



A Comparative Study of the Nature of Violence in the French, Russian, and Iranian Revolutions

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ABSTRACT

Objective: This research conducts a comparative study of the nature of violence in three significant contemporary revolutions: the 1789 French Revolution, the 1917 Russian Revolution, and the 1979 Iranian Revolution. These revolutions are recognized as pivotal moments in the political and social history of each country as well as in global history. The aim of this research is to analyze the causes and consequences of violence in these three historical events. The study employs a qualitative method and a descriptive-analytical approach, identifying patterns of violence and the social, economic, and political contexts through an in-depth examination of each revolution. The findings reveal that in the French Revolution, violence was utilized as an effective tool for achieving social and political change, with the synergy among social classes contributing to its intensification. In the Russian Revolution, specific historical conditions, particularly the aftermath of World War I and widespread poverty, led to increased violence and the outbreak of civil war. In contrast, the Iranian Revolution demonstrates a different approach, where protesters sought to achieve social change through non-violent strategies. Ultimately, this research highlights that social, economic, and political factors, especially feelings of deprivation and the ability to mobilize resources, have direct impacts on the nature of violence and revolutionary outcomes, and can contribute to a better understanding of contemporary social transformations.

Method: The study was conducted using a qualitative method and a descriptive-analytical approach, and through an in-depth investigation of each revolution, patterns of violence and social, economic and political contexts have been identified.

Results: In the French Revolution, violence as an effective tool for social and political changes and synergy between social classes has helped to intensify it.

In the Russian Revolution, the consequences of the First World War and widespread poverty have led to an increase in violence and the occurrence of civil war.

In the Iranian revolution, protesters tried to achieve social changes by using non-violent strategies.

Conclusions: Social, economic and political factors, especially the feeling of deprivation and the ability to mobilize resources, have direct effects on the nature of violence and revolutionary outcomes.

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Introduction

The United Nations, in 2002, defined violence as the physical threat, exertion of power against a person, others, or a group/society, leading to psychological harm, injury, death, or deprivation. Violence is also identified and defined in various types, including political, economic, social, and institutional violence, encompassing military terrorism, quasi-guerrilla conflicts, and armed political conflicts. One of the important issues in the study of revolutions is examining the extent and role of violence in these transformative processes. Revolutions are historical events that utilize violence to achieve goals and demands. By examining many revolutions, including the French, Russian, and Iranian revolutions, it can be seen that such revolutions often have diverse and sometimes contradictory aspects with the existing intellectual and social system. These revolutions have often occurred to achieve specific political and ideological goals and have employed both peaceful approaches and violence. . .

Revolutions, as fundamental transformations in the political, economic, and social structures of societies, have always been the focus of researchers and experts. Some scholars believe that violence is an integral and even driving force behind revolutions. They argue that revolutions are inherently shaped by the use of force and violence and are impossible without it. Conversely, another group of researchers believe that revolutions can occur peacefully and without the use of violence, and that violence can even lead to the failure of revolutions. Therefore, this article undertakes a comparative study of the nature of violence in three major historical revolutions: The French Revolution, the Russian Revolution, and the Iranian Revolution. The aim of this research is to answer the main question: ‘What are the similarities and differences in the nature of violence in the Iranian, French, and Russian revolutions?’ This article also seeks to provide a comprehensive analytical framework to facilitate a comparative study of the nature of violence in other historical revolutions. To achieve these objectives, the article will use Charles Tilly's resource mobilization theory and Robert Ted Gurr's relative deprivation theory, and a review of the existing literature on the relationship between violence and revolution, to conduct a comparative study of violence in the three aforementioned revolutions. This analysis will be conducted using qualitative methods and based on historical sources and documents. The results of this research can open up new horizons in a better understanding of the relationship between violence and revolutions, as well as better management of revolutionary processes.

1. Theoretical Foundations of the Research

This article is written to conduct a comparative study of the level of violence in the French, Russian, and Iranian revolutions, in order to gain a better understanding of the extent of violence in these revolutions. To achieve this goal, the second-generation framework of revolution theories is used. The first generation of these theories, known as the "Natural History School," was the dominant framework for explaining and comparing revolutions in the 1920s and 1930s. The second generation included general theories of political violence, which were presented in the 1960s and early 1970s by theorists such as Charles Tilly, Robert Gurr, and others. The third generation of revolution theories emerged in the late 1970s and 1980s, focusing on structural factors.

This second generation sought to explain the causes of revolutions within the modernization process across various societies. Therefore, the structure of this article will be based on Charles Tilly's "Resource Mobilization" theory and Ted Robert Gurr's "Relative Deprivation" theory.

Charles Tilly is one of the most important theorists of resource mobilization. Using existing studies and his own research, he presented a comprehensive resource mobilization theory in his book "From Mobilization to Revolution." Tilly argues that the history of revolutions shows a significant growth of political organizations among deprived groups before a revolution occurs. These organizations, whose protests are suppressed by governments, resort to violence as a strategy and tactic to gain political power. Therefore, revolution is a type of organized, conscious, and purposeful political violence by deprived and protesting groups against the system. He emphasizes that dissatisfaction and conflict are natural parts of the political arena, arguing that the likelihood of political violence only exists when dissatisfied parties possess the necessary tools and resources to carry out effective violence; in other words, they have the resources and organization necessary for significant action (Ahmadimanesh et al., 2014 AD/1394 SH: 76-77).

In Tilly's view, revolution involves purposeful, voluntary, and organized political violence by dissatisfied groups. This violence stems from the facilities and organizations at the disposal of the movement, the potential for popular rebellion, the regime's attempts at suppression, and deprivation of power. He considers dissatisfaction and conflict natural components of

political life, but political violence is only possible when dissatisfied parties have the necessary resources to engage in violence (Tilly, 2006 AD/1385 SH: 81-82).

Psychological theories of revolution also view revolutions as the product of transformations in individuals' mental processes. These theories focus on frustration-aggression theory, arguing that if obstacles arise in individuals' pursuit of their goals, the natural result is frustration and dissatisfaction. If the source of deprivation is identified and accessible, aggression becomes a natural means of reducing psychological tension.

One of these theorists is Ted Robert Gurr, who, in his book "Why Men Rebel," presents a detailed discussion of a complex model based on frustration-aggression theory. In this research, the main dependent variable is political violence, which may or may not take the form of a socio-political movement. He answers three main questions in this research:

- 1) What are the potential psychological and social sources of collective violence? 2) What factors influence the degree to which this potential is focused on the political system?
- 3) What social conditions affect the volume, form, and consequences of violence? (Daliri, 2003 AD/1382 SH: 815)

Ted Robert Gurr, by tracing the roots of collective political violence, considers it to encompass all collective attacks within a political community against the political regime and its actors; namely, rival political groups and office holders. He considers relative deprivation the main cause of collective violence, defining it as the difference between people's value expectations and their value capabilities. According to Robert Gurr, political, economic and social deprivation initially leads people towards dissatisfaction, then transforms into political dissatisfaction, and finally culminates in violent action against political actors (Mirzaei et al., 2017 AD/1397 SH: 123).

The feeling of relative deprivation can be an important indicator in analyzing economic well-being. Researchers have shown that feelings of deprivation at the individual level lead to increased anxiety, turmoil, alienation, and social isolation. In contrast, feelings of deprivation at the group and collective levels lead to decreased normative participation and increased political violence in the form of riots, internal conflicts, and the like. Therefore, in analyzing the theory of relative deprivation, attention to the level of analysis (individual or collective) is of particular importance. This helps researchers to better understand how feelings of deprivation affect the political and social behaviors of individuals and groups. Research on relative deprivation shows that social violence and protest behaviors stem from feelings of

injustice and uneven resource distribution, increased inequality between economic and social groups causes marginalized groups to become alienated from society.

This issue will ultimately lead to the expansion of internal conflicts and the outbreak of collective violence (Imam Jomehzadeh et al., 2015 AD/1395 SH: 30).

2. Research Background

Scattered research has addressed the issue of psychological and political violence, but not violence in revolutions. Various studies have also used the theories of relative deprivation by Ted Robert Gurr and resource mobilization by Charles Tilly as theoretical bases to explain revolutions, including the Iranian, French, and Russian revolutions. However, no research has used both Charles Tilly's and Ted Robert Gurr's theories to examine and analyze violence in these revolutions. The table below shows a list of relevant research literature, each of which analyzes political and psychological violence in revolutions from a specific theoretical perspective.

Table 1. Title or Brief Explanation

Row	Author(s) (Year of Research)	Research Title	Research Methodology	Most Important Findings and Results Related to the Research
1	Alireza Zamzam (2024 AD/1403 SH)	Leadership in the Islamic Revolution and the Russian Revolution (A Comparative Study)	Comparative-Analytical	Russian Revolution, leadership was limited to the post-revolution period and lacked a unified leadership. Examines the role and extent of leadership in the Iranian Islamic Revolution and the February 1917 Russian Revolution, showing that in the Islamic Revolution, Imam Khomeini's leadership was comprehensive and widespread, while in the
2	Abbasali Talebi (2024 AD/1403)	Examining the Reflection of the	Descriptive-Analytical	The occurrence of the Islamic Revolution led to the inability of

	SH)	Islamic Revolution on Revolution Theories with Emphasis on the Fourth Generation		the first three generations of theories to explain this revolution and led to the formation of the fourth generation of theories; it also had significant effects on Skocpol's and modernist ideas and led to greater attention to cultural components and the role of leadership in mass mobilization in explaining revolutions.
3	Taha Ashayeri (2023 AD/1402 SH)	Meta-analysis of Research Related to Ethno-Political Violence: The Period 1386 to 1400	Meta-analysis Method	Ethno-political violence is the result of sudden and disorganized development and changes that lead to social anomie and social cleavages and are exacerbated by cultural, social, political, psychological, and contextual factors.
4	Hossein Nourinia (2023 AD/1402 SH)	A Sociological Explanation of the Distinctions in Political Violence Before and After the Iranian Constitutional Revolution	Historical Analysis	The article demonstrates that before the triumph of the Constitutional Revolution, political violence was based on collective identities and the divine legitimacy of power, whereas after the revolution, with the emergence of organizational identities and revolutionary ideals, political violence shifted to written rules and acquired identities.
5	Najaf Shaykh Saraei (2023 AD/1402 SH)	Examining the Results of the French Revolution in the Thought of Hannah Arendt and Edmund Burke.	Comparative	This research examines the differences in the perspectives of Hannah Arendt and Edmund Burke regarding the outcomes of the French Revolution and concludes that Arendt has a tragic perspective and Burke a dramatic one, which

				can provide a theoretical framework for comparative studies of revolutions.
6	Hossein Mohammadi Sirt (2023 AD/1402 SH)	A Comparative Study of Provisional Governments in Major Revolutions (Case Study: The French, Russian, Algerian, and Islamic Revolutions)	Comparative	Provisional governments undertake common actions such as determining the judicial and security status of the former regime's political elites, drafting new regulations for the revolutionary government, and providing the necessities for establishing stable structures of the new political system.
7	Ali Tadayyon Rad (2022 AD/1401 SH)	Examining the Relationship Between Violence, War, and Politics with an Emphasis on the Ideas of Hannah Arendt.	Descriptive-Analytical	From a realist perspective, politics is intertwined with deceit and trickery, while Hannah Arendt views politics as a human and dialogical action that is in contrast to violence, such that the beginning of violence signifies the end of politics.
8	Ismail Bayat (2021 AD/1400 SH)	Mechanisms for the Export of the Iranian Islamic Revolution and the Russian Revolution: Similarities and Differences.	Historical-Documentary	The article critiques various explanations of the Islamic Revolution, including theories of mass society, the new world order, and the weakness of the Shah's repressive apparatus, and examines how these theories have been used to explain the Islamic Revolution.

The present study focuses on a comparative study of the nature of violence in three major revolutions of modern history: The French Revolution, the Russian Revolution, and the Iranian Revolution. It offers a more precise analysis of the dynamics of violence in these transformations. While other studies primarily focus on explaining the causes, leadership, or

outcomes of revolutions, this research, based on the theories of Charles Tilly and Robert Ted Gurr, examines the economic, social, and political factors influencing the emergence of violence. Another distinguishing feature of this article is its use of a qualitative and descriptive analytical approach, which allows for a deeper understanding of the specific conditions of each revolution and the varying levels of violence within them. While many studies have examined violence qualitatively or quantitatively, this research attempts to examine the evolution of violence more comprehensively, considering historical and cultural contexts. These aspects clearly distinguish and enhance my research compared to existing literature and demonstrate that this study can be a significant step towards a better understanding of the dynamics of violence in revolutions.

3. Research Innovation

This research conducts a comparative study of the nature of violence in revolutions, particularly in the French, Russian, and Iranian Revolutions, utilizing two important theoretical frameworks: Charles Tilly's theory and Robert Ted Gurr's relative deprivation theory. This innovative theoretical combination allows for a deeper analysis of the social and economic factors influencing the outbreak of violence and helps to understand the complexities of this phenomenon. Specifically, the research identifies the relationship between social inequalities and the emergence of violence, showing how feelings of relative deprivation lead not only to tensions but also to the formation of collective identities and ultimately to organized violence. The comparative analysis of the nature of violence in three different revolutions is a key aspect of this research. This approach helps identify common patterns and specific differences in the emergence of violence and examines in detail how the cultural, economic, and political contexts of each revolution affect the type and intensity of violence.

For example, in the French Revolution, violence was employed as a means to achieve the ideals of liberty and equality, whereas in the Russian Revolution, violence was primarily used as a tool to overthrow the old regime and exert control over the new society. This comparative analysis can lead to a deeper understanding of the mechanisms of violence in each context and how they interacted. This research, by offering a multifaceted and comprehensive analysis of violence in revolutions, adds to the existing body of literature in this field and serves as a reference for future research in sociology and political science. With this analytical and

multidimensional approach, the research clarifies the relationships between various factors and their impact on the outbreak of violence in revolutions, providing a better understanding of this complex and multi-layered phenomenon. Furthermore, the use of primary sources in this research enhances the richness of the analyses and adds novel perspectives, contributing to new insights regarding violence in revolutions.

4. Research Methodology

This research is written using an analytical-descriptive method and data was collected using a review of primary and secondary historical texts, employing a library research approach.

Qualitative analysis was used to examine the collected information. This research utilizes the theories of Robert Dahl and Charles Tilly regarding the nature of violence in the Iranian, Russian, and French revolutions within its theoretical framework.

5. Violence and Revolution

Violence refers to any type of planned physical and non-physical behavior that uses material and immaterial means to eliminate an opponent or rival. This elimination can range from reducing the power and ability of an individual or society to complete physical elimination, as well as the elimination of social relations and the creation of new ones.

Political violence is also directed at political power and is employed by both the dominant political power and by groups vying for power and engaged in power struggles, sometimes accompanied by mass violence. This political violence, as coercive force directed at political power and possessing cultural legitimacy, has been used by both sides throughout Iranian history and has always been accompanied by the use of various tools (Nourinia et al., 2023 AD/1402 SH: 131).

Arendt argues that despite the significant role violence has always played in history; it has rarely been subject to reflection, appearing as "A taken-for-granted premise." She believes that "Anyone searching for meaning in historical documents can hardly fail to see violence as a serious phenomenon." (Tadayyo Rad, 2022 AD/1401 SH: 95).

One undeniable characteristic of the political phenomenon of revolution is its violent nature. Specifically, examining all global revolutions reveals that both during their occurrence and following the major changes they bring, various forms of violence, such as murder, assassination, exile, etc., have always been present. Contemporary national history also

demonstrates the truth of this regarding the 1357 Iranian Revolution, with the methods of struggle employed by certain political groups clearly illustrating this point. To clarify the concept of violence, constantly referenced here, it must be said that no comprehensive definition has been offered, and each individual, based on their social and cultural background, holds a different view. Generally, violence is defined as rage, intensity, brutality, and opposition to gentleness. Furthermore, other terminological definitions exist; such as the use of force or power, unlawful attacks on freedoms granted by society to its members, and harsh or sudden behaviors that can be harmful, threatening, and sometimes lethal (Rezaei, 2020 AD/1399 SH: 12-13).

Hannah Arendt defines violence as "An action performed without discussion and dialogue and without thinking about its consequences, or in other words, the use of force (both physical and non-physical) to coerce individuals, inflict harm, negate autonomy and legitimate freedoms, and violate the laws and regulations of society." In Arendt's view, "Violence stems from the failure of action in our world and also requires specific tools and means." (Arendt, 1979 AD/1359 SH: 11 and 14)

Furthermore, Hannah Arendt, in her book "On Revolution," examines the concept of revolution and writes: "Humanity hopes that revolution will liberate all people." She views revolution as a momentous event that ultimately leads to human freedom.

He views revolution as a significant event ultimately leading to human liberation. Arendt also notes that "historically, war is one of the oldest phenomena in modern human history, while the concept of revolution, in its true sense, did not exist before the modern era and is one of the newest concepts among political data" (Arendt, 1982 AD/1361 SH: 10).

In discussions on the study of revolutions, a fundamental distinction is clearly seen, stemming from the commitment and diversity of definitions of revolution among researchers. Aristotle points out that revolution are the result of a sense of inequality; those in lower positions seek equality. Tilly believes that the definition and concept of revolution are not fixed. However, his approximate definition of revolution is: "Revolution is the violent replacement of part of the ruling elite under conditions of multiple governances."

He also believes that "Revolutions will not continue in their former form, because governments are also not fixed." The factors and mechanisms that characterize revolution are subjects that must be examined; in other words, how power is concentrated in a governing system and consequently the likelihood of a revolution and its nature, result from the

functioning of each governing system (Harati, 2018 AD/1398 SH: 67). Ted Robert Gurr considers revolution a type of political violence and defines it as: "Political violence includes all collective attacks within a political society against the ruling regime, its actors, including rival political groups and office holders or its policies." (Ghajari, 2013 AD/1393 SH: 8)

5.1. The Nature of Violence in the 1789 French Revolution

Revolutions have roots. In 18th-century France, known as the wealthiest country of its time, the revolution was largely caused by a financial crisis and internal conflicts within the privileged class. In the 1780s, after two decades of attempts at financial and economic reforms, the king realized that the tax system could no longer generate sufficient revenue to meet the country's administrative and military needs. He asked the government's grandees for help, but the financial system was heavily intertwined with the privileges of the aristocracy, and finding a simple solution was impossible.

Instead, these conditions caused conflicts between the king and various groups of the privileged class, leading to the formation of a National Assembly and the beginning of debates among them; the conflicts between the government and the privileged class, along with intense protests, encouraged peasants and workers to effect changes in their favor. In 1788, there was a poor harvest, and peasants refused to pay taxes and attacked landowners' offices. Urban workers also realized that the king's supporters were obstructing reforms that would lead to lower bread prices (Goldstone, 2017 AD/1397 SH: 260). Therefore, the despotism of the kings, the oppressive class system, the unstable economic conditions, increased taxes and heavy pressure on the Third Estate, the army's defeat in foreign wars, and the extremely harsh and arduous winter of 1789, drove the people of Paris to the streets (Kazemi, 2009 AD/1388 SH: 3). Finally, on July 14, 1789, the people of Paris stormed the Bastille to collect gunpowder and also issue a political statement marking the beginning of the revolution. The rebels killed many of the Bastille's defenders, including Commander Bernard René Jourdan, whose head was severed and then carried on a pike. Following the start of the revolution, the need to suppress counter-revolutionaries was felt. In these circumstances, the September Massacres resulted in thousands of deaths. Hobsbawm, as a Marxist, considers the violence of the French Revolution the sole agent of social change (Chatzakou, 2023). The role of the Reign of Terror (1793-1794) should not be overlooked. The Jacobins, as the

dominant revolutionary group, attempted to prevent counter-revolutionary activities and proceeded to arrest, execute, and suppress individual liberties. During this period, the queen and king were executed in January 1793. Although the revolutionaries represented the ideals of the Enlightenment, thinkers like John Locke believed that violence should always be used as a last resort (Chatzakou, 2023). Therefore, the French Revolution of 1789 caused tremendous transformations not only in France but throughout the world. In Hannah Arendt's words, "This revolution set the world on fire." (Shirkhani, 2018 AD/1398 SH: 91)

More has been said, written, mythologized, and debated about the French Revolution than any similar event in the past two hundred years (Sayyar, 2008 AD/1387 SH: 107-108).

In the turbulent revolutionary century of France after 1780, historians of collective action such as Charles Tilly have highlighted a significant shift in the forms of collective protest after the mid-nineteenth century. This ranges from "reactive" violence against new state and capitalist interventions, food riots and anti-tax revolts, to "Proactive" mobilization through unions, election campaigns, strikes, and demonstrations. These new tactics sought to gain influence and control over national institutions (Mc Fee, 2020: 347). Initially, the level of violence in this revolution was relatively low, with the highest casualties occurring during the storming of the Bastille, where 200 people were killed. Although slogans of equality and liberty were raised in France, in the early stages of the revolution, the revolutionaries focused more on abolishing feudalism and the tax exemptions of the aristocracy and establishing liberty. However, this liberty did not initially imply the establishment of a republic. The 1791 Constitution established a constitutional monarchy, but due to the king's collaboration with counter-revolutionaries and foreign support, the French people accused him of inviting foreign forces for military intervention. This situation led to the growth of republicanism. Moderate republicans, led by Danton, came to power in 1792, and Louis XVI was subsequently arrested and executed by a vote of the Assembly. In 1793, radical republicans led by Robespierre revolted and seized power when Paris was threatened with occupation. At this time, the French Revolution emphasized liberty more and marginalized equality (Malakoutiyan et al., 2010 AD/1390 SH: 35-36).

In fact, violence in the revolution contributed to creating a kind of historical change; however, violence is a factor, not an actor, in history. Widespread violence in various forms continued in France despite the existence of three constitutions (1791, 1795, and 1799) and their claims to end the revolution.

The popular violence that began in 1789 contributed to the dismantling of feudal remnants and the abolition of hereditary privileges. In 1792, rural uprisings, urban riots, and foreign wars facilitated the fall of the monarchy and the promotion of social equality. The collapse of the ancient régime provoked widespread reactions, leading to state-sponsored terror, unprecedented mass executions, and severe repression in 1793-1794 (Brown, 2023: 224).

According to the Trigger theory of revolution, revolutions typically stem from deprivation and a sense of dissatisfaction with the existing order. The masses in France were discontent with the monarchy. The French Revolution represented a shift from absolute monarchy towards a limited, constitutional monarchy. The financial crisis engulfing the ancient régime exacerbated its authoritarian nature. The absolute monarchy was suffering from a confluence of crises. Externally, France was perceived as a weak and ineffective power. By the late 1780s, it was rapidly losing its diplomatic influence in central Europe and had lost significant portions of its colonies in North America and India (Novagwani, 2016: 82).

Charles Tilly also argues that the repressive apparatus and coercive force play a key role in the shaping of revolutions. He posits that every revolution comprises two main elements: a revolutionary situation and revolutionary outcomes. The combination of these two elements leads to the actual occurrence of a revolution, namely the transfer of power through coercive force. In a revolutionary situation, three factors simultaneously interact, considered as the direct causes of a revolution:

- 1) The emergence of individuals or coalitions with competing claims to power in the country or parts thereof;
- 2) Widespread popular support for these claims;
- 3) The incumbent power holders are unable to suppress the successor coalition or its supporters.

Revolutionary outcomes, in turn, stem from four factors:

- 1) The population opposes the regime;
- 2) Revolutionary coalitions gain access to armed forces;
- 3) The regime's armed forces declare neutrality or join the opposing groups;
- 4) Members of revolutionary coalitions seize control of the governmental apparatus and dominate governmental institutions and structures (Azimi Dolatabadi, 2016 AD/1396 SH: 143).

Royalism, Jacobinism, religious resistance, and the continuation of war all intensified cyclical violence after 1794. These unstable, multifaceted forces could only be controlled by strengthening the repressive powers of the state. Attempts to stabilize the Republic and control violence, particularly through the militarization of society, increased repression, and the curtailment of democracy, led to the emergence of a growing authoritarian liberalism after 1797, which contributed to the formation of a security state and personal dictatorship in 1802 (Brown, 2023: 224).

5.2. The Nature of Violence in the 1917 Russian Revolution

To understand the role of violence in the 1917 Russian Revolution, we must be familiar with its historical context. Peasants and workers began organizing as early as 1813, and by 1845, strikes were deemed illegal. In 1905, a group led by a priest attempted to petition the Tsar for civil rights, but were fired upon by police before reaching the Winter Palace. This event escalated strikes and uprisings into widespread political protest. Despite the scale of the 1905 events, no fundamental or systematic change occurred. Tsar Nicholas II failed to quell the internal unrest, which intensified after Russia's entry into World War I. Furthermore, the controversial presence of Rasputin¹ at court increased distrust of the Tsar. In February 1917, men and women took to the streets of St. Petersburg, a movement driven not by the leadership of a political group, but by hunger, poverty, war, and exhaustion. Under these circumstances, the Tsar's army refused to suppress the protesters and instead sided with them (Hobsbawm, 2015). Unlike the 1905 revolution, the February Revolution led to the collapse of the regime. At this stage, violence was primarily exerted by the regime, not the revolutionaries.

The Tsarist dictatorship was replaced by a provisional government that failed to meet the demands of the people. This revolution did not yet have a Marxist character. Workers demanded their rights, but not within the framework of a proletarian state. The Bolsheviks introduced Marxist elements into the October 1917 revolution. This time, revolutionaries led by Lenin employed violent methods to overthrow the provisional government. Lenin considered violence necessary for such a revolution (Chatzako: 2023).

¹. Grigori Rasputin was a controversial and significant figure in Russian history, living in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. He was known as a religious mystic and seer, and wielded considerable influence over the court of Tsar Nicholas II.

In fact, in the Russian Revolution, the Bolsheviks, as its main organizers, held a positive view of the use of violence and armed struggle. Lenin, as the leader of the Bolsheviks, emphasized that organizing the proletariat for armed uprising, equipping the workers, and leading this uprising were the main tasks of the Bolshevik party. In contrast, the Mensheviks consistently disagreed with the Bolsheviks' use of these violent methods and differed on this issue. Indeed, the differing viewpoints of the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks regarding the use of violence in the revolution were one of the fundamental disagreements between these two political factions. Lenin, as the most important leader of the Russian Revolution, stressed that one of the main tasks of the Bolshevik party was to strive to arm and equip the workers. This shows that the Bolsheviks, especially Lenin, believed that resorting to force and armed struggle was necessary to advance revolutionary goals. Unlike other political factions in Russia, the Bolsheviks considered this violent approach one of their primary duties (Morshedizadeh et al., 2014 AD/1394 SH: 67). Therefore, the bloodiest phase of the revolution occurred during the civil war. The Red Army, striving to defend the Bolshevik government, clashed with the White Army and nationalist movements. During the Red Terror, crimes were also committed against civilians (Chatzako: 2023).

In the Russian Revolution, the use of various tools and methods of mobilization and protest is clearly evident. From 1917 to 1918, Russia's political, economic, and governmental systems completely collapsed. During this period, various social classes, especially workers, peasants, and soldiers, actively sought the overthrow of the ruling regime.

Peasants, suffering from harsh economic conditions and severe poverty, sought change through local protests and uprisings, demanding land reforms. Soldiers, themselves burdened by the hardships of World War I, joined the protesters, many rising up in support of the Bolshevik Revolution. These protests manifested not only in rallies and strikes but also through the dissemination of publications, proclamations, and revolutionary slogans. These methods rapidly spread public discontent, ultimately leading to the collapse of the Tsarist regime and the rise of the Bolshevik government. In this process, solidarity among different social classes played a key role in shaping the revolution and its political and social transformations. Protesters demanding bread took to the streets of Petrograd. Supported by a large number of striking industrial workers, they clashed with police and refused to disperse. On March 11th, garrison forces in Petrograd were called in to suppress the uprising. In some

clashes, regiments opened fire on protesters, killing several, but the protesters continued their violence and demonstrations, causing the forces to waver and eventually disintegrate. The Duma formed a provisional government on March 12th. A few days later, Tsar Nicholas abdicated, ending centuries of Romanov rule in Russia (Siyansiala, 2024). This revolution, with its internal conflicts within the vast remnants of the Russian Empire, dragged on and resulted in the deaths of millions in less than eight years (Nouri, 2019: 65). Ultimately, the Russian Revolution of 1917 occurred when workers' strikes and uprisings prompted soldiers to join them. This spontaneous movement, lacking prior planning or leadership, led to the downfall of the 300-year-old Romanov regime in Russia, plunging the country into a major crisis. Notably, this revolution unfolded spontaneously, without pre-determined guidance or organization. No one anticipated that this sudden, unplanned movement could topple the powerful Romanov regime and confront Russia with such immense challenges (Mohammadi Sirat, 2023 AD/1402 SH: 166).

5.3. The Nature of Violence in the 1979 Iranian Revolution

Historically, non-violent revolutions were virtually inconceivable. From the enraged Parisians storming the Bastille with torches to the Russian workers rising up against the Tsar, revolutions were synonymous with violence. However, when unarmed people, after a prolonged struggle, forced Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, the last Shah of Iran, to flee Tehran on January 16, 1979, they presented the world with a new and seemingly paradoxical phenomenon: a non-violent revolution (Philip, 2010: abstract).

The first wave of revolutions associated with the post-World War I era, encompassed political and social changes in Europe and Asia. This wave, fueled by new ideologies like communism and fascism, led to the overthrow of old regimes and the establishment of new governments. The second wave, in the post-World War II period (1945-1960), comprised anti-colonial revolutions in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. This wave resulted in struggles for independence and self-determination, pushing many nations towards democracy and nationalism. Following these two waves, a third wave of revolutions (1974-1980) emerged. During this period, an increasing number of non-violent popular uprisings against authoritarian governments took place. One of the most significant revolutions of this wave was the Iranian Revolution of 1978-1979, which largely employed non-violent resistance,

although government attacks on peaceful demonstrations resulted in significant bloodshed. While revolutionary movements utilizing violent tactics have not entirely disappeared, the use of non-violent methods appears to be increasing (Goodwin, 2022: 529).

The non-violent nature of the Iranian Revolution can be understood by examining the statistics of those killed. In historical research, Emadoddin Baqi, in an interview with "Agahi-ye No" magazine and in his book "Evalouating the Iran Revolution," analyzed the number of casualties from 1963 to 1978. Specifically, he cited 3164 casualties. However, the Martyrs Foundation reported a lower figure of 2781.

In this regard, Baqi has pointed out that some groups, such as Marxists, are not included in the official statistics. Baqi also did not rule out the possibility of some cases not being registered and mentioned this in his book: "Given the geographical scope of this foundation and more than two decades having passed since the revolution, it is possible that only the names of a very small number of victims were not recorded." He believes that although there may be some cases, their number is so small that it will not significantly affect the overall statistics.

On the other hand, he also points to the possibility of reverse cases, where some individuals may have been identified as martyrs, while these claims are not provable. These exceptional cases should be carefully examined and considered in future analyses (Baqi, 2024 AD/1403 SH: 235).

In fact, in the late 1970s, the Islamic Revolution in Iran surprised the global community and ended the long-standing monarchy. The anti-Shah protests and general strikes in the country constitute a major popular uprising in world history, with at least 10 percent of the population participating. This proportion is higher than the number of people who participated in the French Revolution (less than 2 percent) and the overthrow of Soviet communism (less than 1 percent). Furthermore, the Iranian Revolution resulted in fewer casualties compared to other movements. For example, while the South African anti-apartheid movement left more than 7,000 revolutionary martyrs, the available statistics in Iran indicate much lower casualties. The Martyrs Foundation identified 744 martyrs in Tehran, the main center of the Islamic Revolution. Also, the statistics of the Legal Medicine Organization and the main cemetery of Tehran, Behesht-e Zahra, reported 895 and 768 martyrs, respectively. These numbers show that the Iranian Revolution was relatively accompanied by fewer casualties and can be considered the minimum number of victims of the revolution. A primary study conducted in 1982 by Sahlollah Amiri, an employee of the Martyrs Foundation, examined the number of

deaths directly related to the revolution. Amiri excluded deaths due to accidents and natural causes in this research and then compared the statistics of his foundation with the records of the Tehran Legal Medicine Organization and the main cemetery of Tehran.

This comparison revealed similar figures, suggesting that approximately 700 to 900 Iranians lost their lives in Tehran during the year of the revolution. These numbers indicate a relatively low level of violence and casualties in the Iranian Revolution (Farzanegan, 2022: 2062).

Between 1979 and 1981, with the gradual formation of the ideology of "Vilayat-e Faqih" (Guardianship of the Jurist) and the belief in it, nationalist, national-religious, eclectic, Marxist-leftist, and other ethnic groups joined the opposition. In the early 1980s, the political forces primarily comprised groups within the regime, operating through organizations such as the Islamic Republic Party and the Organization of the Mojahedin of the Islamic Revolution. Some smaller opposition groups, such as the Freedom Movement and the Melli Iran Party, remained active within the country with limited activities, while others, after engaging in overthrow attempts and armed conflict, were suppressed and largely left the country. In the 1980s, there was no legal opposition, and particularly during the war years, the political system operated in a centralized and authoritarian manner. The overthrow-seeking opposition mainly consisted of eclectic and ethnic groups such as the Democratic Party and Komalah, which were considered major threats to internal security. After the war, although opposition activities continued with less intensity, they still affected the country's security. The "Bloody Summer" of 1981 demonstrated that few days passed without incidents stemming from the opposition. The most important opposition group in the 1980s was the People's Mujahedin Organization (PMOI), which, through bombings of the Islamic Republic Party offices, the Prime Minister's office, and the Prosecutor General's office, assassinated many key regime figures. This organization also engaged in espionage for foreign powers; for example, a commander of the army's naval forces, who was a member of the Tudeh Party, provided sensitive information to enemies. Another activity of this opposition was planning a coup in 1980, in collaboration with foreign countries, which was uncovered before its execution. The increase in violence during this period stemmed from several key factors. First, the terrorist and bombing activities of the PMOI fueled insecurity and fear in society.


Secondly, the group's collaboration with foreign entities and attempts to overthrow the regime led to increased tensions and strong government reactions. Ultimately, this situation resulted

in a tense and violent atmosphere, the effects of which were profound and lasting on Iranian society (Haghpanah, 1999 AD/1378 SH: 17-18).

This escalation of violence occurred for several reasons. Political conflicts and the lack of a legal opposition drove opposition groups to violent actions. Furthermore, the war and the regime's repressive responses to opponents created a cycle of violence that exacerbated tensions. As a result, the political climate was extremely volatile and violent. The Iraqi invasion of Iran in 1359 SH (1980 AD), triggered by the revolution and a shift in the balance of power in the Middle East, resulted in significantly greater human and economic losses. This war remains the deadliest in Middle Eastern history and the longest war of the 20th century. More reliable data on total casualties has been presented, indicating that the number of killed and missing reached 680,000. Iran's share of the total casualties was approximately 73% (500,000 Iranians), in addition to 1.5 million wounded and injured. 85% of those killed were soldiers, with the number of Iranian soldiers killed being 3.5 times higher than that of Iraqi soldiers. The number of civilians killed in bombings accounted for about 3% of the total casualties. The remaining 12% of civilian casualties included Kurds killed by both Iraqis and Iranians. Approximately 115,000 soldiers were taken prisoner (70,000 Iraqis and 45,000 Iranians) (Farzanegan, 2022: 2063).

According to the Martyrs Foundation statistics in Esfand 1380 (February/March 2002), during the Iran-Iraq war and the imposed war, the number of martyrs was considerably higher than the number of martyrs of the revolution. More than 216,000 individuals are registered as martyrs, of whom approximately 87%, or more than 188,000, died in the Iran-Iraq war. Of this number, more than 172,000 were killed in direct confrontations with the enemy, and nearly 16,000 were killed in missile attacks on cities. During the war, Iraq fired 532 missiles at 25 Iranian cities, with 410 missiles hitting residential areas (Kadivar: 2019 AD/1399 SH). Excerpts from the statistics of the Martyrs Foundation of the Islamic Revolution up to 1380 (according to Kadivar: 2021)

Selected statistics from the Islamic Revolution Martyrs Foundation until 1380 (quoted from Kaddivar: 2010 AD/1399 SH)



The level of violence in the post-revolutionary period, particularly during the Iran-Iraq war, was extremely high. The high casualty figures demonstrate the intensity of the fighting and bombardments, which affected not only military personnel but also the lives of civilians. This situation created an atmosphere of fear and insecurity in society and had a profound impact on the collective psyche of the people. The missile bombardments and widespread civilian casualties highlight the intensity and terror of the war during this period.

Based on Tilly's theory, the Iranian Revolution can be examined from various perspectives, as it possesses the two essential conditions Tilly outlines: revolutionary situation and revolutionary outcome. During the Iranian Revolution, the Shah's regime, the rise of Ayatollah Khomeini, and the growth of leftist movements were three major forces vying for complete control of the government. The Shah's moral corruption prompted Ayatollah Khomeini's mobilization against him. The Shah's authoritarian rule also angered many in the middle class who desired political reforms. Generally, disruptions in social and economic patterns stemming from the inequitable distribution of oil wealth, difficulties in political participation for citizens, and the lack of Islam's influence contributed to popular mobilization. As Tilly's theory notes, the structure of a state influences revolutions. In the Iranian Revolution, the socio-economic conditions indicated the potential trajectory of the revolution. According to Tilly's theory, for an event to be considered a revolution, it must occur. During the Iranian Revolution, Ayatollah Khomeini initiated what he termed "Moral

Assault" on the Shah's armed forces and, through oil workers' protests, created an economic collapse aimed at neutralizing the regime's military. Four factors contribute to revolutionary outcomes. As seen in the case of Ayatollah Khomeini, he utilized demonstrations to achieve these outcomes. Regarding the execution of his "Moral Assault," he explained his strategy: "We must fight the soldier in the hearts of the soldiers. We must fight through martyrdom, for the martyr is the essence of history."

"Let the army kill as much as it wants until the soldiers are shaken in their hearts by the killing they have done, and the army collapses" (Lezczynski, 2021). In Tilly's view, some opposition groups are members of the political community who claim representation within the governing system, while others are challengers seeking to gain political power. The most important challengers in the Islamic Revolution included the traditional middle class (merchants and clerics), the new middle class (intellectuals and academics), and industrial workers (Keshavarzi et al., 2011 AD/1390 SH: 107). In the Islamic Revolution, revolutionary groups, in response to emerging opportunities, mobilized their resources to achieve demands they had not previously recognized as their rights. The opening up of the country's political and social space through the facilitating actions of the government and the court, the revolutionaries' success in some revolutionary actions such as holding peaceful demonstrations, and incidents such as the Cinema Rex fire in Abadan and the 17 Shahrivar (Black Friday) events, along with the decisive, widespread, and charismatic leadership of Imam Khomeini, served as accelerating factors at the disposal of the mobilizing core. These conditions created a suitable opportunity for the movement's leaders and the nation to challenge the government and raise new demands such as the overthrow of the Pahlavi regime and the establishment of the Islamic Republic system, thus shaping the aggressive mobilization of the revolutionaries (Keshavarz Shokri, 2013 AD/1393 SH: 122). In the Todger theory, in explaining the cause of the Islamic Revolution, the middle class faced deprivation in gaining access to power and political participation through institutional mechanisms. Workers and farmers also faced numerous problems, especially in terms of livelihood, due to land reforms. Furthermore, Mohammad Reza Shah's quasi-modernist and quasi-nationalist policies led to the expansion of the authoritarian system into that part of urban society, namely the religious authorities and the religious community, which usually enjoyed considerable independence in its relationship with the government. Mohammad Reza Shah's quasi-modernist actions plunged the Pahlavi regime into a crisis stemming from the

mismatch between the government and society. The combination of these factors created the conditions for the revolution, with the release of pent-up forces leading to the 1979 Iranian Revolution (Imam Jom'e Zadeh, 2016 AD/1395 SH: 55-56). According to relative deprivation theory, it can be argued that in the late Pahlavi era, various segments of Iranian society felt deprived and experienced severe relative deprivation due to the disregard of their political, social, economic, and cultural demands and fundamental rights. On the other hand, the revolutionary ideology led by Imam Khomeini successfully promoted political and religious rights, personal security, and economic welfare as widespread public expectations. Imam Khomeini succeeded in uniting various dissatisfied groups, paving the way for the victory of the Islamic Revolution and the end of the monarchical regime. Considering these facts and using the theory of relative deprivation, it can be concluded that the widespread relative deprivation among Iranians was a factor in the occurrence of the Islamic Revolution in February 1979 (Taliban, 2017 AD/1397 SH: 7-8).

6. Commonalities of the Three Revolutions

6.1. Mobilization of Resources

In all three revolutions, the ability of social groups to mobilize and cooperate played a key role in the creation and escalation of violence. In the French Revolution, the bourgeoisie and workers cooperated to overthrow the royal system. This synergy demonstrates how different groups can create a powerful force by sharing resources and common goals. In the Russian Revolution, the Bolsheviks, by exploiting public discontent and mobilizing the masses, quickly seized power. This collective mobilization, especially in situations where feelings of deprivation and inequality are deeply rooted in society, can lead to widespread violence. In Iran, too, various groups, including religious and nationalist groups, united to overthrow the Shah's regime. These experiences show that effective mobilization of resources and cooperation between social groups can lead to revolutionary violence (Shokri, 2010 AD/1390 SH: 83).

6.2. Feeling of Deprivation

The concept of relative deprivation plays a significant role, especially in the analysis of revolutionary violence. In each of these three revolutions, social and economic inequalities

fueled feelings of deprivation. In France, the financial pressures resulting from continuous wars and famines severely burdened the lower classes of society. This discontent led to the formation of protest movements that ultimately resulted in revolutionary violence.

In Russia, widespread poverty and dissatisfaction with the Tsarist regime, particularly among workers and peasants, intensified feelings of deprivation. This situation enabled the Bolsheviks to exploit these grievances and incite the masses towards violence. In Iran, political and economic corruption and the Shah's continuous repression brought feelings of deprivation among the people to a peak, leading to revolutionary violence. These experiences demonstrate that feelings of deprivation, especially when coupled with severe inequalities, can lead to widespread violence (Ghasemi, 2017 AD/1397 SH: 38).

6.3. State Repression

Brutal state repression in each of these revolutions fueled the escalation of violence. In France, the monarchy's attempts to suppress dissent led to massacres and widespread terror, ultimately culminating in a bloody revolution. In Russia, the Tsarist regime's severe repression of protests, particularly in the years leading up to the 1917 revolution, increased tensions and severely exacerbated grievances. In Iran, the Shah's repression, especially during the 1970s, led to increased violence and protests. This vicious cycle of repression and violence demonstrates that whenever governments resort to repression instead of responding to grievances, the likelihood of revolutionary violence increases.

6.4. Leadership and Organization

Effective leadership and cohesive organization were vital factors in guiding and shaping revolutionary violence. Leaders such as Robespierre in France, Lenin in Russia, and Khomeini in Iran were able to mobilize the masses and direct revolutionary goals towards fundamental changes. This leadership not only demonstrates the ability to garner social support but also showcases the ability to organize and manage resources. In all three revolutions, strong leadership acted as an accelerating factor in transforming public discontent into revolutionary violence (Karimi Keshe, 2023 AD/1402 SH: 107).

6.5. Consequences of Violence

The consequences of violence in each of these revolutions also reveal significant commonalities. The French and Russian revolutions, after widespread violence, led to profound political changes that overthrew the old regimes and established new ones. In Iran, violence against the Shah's regime led to the establishment of the Islamic Republic.

These results indicate that violence can act as a catalyst for profound social change, although its consequences may differ across countries.

Table 1. Commonalities of the French, Russian, and Iranian Revolutions

Aspect	French Revolution	Russian Revolution	Iranian Revolution
Mass Mobilization	Financial crisis and increased taxes on the Third Estate created pressure.	World War I and widespread poverty exacerbated public discontent.	Economic corruption and government inefficiency caused public dissatisfaction.
Sense of Deprivation	Collaboration between various classes, especially the working class and the bourgeoisie.	Workers and peasants as the main pillars of the Bolshevik movement.	Unity among various social groups, from nationalists to clerics.
State Violence and Repression	September Massacres and Jacobin terror.	Severe repression of protests using military forces.	Strong government response to peaceful, but more controlled, demonstrations.
Leadership and Organization	Establishment of a republic and the end of feudalism.	Establishment of a communist state and structural changes.	Major changes achieved largely without violence, positive impact on the new structure.
Casualties and Civil War Aftermath	High human losses and civil war.	Millions of casualties and civil war.	Approximately 3164 casualties and reduced negative social consequences.

(Source: Author)

7. Points of Divergence among the Three Revolutions

7.1. Nature of Violence

French Revolution: In this revolution, violence was used as a tool to achieve political and social goals. Revolutionaries targeted their opponents by creating an atmosphere of terror and

repression. This use of violence indicates that the revolutionaries used every tool (including mass killings) to consolidate power and achieve their ideals. This process gradually led to ruthless massacres that also involved many innocent people, demonstrating the complex psychological and social dynamics within the revolutionary society (Ghanifi, 2018: 912).

Russian Revolution: This revolution systematically used violence as a strategic tool. The Bolsheviks severely repressed their opponents to achieve Marxist ideology. From this perspective, violence in the Russian Revolution was considered an essential component for establishing a communist regime. This approach to the Russian Civil War resulted in extensive human casualties, demonstrating the Bolsheviks' commitment to their goals and their inability to control the consequences of this violence (Finckenauer, 2001: 8). **The Iranian Revolution:** Despite severe repression by the Shah's regime, this revolution largely proceeded non-violently. Protesters, relying on peaceful demonstrations and moral arguments, sought to overthrow the monarchy. This non-violent approach not only helped reduce human casualties but also contributed to maintaining social cohesion and reducing internal tensions. This difference in approach reflects Iran's specific political and social culture, as well as the historical influences on social movements.

7.2. Consequences and Results of Violence

The French Revolution: Violence in this revolution led to severe instability and insecurity in society. The Reign of Terror, which followed the revolution, exemplifies the negative consequences of this violence. This situation gradually led to the creation of a dynamic but tense political environment where power was constantly shifting. This demonstrates that violence can not only cause rapid changes in political systems but can also lead to deeper instability and social crises (Brown, 2023: 198). **The Russian Revolution:** The violence and high human casualties in this revolution had profound and lasting consequences for society. The civil war and the Bolsheviks' severe repression created an atmosphere of terror and fear, leading to the establishment of a dictatorial regime. These consequences demonstrate that violence can significantly impact a country's political and social structure and contribute to the consolidation of authoritarian regimes (Smith, 2014: 200). **The Iranian Revolution:** Although the Iranian Revolution was largely non-violent, the government's response to peaceful demonstrations resulted in some violence. However, the number of casualties was

significantly lower than in the other two revolutions. This reduction in casualties demonstrates that the Iranian Revolution was able to achieve significant political changes without widespread violence. Furthermore, this helped maintain social cohesion and prevent deeper tensions.

7.3. Number of Victims

French Revolution: The number of victims of this revolution reaches thousands, including widespread massacres and civil wars. This high number of victims indicates that violence was pursued in France with great intensity and extent, and was considered part of the process of social change. This situation was particularly evident during the Reign of Terror, when revolutionaries used every means to maintain their power (Costa, 2013: 3).

Russian Revolution: Human casualties in this revolution also reached 7 to 12 million, and the civil war and severe repression by the Bolsheviks severely weakened society. These casualty figures demonstrate the violent consequences of this revolution and, in particular, its negative impact on the country's social and political structure (Falconer, 2017: 148).

Iranian Revolution: The number of victims of the Iranian Revolution is estimated at approximately 3,164, which is much lower compared to the other two revolutions. This figure indicates the non-violent approach of the protesters and the more controlled responses of the government. This difference in the number of victims can be attributed to various factors, including the non-violent strategies of the protesters and the specific historical and cultural conditions of Iran (Baqi, 2024 AD/1403 SH: 235).

7.4. Experience of Civil War and Post-Revolution Unrest

French Revolution: This revolution was accompanied by instability and civil wars after the revolution. This unrest shows that violence not only acts as a factor in creating change, but can also lead to long-term social consequences and crises. After the revolution in France, a large group of opponents were executed on charges of opposing the revolution, and in less than a year, about 1376 people were sent to the guillotine (Koulai, 2018 AD/1398 SH: 170-171).

Russian Revolution: Civil war, as a natural consequence of the initial violence, was accompanied by very high human and economic losses. In Russia, the limited revolt of

factory workers and soldiers of the Petrograd garrison was a turning point in the political history of the country, leading to the fall of the Romanov dynasty. This revolt occurred as deep economic and social discontent resulting from World War I and the corruption of the Tsarist regime reached its peak.

Rebels, utilizing violence as a tool to express discontent and effect fundamental change, rapidly seized power and challenged the ruling regime. This behavior not only indicated the collapse of the then-existing socio-political structure but also shaped a violent model for future protest groups (Korzin, 2018 AD/1398 SH: 122).

The Iranian Revolution: Although the revolution began non-violently, the Iran-Iraq war resulted in significant human casualties. However, this war is considered a separate consequence from the revolution itself, not part of the process of change. This demonstrates that the Iranian Revolution, despite the challenges it faced, managed to prevent major internal crises.

Table 2. Distinguishing Points of the Nature of Violence in the French, Russian, and Iranian Revolutions

Component	French Revolution	Russian Revolution	Iranian Revolution
Nature of Violence	Widespread use of violence to suppress opponents and achieve political goals.	Violence as a strategy to consolidate Bolshevik power and suppress opponents.	Primarily non-violent, with controlled government suppression.
Consequences of Violence	Instability and insecurity, a period of terror and widespread killings.	Civil war and high human casualties, a climate of terror in society.	Fewer casualties and less negative social impact.
Number of Victims	Millions of victims, including killings and civil wars.	Millions of victims in civil war and repression.	Approximately 3164, fewer compared to the other two revolutions.
Experience of Civil War and Unrest	Instability and civil wars after the revolution.	Civil war as a natural consequence of initial violence.	The Iran-Iraq war as a consequence separate from the revolution.

Conclusion and Suggestions

This research conducted a comparative study of the nature of violence in the French, Russian, and Iranian Revolutions. Through a deeper analysis of these events, we have achieved a better

understanding of the causes and consequences of violence in each. In the French Revolution, violence was used as a tool for social and political change. This revolution, not only due to economic and social grievances but also due to the strong mobilization of various social classes, quickly led to widespread violence.

This synergy demonstrates how a shared sense of deprivation can fuel violence and advance revolutionary goals. In the case of the Russian Revolution, specific historical and social conditions, particularly the aftermath of World War I and widespread poverty, created the groundwork for intense violence and civil war. The Bolsheviks leveraged this discontent as an opportunity to mobilize the masses, significantly escalating violence. Analysis of this revolution reveals how repressive policies and economic injustices can exacerbate social violence. In contrast, the Iranian Revolution represents a different approach to violence. Despite the regime's severe repression, protesters sought social change using non-violent strategies. This approach helped maintain social cohesion and reduce casualties, illustrating how, in critical situations, adopting different strategies can significantly impact the final outcome. Ultimately, this research, by examining various aspects of all three revolutions, concludes that social, economic, and political factors, especially the feeling of deprivation and the ability to mobilize resources, directly influence the nature of violence and revolutionary outcomes. This analysis suggests that a deeper understanding of these factors can help us better analyze contemporary social transformations and extract lessons for the future.

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