

Many Shades of Love in Kant

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ABSTRACT

Kant is usually considered a cold moralist who does not give any importance to feeling and emotions. In this paper I show that Kant has a place for love although he uses this word in different meanings through his work. I will analyze the use and meaning of five different uses of the term love: self-love, practical love, love as affect, love as passion, and sexual love. I show that Kant has a place for love in his theory, in a plurality of shades and meanings, going from the practical love to romantic love. Some of their expressions are meaningful for the moral life, such as practical love, some are not. Kant portrait romantic love as a silly affect, sometimes as a dangerous passion who can even call for medication. And about sex, he claims that it is nothing but the use of the other as a means, which may obtain a higher juridical status if this use is reciprocal, in the case of marriage.

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Self-love

We all have in mind the aim of the *Groundwork* and the *Critique of practical reason*: to prove that we can have morality without feelings of pleasure and displeasure. More than that, that the true moral worth of an action is at least revealed more clearly if we don't have any emotion, not even sympathy for the fate of others. Since the Henson's article "What Kant might have said: moral worth and the overdetermination of a dutiful action" (HENSON,1979), much have been said about that the presence of feelings and emotions, and now the majority of commentators agree that emotions do not really make the action without moral worth. However, I still think that feelings cannot be the motivation or the incentive of a moral action, although they can be present, and the mere presence does not make the action morally unworthy. Then the cold philanthropist could be not that cold and still perform a moral action.¹

In the *Critique of Practical Reason*, Kant links the two faculties that are important for action. Although these faculties have been absent in the *First Critique* and in the *Groundwork*, Kant here brings back the psychology of faculties, that he inherited from Baumgarten. But how could he reconcile his moral theory with a psychology of desire and pleasure? The solution was to relate the faculty of pleasure and displeasure with the inferior faculty of desire.

Kant claims in theorem II of the KpV:

Material practical rules place the determining ground of choice in the pleasure or displeasure to be felt in the reality of some object, and they are not related with the superior faculty of desire or to morality. They are all principles of the same kind that belong to the *principle of self-love or happiness* (KpV, AA 5, 22).

And in the Corollary of § 3 of the KpV Kant claims that

All *material* practical rules put the determining ground of the will in the *lower faculty of desire*, and were there no merely formal laws of the will sufficient to determine it, then neither could *any higher faculty of desire* be admitted (KpV, AA, 5, 22).

If determination of the will is based on pleasure and displeasure, only the inferior faculty of desire is concerned and we do not have any practical law, only the principle of self-love. Then, to do good because you feel pleasure in someone's happiness is not a moral action but belongs to the principle of self-love.

Practical love

In the *Doctrine of virtue*, love comes back again, not in a depreciative way, but as the practical love of beneficence, not related to the feeling of pleasure. This idea that Kantian practical love is not

¹ For the relation between emotions and action, see Shermann (1990), Borges (2004). Cohen (2014), Morrison (2008).

related to delight is shown in the *Doctrine of Virtue* in the Section XII of the Introduction, named “Concepts of what is presupposed on the part of feeling by the mind’s receptivity to concepts of duty as such”. One of these concepts is love of human beings. This love is not a feeling but a conduct:

Love is a matter of feeling, not of willing, and I cannot love because I will to, still less because I ought to (I cannot be constrained to love); so, a duty to love is an absurdity. But benevolence (*amor benevolentiae*), as conduct (*als ein Tun*), can be subject to a law of duty. However, unselfish benevolence toward human beings is often (though very inappropriately) also called love (TL, AA 6, 401).

By love of human beings, Kant means, not the love of delight (*complacentia*), but the love of benevolence (*benevolentia*), since the latter could be demanded from someone, but not the former, given that it would be a contradiction that somebody should have the obligation to feel pleasure:

So, the saying “you ought to love your neighbor as yourself” does not mean that you ought immediately (first) to love him and (afterwards) by means of this love do good to him. It means, rather, *do good* to your fellow human beings, and your beneficence will produce love of them in you (as an aptitude of the inclination to beneficence in general). Hence the love that is delight/ *Liebe des Wohlgefallens* (*Amor complacentia*) is direct. But to have a duty to this (which is pleasure joined immediately to the representation of an object’s existence), that is, to have to be constrained in take pleasure is a contradiction (TL, 6, 402).

Love of human beings, as a concept necessary for the mind’s receptivity to concepts of duty as such, is not a feeling based on the delight for helping other people, but an inclination to beneficence. The same holds for the duties of virtue to others.

Kant enumerates two ends that should be considered as duties: self- perfection and other people's happiness. These two ends lead to two different kinds of duties: the duties of man related to him, and duties related to others, among which we find the *duty of love to other human beings*, which consists in promoting the happiness of others. This love is not a feeling but a maxim of benevolence that leads to beneficent actions:

In this context, however, love is not to be understood as *feeling*, that is, as a pleasure in the perfection of others, love is not to be understood as *delight* in them (since others cannot put one under obligation to have feelings). It must rather be thought as the maxim of *benevolence* (practical love), which results in beneficence (TL, 6, 449).

There is no delight in practical love because it is impossible to have a duty to have a feeling, even if it is a contentment with the happiness of others. Practical love is not properly speaking a love-feeling, but a maxim to perform beneficent actions.

The revival of Sympathy

The duties of love are divided in duties of beneficence, gratitude, and sympathy. The duty of beneficence is the duty to promote according to one's means the happiness of others in need. While benevolence is satisfaction in the happiness (well-being) of others, beneficence is to make the happiness of others one's end. The duty to gratitude is honoring a person because of a benefit he has rendered us.

And then sympathy comes back as a duty, after its clear disapproval as a feeling with no moral value in the *Groundwork*. How can we conceive a duty to have a feeling? Is sympathy a feeling or it is now a propensity to perform a benevolent action?

The difference between sympathy in the *Groundwork* and in the *Doctrine of Virtue* is that in the latter there is a division between the capacity and the will to share in others' feelings (*Humanitas practica*) and the receptivity to the feeling of joy and sadness of the other (*Humanitas aesthetica*). Kant claims that

the first is free, and is therefore called sympathetic (*communio sentiendi liberalis*); it is based on practical reason. The second is unfree (*communio sentiendi illiberalis, servilis*); it can be called communicable (since it is like receptivity to warmth or contagious diseases), and also compassion, since it spreads naturally among human beings living near one another. There is obligation only to the first (TL, AA 6, 456).

Sympathy related to *humanitas practica* is a duty, but compassion, related to *humanitas aesthetica* is not a duty, because it does not lead to beneficence. To feel the pain of other human being and do nothing to alleviate it will only increase the suffering in this world.

The § 34 of the *Doctrine of Virtue* shows that the only sympathy we could accept is the practical one, not really a feeling, but a maxim of helping people in distress. There is a difference between sympathy and compassion, a feeling that only increases the suffering of the world. Kant even claims that this is an insulting kind of beneficence:

But there cannot possibly be a duty to increase the ills in the world and so to do good from compassion. This would be an insulting kind of beneficence, since it expresses the kind of benevolence one has toward someone unworthy, called pity (TL, AA, 6, 457).

However, the § 35 of the *Doctrine of Virtue* surprises us by stressing the importance of feelings in the accomplish of beneficence. If sympathy in order to be moral, should be active, now come

into play compassionate natural feelings. And to cultivate these feelings are said to be an “indirect duty”.

And then comes the famous and ambiguous passage:

It is therefore a duty not to avoid the places where the poor who lack the most basic necessities are to be found but rather to seek them out, and not to shun sickrooms or debtors’ prison and so forth in order to avoid sharing painful feelings one may be not able to resist. For this is still one of the impulses that nature has implanted in us to do what the representation of duty alone might not accomplish (TL, AA 6, 457).

What is the meaning of that? Should we stimulate the development of this kind of feelings? Many commentators consider that the role that Kant attributes to sympathy is, therefore, of a provisory moral feeling, which can assist in the accomplishment of good actions, when the feeling of respect for the moral law is not yet developed enough.

I believe that Kant is ambiguous here: in one place he says that sympathy as *humanitas aesthica* is compassion and have to be avoided; in the other, that we should cultivate this feeling in order to promote a rational benevolence:

Sympathetic joy and sadness (*sympatia moralis*) are sensible feelings of pleasure and displeasure (which are therefore to be called “aesthetic”) at another’s state of joy or pain (shared feelings, sympathetic feeling). But to use this as a means of promoting active and rational benevolence is still a particular, though only a conditional duty (TL, AA 6, 456).

How could we solve this puzzle? In the *Observations on the beautiful and the sublime*, while claiming that the women could not act from moral principles, but only from feelings, Kant also says that to act from principles is very rare among the male sex (GSE, AA2:232). My interpretation is that for the majority of real people, aesthetic sympathetic feelings are usually necessary for moral action, although the pure moral action does not need any sensible incentive.

Romantic love

And what about romantic love as emotion? Did Kant ever consider it seriously? I guess that the answer is positive. In the *Anthropology from a pragmatic point of view*, Kant refers to what I am calling “romantic love”, both as affect and as passion.

First, we have to remember that affects and passions are diseases of the mind:

to be subject to affects and passions are probably always an illness of the mind because both affects and passions shut out the sovereignty of reason. Both are also equally vehement, but as concerns their quality they are essentially different

from each other, both with regard to the method of prevention and to that of the cure that the physician of souls would have to apply (Anth, AA 7, 252).

Affect and passion are impediments to the sovereignty of reason. However, affect is stormy, but fickle, while passion is deeper and can be a permanent illness. Kant compares affect and passion with different diseases:

Affect works on health like a stroke of apoplexy; passion works like consumption or atrophy, affect like an intoxicant which one has to sleep off, although it is still followed by a headache; but passion is looked upon as an illness having resulted from swallowing poison (Ant, 7,252).

It can be seen here that affect differs from passion regarding the intensity, duration, and degree of danger of each emotion. The first is more intense, however, it is shorter lasting and less dangerous than passion. For this reason, Kant affirms that, where there is much affect, there is little passion, since stormy emotions deplete quickly, and do not allow the cold evaluation of the lived situation and deliberation

When referring to love as affect, Kant shows its intensity, combined to its short duration. The love-affect also makes the agent blind to flaws of the object of love. Fortunately, since affect is not permanent, this blindness will go away with time.

Whoever loves can keep his vision intact; but the person who is in love is inevitably blind to the mistakes of the beloved object, although the latter will usually regain his vision a week after the wedding (Ant, 7, 253).

Romantic love, or love as affect, is also difficult to conceal, and the lover is incapable of controlling the manifestations of this emotion, what make it difficult even to accomplish his/her aim, to seduce the beloved:

A serious lover is often restrained, awkward, and uncaptivating in the presence of his beloved. But he who only pretends to be madly in love, and who has no other talent, can play his role so naturally that he lures the poor, deceived maiden wholly into his snare, just because his heart is uninhibited and his head clear (Anth, 7,264).

It is easier, then, to seduce the beloved man or woman if you are not in love. The love affect is then not only an illness of the mind but is an impediment to its own romantic purpose.

But how about love as passion? The social passions for Kant are lust of power, lust of honor, and greed, and their existence are due to the fact that they are never satisfied. Romantic love could be satisfied by the satisfaction of physical love or desire, then it will never become a passion if the physical love is satisfied:

once the desire is satisfied (by enjoyment), the desire, at least with regard to the very person involved, also stops (Anth, AA 7, 266).

The only way romantic love could be a passion is when it is never satisfied. Love could then assume the obsessional aspect of other passions, such as ambition. And if one goes crazy due to love it is because it was already disturbed when choosing an impossible target.

One of the possibilities to choose a wrong partner, in Kant's time, was to fall in love with someone of a higher social standing. While analyzing mental illness, Kant claims people say, "he became crazy from love", but the fact is he was already crazy:

Falling in love with a person from a class of whom to expect marriage is the greatest folly, was not the cause, but rather the effect of madness (Anth, AA 7, 217).

Healing love

We have seen so far, the parallel that Kant establishes between affects, passions and diseases of the body: epileptic seizure, phthisis, headache and even poisoning. Kant is not the only one in the eighteenth century to make this comparison. Goethe also compares the disease of love to the disease of the body. In *The Sufferings of Young Werther*, this pain of love appears as an almost physical pain and the protagonist compares his decision to commit suicide to the body that no longer has the strength to live. By narrating the story of a girl in love who, when despised by her lover, commits suicide, he justifies her act:

And isn't this the same case with illness? Nature finds no way out of this labyrinth of intricate and antagonistic forces, and man has to die. Woe to one who, in view of this, was able to say; 'How crazy! If she had waited, if she had let time pass, her despair would have calmed down and she would soon find another one to console her'. It is just as if someone were to say: 'The madman is going to die of fever! If he had waited until his strength returned, until they had corrected his moods and appeased the tumult of his blood, everything would have been restored and he would be living to this day' (Goethe, 2003, 75, 76).

We see, both in Kant and in Goethe, a parallel between the diseases of the soul and the diseases of the body. When analyzing love as affection, Kant goes further in this analogy, showing that love can resemble a temporary blindness, because the person is blind to the defects of the loved one.

The affect of love, when not sexually fulfilled, can also be transformed into the passion of love, which would resemble a compulsive disorder.

The term *mania* is used to designate a passion (mania for honor, revenge, domination, etc.), except for love. The reason is that in so far as the desire has

been satisfied (through *jouissance*), it ceases, at least in relation to that same person. Therefore it may be presented as passion to be passionately in love (while the other person persists in refusal), but one cannot present any physical love as passion, because it does not contain a constant principle in relation to its object (Anth, AA 7, 266).

Love that seeks and finds its physical satisfaction, although it can induce cognitive failures regarding the defects of the loved one, is not a *mania*, because it does not present the obsessive aspect of other passions, such as ambition and greed. However, if there is a refusal of the beloved object, the obsessive aspect of love manifests itself.

When analyzing mental illnesses, Kant states that people say, "he got crazy from love", but the fact is that the person was already crazy: "Falling in love with a person of a class from whom expecting marriage is the greatest madness was not the cause, but the effect of madness" (Anth, AA 7, 217). Surprisingly, the analysis of love passion is made, not in the Book III of *Anthropology*, On the *Faculty of Desire*, but in the section of the Book I, *On the Cognitive Faculty*, related to the infirmities of the mind. Although the relationship between love as passion and mental illness is very nonspecific, Kant's idea is not far from contemporary discoveries about the occurrence of a brain neurochemical instability in love.

The chemistry of love

In the book *Love is the drug*, Brian Arp and Julian Savulescu refer to several studies that show that the passion of love involves modifications of brain chemistry. One of the experiments cited was carried out by Karen Fisher at the State University of New York. In it, people who admitted to being in love were selected. MRI scans were performed on the brains of the lovers, which revealed an increase in blood flow in a certain brain area, the brain's reward center. This finding corroborated the result of other research in the area, which points to dopamine and noradrenaline as neurotransmitters present in the state of love - passion.

The authors of *Love are the drug* state that we have three distinct mental systems that are part of romantic love: desire, passion, and attachment. Each stage of love involves a specific chemistry. In the first stage, we have sex hormones, especially testosterone. In the second, properly romantic phase of love, dopamine and noradrenaline come into play. Dopamine is responsible for energy and focus on the loved one. It also gives a sense of well-being, often taking away hunger and sleep. In this second stage, we have a decrease in serotonin, that induces obsessive-compulsive behaviors. When love is frustrated, either because it is not reciprocated or because of a breakup, psychological pain will be the result of decreased pleasure due to the lack of dopamine, combined with low serotonin that induces obsessive thinking about the loved one, even if your desire is to forget him or her.

In the third phase, or attachment phase, the main neurotransmitter is oxytocin. Since they refer to different neurotransmitters and brain circuits, sexual attraction, romantic passion, and attachment do not necessarily go together:

Men and women may copulate with individuals with whom they are not in love, they may be in love with people with whom they do not have sexual intercourse, and they may be deeply attached to someone for whom they have no sexual desire or romantic passion. (Earp, Savulescu, 2020, 125).

Based on these discoveries of brain chemistry present in the phases of love, Savulescu and Earp investigate the possibility of using chemical substances both to produce and to extinguish a passion. Is it possible to think of a chemical formula that acts as a drug to attenuate love? The book proposes a double strategy for that: the increase of serotonin in the brain circuit and the use of dopamine and/or oxytocin blockers. The conclusion that lovers have low levels of serotonin was reached by the experiment of neuroscientist Danatella Marazinni, according to which the obsession of lovers, especially in the first moments of romance, has a similarity with obsessive-compulsive disorders, presenting the same low levels of serotonin. The authors suggest that the same treatment used in this pathology may be effective to reduce the obsessive aspects of a love relationship. The treatment is based on selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs), which would probably have an effect of emotional blunting of the intense feelings involved in romantic passion, since most patients treated with these drugs for depression or obsessive-compulsive disorders, "report a lower ability to cry, worry, get angry or care about the feelings of others" (Earp, Savulescu, 2020, 129).

Regarding attachment, there is the possibility of using oxytocin, as well as dopamine, blocker drugs. Although no studies have been done in humans, for ethical reasons, the authors report studies in mammals that show a proximity in their mating behavior to humans, in this case, the prairie rats (*prairie voles*). In one study, when females of this species were injected with oxytocin or dopamine blockers, they lost their monogamous tendency, no longer binding to the male with which they copulated, as was their tendency previously. When a dopamine blocker was specifically used, injected into the *nucleus accumbens* of males of the species, they no longer tended to remain with the same female and became receptive to interactions with new mates.

Although there have been no human studies on such oxytocin or dopamine blockers, the authors claim that alcohol is a drug that can promote sex without involvement. When tested on prairie rats, alcohol curiously caused males to become promiscuous and prevented them from bonding, while females acted in opposite, tending to bond prematurely. That this happens in the same way with human beings, there is no evidence. (Earp, Savulescu, 2020, 131)

Kant and chemical intervention to treat emotions that resist our control

We may think that using some kind of chemistry to control passions and affects is very far from what Kant proposed as controlling the inclinations that resist reason. He admits, however, that there

is a physiological component to affects. In *Anthropology from the pragmatic point of view*, there is an explicit reference to the physician John Brown (1735-88), for whom the cause of diseases is an increase or decrease in physiological excitation. Thus, sthenic diseases were the consequence of an excess of excitement, while asthenic diseases arose from a lack of excitement. Kant intends to classify affects according to Brown's system:

affects are, in general, unhealthy attacks (symptoms), and can be divided (by analogy with Brown's system) into sthenic, proceeding from strength, and asthenic, proceeding from weakness (Anth, AA 7, 256).

Without wanting to affirm that affects cannot be controlled in any way, Kant admits that, in some cases, when they are very intense, their control or cultivation is not obtained only by a change of judgments, along the lines of what the Stoic tradition proposes. This control, when necessary, should include bodily and physiological strategies, such as relaxation and even the use of "medications, which will act directly on the mind, cheering it up or relieving worries through the suppression or stimulation of affects". Kant even states that, for the control of intense affects, it would be better to use "high doses of *hellebore* than to rely on the healing power of reason" (Rek, AA 15, 943).

In the case of intense affects, uncontrollable through reason, he advises the use of drug strategies. *Hellebore* was a natural medicine used in Kant's time, which had calming properties. It is still used today in homeopathy as a treatment for depression and paralysis of the limbs.

Kant, therefore, is one of the precursors of the strategy of proposing medicines to attenuate the affects that do not allow themselves to be controlled by the will. Although trusting in the power of reason, both in its theoretical and practical use, our philosopher is skeptical of its power to cure diseases of the mind.

Sex

If someone wants to read a philosopher who about sex, she will probably choose Foucault or Bataille, but never Kant. When one wants to find something relevant on sex, usually nobody thinks about Kant. He was never married, and as far as we know, he did not have sexual affairs. He is considered very conservative, and I am not denying this. However, I consider he has some interesting points on sex, that I will call non emotional view of sex. And I believe this is important when we take into consideration intimate relations and objectification now a day. I think that he has a very realistic view of what sex really is, that will help to avoid a contemporary romantic illusion on sex. I will explore two points: for Kant, sex is not related to feelings and to have sex with someone is to use this person as a means.

Sexual drive is not related to feeling, but to instinct, the second level of the faculty of desire. It is not but a mating instinct, that human beings share with other animals.

The sexual inclination is actually not a passion, but rather only a stronger instinct that is periodic, as one sees in the savages. It only becomes a passion through the power of imagination, and through the cultivation of the power of imagination this sexual inclination is called love (Anth Mrongovius, AA 25, 1361).

I say that it is realistic, because now a day, when discussing the objectification in intimate relations, some philosophers, as Martha Nussbaum, in the article *Objectification* (NUSSBAUM,1995), refers to the idea that to use someone to get pleasure is morally acceptable, only if we consider the other in his feelings and as a person.

Also, there is an idea that in intimate relation, we should consider the other not only as a means, but also as a person. In order to sustain this point, people often refer here to the second formula of Categorical imperative: "So act that you use humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means." (GMS, AA 4, 429)

However, Kant never considered that sex by itself is to use someone as an end in itself. To have sexual relation with someone is always objectification.

In the discussion of objectification, Patricia Marino (MARINO, 2008), in opposition of Nussbaum, considers that we may morally accept weak objectification, as long as it comes with an informed consent. According to Marino, we should morally condemn "strong objectification": cases in which there is no consent, such as rape or sexual harassment.

I believe that Kant too accepts weak objectification, and the only way to avoid strong objectification is the reciprocal possession of the other as a thing. And this is what marriage is about.

Kant never considered that sex by itself could mean taking someone as an end in itself, which he makes clear at the beginning of § 24 of the *Doctrine of Right*, which deals with matrimonial law: "sexual union (*commercium sexuelle*) is the reciprocal use that a human being makes of the sexual organs and capacities of another (*usus membrorum et facultatum sexualium alterius*)" (RL, 6, 277). He claims that this sexual union is objectification: "in this act", he claims, "a human being makes himself into a thing, which conflicts with the right of humanity" in his own person (MS, 6, 278)

In marriage, both persons use the other as a thing, and this reciprocity is the only way to restore their personality:

there is only one condition under which this is possible: that while one person is acquired by the other as if were a thing, the one who is acquired acquires the other in turn; for in this way each reclaims itself and restores its personality (MS, AA 6, 278).

Sexual union is always objectification; the distinction is whether or not this union is in accordance with the law:

Natural sexual union takes place, either according to the merely animal nature (*vaga libido, venus volgivaga, fornication*) or according to the law. Sexual union according to the law is marriage (*matrimonium*) (MS, AA 6, 278).

In § 25 of the *Doctrine of Right*, Kant claims that this sexual union is objectifying, because the other becomes a thing, an object:

The natural use that one sex makes of the sexual organs of the other is pleasure, through which one gives itself to the other. In this act, the human being makes himself a thing, which conflicts with the right of humanity in his person. (MS, AA 6, 278)

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It is important to note here that the restoration of the personality does not occur because the other is no longer used as a means, but by the reciprocity in the use as a thing: the one who is acquired as if it were a thing acquires, in turn, the other as a thing. And this is in accordance with the legal laws of pure reason.

Marriage has the objective of legalizing the reciprocal use of the other as a thing, not having procreation as its purpose, although this may be considered as an end of nature:

The end of begetting and bringing up children may always be an end of nature, for which it implanted the inclinations of the sexes for each other; but it is not requisite for human beings who marry to make this their end in order for their union to be compatible with rights, for otherwise marriage would be dissolved when procreation ceases (MS, AA 6, 278).

I consider that on this specific point, of the non-consideration of procreation as the end of marriage, Kant is progressive, despite his prejudices in relation to the requirement of marriage to take place with people of different sexes. The disregard of the end of nature, procreation, as that which establishes a juridical end, opens space for the consideration of same-sex marriage, even if this was not on the horizon of the eighteenth century.

Another curious aspect is that sex is still the use of the partner's sexual organs, and there is no mention of considering the other as an end in itself. I disagree in this aspect with Varden's considerations, for which Kant holds that to be sexually attracted to someone is to want their person and not just their body, to want the other to show us their aesthetic and creative playfulness, for the other to reveal themselves in their creative and spontaneous expressions (Cf VARDEN, 2020, 120). I consider that Helga Varden, at this point, makes a romanticization that is not found in Kantian texts. In this way, she inclines to a denial of the crudeness of what Kant really says: that sexual intercourse is to want the body of the other. I think that this Kantian position, in spite of its apparent coldness, brings an interesting contribution to the contemporary discussion on sexuality and objectification.

Then this double and reciprocal objectification is in accordance with pure reason's laws of right. The difference between prostitution and marriage consists in the fact that marriage preserves the right of humanity in one's own person only by adding the contractual aspect, that of the right to use the other in turn. Both husband and wife have the right to use each other's sexual organs, and they also have the exclusive right to use them. But this is not the case, for instance, in prostitution and that is one of the reasons why Kant condemns it.

The contractual aspect preserves the humanity of the husband and wife, and the only possibility of making sexual relations a relationship according to the principle of right is the warranty of the exclusive use of one another's sexual organs. But it does not imply that their sexual relation becomes more than it is, to use the other as a means.

And then sex is not love. It is a weak objectification, and it is according to the law of right, as long as there is a contract for the reciprocal use of the other's sex organ and capacities.

Conclusion

Kant has a place for love in his theory, in a plurality of shades and meanings, going from the pure practical love to the most empirical one. Some of their expressions are meaningful for the moral life, such as practical love, the love of beneficence, and even sympathy. Kant was very critical of romantic love, which was portrait sometimes as a silly affect, sometimes as a dangerous passion who can even call for medication. And about sexual love, he is very cold, claiming that it is nothing but the use of the other as a means, which may obtain a higher status if this use is reciprocal, in the case of marriage. Then, although we may disagree with him, Kant has given a thought about this multiple senses of love.

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