

Fardid and Nasr on the Confrontation of Western World

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ABSTRACT

Regarding the way of facing the West and modernity, Ahmed Fardid is among the thinkers who, by adopting a philosophical and judgmental approach, rejects modernity, philosophy, and western civilization in its entirety. Fardid considers modernity and the West to have an inherent crisis and considers any attempt to patch up modernity with Eastern religions or cultures futile. Fardid, who is the creator of the word “*Gharbzadegi* (Westoxification)”, considers human sciences and Western civilization to be nothing more than the inciting soul vanities and blasphemy. By adopting an essentialist and negative approach towards the modern world, he calls for a complete break from the subjectivism and humanism associated with the modern world and a return to Islamic-oriented philosophy (Hekmat-e Onsi). Seyyed Hossein Nasr, as a traditionalist thinker, rejects Western civilization and modernity as a unified whole. He wants to incorporate modern science and reason and take perennial philosophy. In this paper, via a comparative analysis method, this hypothesis is examined that although Fardid and Nasr are sympathizers in the complete negation and rejection of the modern world, Fardid confronts modernity and its consequent subjectivism using Heidegger’s western thought. This is when Nasr confronts modernity from the perspective of a traditionalist thinker who believes in the foundations of tradition. Nasr considers the return to the perennial philosophy to solve confronting the Western world and modernity, but Fardid faced with the modern world, emphasizes that although modernity is the exposure of self-fulfillment, one must strive to overcome it. It is difficult to return to the past.

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Introduction

The type of encounter between the East and the West has been one of the main concerns and preoccupations of thinkers and intellectuals since the constitutional era, and different schools of thought have given different answers to the type of encounter between the East and the West. Seyyed Ahmad Fardid is the thinker who, using Martin Heidegger's thought, consider the modern era as a time of trouble because the desire for power has been imposed on the world as economic, political, cultural and technological domination; modern man has not only relied on the position of Zeus but also sent other gods into exile. Like Martin Heidegger, Fardid wants to overcome the subjectivism of the modern world: in his opinion, subjective means what is below you and objective means what is in front of you. Therefore, the subject means the sensual subject and the meaningful object belongs to the sensual. What is important in this is that the object increases the subject and the subject reduces the object. In this process, the subject becomes so big that it no longer needs an object. Inspired by Heidegger, Fardid mentions the modern world under the title of double westoxification.

In the double westoxification, man becomes the knower and agent of history, and man is trapped in his fundamental self and egoism, and he does not consider anyone or anything other than himself. Farid's solution in facing the self-abnegation of the foundation of the modern world is to invent subjectivism and return to the old days, the era when a person faces the facts once again and a person gets to know the presence and rule of the divine names in the relations between the world and the person. Seyyed Hossein Nasr is another Iranian revolutionary thinker who, like Fardid, rejects Western civilization as exposure of subjectivism and humanism and calls for a complete break with the modern world and turning to perennial philosophy. Nasr rejects the partial reason associated with the modern world and calls for the revival of imperishable wisdom or perennial philosophy, which is based on a firm belief in God as the only unifying regulator and environment in the universe. Although Nasr, like Heidegger, wants to overcome the humanism and subjectivism associated with the modern world; however, Fardid confronts modernity from the perspective of Heidegger, a thinker who belongs to the Western world, while Nasr rejects modernity from a traditionalist perspective.

Farid, unlike Nasr, wants a complete return to the past and has a cautious approach towards the Western world; this brings up the point that we cannot dream of returning to the past without the West and modernity, but we can find an exit to the future in this new history, which is the history of modernity.

1. Comparison of Heidegger's and Ferdid's views on the West

Martin Heidegger is one of the most prominent thinkers of the 20th century, who criticizes the 2500-year history of the West as exposure to subjectivism and metaphysical rationality. He wants to

break away from the subjectivism and humanism associated with the modern world and turn to the fundamental ontology of the pre-Socratic era when man was open to himself, the world, and others, and there was no gap between man and the world (Ahmadi, 2002,191). Heidegger believes that with the emergence of Descartes' thought, a new and unprecedented meaning of truth was formed. For Descartes, the truth was the absolute certainty of the subject, that is, truth is something that the knowing agent or the thinking subject has complete certainty about (Abdolkarimi, 2018, 110).

The Cartesian world is a world under the control of the subject: the subject acquires and gives meaning to this acquisition. This giving meaning is the representation of what is always present in the subject. The world is the product of the representation of the subject; the subject makes the world. What is hidden in Descartes' subjective thought and the knowledge paradigm of the foundation of the modern world is the gap that is created between the subject and the object. This gap turns the subject into a subject that represents the world as an object and subject of identification in its identification (Jabbari, 2010, 29).

Heidegger appeals to the famous example of the hammer to explain and refine his meaning of the superiority of subjectivism in the modern world. He believes that the hammer that is in our hand, together with the nail and the door and the wall and a thousand and one other things, including even my hand, constitutes an important part of "being-in-the-world", that is, "being-with" others. Phenomenological reflection on this hammer and the network of tools connected to it is an important part of Heidegger's fundamental ontology. According to Heidegger, the phenomenology of this hammer as a phenomenon "present-at-hand" can clarify the meaning and truth of existence. If this hammer breaks, breaks or fails to work, it will become an object present-at-hand and a being or thing for scientific and metaphysical analysis. As a result, instead of asking how its "being-with" is us, we should investigate its nature and properties and what it is or its metaphysical essence. According to Heidegger, this scientific investigation and philosophical realization will turn a person into a subject of identification or a Cartesian subject, the world into a set of objects or beings, and knowledge and truth into a representation. This is nothing but the forgetting of existence that has always made us further away from the sense and truth of being. Being as this hammer and nail is more at our fingertips than as soul, essence, substance, object, mass, and electron (Farhadpour, 2009, 118).

Heidegger believes that in our everyday life, we do not encounter things like present affairs and pure identification subjects, but we find them as objects ready-to-hand, useful, efficient, and manipulable. Tools are placed in significant things and we come into contact with them through a practical relationship. This everyday knowledge is practical intelligence and insight, or as Aristotle says, practical wisdom, which comes from dealing with the context of tools and not from them themselves (Ahmadi, 2011, 349). For example, we can have two types of encounters when dealing with a table. One is "present-at-hand" and the second is "ready-to-hand". The former (objects

present-at-hand) can, for example, refer to a table as a wooden thing with certain properties; and the latter (objects ready-to-hand) indicates the table as a tool that we sit behind and read books and eat. Heidegger believes that we first encounter things as ready-to-hand, instrumental, and practical matters, and things are not the subjects of our theoretical, practical, and cognitive contemplation. Before the post-modern philosophers, the Greeks realized that things first show themselves as useful things or tools, and contrary to Cartesian subjectivism, things do not first meet the researcher's eyes, but get acquainted with human hands (Ahmadi, 2011, 347).

Ahmed Fardid also, inspired by Martin Heidegger, makes the West as exposure to subjectivism and humanism important in his criticism. He mentions that when we discuss the West, we are considering an idea and not about special geography, and the West is the place and historical abode of egoism, nothingness, and sensual subjectivity. According to Fardid, human history has eras that can be separated. These eras start from the beginning of human creation and before history in common sense. An era comes and an era goes: according to Farid, the eras of history begin at the "day before yesterday" which is the "day before yesterday" of the era of a unified nation. Besides the single divine language, this nation has also had other characteristics, which he writes: "the principle of a unified nation is not the beginning of history, as if they did not exist, and they had a home near existence and were the voice of the call of existence" (Ma'aref, 2001, 108).

The "day before yesterday" era or the era of a unified nation was an era when subjectivism did not dominate the world, and instead of being in front of the world, a person was in the world and with the world. In this era, the main characteristic of a person was his openness to himself, the world, and others. In the early days, a person was a shepherd and watcher of existence, and the knowledge paradigm of modernity had not dominated the world. The unified nation was not contaminated by discrimination, arrogance, and oppression, and metaphysics based on connection ruled the world (Hashmi, 2005, 101). The "day before yesterday" era gives way to the "yesterday" era with an intermediate historical era, which is paganism or polytheistic interpretation of the names and attributes of God.

"Yesterday" is the era of neglect of right and nonexistence. This era is the era of dominance of the Greek philosophical culture, which continues until the middle historical era which is the Renaissance (Ma'aref; 2001, 353). With the renaissance, the "today" era-- the era of dominance of sensual subjectivity or subjectivism-- is substituted for "yesterday". However, "today", that is, the era of the supremacy of subjectivism and humanism because of the modern paradigm, will terminate, and even the signs of this end are obvious because we have reached a new intermediate historical era: the postmodern era. The postmodern era, in which the theoretical foundations of the "today" era of doubts, will be opened to a horizon for "tomorrow". "Tomorrow" is the historical era between the contemporary era and the future unified nation. During this period, humanity will understand its hardship and will be in a preparatory await the "day after tomorrow", when the veil

will be removed from the face of truth and truth again and class-based groups will be abolished and a unified nation free from domination and exploitation will re-emerge (Ma'aref; 2001, 419-454).

Fardid considered the east and the west to be the same and believed that we are getting further away from the east day by day. Opposite the East is the West, and according to this, the West is yesterday and today. The east of the place and the historical abode of the unified nation is “the day before yesterday”, and the west is the place of subjectivism and humanism. The West is the veil of the East, and since the beginning of the height of Greek civilization, the East has become more and more veiled, and with the beginning of the modern period, it has become completely hidden. According to Fardid, those who fall away from the East and turn their hearts to the West have become Westoxicated, and this Westoxification has different types and levels (Fardid, 1971, 33): It is the “day before yesterday” is the East.

Little by little, the East becomes veiled and the history of the westoxification of humanity begins. The first stage of this westoxification is Greekization, and the second stage is the beginning of the modern era until today, when the westoxification of mankind is intensified, or in Fardid words, the era of double westoxification occurs. Non-double westoxification is “yesterday” and double westoxification is “today”. Non-double westoxification requires the nihilism or negation of the right, but not all other beings. Double westoxification means that everything is negated but the human soul (Hashmi, 2005, 105).

Westoxification, of course, besides this dual division that has a historical basis, has two other types of division that have a qualitative aspect. One is divided into compound and simple and the other is divided into negative and positive westoxification: Compound westoxification means that a person is westoxicated and is unaware of his westoxification. This interpretation is based on interpreting compound ignorance. The compound westerner has a compound ignorance about his westoxification. In contrast to compound aging, there is simple aging. A simple westoxicated person is someone who is westoxicated and is aware of his Westoxification and has self-awareness about it. Positive westoxification is someone who is westoxicated and insists on his westoxification and emphasizes the originality of the human soul, the opposite of positive westoxification is negative westoxification. Even though he is westoxicated, the negative westoxicated person dreams of passing through the westoxification and wishes to pass away from nothingness in his heart—the negative westoxicated negativity has reached the beginning of awaiting the preparer (Fardid, 2002, 344-349).

It is no coincidence that Fardid seeks to separate the two the “day before yesterday” and the “day after tomorrow” eras from the three “yesterday”, “today” and “tomorrow” eras in his division of different historical eras. In this division between East and West, he is completely influenced by Heidegger: Heidegger believes that being or existence has two aspects: exposure and concealment,

and there is always a constant conflict between appearance and concealment, heaven and earth, concealment and unconcealment, and debuting and veiling is going on. It is with the dominance of fate and the power of modernity that the truth of existence is removed and the fate of humanity is given to the hands of humankind. Man, also continues his path to self-view and self-opinion, and instead of listening to the call of existence, man turns the world into an image, and the modern world is built based on the image and rule of subjectivism (Rikhtegaran, 2010, 199). In Heidegger's thinking, existence (being) is the same amid multiplicity: the unity that existence (being) calls us to is a unity that comes from multiplicity, and the truth of existence is the arena of constant conflicts that has existed between opposites since eternity. This foundation is standing for this struggle. Just as day conflicts with night and night conflicts with day, old age conflicts with youth and youth conflicts with old age, darkness with light and light with darkness, and heat with cold, this foundation stands in this conflict—the nature of plurality is the unity obtained from the opposites producing unity (Rikhtegaran, 2010, 236).

By re-reading Heidegger's thought and making it his own, Fardid links Heidegger's view on the two aspects of exposure and concealment of existence to Ibn Arabi's mysticism, and writes: "What gives certainty to every historical period "is a historical transfer or nominal ruling that governs that period" (Ma'aref, 2001, 418). Therefore, according to Fardid, every historical period is a period of specific nominal dominance, or, the period of the rule of a specific form. Fardid can identify the identity of that period and people by looking at the appearance of specific names in each period. Inspired by Ibn Arabi's Islamic-oriented philosophy (Hekmat-e Onsi), he mentions that the main language of human beings in the "day before yesterday" era was inspired by God's creation, but when entering the "yesterday" era, this language gets branched and the meanings of many words are distorted. Therefore, man should try to get past the subjectivism and mortal time associated with the modern world and move to the remaining time, that is, the time free from subjectivism. According to Fardid, the word that has fallen on the modern world is *Ism al-Taghout* ("Rebel"), and man is the embodiment of this name, and the science that governs the modern era is also the science that dominates everything, and so to speak, it dominates the world. The "day after tomorrow" era is when the word "Rebel" is removed, the word "Allah" appears, and the arrogance of Satan is destroyed (Dibaj, 2004, 257).

Therefore, the true thinking in Islamic-oriented philosophy (Hekmat-e Onsi) is the process from the appearance to the interior, the process from the appearance of the word to its interior, the process from the appearance of existences to its essence, the process from the essence to existences, and finally, the process from truth to creation. According to Islamic-oriented philosophers (Hakim-e Onsi), true philosophy observes the rule of truth: a person can be described as a sage or philosopher only when he embodies the word "Hakim" (sage). Islamic-oriented philosophy (Hekmat-e Onsi) is the knowledge of man's presence with Allah (Dibaj, 2004, 290). Such

philosophy is a way of approaching the truth of existence, the basis of which is to wash one's hands of egotism and self-conceit: his philosophy and art originate from the conceive a unified nation at the beginning of history (the day after tomorrow) and faces the world of a unified nation at the end of history (the day after tomorrow), carrying the historical events of the day after tomorrow. Fardid seeks a way to escape of the central subject in Islamic-oriented philosophy (Hekmat-e Onsi), and it is precise because of this that he seeks to exclude the subjectivism resulting from the modern world in Islamic-oriented philosophy (Hekmat-e Onsi).

In Islamic-oriented philosophy (Hekmat-e Onsi), original thinking is thinking by presence, not thinking by acquisition. Thinking by presence is the same as heart or non-conceptual thinking, while thinking by acquisition is conceptual thinking (Bayat, 2015, 128). Fardid wants to focus on both the world and the Hereafter in Islamic-oriented philosophy (Hekmat-e Onsi), which is against the opinion of mystics who only give significance to the Hereafter. According to Islamic-oriented philosophy (Hekmat-e Onsi), a human being is a creature of two citizens, one of whose citizenships is related to the mortal world and the other to the eternal world. Although he gives originality to knowledge by presence, Fardid does not consider knowledge by acquisition worthless— he believes that man should not stop at knowledge by acquisition ((Bayat, 2015, 127).

Strongly affecting Fardid regarding the simultaneous exposure-concealment aspects of existence, Heidegger believes that existence has always revealed itself in different ways in history. In the modern world, existence has gone into hiding and the world has turned into an image. Heidegger believes that the history of the West is the history of the courtship of existence and its concealment and non-concealment, and it is with the emergence of the modern world that existence appears as the concealment and superiority of subjectivism (Jabbari, 2011, 315). Inspired by Heidegger, Fardid believes that today's historical context is the historical context of the West, and the historical context of the East is concealed:

The generic form in each historical era is the historical matter of the era that follows it— that generic form that was the embodiment of the name whose rule has terminated, is the matter for the new generic form whose rule has begun. The whole unity of political, economic, and cultural relations in each era is a unified thing, a typical form of that historical era. All the political, economic, and cultural affairs of that era are an aspect of the aspects and quality of the affairs of that typical form. I call the names concealed as matters. I call that name that prevails over all as forms. A kind of relationship in every historical era is the relationship that man has with the right and from there with the people (Fardid, 2002, 419-417).

For Fardid, “tomorrow” is a form that gives its place to a new form, i.e. “today”, and the matter of that new form is placed, i.e. yesterday, and this process continues until the historical stage of “the day after tomorrow” (Taherzadeh, 2010, 102).

Although Fardid seeks to break away from Western subjectivism by clinging to Heidegger’s thought he considers a solution to address Western subjectivism to turn to Islamic-oriented philosophy (Hekmat-e Onsi) and knowledge by presence. When Heidegger replies to a reporter who asked him to offer his solution to escape of the modern world, he believes one should not expect the answers to these big questions to be carried by this thin body of mine. Heidegger adopts an expectant approach in facing the fundamental knowledge of the modern world (Abdolkarimi, 2018, 92).

Being, according to Heidegger, is not something separate and outside the realm of beings: it is like God or Plato’s Idea of a world different from this world. Heidegger does not equate existence with God, the unseen, the world of similitude, and an origin outside the circle of beings. Therefore, contrary to Fardid, Heidegger does not believe in an unseen world— Heidegger’s existence has no relationship with God as something transcendent. The god in Islamic-oriented philosophy (Hekmat-e Onsi) is a supreme being, the first cause, and the highest intellect. This creature does not need any other creature for its perfection and realization. This is when Heidegger seeks the emergence of the truth of existence not from a reference outside the world, but from the heart of the world and through man in his present state (Jamadi, 2006, 917).

Although Heidegger wants to break away from the subjectivism of the modern world, what is called intuitionism in Fardid’s thought differs from Heidegger’s phenomenological approach. Heidegger, a post-Kantian thinker, does not believe in Transcendence: he wants to get from phenomenology to ontology. Fardid’s discursive space is relatively bipolar: he wants to remove Western subjectivism and take Islamic-oriented philosophy (Hekmat-e Onsi) and knowledge by presence. This is while Heidegger does not provide any specific solution to break away from Western subjectivism, and only in the guise of a thinker believing in negative issues, he calls for a break from subjectivism. Heidegger holds we should await a new historical era to dominate the world, and in the meantime, what is decisive for man. So, the man is to prepare oneself for the emergence and discovery of a new aspect of existence. Heidegger’s plan for future thinking is to free man from all metaphysical categories and concepts and criteria through re-reading and fundamentally destroying the history of Western metaphysics and providing a suitable ground for obtaining an authentic experience of existence and the emergence of a new aspect of existence (Abdolkarimi, 2008, 7).

2. Essentialist negation of the Western world in Seyyed Hossein Nasr

A famous Islamic thinker, Seyyed Hossein Nasr interacts with the western world from a traditionalist point of view. Most thinkers consider traditionalism in its general sense as a kind of reaction to the phenomena of the modern world, and the main goal and demand of this negative reaction is to return to the traditional world. According to this definition, anyone who faces one question in the modern human mind and world, for example, how to fight environmental destruction, presents a solution based on returning to the way of life of the ancestors and inhabitants of the pre-modern world and says, for example Abandoning the car is one way to fight this destruction, it is considered a traditionalist in its general sense (Abak, 2005,162). However, traditionalism in its special sense refers to an intellectual movement that begins in the early 20th century with René Jean-Marie-Joseph Guénon's efforts, a French thinker and mystic who later became a Muslim, and reaches its peak with the efforts of thinkers such as Frithjof Schuon. This movement in Iran is associated with Seyyed Hossein Nasr. From the perspective of traditionalists such as Nasr, opposition to modernity means rejecting everything that belongs to the modern and postmodern Western world, including all the elements of new science that conflict with the traditional reading of the world (Nasr, 2001, 134). According to Nasr, tradition is not a custom, a habit, and a collection of previous speeches and actions, and he defines the tradition as such

Tradition, in its technical sense, means truths or principles of divine origin that have been revealed to human beings through various personalities known as messengers, prophets, logos, or other transmission agents, and, in fact, a complete cosmic part. This is associated with the application and application of these principles in various fields, including social and legal structure, art, mysticism, and sciences, and indeed, it includes transcendental knowledge, along with the means to study that knowledge (Nasr, 2001, 135).

Nasr sees the relationship between religions and what they call tradition as close and in an unbreakable bond:

Religion is something that connects humans with God and humans with each other as members of a holy community or nation, or what Islam called Ummah (Nation). If we understand religion in this sense, it can be considered as the origin - as a heavenly beginning that manifests certain truths and principles through revelation, whose application and application form the Sunnah (Tradition) from then on. But the perfect and real meaning of tradition includes this origin and its consequences and employment and application. While some thinkers consider religion in its broadest sense to include the application of the

principles and foundations of religion and its subsequent historical development so that this also includes what we mean by tradition (Nasr, 2001, 142).

For Nasr, tradition and religion have an integral and inseparable relationship, and religion without tradition and tradition without religion is meaningless. Indeed, it is important to mention that Nasr's approach to religion is esoteric-mystical, and he is so fascinated by an Islamic mysticism that he sees everything under its protection. Nasr tries to confront the humanism and subjectivism of the Western world by proposing a mystical concept called perennial philosophy (*Khosrow Panah*, 2008, 215).

Based on imperishable wisdom or perennial philosophy, wisdom has a divine origin, and knowledge is a sacred thing that God has given to Adam. In the realm of ontology, perennial philosophy assumes that there is a being at the head of the system of being, whose existence is absolute and eternal, and whose circle of presence does not accept any limits in terms of time and place. The origin of all beings is this non-material existence, and other beings, including humans, are placed in an existentially inferior position, and this conflicts with the modernist materialistic view of the world (Aavani, 1998, 45). In perennial philosophy of the Western world, reasoning intellect has taken the place of general reason and sits in a position beyond its place. This reasoning intellect should save itself from wandering by connecting to the general intellect, rather than trying in vain to recognize it by shining light on the sun, which is the general intellect (Tavakkolian, 2005, 61).

Via perennial philosophy, Nasr mentions that the western world is a manifestation of betrayal of revelation and inspiration and a historical impasse; one should not consider the works of modern western civilization, but its foundations, which include elements such as humanism and subjectivism, invalidate. Nasr likes Plato's saying that "those who practice philosophy in the right way are in training for dying, and they fear death least of all men" and also Mawlana Rumi's saying that "those who reason is standing on a weak cane", reminding that the way to human salvation is not through Cartesian humanism and Nietzschean nihilism, but through Seeking recourse to perennial philosophy (Boroujerdi, 2005, 188).

Nasr strongly opposes instrumental rationality and Western civilization and compares it to a rooster whose head has been cut off and for a short period, it moves here and there with a quick and aimless movement until it dies. The new civilization, with all its progress in conquering nature, is plagued with a huge problem, that is, forgetting itself, and it has ignited a fire, the first victim of which is itself. The freedom desired by the Westerners is the freedom of the soul, and today's modernization has turned into a philosophy of consumption that tries to satisfy man's inexhaustible appetite for everything. This modernization has even led to the destruction of nature (Nasr, 2007, 110). Nasr criticizes the Faustian and domineering spirit of the modern world: Modernity, by prioritizing the mind and body over the soul and introducing a mystical vision, removing the divine

jewel of nature and favoring non-religious science and knowledge, has brought the humankind to the abyss. According to Nasr, it is with modernity that the primary harmony between God and nature is disturbed by human interference and agency, and man rebels against God and nature and the world sink into darkness (Nasr, 1975,12).

Nasr's definite and inviolable alternative to science and reason in the modern world is to adopt a mystical approach influenced by religion. He believes that referring to tradition is not only referring to the appearance of religion, but religion is both outward and inward. Every appearance has an inwardness and every inwardness has truth; the sum of these two becomes religion (Aavani, 2001,15). Nasr introduces religion as the immutable truth of God and the target of religion as unchangeable human nature, and considers the secret of the need for religion as a human need, and the only way to preserve religion is to cling to mysticism (Nasr, 1980,17). In Nasr's mystical view, man is not the ruler of the world, and living in perennial philosophy means breathing in a world where a person is connected to a truth beyond his self. This presupposition is completely in conflict with the epistemology of the modern world, in which no knowledge holder can consider himself immune from error and no authority is recognized (Tavaklian, 2004, 61).

3. Comparing Fardid's and Nasr's views of the western world

One pioneer of traditionalism, Guénon claimed that to achieve meaning and spirituality, one must return to the spirit of the tradition, and the spirit of the tradition is what is called imperishable wisdom or immortal wisdom. Traditionalists believe that Western civilization will also disappear like the various civilizations that have arisen and disappeared. Unlike the defenders of modernity, who consider human history to be forward and progressive, they believe that there was a golden age in the past and we are descending from that golden age (Guénon, 2008, 15). Nasr, a follower of Guénon, believes that the modern approach to the world that has been formed since the Renaissance; he ignores the sacred and transcendental dimension of the world and has reduced science and knowledge to its material and secular dimension.

According to Nasr, five centuries ago, man rebelled against the higher world and fell into the abyss of misery and misery because he lost understanding and understanding of the sacred and drowned in instability and restlessness (Nasr, 2001, 81). Therefore, the solution is for man to submit to the will and will of God with no number and as one, and take guidance and instructions from him for his life and how to realize his will and will in the order of creation (Nasr, 1997, 44). Nasr is not opposed to the consequences of modernity, but to the totality of modernity as a civilization ruling the West.

He looks at modernity from an essentialist point of view and considers it to have a coherent whole, in which human-centeredness, reason itself, secularism, science, and material existence are inseparable components. In front of modern science, Nasr proposes the knowledge by presence, which is achieved by austerity and removal of the body and leaving the soul out of the body. Nasr

is one of those people who criticizes modernity from the standpoint of tradition; thus, he considers the solution to be the revival of Islamic mysticism and oriental intuition (Bahrami Komail, 2014, 190). Fardid is also a thinker who, almost like Nasr, has an essentialist approach to the modern era and considers modernity to have a pure and universal universality in which there is no possibility of selectivity. In other words, in the discussion of the nature and nature of modernity, Fardid considers modernity to be a coherent whole in which man's view of the world has fundamentally changed and man, by placing himself in the center of the world, has turned other things into objects.

From the point of view of values, Fardid considers such an era as the era of human error and misery. He considered modernity, philosophy, and civilization of the West in its entirety and with all its components, such as freedom, human rights, rationality, and fundamental self; He considers it evil and tyrannical (Fardid, 1381, 139). Fardid rejects the central subject, self-founding and humanism of the Western world:

Modern freedom is the same as tyranny, in my opinion. Modern reason and opinion are independent of the Holy Book (Quran) and tradition. Authenticity is the very authenticity of a human being! Whether this human being is an individual or a group, what is the essence of realization is the very human being. In the new era, there is no book and tradition, and what becomes original is the material world of creation (nature). Man's duty is to study Nasuti's book (Fardid, 2005, 141).

In Fardid's view, modernity is only attached to knowledge by acquisition and has forgotten knowledge by presence, while the essence is knowledge by presence (Fardid, 1381,125). Fardid builds a concrete wall between the Western and Eastern worlds, rejecting any kind of compromise and reconciliation between them. As he believes, the freedom proposed in modernity is completely and essentially in conflict with the freedom proposed in religion, and the sum of these two freedoms is impossible - freedom is either humanistic or divine (Fardid, 2005, 14).

It seems that Fardid and Nasr agree in their negative view and negative view of the Western world and modernity, and both of them want the complete integration of Western humanism and subjectivism. Both Fardid and Nasr consider modernity to have an inherent and essential crisis and consider any attempt to patch modernity with Eastern religions or cultures to be futile (Bahrami Komail, 2013, 170). Of course, besides the similarities between Fardid and Nasr's thoughts, there are also subtle and significant differences between Fardid and Nasr in facing the Western world, which cannot be simply ignored. Fardid is a thinker who, inspired by Heidegger, has a historical vision by which he means the attitude that does not consider human affairs, society, culture, and civilization as perennial, eternal, and unchangeable, and understands them all in a historical stream. According to Fardid, even the intellect is a historical matter and it finds new meaning in every historical era. He argues that: "in each era, the Greek era, the Roman era, and the modern era, the human being is the manifestation of a name and the meaning of reason changes" (Fardid 2004,

248). Combining Heidegger's historical thought and Ibn Arabi's nameology, Fardid considers the history behind the emergence of names and considers man as a historical being who is influenced by the name of each era, but he has a relationship with meta-history, that is, with the essence of truth. A believing man is someone who finds a transhistorical matter behind the transition of historical events, which reveals itself, and in Farid's thinking, this transhistorical matter is also referred to as the remaining time (Abdolkarimi, 2012, 282). Fardid considers modernity as a kind of event and historical transition of today's world. He believes that subjectivism and metaphysical nihilism have become a part of our identity; Therefore, unlike traditionalists such as Nasr, he does not consider it an uncomplicated matter to overcome Westoxification and confront the dominance of the Western world: in his opinion, because of our historical past, it is impossible to return to the tradition, and one can only talk with the tradition and the feats of the past (Abdolkarimi, 2012, 284).

Contrary to Fardid, Nasr does not have a historical attitude towards the West and the East: his confrontation with these two concepts is dominated by dualism, in which the West is considered completely evil and the East completely merciful. Nasr thinks he can stand against the nihilism of the modern world by simply relying on tradition, and this is when Fardid, under the influence of his historical attitude, says that the tradition, if it is expressed as it is, will not be the tradition. We cannot refer to the Sunnah (tradition) traditionally and we must re-read the Sunnah (tradition) in the light of future thinking (Abdolkarimi, 2015, 227).

Fardid's understanding of tradition was the perception of cognitive existence, in the sense that for him, the tradition was a source for discovering or reviving the possibility for thinking in opposition to the Western metaphysical tradition and all its results and accessories, that is, a possibility for understanding existence and the relationship between man and existence. Fardid revives the mystical and mystical wisdom in our historical tradition in the geography of the contemporary world thought and life in the present world-- it provides the grounds for reviving the true meaning of the tradition, returning to it, overcoming our historical gap and discontinuity in the contemporary era theoretically, and achieving a kind of historical continuity and integrity (Abdolkarimi, 2013, 284-285).

Nasr is fascinated by Islamic mysticism and mystic opinions such as Suhrawardi and Mulla Sadra, and he wants to confront Western subjectivism from this mystical stronghold. Fardid considered Islamic mysticism, especially enlightenment wisdom, to be subordinate to philosophy and fundamental to itself, and he believed that the intellect that Suhrawardi refers to is the common intellect and not the transcendent intellect (Dibaj, 2013, 313). Fardid, unlike Nasr, did not consider Islamic mysticism as the final point of thought and had a critical confrontation with the opinions of Suhrawardi and Mulla Sadra. He even accused Ibn Arabi's Neoplatonic orientation affected by metaphysical rationality (Dibaj, 2013, 289). Criticizing traditionalists such as Nasr, who are

influenced by esoteric-mystical approaches, Fardid states that “for esotericism, intellect is the more or less outdated intellect of the Greek era” (Fardid, 1979, 8).

Fardid also criticizes Mulla Sadra, the philosopher whose ideas are Nasr’s reference sources in confronting the Western world, arguing that there is asceticism in Mulla Sadra’s Transcendent Theosophy, but this asceticism is mixed with metaphysics (Dibaj, 2014, 219). Fardid believes that: “Mulla Sadra’s philosophy is eclectic and mixed-- in this philosophy, Quranic piety has been forgotten, philosophy has been rained down” (Fardid, 2002,356). The fact of the matter is that Fardid, who is wary of taking and adapting and warns against their eclecticism with piety, clearly uses Heidegger’s philosophical hermeneutics to criticize Western metaphysics. Did Fardid not know that carrying Heidegger’s hermeneutics may lead to relativism in understanding reality and understanding religious texts (Khosrow Panah, 2009, 156)!?

Another point of difference between Fardid’s and Nasr’s viewpoints is Farid’s great interest in having a kind of philosophy of history. Fardid believes that history has a beginning and an end, following the opinions of thinkers such as Hegel, Marx, and Ibn Arabi. In his opinion, the movement of history in its forced path will examine the revolution so that yesterdays and today’s humanity will pass through today and tomorrow and reach the day after tomorrow. Fardid introduces the single nation as a historical manifestation of the period of tomorrow and the day after tomorrow and tries to explain the historical system of the world based on weakness and arrogance (Ma’aref, 2010, 289-288). Fardid even interprets the rise of the promised Mahdi (PBUH) in line with the realization of the post-mortem period and the formation of a single nation. It is precisely because of this that unlike traditionalist thinkers such as Nasr, who are fundamentally opposed to revolutionary action, he defends revolutionary action and the first way of the Islamic Revolution as a great and fateful event in the realization's direction of the Westoxification of the modern era: “Islamic revolution was the beginning of the East’s aggression against the West and Western thinking and the East’s turning to spiritual thinking and Oneness wisdom” (*Madadpour*, 1973, 5). Fardid also defends revolutionary activism: “our revolution is a potential revolution and an actual rebellion” (Fardid, 2002, 74).

Conclusion

One of the most influential contemporary traditionalist thinkers in Iran is Seyed Hossein Nasr, who, by adopting a traditionalist approach, rejects science, reason, and modern technology and calls for a return to tradition and the establishment of a traditional society. Nasr’s main concern in confronting the western world is criticizing western humanism and returning man to the Divine world. Nasr’s solution in addressing the modern world is to return to the perennial philosophy and the mystical approach that follows it. Based on his mystical approach, Nasr mentions that in the western world, appearance and changing human needs are centered, and thus the ear of modern

man does not hear the call of the inner world; therefore, the only way to win in the face of the modern world is to fully incorporate modern science and reason and return to the traditional world. Nasr's solution in dealing with the modern world is to return to perennial philosophy and the mystical approach that follows it. Based on his mystical approach, Nasr mentions that in the western world, appearance and changing human needs are centered, and thus the ear of modern man does not hear the call of the inner world; thus, the only way to win in the face of the modern world is to fully incorporate modern science and reason and return to the traditional world. Fardid, as an anti-modernist thinker like Nasr, rejects the Western world as a manifestation of humanism and subjectivism. Unlike Nasr, Fardid has a historical perspective on the concept of the West and Westoxification. Fardid believes that modernity is the historical transition of today's world; therefore, regardless of the historical requirements and requirements, it is never possible to simply return to the warm embrace of the traditional world. Although Fardid, like Nasr, has an essentialist view of Western civilization, he does not see an uncomplicated path to a complete break with the Western world due to his influence from the historical approach of Heidegger's views and Ibn Arabi's nameology. Inspired by Heidegger, Fardid takes the West as the crystallization of Cartesian and Kantian subjectivism to the center of his criticism and calls for the realization of an Eastern world free of Western subjectivism. He even considers the mystical approaches of people like Seyyed Hossein Nasr to be imbued with metaphysical rationality, and he mentions that Islamic philosophy and mysticism are plagued by Greekism. Therefore, he accuses traditionalists like Seyed Hossein Nasr, who are somehow influenced by Sadra's mysticism and enlightenment wisdom, of Westoxification and Greekization.

Generally, it can be said that Fardid and Nasr agree in rejecting Western subjectivism; however, they choose two different solutions in the type of confrontation and justification with the western world. From the point of view of a traditionalist thinker, Nasr calls for the realization of the traditional world by rejecting the western world completely, with a desire for perennial philosophy. Fardid, inspired by Heidegger and Ibn Arabi, has a completely philosophical and historical approach toward the West. Although he wants the realization of a united nation and the post-mortem period, he never sees the realization of a world free from humanism and subjectivism as easy and easy as Nasr.

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