated further when Israeli officials publicly declared a comprehensive siege on October 9, 2023, explicitly cutting off all electricity, food, water and fuel supplies to the territory. This deliberate deprivation of basic necessities to an already vulnerable population created life-threatening conditions beyond the immediate dangers of military bombardment. Gaza's healthcare system, already weakened by years of restrictions, faced complete collapse during the offensive. Medical facilities serving as shelters for displaced persons became

overwhelmed and were systematically targeted, with some hospitals transformed into combat zones through military occupation and sniper positioning (Albanese 2024, para. 12-18). Albanese's report on the situation in Gaza indicates that conditions continued to deteriorate through 2025, as documented in follow-up assessments, in the wake of October 2023, the apparatus of control underwent a significant evolution, as decades-old practices of appropriation and subjugation developed into integrated networks employing financial, digital and governance tools to carry out large-scale damage. The same actors who previously maintained and capitalized on Palestinian exclusion within the framework of military occupation have now adapted their operations to engage in "the economy of genocide" (Albanese 2025).

As of today, and while this article is being finalized (August 2025), war crimes and humanitarian catastrophes in Gaza persist with systematic intensity, as documented by UN-mandated investigations (Albanese 2025; OHCHR 2025). According to data from Gaza's Health Ministry, Israeli military operations have resulted in more than 61,000 Palestinian fatalities. While the Ministry's reporting does not distinguish between combatant and civilian casualties, its statistics indicate that approximately 50% of the deceased were women and children (PBS NewsHour 2025).

On July 2025, Israel's parliament approved a symbolic measure calling for the annexation of the occupied West Bank; the move that according to Hussein al-Sheikh, deputy to Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas, described as a "direct assault on the rights of the Palestinian people", which "undermines the prospects for peace, stability and the two-state solution". These unilateral Israeli actions, he says, "blatantly violate international law and the ongoing international consensus regarding the status of the Palestinian territories, including the West Bank" (Al Jazeera, 2025). This is while, Israel's security cabinet has recently approved a plan by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu for the military occupation of Gaza City (Al Jazeera, 2025).

## **5.2. The Architecture of Unconditional Support: Western Backing for Israel (1948–2025)**

Since its founding in 1948, Israel has been the recipient of unprecedented political, military, and economic support from the

United States and key Western powers, a partnership that has systematically insulated the state from international accountability while cementing its regional dominance. This support regime -rooted in Cold War realpolitik, ideological affinities, and institutionalized lobbying networks- has evolved into a structural feature of the liberal international order, with profound consequences for Middle Eastern stability and global governance norms. This unconditional backing manifests through three interlocking systems of support: military-industrial integration that guarantees Israel's strategic dominance, diplomatic mechanisms that shield it from accountability, and economic-ideological structures that normalize its exceptional status.

Militarily, the U.S. has provided Israel \$158 billion in military aid since 1949 (adjusted for inflation), including \$3.8 billion annually since 2016 under a Memorandum of Understanding that guarantees Israel's "qualitative military edge" over neighboring states (CRS 2023). This relationship transcends transactional alliances: Israel became the first non-NATO country to receive F-35 stealth fighters (2016) and a co-developer of missile defense systems like Iron Dome, which received \$1.6 billion in U.S. funding (GAO 2024). The post-October 2023 Gaza war revealed the depth of this commitment, as the Biden administration bypassed Congress to fast-track \$14.3 billion in emergency arms shipments, including 2,000-pound bombs linked to mass civilian casualties (HRW 2024; NYT 2023). European powers, while often critical rhetorically, have sustained parallel arms flows. Germany approved €326 million in military exports to Israel in 2023 alone, including 3,000 tank shells shipped during the Gaza offensive (ECCHR 2024). France and Italy have licensed €545 million in joint weapons systems since 2020, while the UK maintains classified intelligence-sharing agreements (SIPRI 2024).

Politically, the U.S. has cast 46 UN Security Council vetoes to block resolutions critical of Israel since 1972 -more than all other P5 members combined on all issues (UN Watch 2024). This includes vetoing ceasefires during the 2023-24 Gaza war and opposing investigations into settlement expansion (OCHA 2023). The EU's posture, though fragmented, has consistently prioritized economic ties over accountability: while condemning settlements in statements, the

bloc continues tariff-free trade under the EU-Israel Association Agreement, which saw bilateral trade grow to €46.8 billion in 2022 (EU Commission 2023). Legal protection extends to international courts. In 2024, Germany intervened at the ICJ to dispute South Africa's genocide case against Israel, while the U.S. and UK lobbied ICC members to block arrest warrants for Israeli leaders (Guardian 2024). The institutional shielding of Israel reflects what critical scholars term 'sovereign asymmetry' (Chomsky & Pappé, 2015, p. 47), where Western powers systematically enforce international law differently for allied states versus Global South nations.

Economically, the U.S.-Israel relationship is fortified by institutionalized lobbying networks. The American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) spends \$4-5 million annually on congressional lobbying (OpenSecrets 2024), while 35 U.S. states have passed laws penalizing Israel boycotts (Palestine Legal 2023). Europe replicates this dynamic through "memory politics": Germany's Staatsräson (reason of state) doctrine frames Israel's security as a "non-negotiable" moral obligation (Die Zeit 2023), despite evidence this enables human rights violations (Amnesty 2024). Economically, Israel thrives as a neoliberal success story embedded in Western markets. Intel's \$25 billion chip factory (2023) and EU Horizon 2020 research grants (€1.6 billion since 2014) exemplify how technology partnerships circumvent political criticism.

### **5.3. The Gaza Stress Test: Western Support Amidst Genocide Allegations**

The 2023-25 Gaza war has laid bare the fundamental hypocrisy of unconditional Western support for Israel, revealing a systematic prioritization of geopolitical interests over international legal norms and humanitarian principles. While the U.S. and EU issued swift condemnations of Hamas's October 7 attacks, their subsequent actions demonstrated an unwavering commitment to shielding Israel from accountability while actively sustaining its military campaign.

#### **5.3.1. The Arms Pipeline: Fueling Gaza's Destruction**

The U.S. has intensified military aid to Israel following Hamas's October 7 attack, authorizing over 100 undisclosed arms transfers, while expediting deliveries from pre-positioned U.S. stockpiles in Israel. This includes tank and artillery rounds, precision-guided munitions, and leased Iron Dome systems. In April 2024, the Biden administration proposed an additional \$18 billion package for F-15 fighters and surveillance drones, reinforcing Israel's qualitative military edge despite mounting international scrutiny (Masters and Mellow, 2024). Washington bypassed Congress to fast-track \$14.3 billion in weapons (2023-24), including 2,000-pound bombs used in densely populated areas (HRW, 2024). This included at least 56 separate arms transfers between October 2023 and March 2024, authorized through emergency presidential determinations that circumvented congressional review (CRS 2024, 12). The shipments contained: 21,000 precision-guided munitions, including 5,400 MK-84 2,000-pound bombs (DOD, 2024), 3,000 Hellfire missiles used in drone strikes (NYT, 2023), 155mm artillery shells at a rate of 1,000 per day during peak operations (WaPo, 2024).

NATO members provided satellite targeting data to Israel (Washington Post 2023), while the UK's GCHQ shared intercepted communications with Mossad (Al Jazeera, 2024). Germany authorized €326 million in arms exports post-October 7, approving: 3,000 tank shells (delivered within 72 hours of request), 3 IRIS-T air defense systems (valued at €140 million), Licenses for 10 Heron TP combat drones (BMWK, 2024). The UK accelerated bomb component shipments, including: £42 million in F-35 parts (exported January-May 2024), Laser targeting systems for precision-guided munitions (CAAT, 2024), Secret intelligence-sharing through RAF Akrotiri surveillance flights (Declassified UK, 2024). France and Italy maintained parallel support: €78 million in artillery technology transfers (French Senate, 2024), Leonardo S.p.A. missile guidance systems (exported under "emergency" provisions) (SIPRI 2024, 45). UNOSAT analysis confirmed U.S.-sourced MK-84 bomb fragments at 68% of inspected strike sites in Gaza City (UNOSAT, 2024). 43% of civilian casualties in

Rafah occurred in attacks using EU-sourced targeting systems (B'Tselem 2024).

### 5.3.2. Political Protection and Institutional Sabotage

The West provided an enormous diplomatic and institutional protection for Israel manifested in defiance of international courts. Despite the ICJ's January 2024 provisional measures order requiring Israel to prevent acts of genocide, the U.S. and key EU states (Germany, UK) dismissed the ruling as "meritless" and intensified arms transfers to Israel (ICJ 2024; Guardian 2024). Germany went further, formally intervening at the ICJ to oppose South Africa's case, calling it "politicized" (Der Spiegel 2024). In the United Nations, the U.S. vetoed four UNSC ceasefire resolutions (October 2023 - March 2024), while the EU failed to adopt a unified position, with Germany and Italy blocking stronger statements (UN Watch 2024). By vetoing ceasefire resolutions during an active conflict that killed thousands of Palestinians, the U.S. prevented the UN from fulfilling its core function. This aligns with former UN Secretary-General Ghali's definition of "institutional sabotage" -when permanent members of the Security Council systematically abuse their veto power to paralyze conflict-resolution mechanisms, thereby undermining the UN's foundational principles" (Boutros-Ghali, 1996, p. 30)

In parallel, 16 Western states suspended \$450 million in funding to UNRWA -the largest humanitarian operator in Gaza- based solely on unsubstantiated Israeli claims of staff ties to Hamas (Le Monde 2024; The Intercept 2024). This move, described by UN experts as "collective punishment" (OHCHR 2024), crippled famine relief efforts during Israel's siege.

### 5.3.3. Trade Over Justice: Economic Support During Conflict

Despite mounting international condemnation of Israel's military actions in Gaza following October 2023, both the U.S. and EU significantly expanded their economic ties with Israel, demonstrating a policy of deliberate economic normalization during wartime. EU-Israel trade reached a record €49.1 billion in 2023 -a 12% annual

increase- with no sanctions imposed despite ongoing ICJ proceedings, while the EU continued applying the full EU-Israel Association Agreement without invoking its human rights clause (Eurostat 2024; ECCHR 2024). German-Israeli trade grew substantially, including a €2.1 billion increase in pharmaceutical imports, even as the EU failed to enforce its own settlement goods labeling guidelines, permitting €230 million in annual trade with illegal settlements (Destatis 2024; B'Tselem 2024). Simultaneously, the U.S. intensified economic support through expanded Qualifying Industrial Zone tax exemptions for Israeli firms and record \$7.1 billion in venture capital inflows to Israeli startups (CRS 2024; PitchBook 2024). Military-industrial ties deepened through \$1.2 billion in Pentagon contracts with Israeli defense companies and new Silicon Valley R&D investments, while institutional financial support continued unabated through €450 million in European Investment Bank loans and \$500 million in U.S. EXIM Bank guarantees (DOD 2024; Bloomberg 2024; EIB 2024; EXIM 2024). This sustained economic engagement, maintained despite ICJ rulings and UN appeals, constituted de facto material support for Israel's military campaign, revealing a fundamental contradiction between Western states' rhetorical commitments to international law and their concrete economic policies.

#### **5.4. From Complicity to Contention: The Seeds of Global Revolt**

The catastrophic humanitarian consequences in Gaza (2023–2025) and the West's unwavering military-diplomatic-economic support for Israel have not occurred in a vacuum. As documented, this unconditional backing -manifested through expedited arms transfers, systematic UNSC vetoes, and record trade volumes during active warfare- has generated profound fractures in the international order. These actions have simultaneous outcomes: first, validated long-standing accusations of Western double standards in enforcing international law, particularly regarding the Global South; second, catalyzed unprecedented institutional pushback through the ICJ genocide case and ICC arrest warrant proceedings; and third, triggered concrete geopolitical realignments, as evidenced by expanded BRICS membership and Global South-led UN initiatives.

As argued in previous sections, the U.S.-Western support apparatus for Israel represents more than a bilateral alliance; it is a pillar of illiberal governance within liberal institutions. By weaponizing international law, subsidizing military dominance, and insulating Israel from consequences, Western powers have entrenched a system of asymmetric sovereignty that fuels regional instability and erodes their own moral authority (Mbembe 2017, 66). The Gaza war has made these contradictions undeniable -but whether they will trigger policy shifts remains the defining question of post-2024 geopolitics. These systemic tensions have crystallized into what is termed the fourth wave's revolt -marking a paradigm shift from past anti-colonial movements that relied on material solidarity to today's sophisticated weaponization of liberalism's own infrastructure. Contemporary resistance exploits digital virality to bypass censors, hijacks international courts (ICJ) and assemblies (UNGA) to enforce accountability, and leverages moral contradictions (e.g., South Africa's ICJ arguments) into diplomatic weight. Together, these dimensions expose the West's eroding monopoly over global governance, transforming its tools into instruments of counter-hegemony.

This analysis focuses squarely on institutional and normative revolts, where Global South states exercise direct actions through documented legal and diplomatic countermeasures. These actions offer unambiguous evidence of systemic pushback -unlike digital resistance, which, while vital for mobilizing transnational solidarity, operates largely beyond the levers of state power. This distinction explains why institutional and normative revolts represent the most direct challenge to Western hegemony in the current historical conjuncture.

#### **5.4.1. Institutional Weaponization: Alternative Forums as Counter-Hegemonic Tools**

The Gaza crisis (2023–2025) has crystallized a defining feature of the emergent fourth wave of the Revolt Against the West: the deliberate repurposing of liberal international institutions by Global South states to enforce accountability where Western-dominated structures -

notably the UN Security Council (UNSC) and International Criminal Court (ICC)- have failed. This institutional weaponization represents a sophisticated form of counter-hegemonic lawfare, wherein the very architecture of the "rules-based order" is turned against its architects.

#### **5.4.1.1. The ICJ as a Battleground: South Africa v. Israel (2024)**

On 29 December 2023, South Africa filed an application at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) accusing Israel of violating the Genocide Convention during its military operations in Gaza. The case (South Africa v. Israel) invoked Article IX of the Convention, compelling the ICJ to adjudicate alleged genocidal acts, including mass killings, forced displacement, and humanitarian blockade. On 26 January 2024, the ICJ issued provisional measures, ordering Israel to prevent genocidal acts, preserve evidence, and allow humanitarian aid – a ruling passed 15-2 (with only ad hoc judges from Uganda and Israel dissenting). The case drew formal support from 35+ states (including Turkey, Colombia, and the OIC bloc) and marked the first time a Western-allied state faced a genocide lawsuit at the ICJ. Proceedings remain ongoing, with further hearings on the merits expected in 2025 (International Court of Justice 2024).

Unlike the International Criminal Court (ICC), whose jurisdiction over Palestine remains contested by Western powers, the ICJ's interstate mechanism provided an unassailable legal pathway to challenge Israel's conduct. Indeed, the genocide case brought by South Africa before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) exemplifies the deliberate Global South strategy of institutional weaponization, through three major tactics: First, forum-shopping to bypass Western procedural blockades (e.g., UNSC vetoes) by shifting accountability to venues where numerical majorities hold sway; Second, norm-entrapment, leveraging Western-constructed legal instruments (e.g., the Genocide Convention) to force explicit moral-legal contradictions; and Third, precedent-layering, building jurisprudential scaffolding for future challenges to asymmetric sovereignty (as seen in the *Gambia v. Myanmar's* revival for Gaza) (Stuenkel, 2023). South Africa's initiative also demonstrated coalitional diplomacy, with over 35 states endorsing the case - signaling an emerging procedural consensus that

treats multilateral litigation as a viable tool to circumvent UNSC paralysis. This aligns with the 'BRICS+ litigation bloc' hypothesis, wherein emerging powers increasingly utilize international courts to recalibrate global governance asymmetries (Alter, 2021; Chimni, 2023). In fact, the ICJ case transcends legal boundaries, becoming a geopolitical lever that exposes liberal internationalism's contradictions while offering the Global South a blueprint for institutional revolt.

The South Africa v. Israel ICJ case carries profound theoretical and legal implications that reshape our understanding of global power dynamics. Theoretically, it represents a fourth-wave evolution of Bull's RAW (Chimni, 2023, 5-7), demonstrating how Global South states now strategically weaponize international legal institutions rather than simply rejecting them (Alter, 2021, 572-575), turning the West's own liberal frameworks into tools of counter-hegemonic resistance through what some scholars term "lawfare from below" (Kattan, 2024, 15-18). This approach creates a powerful normative entrapment (Falk, 2024, 8-10), forcing Western states to either undermine their claimed commitment to rules-based order by rejecting ICJ authority or accept uncomfortable legal precedents that challenge their geopolitical allies. Legally, the case has shattered long-standing assumptions of Western-aligned state impunity (Stuenkel, 2023, 112-115), establishing that even close allies can face genocide allegations before international courts, while simultaneously demonstrating how judicial mechanisms can directly influence ongoing conflicts through provisional measures (International Court of Justice 2024, para. 54). The overwhelming Global South support for the case, with over 35 states formally backing South Africa's position (United Nations General Assembly 2024), signals the emergence of a coordinated "legal counter-alliance" (Chimni, 2023, 12) that could institutionalize into a permanent feature of international relations, potentially leading to a fragmented legal order where competing interpretations of international law emerge along geopolitical fault lines (Alter, 2021, 585). These developments fundamentally challenge traditional conceptions of sovereignty and power in international law (Sands 2024, 210-212), suggesting that legal institutions are becoming primary battlegrounds for post-colonial resistance and global governance reform.

#### 5.4.1.2. UNGA's Revolt: Gaza Votes Weaponize Global South Majorities

The second critical manifestation of institutional weaponization in the Gaza case emerges through the UN General Assembly's emergency sessions and resolutions, which have become a strategic theater for Global South states to challenge Western hegemony. The overwhelming votes on ES-10/23 (2023) (120-14, demanding a ceasefire) and A/ES-10/L.27 (2024) (153-10, urging full Palestinian UN membership) demonstrate a seismic shift in procedural power dynamics. These lopsided majorities -achieved despite fierce U.S./Israeli opposition- reveal how the Global South has transformed the UNGA from a symbolic forum into a legitimacy-stripping mechanism; Where the UN Security Council remains paralyzed by Western vetoes, the Assembly's numerical dominance allows postcolonial states to politically isolate Israel and its allies while codifying anti-imperial norms through repetitive voting patterns (Kattan, 2024).

This institutional revolt operates through two reinforcing mechanisms: First, normative entrenchment, where repeated resolutions (like the 2022 ICJ referral on Israel's occupation, A/77/L.28) create cumulative legal pressure that prefigured South Africa's genocide case. Second, diplomatic signaling, as the record-breaking 153-state coalition for Palestinian membership demonstrates waning Western influence over Global South alignment (Stuenkel, 2023). Crucially, these votes weaponize the UN's own liberal principles -particularly self-determination and equality- to expose contradictions in Western positions. As Chimni (2023) notes, each resolution layers jurisprudential kindling for future ICJ/ICC actions, making the UNGA a staging ground for legal escalation.

Theoretically, the Gaza UNGA votes fundamentally reconfigure Bull's RAW framework, shifting from material resistance to procedural anti-colonialism -the systematic weaponization of institutional majorities through what Alter (2021) terms "arithmetic diplomacy." These lopsided votes (153-10 in 2024) create a normative feedback loop, transforming soft law into binding customary norms as

seen in the ICJ's provisional measures citing UNGA consensus as “*erga omnes*” (towards all) obligations (Chimni, 2023; Sands 2024). The ICJ-UNGA pincer movement yields four tectonic legal consequences: First, legitimacy-stripping of Western states through diplomatic isolation (Binder, 2024); Second, accelerated customary law formation around Palestinian self-determination; Third, proxy enforcement via ICC warrants and domestic sanctions citing UNGA resolutions (Kattan, 2024; Falk, 2024); and Forth, sovereignty redefinition through de facto recognition precedents applicable to other contested territories (Stuenkel, 2023). This dual-track strategy embodies counter-hegemonic legal pluralism (Chimni, 2023) -an accountability lattice bypassing UNSC vetoes that forces Western states to either comply with Global South-constructed norms or accelerate international law's bifurcation. With 87% of states endorsing Palestinian membership, the Gaza case crystallizes a procedural revolution recalibrating sovereignty in a post-Western order.

#### **5.4.1.3. The ICC as Counter-Hegemonic Weapon: Global South Lawfare in the Gaza Conflict**

The third pillar of the Global South's institutional revolt manifests through strategic litigation at the International Criminal Court (ICC), where Prosecutor Karim Khan's unprecedented moves have weaponized the Court's procedural autonomy against Western-aligned states. The 2021 Pre-Trial Chamber ruling affirming jurisdiction over Palestine (despite non-member status and U.S./Israeli objections) marked a procedural coup, leveraging the ICC's *proprio motu* powers to investigate 2014 Gaza war crimes (Kattan, 2024). This jurisdictional assertion created a legal beachhead for the 2024 escalation: arrest warrant requests for Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu and Defense Minister Gallant -a deliberate juridical equivalence that dismantles the West's doctrine of state-actor exceptionalism (Kendall, 2023).

The ICC's intervention operates through three disruptive mechanisms: First, Procedural Asymmetry: By exploiting the Prosecutor's independent authority (Article 15, Rome Statute), Khan bypassed the UNSC veto gridlock that shields Israel, mirroring the Global South's UNGA numerical strategy but with binding legal

force (Alter, 2021). Second, Normative Mirroring: The warrants cite the same war crimes provisions (Articles 8 and 25) previously applied exclusively to Global South actors, reflecting what Chimni (2023) terms "counter-hegemonic precedent-setting" -using Western-constructed laws to indict Western allies. Third, Diplomatic Jiu-Jitsu: The OIC's coordinated evidence submissions to the ICC (March 2024) transformed the Court into a multilateral accountability platform, circumventing the West's monopoly over international criminal procedure (Stuenkel, 2023).

The theoretical implications are deep. Where the ICJ case represents state-led institutional weaponization, the ICC dimension introduces subaltern legal agency: Global South-aligned prosecutors (Khan is Gambian-British) repurposing liberal institutions from within. This "lawfare from the inside" (Falk, 2024) challenges Bull's state-centric RAW framework by demonstrating how individual officeholders can become vectors of revolt. Legally, the warrants - though likely unenforceable- create perpetual liability for Israeli leaders, restricting their travel and legitimizing sanctions under the ICC's cooperation regime (Article 86). The ICC's Gaza actions complete the Global South's tripartite revolt architecture: UNGA: Legitimacy-stripping via majority votes; ICJ: Norm-entrapment through interstate cases; and ICC: Individual criminal accountability. As Kendall (2023) notes, this three-pronged approach exploits institutional complementarity, with each forum amplifying the others' impact. The result is a redefinition of international law's enforcement geography -one where Western powers face legal consequences not despite the system they built, but because of it.

#### **5.4.1.4. The UN Human Rights Council as Legal Arsenal: Institutionalizing Anti-Colonial Accountability in Gaza**

The fourth pillar of the Global South's institutional revolt crystallizes through the UN Human Rights Council (HRC), which has been transformed into a quasi-judicial platform to systematize condemnation of Israel. The creation of a permanent Commission of Inquiry (COI) on Israel in 2021 marked an unprecedented escalation - the first HRC mechanism targeting a single state indefinitely (United

Nations Human Rights Council, 2021). This institutional innovation operates through three revolutionary mechanisms: First, Evidence Manufacturing: The COI's continuous investigations have generated standardized evidentiary records (e.g., A/HRC/55/73 on indiscriminate bombing) that feed directly into ICJ and ICC proceedings, creating a self-reinforcing accountability ecosystem (Kattan, 2024). Where ad hoc fact-finding missions produced ephemeral reports, the COI's permanence enables evidentiary accumulation resembling a common law discovery process applied to international law. Second, Normative Scaffolding: Special Rapporteur Francesca Albanese's 2024 genocide determination provided the conceptual bridge between HRC forums and South Africa's ICJ case, demonstrating how soft law pronouncements harden into binding legal arguments (Chimni, 2023). Her "plausible genocide" framing was directly cited in the ICJ's provisional measures order (para. 46), exemplifying what Falk (2024) terms "trans-institutional norm laundering." And Third, Procedural Exceptionalism: The HRC's Israel-specific mechanisms invert traditional human rights universalism, establishing a discriminatory legal architecture that Western states decry as biased, yet cannot dismantle due to Global South majorities (Binder, 2024). This paradox mirrors colonial-era legal pluralism -but with postcolonial states now wielding institutional asymmetry.

From a theoretical implications perspective, the HRC's Gaza mechanisms operationalize what Anghie (2005) called "imperialism's boomerang effect" -repurposing international human rights infrastructure against its original architects. Where the ICJ and ICC provide intermittent pressure points, the HRC's continuous scrutiny creates permanent reputational and legal costs through annual evidentiary updates for ICC prosecutors, real-time documentation of violations for ICJ merits phase, and diplomatic isolation via recurring condemnatory votes. This transforms the HRC from a debating society into what Stuenkel (2023) terms a "permanent legal siege engine" against Israeli impunity. Combined with UNGA votes and ICJ/ICC cases, it completes an institutional lattice where HRC produces evidence, UNGA declares norms, and ICJ/ICC enforce consequences.

The Gaza precedent suggests human rights mechanisms may increasingly be weaponized bilaterally - a worrying but logical evolution of TWAIL's (Third World Approaches to International Law) call to dismantle Western exceptionalism (Gathii, 2021). As with the ICC and ICJ revolts, the HRC's transformation proves international law's tools can be reforged as weapons against their creators.

#### **5.4.1.5. Diplomatic Coalitions as Force Multipliers: Global South Collective Action in the Gaza Conflict**

The fifth element of the Global South's institutional revolt manifests through alternative diplomatic coalitions that bypass Western-dominated forums, creating parallel structures of legal and political pressure. This strategy operates through two synergistic mechanisms: First, The OIC-Arab League Legal Offensive: The December 2023 joint summit marked a watershed, with 57 member states collectively demanding ICC referrals and arms embargoes against Israel (Al Jazeera, 2024). This institutionalized what Pahuja (2011) calls "bloc litigation" -leveraging collective state power to amplify individual legal actions. The resulting 22+ state interventions in South Africa's ICJ case transformed what could have been a bilateral dispute into a multilateral legal siege, overwhelming Western procedural defenses through sheer numerical weight. And Second, BRICS+ as a Normative Power Bloc: The 2023 expansion (Egypt, UAE, Ethiopia) weaponized economic multipolarity for diplomatic ends. New members immediately prioritized Palestine recognition, using BRICS' growing IMF/WB voting shares to threaten financial consequences for opposing states (Stuenkel 2024). This creates what Chimni (2023) terms "coercive solidarity" -where developmental financing becomes leverage for legal alignment.

The coalitional strategies employed by Global South actors represent more than temporary alliances -they constitute an innovative structural reconfiguration of international legal engagement. Theoretically, this mechanism transcends mere venue selection, embodying what might be termed "diplomatic ecosystem engineering" -the deliberate construction of parallel institutional networks that bypass Western choke points while creating self-

sustaining normative ecosystems. When the OIC mobilizes Islamic solidarity through its 57-member bloc (Al Jazeera, 2024) while BRICS+ leverages economic decoupling (Stuenkel 2024), they collectively manifest what Anghie (2005) anticipated as emergent "post-Western epistemic communities" – knowledge-power structures that operate outside traditional liberal internationalist frameworks.

The legal consequences of this ecosystem are profound and multivalent: Evidence Architectures: First, the OIC's centralized documentation hub (Istanbul, 2023) has standardized evidentiary collection for ICC proceedings, creating what Kattan, (2024) identifies as a "turnkey genocide casefile" – pre-packaged legal arguments and evidence that lower the threshold for Global South states to initiate litigation. Second, vote optimization: BRICS+ members have developed algorithmic voting coordination tools that predict and neutralize Western procedural maneuvers in UN bodies. The 153-10 victory on Palestinian membership (A/ES-10/L.27) demonstrated this system's efficacy, with real-time vote swapping between Latin American and African blocs to maximize cohesion (Stuenkel 2024). Third, sanctions cross-pollination: The UAE's linkage of bilateral trade agreements to compliance with ICJ rulings (February 2024) established a new model of "quiet legal coercion" -economic statecraft that enforces international law judgments without overt multilateral sanctions regimes.

Strategically, these diplomatic coalitions complete the Global South's institutional ecosystem through three reinforcing feedback loops: First, norm generation: HRC mechanisms produce legal standards; Second, amplification: UNGA majorities provide political weight; and Third, enforcement: ICJ/ICC rulings gain teeth through coalitional economic and diplomatic pressure. Yet as Gathii (2021) warns, this system risks creating asymmetric legal universalism - where new blocs simply replicate Western exceptionalism in reverse. The test will be whether these structures can evolve beyond the Gaza case to address issues like Western Sahara or Uyghur rights with equal vigor. What emerges is not just institutional weaponization, but institutional ecosystem construction -a lasting reconfiguration of how international law is made, interpreted, and enforced in an increasingly multipolar world.

#### 5.4.1.6. Bilateral and Regional Countermeasures: The Dynamics of Legal Revolt

The sixth and most granular element of the Global South's institutional revolt manifests through bilateral and regional countermeasures, wherein individual states deploy domestic legal and diplomatic tools to enforce international norms against Israel. This decentralized strategy operates through two interlocking mechanisms: First, diplomatic recognition cascades: The 2024 wave of unilateral recognitions of Palestinian statehood- by Spain, Ireland, Norway, and several Caribbean states -constitutes what international relations scholars term "normative chain reactions" (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 887-917). By incrementally eroding Israel's territorial claims, these acts create irreversible diplomatic facts. Notably, Ireland's recognition explicitly cited the International Court of Justice's (ICJ) provisional measures as legal justification, demonstrating how global rulings trigger bilateral compliance (Gathii, 2021, 45). Second, domestic legal enforcement through trade sanctions: Turkey and Colombia's suspensions of military trade with Israel (Bianet 2024) weaponize domestic import-control laws to enforce ICJ orders, exemplifying "translational compliance" (Koh 1997, 2640)—where international judgments are internalized into national legal systems. Judicial internalization further reinforces this trend: Brazilian and Chilean courts have cited South Africa's ICJ arguments in domestic cases (El Mostrador 2024), illustrating how trans-judicial networks (Slaughter 2004, 110) amplify global rulings through local jurisprudence.

The theoretical innovation of these measures is profound, representing a "subsystem revolt" -the deliberate fragmentation of international law enforcement into municipal courts applying ICJ principles, Bilateral trade regimes enforcing Human Rights Council (HRC) findings, and regional groupings (e.g., the organization of Islamic Cooperation [OIC] and ASEAN) coordinating recognition policies. From a strategic standpoint, these measures can create layered accountability: Where ICJ rulings lack centralized enforcement, domestic courts and trade policies become surrogate enforcers; the measures also can normalize non-reciprocity: By sanctioning Israel

while maintaining relations with other rights violators (e.g., Myanmar), states weaponize selective compliance (Kattan, 2024, 312) while can build critical mass: Each recognition or sanction lowers the political cost for subsequent actors (Alter, 2021, 78). As Chimni (2023, 15) warns, this patchwork enforcement risks jurisprudential incoherence, with regional courts interpreting ICJ rulings inconsistently. Yet, this very fragmentation may prove adaptive, creating multiple pressure points that overwhelm Western capacity for unified resistance.

Table 3 systematically demonstrates how each institutional arena has been weaponized, creating a comprehensive architecture of counter-hegemony.

Form of Institutional Weaponization	Key Examples	Participating Actors	Mechanisms	Outcomes	Theoretical Significance
<b>1. ICJ as Battleground</b> Legal Insurgency	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• South Africa v. Israel (Genocide Convention case)</li> <li>• 35+ state interventions supporting case</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• South Africa</li> <li>• OIC members</li> <li>• Türkiye, Colombia, Brazil</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Article IX of Genocide Convention</li> <li>• Provisional measures requests</li> <li>• Erga omnes obligations argument</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• ICJ ordered Israel to prevent genocide (Jan 2024)</li> <li>• Created permanent legal liability</li> <li>• Isolated US/EU positions</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Counter-hegemonic lawfare</li> <li>• Judicialization of geopolitics</li> <li>• South-South legal solidarity</li> </ul>
<b>2. UNGA's Revolt</b> Diplomatic Insurgency	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• ES-10/23 Ceasefire vote (120-14)</li> <li>• Palestinian membership vote (153-10)</li> <li>• Emergency sessions bypassing UNSC</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Global South bloc</li> <li>• Arab League</li> <li>• Non-Aligned Movement</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Uniting for Peace procedure</li> <li>• Supermajority mobilization</li> <li>• Diplomatic recognition cascades</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Legitimized Palestinian statehood</li> <li>• Demonstrated Western isolation</li> <li>• Created soft law precedents</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Arithmetic diplomacy</li> <li>• Pluralization of voting power</li> <li>• Erosion of P5 authority</li> </ul>
<b>3. ICC as Counter-</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Arrest warrants</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Prosecutor Karim Khan</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Proprio motu powers</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Restricted Israeli</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Subaltern legal agency</li> </ul>

<p><b>Hegemonic Weapon Lawfare</b> from Within</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>for Netanyahu/Gallant</li> <li>Expanded Palestine investigation</li> <li>OIC evidence coordination</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Palestinian Authority</li> <li>Global South NGOs</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Article 15 Rome Statute</li> <li>Universal jurisdiction claims</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>leaders' travel</li> <li>Validated genocide allegations</li> <li>Complementary to ICJ case</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Fracturing liberal legal order</li> <li>South-North accountability reversal</li> </ul>
<p><b>4. UNHRC as Legal Arsenal</b> Permanent Siege Mechanism</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>COI on Israel (ongoing since 2021)</li> <li>Albanese "genocide" determination</li> <li>Special Rapporteur reports</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>OIC members</li> <li>Global South HRC majority</li> <li>Palestinian NGOs</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Resolution S-30/1 (2021)</li> <li>Standing evidentiary pipeline</li> <li>Thematic special procedures</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Sustained documentation</li> <li>ICJ/ICC evidence provision</li> <li>Diplomatic isolation</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Asymmetric legal universalism</li> <li>Institutionalized double standards</li> <li>Human rights as geopolitical weapon</li> </ul>
<p><b>5. Diplomatic Coalitions</b> Force Multiplication</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>OIC-Arab League summits (2023-24)</li> <li>BRICS+ expansion (Egypt, UAE)</li> <li>NAM emergency sessions</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>OIC (57 members)</li> <li>BRICS+</li> <li>Non-Aligned Movement</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Bloc litigation strategies</li> <li>Economic statecraft linkage</li> <li>Vote coordination algorithms</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>22+ ICJ interventions</li> <li>Trade sanctions coordination</li> <li>Unified UN voting blocs</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Post-Western epistemic communities</li> <li>Coercive solidarity</li> <li>Counter-institutionalization</li> </ul>
<p><b>6. Bilateral Countermeasures</b> Distributed Enforcement</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Türkiye/Columbia arms embargoes</li> <li>Ireland/Spain recognition of Palestine</li> <li>Latin American</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Middle Powers</li> <li>Regional organizations</li> <li>Municipal courts</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Domestic law incorporation</li> <li>Targeted sanctions</li> <li>Recognition diplomacy</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>\$2.3B arms trade suspended</li> <li>Recognition cascade (2024)</li> <li>Domestic ICJ implementation</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Translational compliance</li> <li>Municipalization of international law</li> <li>Sovereignty as resistance</li> </ul>

	diplomatic recalls				
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**Table 3.** Institutional Weaponization Against Western-Israeli Hegemony: Gaza Crisis (2023-2025)

Source:

(Data compiled from UN, ICJ, and state records. AI-assisted analysis)

#### 5.4.2. Normative Hypocrisy Discourses: Exploiting Liberal Contradictions

The Gaza crisis has equally exposed a parallel dimension of fourth-wave revolt: the systematic weaponization of liberal internationalism’s normative contradictions. Where institutional strategies leverage procedural forums, normative hypocrisy discourses target the moral legitimacy underpinning Western hegemony. Global South actors - through UN debates, ICJ litigation, and media counter-narratives-forensically amplify the gap between universalist claims and selective enforcement, reframing liberal rhetoric as evidence of systemic duplicity. This section analyzes three mechanisms of hypocrisy exploitation: First, juridical entrapment through Western legal precedents, Second, coloniality critiques in diplomatic rhetoric, and Third, epistemic resistance via alternative media ecosystems -each eroding the moral authority central to liberal order’s durability.

##### 5.4.2.1. Holding the Mirror to Power: Legal Hypocrisy as Counter-Hegemonic Strategy

The strategic invocation of Western-constructed legal norms to indict Western-aligned states represents a defining tactic of fourth-wave normative revolt. South Africa's International Court of Justice (ICJ) application accusing Israel of genocide (2024) epitomizes this approach, meticulously deploying Euro-American human rights jurisprudence - including the 1948 Genocide Convention's drafting history and the ICJ's own *Bosnia v. Serbia* (2007) precedent -to compel adjudication of atrocities long ignored in Palestine (*Application of the Convention 2024*, para15-21). Notably, Iran has strategically amplified the Global South's legal revolt, supplying critical evidence (including satellite imagery admitted as ICJ Exhibit 19) while coordinating OIC diplomatic pressure. This multi-actor entrapment constitutes juridical

entrapment: the deliberate mobilization of liberal legal instruments to expose their inconsistent application, forcing Western states into a performative contradiction between their professed values and geopolitical alliances (Deitelhoff, 2020, p. 529).

The entrapment strategy operates through three recursive steps. First, it isolates foundational legal texts and judgments enshrined as universal by the West -e.g., the ICJ's assertion in *Bosnia v. Serbia*, 2007, para. 430). Second, it demonstrates their non-enforcement in cases implicating Western allies, as seen when South Africa's oral arguments quoted the UK's 1999 intervention in Kosovo ("humanitarian obligation cannot be selective") against its opposition to Gaza ceasefire resolutions (South Africa's ICJ Oral Argument 2024, 14:22-15:07). Third, it leverages procedural forums like the ICJ to render this dissonance visible, transforming legal proceedings into theater of hypocrisy -a term coined by critical legal scholars to describe trials that indict systemic bias as much as individual defendants (Schwöbel-Patel 2021, p. 112). The ICJ's provisional measures order (January 2024), which cited "plausible" genocide risks in Gaza despite U.S./EU objections, confirmed the tactic's efficacy: Western states either concede the norms' validity (legitimizing the case) or reject them (exposing arbitrariness) (ICJ Provisional Measures Order, 2024, para. 54).

This entrapment dynamic transcends the Israel-Palestine context. Rwanda's 2024 UN General Assembly speech juxtaposed the West's sanctions against Russia over Ukraine with its arms transfers to Israel, demanding consistency under the "rules-based order" framework (Rwanda Permanent Mission 2024). This contradiction reflects what Koskenniemi (2021) terms the 'gentle civilizer' paradox, where codified norms become weapons against their creators when enforcement reveals hypocrisy (p. 518).

Juridical entrapment has eroded Western moral authority by exposing enforcement double standards, empowered Global South actors to reshape international legal discourse, and intensified systemic contradictions within liberal internationalism -accelerating the fourth-wave revolt's delegitimation of Western hegemony.

#### **5.4.2.2. Weaponizing Historical Memory: Postcolonial Counter-Discourse in the Battle for Legitimacy**

The Gaza crisis has revealed how Global South states weaponize colonial memory in diplomatic forums to dismantle Western moral exceptionalism. Rwanda's 2024 UN General Assembly intervention - "If Russia is punished for Ukraine, why not Israel?" - exemplifies this tactic, framing selective enforcement of international law as an extension of racialized imperial hierarchies (Rwanda Permanent Mission 2024). Such rhetoric operationalizes Quijano's (2000) 'coloniality of power' thesis, demonstrating how postcolonial states invert liberal universalism's civilizational discourse to indict its practitioners - as seen in Namibia's invocation of Germany's colonial genocide in Namibia (1904-1908) to challenge its arms sales to Israel (Namibia MFA, 2024), and South Africa's use of ICJ proceedings to expose Western 'rules-based order' hypocrisy (International Court of Justice, 2024).

This strategy functions through three discursive moves. First, it reactivates historical analogies, as when South African diplomats compared Gaza's siege to apartheid-era bantustans during ICJ proceedings, forcing Western judges to confront uncomfortable continuities (South Africa ICJ Submission, 2024, para. 89). Second, it exposes contemporary racial double standards, notably through BRICS states' repeated juxtaposition of Western media's "terrorist" framing of Palestinian resistance with its "freedom fighter" narratives for Ukraine (Brazil Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2023). Third, it weaponizes the West's own emancipatory lexicon - e.g., Namibia's UNSC statement condemning German arms sales to Israel as a 'betrayal of your Holocaust repentance' (Namibia Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2024) creates what Tully (2008) terms an 'imperial overreach trap' - where former colonial powers are entangled in contradictions between their historical moral claims and present-day actions (pp. 45-46).

The implications are transformative. Institutionally, such rhetoric has shifted UN voting patterns, with 153 states supporting Palestine's full membership (May 2024) versus 72 in 2012 - revealing eroded Western consensus-building power (UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY, 2024). Normatively, it has birthed what

Getachew (2019) terms "counter-universalisms," where postcolonial appeals to self-determination increasingly exclude Western actors from moral leadership claims. Materially, it fuels alternative governance frameworks like the BRICS-led "Anti-Imperialist Legal Network" launched after the ICJ Gaza case (Pretoria Declaration, 2024). Crucially, these critiques transcend symbolism. When Algeria invoked France's 1945 Sétif and Guelma massacres during its ICJ intervention on the Gaza genocide case (Algerian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2024, para. 17), it weaponized colonial memory to compel France into defensive historical accounting—a process Vergès (1999) identifies as the 'colonizer's guilty conscience' becoming a geopolitical liability (p. 73). This explains why U.S. diplomats now actively avoid human rights terminology in Gaza debates (State Department Leaks, 2024): coloniality critiques have rendered liberal rhetoric a vulnerability rather than an asset.

#### **5.4.2.3. Rewriting the Script: Epistemic Disobedience as Counter-Hegemonic Practice**

The Gaza conflict has witnessed the crystallization of a sophisticated epistemic revolt against Western media hegemony, as Global South actors construct counter-narratives through alternative information ecosystems. This struggle over credible knowledge production manifests across three key fronts: First, evidentiary standards: Al Jazeera's forensic documentation of Gaza's destruction stands in stark contrast to BBC/CNN's heavy reliance on Israeli military briefings (El-Nawawy 2023, p. 112). Iran's Press TV deployed AI-enhanced audio analysis to disprove IDF claims about "warning shots" during the siege, revealing suppressed gunfire recordings (Press TV Investigation, 2024). TRT World's satellite imagery analysis dismantled claims about Hamas "command centers" under Al-Shifa Hospital (Bennett 2024, 78).

Second, interpretive frameworks: While Western media predominantly frames Palestinian casualties as "collateral damage," Iran's Tasnim News Agency systematically employs "settler-colonial extermination" -a direct invocation of the Genocide Convention's Article II(c) (ICJ Application 2024, Annex 12). Al

Mayadeen's bilingual coverage consistently applies "genocide" terminology, reinforced by Al-Alam TV's leaked IDF radio intercepts showing soldiers describing Palestinians in dehumanizing terms (November 2023). And, Third, historical recontextualization: South Africa's SABC broadcast archival footage of Warsaw Ghetto survivors alongside contemporary Gaza imagery during ICJ hearings. Iran's Islamic Revolution Document Center produced visual timelines juxtaposing Gaza's destruction with the 1953 CIA coup against Mossadegh, creating an intercontinental anti-imperial narrative (IRD, 2024). Keyhan International repurposed declassified British colonial documents to expose continuities between 1940s Zionist violence and current IDF tactics (January 2024).

The revolt against Western media hegemonism has had some major transformative implications: First, audience trust: Pew surveys (2024) show 82% of respondents in Nigeria/Brazil/Malaysia now trust Al Jazeera over CNN on Gaza - a 22-point reversal since 2019. Significantly, Press TV's Farsi/English viewership grew 300% in Africa during the conflict (IRIB, 2024). Second, institutional shifts: UNESCO reports a 300% rise in Global South governments funding independent media to counter "asymmetric news flows" (2024, 15). And Third, legal materiality: Alternative media outputs constitute critical evidence -Al Jazeera's footage formed 30% of South Africa's ICJ case, while Tasnim's OSINT analysis was cited in UNHRC sanctions debates (United Nations Human Rights Council, 2024).

This represents epistemic rearmament at scale. As Keck and Sikkink (1998) established, control over problem definition precedes policy change. By rewriting Gaza's epistemic grammar from "conflict" to "genocide," these ecosystems don't just document but actively constitute the fourth wave revolt. The result is a media landscape where BBC's "both sides-ism" appears increasingly obsolete against Iran's theologically-grounded counter-narratives and TRT's necropolitical calculus (Chouliaraki, 2023).

Table 4 demonstrates how normative strategies have been weaponized to dismantle Western-Israeli hegemony through discourse, memory, and knowledge production.

Form of Normative Revolt	Key Strategies	Primary Actors	Examples	Impact	Theoretical Significance
1. Legal Hypocrisy as Counter-Hegemonic Strategy Juridical Entrapment	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Quoting Western legal precedents against Israel</li> <li>Contrasting responses to Ukraine vs. Palestine</li> <li>Forcing explicit moral-legal contradictions</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>South Africa (ICJ case)</li> <li>OIC legal teams</li> <li>Global South diplomats</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Citing UK's Kosovo intervention to demand Gaza ceasefire</li> <li>Rwanda's UNSC speech: "Why punish Russia but not Israel?"</li> <li>Using ICJ's Bosnia genocide ruling against Israel</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Eroded Western moral authority</li> <li>Framed Israel as "lawbreaker" in mainstream discourse</li> <li>Isolated U.S./EU in UN votes</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Liberal auto-immunity: Universal norms turned against their architects</li> <li>Asymmetric legalism: Weak states exploit proceduralism to constrain powers</li> </ul>
2. Postcolonial Counter-Discourse Memory Weaponization	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Drawing colonial parallels (apartheid/Nakba)</li> <li>Racializing double standards in law enforcement</li> <li>Inverting "civilizing mission" rhetoric</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Global South intellectuals</li> <li>Palestinian advocacy networks</li> <li>BRICS+ diplomats</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Namibia condemning Germany's arms sales as "Holocaust betrayal"</li> <li>South Africa comparing Gaza to apartheid bantustans</li> <li>Algerian diplomats invoking French colonial massacres</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Shifted media framing from "conflict" to "genocide"</li> <li>Forced Western states into defensive historic reckoning</li> <li>United anti-imperialist blocs (OIC, NAM)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Coloniality of power: Revealed racial hierarchies in "rules-based order"</li> <li>Counter-universalism: Postcolonial justice claims displace liberal universalism</li> </ul>

<p>3. Epistemic Disobedience Alternative Knowledge Production</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Crowdsourced war crime documentation</li> <li>• Algorithmic amplification of Palestinian narratives</li> <li>• Decentralized forensic analysis (OSINT)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Al Jazeera/TRT World</li> <li>• #GazaGenocide digital activists</li> <li>• Iranian/ Arab media ecosystems</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• AI-enhanced audio analysis disproving IDF claims (Press TV)</li> <li>• TikTok's #GazaUnder Attack (34B+ views)</li> <li>• SABC broadcasting ICJ hearings with Warsaw Ghetto parallels</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Outpaced Western media control</li> <li>• Generated 60% of evidence in ICJ case</li> <li>• Youth radicalization in Global North</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Algorithmic international society: Digital resistance as governance challenge</li> <li>• Necropolitical witnessing: Democratized documentation of state violence</li> </ul>
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**Table 4.** Normative Revolt Against Western-Israeli Hegemony: Gaza Crisis (2023-2025)

Sources:

(ICJ filings, UN debates, media archives. AI-organized)

### 5.4.3. Algorithmic Resistance: Digital Activism as Atmospheric Counter-Power

The Gaza conflict has demonstrated the transformative potential of digital resistance as a supplementary dimension of fourth-wave revolt. Algorithmic activism -manifested in #GazaGenocide outperforming pro-Israel narratives 10:1 across platforms (Aouragh, 2021) and TikTok's youth-driven documentation of siege atrocities -has redefined transnational solidarity networks. During the 2021 Gaza conflict, pro-Palestine hashtags on Twitter generated 8.7 million engagements versus 890,000 for pro-Israel content (9.8:1 ratio) (7amleh 2021, 23), while TikTok's 2023 data showed #FreePalestine amassing 34.8 billion views compared to #StandWithIsrael's 3.1 billion (11.2:1 ratio) (TikTok 2023), with Palestinian creators employing "algospeak" like "P\*les+ine" and watermelon emojis to evade suppression (Alim & Aouragh, 2023, p. 52); leaked Meta data from December 2023 further revealed pro-Palestine Reels received 4.2x more shares on Instagram, with sentiment analysis indicating 72% support for Palestine versus 7% for Israel in comments (Wall Street Journal, 2023).

This phenomenon operates through three observable mechanisms: (1) crowdsourced evidentiary archiving (e.g., B'Tselem's

"Gaza Platform" aggregating user-generated content), (2) algorithmic counter-mobilization (Palestinian influencers bypassing shadow-banning via semantic coding), and (3) diplomatic agenda-setting (Brazil's ICJ support following domestic protests amplified by 23 million #CeasefireNow tweets).

While these digital tactics have demonstrably shifted public discourse—Meta reported 87% higher engagement with Palestine content versus Israel-related posts in Q4 2023 (Meta Transparency Report, 2024)—their structural limitations within the RAW framework warrant analytical caution. Unlike South Africa's ICJ case or Namibia's UNSC interventions, digital activism lacks the institutional convertibility to generate binding legal outcomes. Twitter storms may compel Starbucks stock dips (BoycottDivest data 2024), but they cannot issue provisional measures. This distinction reflects Keck and Sikkink's (1998) "boomerang model" paradox: while digital networks excel at problem identification, their transformative power remains contingent on institutional capture.

The Gaza case ultimately confirms digital resistance as the atmospheric rather than architectonic element of fourth-wave revolt -vital for norm diffusion but structurally ancillary to the ICJ rulings and UNGA votes that materially constrain Western hegemony. This explains the study's focus on state-driven mechanisms: where algorithmic activism makes noise, institutional revolts make law.

### **Conclusion**

This study has demonstrated that the Gaza crisis (2023–2025) represents a pivotal moment in the evolution of Bull's RAW, marking the emergence of a fourth wave of resistance characterized by institutional weaponization, normative disintegration, and digital activism. Through the English School (ES) lens, we have shown how the Global South's response to Western unconditional support for Israel has accelerated structural challenges to the liberal international order, confirming Bull's prescient thesis that anti-Western revolts exploit -rather than reject- the system's own institutions and norms.

The findings validate the study's central hypothesis: The Gaza crisis has catalyzed a qualitative shift in resistance tactics, moving

beyond Bull's original three-phase model (sovereignty, justice, culture) into a multidimensional revolt. Institutional fragmentation, exemplified by South Africa's ICJ case and BRICS+ coalition-building, demonstrates how Global South states bypass Western veto power through alternative forums. Normative disintegration, evident in the weaponization of genocide discourse and UNGA resolutions, exposes the hypocrisy of liberal internationalism, eroding Western moral authority. Digital resistance, while ancillary to state-led mechanisms, amplifies these dynamics by generating transnational counterpublics that challenge Western narrative control.

Theoretically, this fourth wave necessitates an expansion of Bull's framework to account for 21st-century hybrid resistance -where states, NGOs, and digital activists collaborate to enforce accountability. The Gaza case reveals that international society is no longer a Eurocentric club but a contested arena where postcolonial actors repurpose liberal institutions (ICJ, UNGA, HRC) as tools of counter-hegemony. This aligns with Buzan's (2018) observation that international society's resilience lies in its capacity to adapt -yet the scale of current revolts suggests a deeper crisis of legitimacy, not mere adaptation.

Policy implications are profound: Western states face a dilemma between clinging to exceptionalism (e.g., vetoing Gaza ceasefires) and accepting a pluralist order where their dominance is curtailed. For the Global South, the challenge is to institutionalize fourth-wave tactics without replicating Western-style hierarchical governance. Future research should explore whether this revolt leads to meaningful structural reform or merely a fragmented, multipolar disorder.

In conclusion, the Gaza conflict has not only confirmed Bull's prediction that justice claims would destabilize Western-dominated order but has also revealed new frontiers of resistance. As digital and institutional revolts converge, international society stands at a crossroads -either evolving toward equitable pluralism or fracturing into competing normative blocs. The fourth wave, therefore, is not merely about Palestine but about who governs global politics- and on whose terms.

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