Islamic resistance, A condition for effective Islamic governmentality

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## Abstract

Governmentality is regulating and directing behavior with the aim of governing with the lowest possible cost. In efficient governmentality, subjects must relate to themselves in such a way (form their understanding and behavior) that they freely and creatively reproduce or update a certain order. Therefore, the basic question of the present article is as follows: How and in what way should efficient Islamic governmentality be established so that on the one hand, Islam and Islamic teachings play a significant role in shaping the understanding and behavior of the subjects, on the other hand, can the creativity and innovation of the subjects be used in order not to marginalize Islam in Muslim life? To answer this question, we must consider Islam as an immanent political force or political spirituality that is current in people's lives (not Islam as an epistemological system that should lead to the rule of law). Islam as an active political force in human life (as manifested in the Islamic Revolution) continuously shapes people's desire for change and resistance (as active forces that live on the limits), and turns them into efficient subjects who creatively apply Islam (as a social knowledge) in their daily lives and keep it efficient.

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
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Introduction

Governmentality is opposed to government from a certain point of view. The difference between governmentality and government can be explained in terms of two opposing approaches: the transcendental approach and the immanent approach. Government is linked to subjects and life with a transcendental view; Such a view makes the government pursue its relationship with the population based on a legal or legal approach. Obviously, from this point of view, one of the important tools of governing the subjects is "laws", "regulations". In general, the transcendental approach to subjects, which is manifested at the government level in the form of the necessity of the rule of law (regardless of the theoretical and epistemological differences regarding how to achieve the rule of law), is based on epistemological approaches, whereas, if we consider life as a plane of immanence with a set of mutual affects, we should no longer cling to transcendental concepts and tools for efficient and low-cost governance (such as law). From this point of view, government (Or to be more precise, the rule of law) should be replaced by governmentality (which is based on the immanent approach).

Therefore, in this article, it is tried to first explain governmentality (which is based on immanent approach to life) in contrast to the epistemological and transcendental view of government, then we will try to show that if we consider Islam as a dominant social knowledge in human life, how can we talk about efficient and low-cost Islamic governmentality?

The hypothesis formulated to answer the above question is as follows: unlike Islamic government, whose main structure is based on Islamic laws and the rule of law in general, in Islamic governmentality, Islam becomes a political force in people's lives, through which subjects constantly a relationship with themselves and thus it is always going on in the lives of the subjects (unlike legal rules and regulations). In addition, the current of Islam in the lives of subjects requires the will to change and resistance. In other words, not to marginalize Islam in the life of the subjects comes from a will that, as a political force, incites the subjects to criticize the axioms of the present time and resist. As a result, in order to confront the force of the free market in neoliberalism, which uses the creativity of subjects to expand capitalism in their lives (subjects establish a relationship with themselves in such a way that the capitalist system reproduces itself), Islam must be turned into a force in the lives of subjects. In this case, Islam, through the driving force it creates, causes criticism of the axioms of the present time, change and resistance against any intellectual and practical rigidity.

In the following, it will be tried to explain the distinction between transcendental and immanent approaches first, and then discuss the concept of governmentality in Michel Foucault's opinion, which is based on an immanent approach to life.

1. Conceptual Framework

1-1. Transcendental and immanent questions and approaches

In a general view, two types of questions can be asked. The first question is a transcendental and representative question. In such a question, the answer is very important and the criticism is the criticism of the answers. In other words, one should discover the answer that best represents the reality. The second question is an immanent question. The immanent question asks about problematization and functions, and its goal is not to achieve transcendental answers. In these questions, concepts or answers are not imagined apart from their life and they cannot be separated from their function in life and be used as a basis for analysis. This is why the concepts are functional and not transcendental; And they have become possible in mutual influences. In this way, in immanent approach, problematization are asked and the critique is not an epistemological critique but a genealogical critique. According to Deleuze's interpretation, this criticism is "repetition as the differenciator of difference" ie eleuze,1994: 76) that seeks creation and does not want to approach life as a immanent level with a pre-existing conceptual structure; "the plane of i. manence is neither a concept nor the sum or set of all concepts; if it were, it would lose its essential character of opening" (Marrati,2003: 91) and cannot be grasped by transcendental concepts, because one cannot find anything beyond the Becoming and multiplicity of forces (Zimran, 2003: 230). In the following, these two approaches are explained in more detail.

1-2. Transcendental questions and approach: Asking based on transcendental and self-evident concepts

Transcendental questions come from a transcendental approach to life. In transcendental approaches, analyzes are based on concepts that form the basis of research work. For example, when you are a phenomenologist in the Husserlian sense, in order to do research, you must take concepts such as epoché, intentionality, lifeworld as self-evident and make them the basis of your analysis. Undoubtedly, in this approach, there can be no doubt about this self-evident statement that "humans live with each other in the "lifeworld ". As a result, the correct understanding is an understanding that is based on this transcendental basis, and we must put these transcendental concepts on human relationships when doing the analysis. In other words, in transcendental analysis, a epistemological structure is assumed, and based on

this epistemological structure, we examine the truth. This is what Foucault refers to when distinguishing the history of science and the genealogy of knowledge. He says about this: "The difference between what might be called the history of the sciences and the genealogy of knowledges is that the history of sciences is essentially located on an axis that is, roughly speaking, the cognition-truth axis, or at least the axis that goes from the structure of cognition to the demand for truth. Unlike the history of the sciences, the genealogy of knowledges is located on a different axis, namely the discourse-power axis or, if you like, the discursive practice-clash of power axis" (Foucault, :::::   ::::   :

According to Lemke, "Foucault conceives of human existence as a 'work of art' in order to free it from the universal validity claims of the human sciences. His aim is to liberate 'man' from the obligation of deciphering 'himself' as a system of atemporal functions and anthropological constants - with all the norms and demands on conduct that this entails" (Lemke,2019: 285).

The first and most important achievement of this approach is a transcendental view of man. That is, humans can be separated from their lives and discover the correct approaches in human relations (wise teacher); Whether they talk about the universality of human understanding in their analysis, or they talk about the limitation of humans to specific cultural and social conditions. In other words, by introducing the factor of the context or lifeworld, we imagine that we are presenting a concrete analysis, but we must not forget that in a transcendental way, firstly, it is us who are separated from our lives and We have discovered these correct relationships and secondly, we provide a transcendental definition of human. For example: "Man is a context-oriented being", or "Humans live with each other in the lifeworld".

It should be noted that what is meant by the transcendental approach has nothing to do with the interpretation of the transcendental approach of a certain philosopher, but the transcendental approach in the view of this article is compared to the immanent approach, which is characterized by taking certain concepts for granted in the analysis, which provide the possibility of representing human and social relations.

1-3. The immanent question and approach: Passing the causal approach in human and moral relations

As it was said, in a general view, two types of questions can be asked about a single research topic. The first question, which is a transcendental question, was addressed. The second question can be asked based on a immanent approach. Undoubtedly, this question is also asked to find an

answer and to tell the truth, as Foucault says: "All those who say that for me the truth doesn't exist are simple-minded" (Foucault, ::::b: :::: :

Before dealing with truth-telling of immanent, it is necessary to mention two points. The first point is that in the transcendental approach, as mentioned, a person can be separated from his life and express propositions based on the discovery of scientific and social facts. Behind this view lies an important assumption: "Being is based on causal relationships (cause and effect) and we as conscious humans can discover these relationships. The second point that must be stated before dealing with immanent truth-telling is that in this research work, like what Foucault says, human sciences and the relationships governing it are in our view; In other words, immanent truth-telling refers to the relationship we establish with ourselves in order to express a moral judgment, or it is about the relationship we establish with others in order to influence their behavior. Although these two ratios (the relation of self to itself and The Relation to the Other) are inseparable and such a separation is done to clarify the discussion. Foucault says about this: "My objective for more than twenty-five years has been to sketch out a history of the different ways in our culture that humans develop knowledge about themselves: economics, biology, psychiatry, medicine, and penology. The main point is not to accept this knowledge at face value but to analyze these so-called sciences as very specific "truth games" related to specific techniques that huamn beings use to understand themselves" (Foucault, 1997b: 224).

We continue the discussion by explaining the immanent approach. Immanence is a view of life in which no existential and essential separation is possible except for the reproduction of a specific function. That is, man cannot have understanding and perception without conflicts in his life. Basically, nothing can be separated from another thing and humans do not have such consciousness and dignity to express such separations, this is because concepts become functional in this approach. According to Foucault: "Philosophy is neither historically nor logically the founder of knowledge; Rather, the formation of knowledge has conditions and rules that philosophical discourse in every era, like any other form of discourse that claims to be rational, is bound to and subject to it" (Foucault, 2015: 74).

This statement of Foucault should be measured through his understanding of life as "a life" or " immanent life". In this regard, it should be said that "Immanence is not related to momeThing as a unity superior to all things or to a Subject as an act that brings about a synthesis of things: it is only when immanence is no longer immanence to anything other than itself that we can speak of a plane of immanence. No more than the transcendental

field is defined by consciousness can the plane of immanence be defined by a subject or an object that is able to contain it. We will say of pure immanence that it is A LIFE, and nothing else. It is not immanence to life, but the immanent that is in nothing is itself a life. A life is the immanence of immanence, absolute immanence: it is complete power, complete bliss" (Deleuze, 2005c: 27).

In other words, in the immanent life, nothing can produce outside of the immanent life; It means to be in a separate transcendental realm and to explain non-functionally, as Deleuze shows about Kaf'a' s wor:s: "In these works, everything is immanent and nothing happens on a level of transcendence of reality" (Due, 2007: 36).

And as Foucault points out this very important point in the article "Nietzsche, Freud, Marx" that Marx also seeks to show in the book "Capital" that there is no deep concept for the analysis of capitalism and it is necessary to understand the deep conceptualizations of the bourgeoisie at the level of power relations; Depths that are nothing but crumpling the surface and therefore have become possible for a function. In this sense, for Foucault, Marx is a genealogist. Foucault says about this: "at the beginning of Capital, he explains how, unlike Perseus, he must plunge into the fog to show that, in fact, there are no monsters or profound enigmas, because everything profound in the conception that the bourgeoisie has of money, capital, value, and so on, is in reality nothing but platitude" (Foucault, ::::a: ::::   :

Therefore, in opposition to idealism and the transcendental approach, it should be said that ideas do not give order to experience, ideas are the result of experience and immanent life. According to Foucault, in political thought and analysis, we have not yet cut off the head of the Prince: "It is in this sphere of force relations that we must try to analyze the mechanisms of power. In this way we will escape from the system of Law-and-Sovereign which has captivated political thought for such a long time. And if it is true that Machiavelli was among the few--and this no doubt was the scandal of his "cynicism"-who conceived the power of the Prince in terms of force relationships, perhaps we need to go one step further, do without the persona of the Prince, and decipher power mechanisms on the basis of a strategy that is immanent in force relationships" (Foucault, ::::a: 97).

Therefore, looking at life based on Immanence, there is no place for transcendental analyzes that are based on self-evident concepts, because in such analyzes "concepts" take the place of "Prince" in the analysis and by presenting a special analysis "represents" their power.

1-4. The difference between epistemological creation and immanent creation

Depending on the changing and concrete conditions, the immanent subject reacts to various issues in order to either preserve his life or to expand his life (his understanding or experience) through creativity and creation, and this expansion of life is catch of minority. According to Patton, "Its goal should be not just the recognition of existing states of affairs or the justification of existing opinions and forms of life, but the absolute deterritorialisation of the present in thought. For this reason, they describe it as an untimely mode of thinking that calls for 'a new earth, a new people"(Patton, 2000: 12). Therefore, epistemological creation starts from conceptual axioms, i.e. a phenomenologist or a Marxist creates by throwing axioms on phenomena, but immanent creativity is related to the flow of mutual influences from the path of will means refusal, curiosity and innovation. In this approach, we are faced with differentiating repetition of mutual affects, in which concepts are used functionally: "The synthesis is one of forces, of their difference and their reproduction; the eternal return is the synthesis which has as its principle the will to power. We should not be surprised by the word "will"; which one apart from the will is capable of serving as the principle of a synthesis of forces by determining the relation of force with forces?" (Deleuze, ::::b:))) . Thus, the eternal return of the will is an ethics inasmuch as it is a "selective ontology" ((ardt, :::::   ::: .

What we have said so far indicates that our understanding is a manifestation of unique mutual forces and affects, so that we cannot separate a concept from this life and throw a transcendental way on social and human phenomena. In this case, the concepts are purely functional. In other words, immanent life cannot explain immanent existence. Therefore, no concepts or conceptual personage can grasp existence. Existence is like a field of forces and a level of immanence, like " the single wave that rolls concepts up and unrolls them" (Deleuze& Guattari,::::: ::: , is always in motion and becoming, and it carries potential forces and events outside the discursive and non- discursive practices of a life: "Immanence is no longer immanent to something other than itself it is possible to speak of a plane of immanence. Such a plane is, perhaps, a radical eQpiricism" (Ibid:))) . A level of data that is neither "about" anything nor "for" anyone; The data of this level cannot be considered to be based on consciousness or to indicate a transcendent reality (Mashayikhi, 2012: 29). According to Foucault "Differences would revolve of their own accord, being would be expressed in the same fashion for all these differences, and being would be no longer a unity that guides and distributes them but their repetition as differences. For

Deleuze, the noncategorical univocity of being does not directly attach the multiple to unity itself (the universal neutrality of being, or the expressive force of substance) ; it puts being into play as that which is repetitively expressed as difference. Being is the recurrence of difference, without there being any difference in the form of its expression" (Foucault, ::::b:)))) . This is why Foucault always sees power as network of relations: "the study of this micro-physics presupposes that the power exercised on the body is conceived not as a property, but as a strategy, that its affects of domination are attributed not to 'appropriation', but to dispositions, manoeuvres, tactics, techniques, functionings; that one should decipher in it a network of relations, constantly in tension, in activity, rather than a privilege that one might possess; that one should take as its model a perpetual battle rather than a contract regulating a transaction or the conquest of a territory" (Foucault, 1995: 26).

2. Immanence and the Force of the Outside : Governmentality

As it was said, the experience is the product of mutual affects that causes the understanding of the subject to be formed by itself (Technologies of the Self); Undoubtedly, this understanding is inseparable from the practices and actions of others (relationship between self and others). In fact, governmentality appears here: conducting behavior in such a way that a person can relate to himself that reproduces specific goals and functions (whether it is following rules and laws, such as Christianity (but the genealogical analysis does not start from rules and laws because power flows and is applied in the small relationships of life) and whether it is in the form of an aesthetic ascetic like ancient Greece). Therefore, techniques of the Self and techniques of the power are inseparable from each other.

So far we have talked about life as "an experience" (in the sense of a set of interactions and or mutual affects) in which "self" which is the Immanence by establishing a relationship with itself (which is full of mutual affects of self and the other), gets an understanding of his surroundings (that this understanding is "a life" or "an empiricism"). Governmentality is also the constant conducting of these behaviors and practices so that person's understanding is formed freely. Now we are faced with a question: What is the thing that makes governmentality to be creative and strategic to conduct of conduct (behavior)? The answer to this question cannot be any transcendental concept, but it must be of the type of immanent affects.

According to what was said, every government is always exposed to forces of the outside; forces that can affect the discursive and non- discursive understanding of curious and creative subjects. Forces of the outside are those fluid forces that are outside our life in an unfixed way and may be

experienced at any moment and a new relationship may emerge. Before understanding the force of the outside, explaining the concept of "diagram" can help us. The diagram shows us how the power relations are immanent to knowledge and in the final analysis, immanent to the subject. Therefore, explaining the immanent cause as a diagram can help us a lot in understanding the Thought of the outside. In the book that Deleuze wrote about Foucault, he explains the reason why Foucault turned to genealogy as follows: "Discipline and Punish poses the two problems that The Archaeology could not raise because the latter remained tied to Knowledge, and the primacy of the statement in knowledge. On the one hand, outside forms, is there in general a common immanent cause that exists within the social field? On the other, how do the assemblages, adjustments and interpenetration of the two forms come about in a variable way in each particular case?" (Deleuze, :::::   ::: .

Deleuze, after bringing up Panopticonin Foucault, points out that Panopticonis used in two senses by Foucault: "When Foucault defines Panopticism, either he specifically sees it as an optical or luminous arrangement that characterizes prison, or he views it abstractly as a machine that not only affects visible matter in general (a workshop, barracks, school or hospital as much as a prison) but also in general passes through every articulable function. So the abstract formula of Panopticism is no longer 'to see without being seen' but to impose a particular conduct on a particular human multiplicity. We need only insist that the multiplicity is reduced and confined to a tight space and that the imposition of a form of conduct is done by distributing in space, laying out and serializing in time, composing in space-time, and so on.17 The list is endless, but it is always concerned with unformed and unorganized matter and unformalized, unfinalized functions, the two variables being indissolubly linked.

What can we call such a new informal dimension? On one occasion Foucault gives it its most precise name: it is a 'diagram', that is to say a 'functioning, abstracted from any obstacle [. . .] or friction [and which] must be detached from any specific use'.18 The diagram is no longer an auditory or visual archive but a map, a cartography that is coextensive with the whole social field. It is an abstract machine. It is defined by its informal functions and matter and in terms of form makes no distinction between content and expression, a discursive formation and a non-discursive formation. It is a machine that is almost blind and mute, even though it makes others see and speak.

If there are many diagrammatic functions and even matters, it is because every diagram is a spatio-temporal multiplicity. But it is also

because there are as many diagrams as there are social fields in history. When Foucault invokes the notion of diagram it is in connection with our modern disciplinarian societies, where power controls the whole field: if there is a model it is that of the 'plague', which cordons off the stricken town and regulates the smallest detail. But if we consider the ancient sovereign societies we can see that they also possess a diagram, even if it relates to different matters and functions: here too a force is exercised on other forces, but it is used to deduct rather than to combine and compose; to divide the masses rather than to isolate the detail; to exile rather than to seal off (its model is that of 'leprosy').

This is a different kind of diagram, a different machine, closer to theatre than to the factory; it involves a different relation between forces. More importantly, it creates intermediary diagrams in which we shift from one society to another: for example, the Napoleonic diagram, where the disciplinary function merges with the sovereign function 'at the point of junction of the monarchical, ritual exercise of sovereignty and the hierarchical, permanent exercise of indefinite discipline'.20 This is because the diagram is highly unstable or fluid, continually churning up matter and functions in a way likely to create change.

Lastly, every diagram is intersocial and constantly evolving. It never functions in order to represent a persisting world but produces a new kind of reality, a new model of truth. It is neither the subject of history, nor does it survey history. It makes history by unmaking preceding realities and significations, constituting hundreds of points of emergence or creativity, unexpected conjunctions or improbable continuums. It doubles history with a sense of continual evolution" (Ibid: 33-35).

Next, Deleuze tries to provide a more detailed explanation of the diagram with the concept of the immanent cause: "What is a diagram? It is a display of the relations between forces which constitute power in the above conditions: The panoptic mechanism is not simply a hinge, a point of exchange between a mechanism of power and a function; it is a way of making power relations functions in a function, and of making a function through these power relations.

We have seen that the relations between forces, or power relations, were microphysical, strategic, multipunctual and diffuse, that they determined particular features and constituted pure functions. The diagram or abstract machine is the map of relations between forces, a map of destiny, or intensity, which proceeds by primary non-localizable relations and at every moment passes through every point, 'or rather in every relation from one point to another'. Of course, this has nothing to do either with a

transcendent idea or with an ideological superstructure, or even with an economic infrastructure, which is already qualified by its substance and defined by its form and use. None the less, the diagram acts as a non-unifying immanent cause that is coextensive with the whole social field: the abstract machine is like the cause of the concrete assemblages that execute its relations; and these relations between forces take place 'not above' but within the very tissue of the assemblages they produce.

What do we mean here by immanent cause? It is a cause which is realized, integrated and distinguished in its affect. Or rather the immanent cause is realized, integrated and distinguished by its affect. In this way there is a correlation or mutual presupposition between cause and affect, between abstract machine and concrete assemblages (it is for the latter that Foucault most often reserves the term 'mechanisms'). If the affects realize something this is because the relations between forces, or power relations, are merely virtual, potential, unstable, vanishing and molecular, and define only possibilities of interaction, so long as they do not enter into a macroscopic whole capable of giving form to their fluid matter and their diffuse function" (Ibid: 36-37).

So far, everything that has been said about the diagram was not from the perspective of the relation to oneself. Based on what has been said so far:

1) We are faced with knowledge as the closure of the discursive with the non-discursive.

2) Power relations as diagrams are immanent in these fields (the discursive and the non-discursive).

For example, the disciplinary diagram is a map of the relations of the forces. This diagram both affects the possibility of knowledge and is affected by it. Diagrams and knowledge are immanent each other and they should not be assumed to be the same.

Power relations include active and reactive affects: "we should not ask: 'What is power and where does it come from?', but 'How is it practised?' An exercise of power shows up as an affect, since force defines itself by its very power to affect other forces (to which it is related) and to be affected by other forces. To incite, provoke and produce (or any term drawn from analogous lists) constitute active affects, while to be incited or provoked, to be induced to produce, to have a 'useful' effect, constitute reactive affects. The latter are not simply the 'repercussion' or 'passive side' of the former but are rather 'the irreducible encounter' between the two, especially if we believe that the force affected has a certain capacity for resistance.3 At the same time, each force has the power to affect (others) and to be affected (by others again), such that each force implies power relations: and every field of

forces distributes forces according to these relations and their variations. Spontaneity and receptivity now take on a new meaning: to affect or to be affected" (Ibid:))) . Foucault says about this: "When I was studying asylums, prisons, and so on, I insisted, I think, too much on the techniques of domination. What we can call discipline is something really important in these kinds of institutions, but it is only one aspect of the art of governing people in our society. We must not understand the exercise of power as pure violence or strict coercion. Power consists in complex relations: these relations involve a set of rational techniques, and the efficiency of those techniques is due to a subtle integration of coercion- technologies and self-technologies. I think that we have to get rid of the more or less Freudian schema— you know it— the schema of interiorization of the law by the self. Fortunately, from a theoretical point of view, and maybe unfortunately from a practical point of view, things are much more complicated than that. In short, having studied the field of government by taking as my point of departure techniques of domination, I would like in years to come to study government— especially in the field of sexuality— starting from the techniques of the self" (Foucault, ::::   ::: .

As it was said about the diagrams, the power relations are always fluid and cannot be localized, and in the existence that is the field of forces, they are always exposed to the influence of the outside forces of the map of the relations of the forces (diagram). The art of governing is to be able to influence the behavior of others in such a way that the subjects do not experience such forces of the outside at all or experience it in such a way that the governing relations are reproduced. Therefore, when all changes are initiated by forces of the outside, this "self[1]" or " immanent subject" should not resist against the rules of dominant knowledge.

In other words, the change and transformation of knowledge or the marginalization of a certain knowledge should be understood from the force of the outside experienced by the "self" and the lack of governmentality of the marginalized knowledge in reproducing its statements and behaviors. As a result, the starting point is always the relationship between self and itself that within the "self" there are always mutual affects. This means that Foucault's problem in archaeology was never the discontinuity (break) of knowledge, but the problem was whether the subjects (when facing the force of the outside due to the relationship they established with themselves and others), were able to prevent the break or because of lack of governmentality, knowledge suffered a break.

Therefore, according to Foucault and Deleuze, life is a work of art. "Art consists of moving from one form to another and not stopping at any of

them. Always unfinished, always becoming" (Salimizadeh, 2008: 23). It is in the art of seizing forces that is of fundamental importance. In this regard, Deleuze's point of view about the painter and his work of art can help a lot to understand the governmentality on the one hand and the genealogy of the present on the other hand: "the painter starts with a figurative form, a diagram intervenes and scrambles it, and a form of a completely different nature emerges from the diagram, which is called the FigureF To be more precise, diagram must not cover the entire painting, which would be "sloppy" (we would once again fall into an undifferentiated gray, or a line of the "marshland" rather than the desert). Being itself a catastrophe, the diagram must not create a catastrophe. Being itself a zone of scrambling, it must not scramble the painting. Being a mixture, it must not mix colors, but break tones. In short, being manual, it must be reinjected into the visual whole, in which it deploys consequences that go beyond it. The essential point about the diagram is that it is made in order for something to emerge from it, and if nothing emerges from it, it fails. And what emerges from the diagram, the Figure, emerges both gradually and all at once, as in 1946 painting[2], where the whole is given all at once, while the series is at the same time constructed. gradually. This is because, if we consider the painting in its reality, the heterogeneity of the manual diagram and the visual whole indeed indicates a difference in nature or a leaped as if we leapt a first time from the optical eye to the hand, and a second time from the hand to the eye. But if we consider the painting as a process, there is instead a continual injection of the manual diagram into the visual whole, a "slow leak," a "coagulation," an "evolution," as if one were moving gradually from the hand to the haptic eye, from the manual diagram to haptic vision" ((eleuze, 5555a5666-160).

3. Governmentality in the form of following basic concepts and laws (morality)

From the point of view of governmentality, in order to reproduce its statements, the governmental knowledge must have the art of appropriating the forces of the outside or the art of governing, that is, it reproduces the forces of the outside in such a way that the fundamental statements of its knowledge remain dominant and others still experience those statements with their behavior or their relationship with themselves (in this case the painter is still loyal to the original figurative form and consequently the figure), but on the other side of the spectrum, for Deleuze, the painter is a curious and refusing self; Someone who constantly exposes the relationship diagram of forces to external experience with curiosity in order to create a new form and life. This means that the painter is a genealogist of the present.

If the established governmentality is not able to strategically establish a new relationship with these forces of the outside or if it is not able to appropriate them and bring them closer to its fundamental concepts, it will not only be further away from the lives of the subjects, but his knowledge also becomes marginal knowledge. It is from this point of view that Foucault did not talk about the break in knowledge, but his concern was how the subject could prevent the marginalization of knowledge, and he did not do this. It is for this reason that the archeology of knowledge should also be understood from Foucault's point of view on subjectification, ethics, governmentality, and the creative and constant conduct of relation of self to itself: "I am working on the history, at a given moment, of the way reflexivity of self upon self is established, and the discourse of truth that is linked to it" (Foucault, 1988: 39).

A third can be added to the above two cases: that is, starting from resistance in order to have efficient governmentality.

4. A fighter approach and resistance (ethics), a condition for efficient governmentality

Governmentality in the sense that was explained is the intersection of one's relationship with oneself and one's relationship with another, which can also take the form of following fundamental principles and concepts, rules and laws (morality), that is, in the face of forces of the outside, established governance as a strategic subject should act in such a way that the subjects reproduce those fundamental principles, concepts and laws in relation to themselves. This type of governmentality was discussed in the previous section.

Considering the immanence of life and the conditions in which existence (as a field of forces and a level of immanence) constantly exposes a force from outside to experiences, being governed in such a way that subjects must act in such a way that certain laws and concepts to be reproduced, it seems to be a difficult task so that in many cases the use of dominance relations will become inevitable and gradually the "rule of law" will take the place of governmentality. In other words, instead of paying attention to the immanent life to govern, it is the rules and laws that are transcended to govern.

Foucault observes this type of governmentality in Christianity and shows its difference with the ethical governmentality of ancient Greece and Rome based on the hermeneutics of the subject: "the hermeneutics of the subject was absent in antiquity, and therefore that it is a typically Christian "invention," as the second lecture explains. In fact, the obligation to tell the truth about oneself occupied a rather modest place within the ancient

philosophical schools, for their objective was rather the individual's transformation through the activation within him of a series of precepts that were supposed to orientate his conduct in every circumstance of life and enable him to reach a number of ends: self- mastery, tranquillity of soul, purity of body and mind, and so on. Emphasis was therefore placed less on the disciple's verbalization than on the master's discourse, and the bond between disciple and master remained entirely provisional and circumstantial: it was a temporary relationship aimed at getting the person being directed to acquire a certain degree of autonomy, and it ended as soon as that result was obtained. Consequently, it was not necessary for the individual to undertake an analytical self- exploration or to expose a secret truth about himself to the other" (Cremonesi, Laura, :::::   : -5).

In fact, unlike the asceticism of Christian nuns, which was based on rules, Self-control in aesthetic asceticism was based on the accumulation of strength and power. In other words, there was a fighter approach in ancient Greece towards building oneself around the system of pleasures: "Ethical conduct in matters of pleasure was contin- gent on a battle for power" (Foucault,1990b:66), in which there was no passive position and relationship that came from a specific law. For example, for the ancient Greeks, Aphrodisia was sexual activity and energy, which in itself does not have any positive or negative value, based on which it can take the form of rule and law. Rather, it was simply the way of shaping and giving style to sexual activities and energies.

Also, Foucault goes to the Stoics in "The Care of the Self" and shows that for them abstinence was an exercise to empower the subject. For example, we can refer to the views of the Stoics regarding the necessity of producing ready soldiers in peacetime (which is achieved through self-abstinence and practice) so that defeat does not occur in war and crisis situations. .oucaul t says: "In days of peace the soldier performs maneuvers, throws up earthworks with no enemy in sight, and wearies himself with gratuitous toil, in order that he may be equal to unavoidable toil. If you would not have a man flinch when the crisis comes, train him before it comes" (Foucault, :::::   ::: .

As a result, according to Foucault, in ancient Greece, the prohibitions were of ethics, art of living and life technique rather than law. In other words, "If Foucault's reconstruction of Greek moral reflection is accurate, then the task of ethics did not mean fixing a systematic code separating permitted actions from prohibited ones. Greek 'sexual morality' was not based on a morphology of acts so much as a dynamic of practices defining the conditions for the correct use of pleasure (chresis aphrodision).

This did not occur in terms of vertical agreement with standing laws, but in horizontal relation to other realms of subjective action: The main question appears to bear much less on the acts' conformity with a natural structure or with a positive regulation, than on what might be called the subject's 'style of activity' and on the relation he establishes between sexual activity and the other aspects of his familial, social, and economic existence. The movement of analysis and the procedures of valuation do not go from the act to a domain such as sexuality or the flesh, a domain whose divine, civil, or natural laws would delineate the permitted forms; they go from the subject as a sexual actor to the other areas of life in which he pursues his activity. And it is in the relationship between these different forms of activity that the principles of evaluation of a sexual behavior are essentially, but not exclusively, situated" (Lem:e,::::::   :::   -173).

In fact, what Foucault is looking for in the aesthetic asceticism of the ancient world is an "immanent ethics". Frederic Gros says so in this regard: What Foucault finds in ancient thought is the idea of introducing an order into a person's life, but an immanent order that is not supported through transcendental values and is not externally conditioned and bound by social norms: Greek ethics focuses on issues of personal choice, aesthetics of living" (Daniali, ::::::   )))) . Foucault says about this: "It was a matter of knowing how to govern one's own life in order to give it the most beautiful form possible (in the eyes of others, of oneself, and of the future generations for whom one could serve as an emample). That's what I tried to reconstitute: the formation and development of a practice of self whose objective was to constitute oneself as the worker of the beauty of one's own life" (Foucault, 1996b: 458).

Therefore, the subjects' creativity can be used more freely. According to Deleuze, "the appearance of the outside in the inside": "if thought comes from outside, and remains attached to the outside, how come the outside does not flood into the inside, as the element that thought does not and cannot think of? The unthought is therefore not external to thought but lies at its very heart, as that impossibility of thinking which doubles or hollows out the outside..   It is as if the relations of the outside folded back to create a doubling, allow a relation to oneself to emerge, and constitute an inside which is hollowed out and develops its own unique dimension: 'enkrateia', the relation to oneself that is self-mastery, 'is a power that one brought to bear on oneself in the power that one exercised over others' (how could one claim to govern others if one could not govern oneself?) to the point where the relation to oneself becomes 'a principle of internal

regulation' in relation to the constituent powers of politics, the family, eloquence, gaq es and even virtue." (Deleuze, :::::   :: -100).

In this case, that is, with outside influence inside, the subjects can act in such a way as to strengthen themselves, for example, as a model student, good citizen, professor, or in any subject position they are; Such strengthening will not be possible unless the subjects, as special intellectuals in their specialized field, criticize and resist the axioms of their present time. Through such subjectification, while a new perspective is opened, a greater space of freedom also emerges in that specialized field. In an interview in January 1984, just a few months before his death, Foucault confirmed the interviewer's statement that "In your work, these games of truth no longer involve a coercive practice, but a practice of self-formation of the subject", he states as follows: "That's right. It is what one could call an ascetic practice, taking asceticism in a very general sense, in other words, not in the sense of a morality of renunciation but as an exercise of the self on the self, by which one attempts to develop and transform oneself, and to attain to a certain mode of being" ((oucaul t, ::::a: :::: :

"It is that we have to build our existence as a beautiful existence; it is an aesthetic mode. You see, what I tried to show is that nobody is obliged in classical ethics to behave in such a way as to be truthful to their wives, to not touch boys, and so on. But if they want to have a beautiful existence, if they want to have a good reputation, if they want to be able to rule others, they have to do this. So they accept those obligations in a conscious way for the beauty or glory of existence. The choice, the aesthetic choice or the political choice, for which they decide to accept this kind of existence-that's the mode d'assujettissement. It's a choice, it's a personal choice" (Foucault, 1997a: 266).

Foucault also observes in his interpretation of the governmentality of neoliberalism and capitalism, i.e. moving from the law to an aesthetic mode: According to Foucault: "This bio-power was without question an indispensable element in the development of capitalism; the latter would not have been possible without the controlled insertion of bodies into the machinery of production and the adjustment of the phenomena of population to economic processes. But this was not all it required; it also needed the growth of both these factors, their reinforcement as well as their availability and docility; it had to have methods of power capable of optimizing forces, aptitudes, and life in general without at the same time making them more difficult to govern" (Foucault, 1990a: 140-141).

Deleuze also mentions the creative governmentality of capitalism in her interview with Antonio Negri: "You see, we [Felix Guattari and I] think

any political philosophy must turn on the analysis of capital-ism and the ways it has developed. What we find most interesting in Marx is his analysis of capitalism as an immanent system that's con-stantly overcoming its own limitations, and then coming up against them once more in a broader form, because its fundamental limit is Capital itself" (Deleuze, 2011). in other words, "For Deleuze, following Marx, the capitalist socius is premised not on identity like previous social formations — but on a continuous process of production — 'production for production's sake' — which entails a kind of permanent reconfiguration and intensification of relations in a process of setting, and overcoming, limits. In this sense, difference and becoming — or a certain form of becoming — is primary" (Thoburn, :::::   :: .

5. The necessity of institutionalizing Islamic resistance in efficient Islamic governmentality (necessity of a radical return to the Islamic revolution)

As it has been said, in the immanent approach, we are only faced with "an immanent life" or "an immanent subject" or "a relation of self to itself". This immanent life is "an affect" which is full of mutual affects. These inseparable influences cannot be reduced to methodology, transcendental subject, and such concepts. As a result, concepts cannot be used non-functionally based on causal chains.

In other words, in a situation where we are faced with immanent relationships, when we experience inefficiency, this experience of inefficiency has no causal and inference relation to theory and concepts or non-implementation of laws, rather, it is simply related to the lack of governmentality or conduct and regulation of these immanent selves.

Now we are faced with an important question: based on the immanent approach, if instead of transcendental concepts (which are the starting point and basis of analysis in transcendental approaches and methodologies), we are faced with immanent lives (according to which understanding or experience is possible within affects that cannot be separated from each other), how can we talk about Islam, which claims to govern efficiently and guide people's behavior?

Governmental Islam does not value after the event, rather, in the heart of the event and with continuous production, it creates and regulates efficient Islamic behaviors. Governmental Islam acts through the measured application of freedom and even strategically considers the texts and images of its opponents as an opportunity for creativity and strengthening itself. In more precise terms, as long as we consider life as a relationship of immanent forces, Islam is considered as a political force that, in order to have governmentality, must flow continuously in the immanent life of the subjects

and not limit itself to mere epistemological frameworks and the rule of law. But what do we mean when we talk about political power?

In the previous section, it was discussed that efficient governmentality in its best form should lead to the result that the subjects try to build and transform themselves by working on themselves in a fighter manner and thus, constantly overcome their limitations. Therefore, governmentality on the one hand, for the efficiency of everyday life, needs a force that causes the subjects to refuse, curiosity, and resist in a certain direction by folding the outside into the inside, and thus takes the most advantage of the creativity of its free subjects, and on the other hand, this force will differentiate the governmentality from other existing governmentalities so that the identity and existence of the governmentality will be preserved in opposition to them.

Consider, for example, the force of the free market in neoliberal capitalism. This force in many neoliberal subjects causes them to actively participate in the capitalist production process by folding the forces of the outside within themselves, through resistance against the axioms of the present time, and thus, turning themselves into an active subject of capitalism and in this way reproduce the efficiency of governmentality. While efficient Islamic governmentality needs other fighter and creative subjects to take the resistance force from Islam (not the free market) to transform themselves into creative subjects.

Islam, as a political force, is a practice that causes man to internalize the force of the outside, and thus, while establishing a different relationship with himself, he continuously resists the axioms of the present time and the statements of the prevailing knowledge. In other words, no force can restore the flow and passion of life to it as much as the force that causes the external force (which change and resistance is achieved by establishing a relationship with it) to be internalized. Therefore, if the basis of Islamic governmentality is the passion for resistance and change, we can witness the most efficient type of Islamic governmentality; A governmentality that with its islamic spiritualism causes that man to be uprooted, transformed, turned upside down to the extent that he renounces his special individuality.

This kind of Islamic spirituality not only takes the farthest distance from petrification with its resistanceist view against the axioms of the present time and continues to make Islam current in the immanent life of the subjects, but, it is the most important competitor of neoliberal capitalism which tries to make maximum use of the subjects' creativity by using the power of the free market.

Foucault calls this Islamic force, which constantly causes the force of the outside to be placed inside the subjects (so to speak, to be folded) and provides the possibility of subjectification and a new innovation, a kind of religious eschatology. In response to the question, what was the characteristic of the general will of the revolutionaries? Foucault explains: "Well, there you have indeed the most difficult part to discuss. We could of course just say to ourselves that they no longer wanted that regime, that this general will boiled down to that. Now I believe, and perhaps I'm wrong here, that in fact they want-ed something else. ...   what they wanted, what they had in the back of their heads or, you might say, what they'd set their sight on when they risked their lives in these protests—it seems to me that what they were after was a kind of eschatology. You could say that the form this general will took was not a will for a state or a political organization; it was, so it seems to me, a sort of religious eschatology" (Foucault, ::::: 327).

Therefore, it can be concluded that in the Iranian revolution, Islam as a political force or, in Foucault's words, a religious eschatology with a "limit-attitude" made possible the criticism of the present. A kind of new ethos that Foucault describes as follows: "This philosophical ethos may be characterized as a limit-attitude. We are not talking about a gesture of rejection. We have to move beyond the outside-inside alternative; we have to be at the frontiers. Criticism indeed consists of analyzing and reflecting upon limits. But if the Kantian question was that of knowing [savoir] what limits knowledge [connaissance] must renounce exceeding, it seems to me that the critical question today must be turned back into a positive one: In what is given to us as universal, necessary, obligatory, what place is occupied by whatever is singular, contingent, and the product of arbitrary constraints? The point, in brief, is to transform the critique conducted in the form of necessary limitation into a practical critique that takes the form of a possible crossing-over Lfranchissement]" (Foucault, ::::c: :::: :

In other words, Foucault observes a kind of critical questioning related to the present in the revolution; Critical questioning whose current driving force in human life is Islam, which provides the possibility of resistance through the subject's encounter with the basic question of "what is our present": "there exists in modern and contemporary philosophy another type of question, another kind of critical questioning: it is precisely the one we see being born in the question of the Aufklarung or in the text on the Revolution. This other critical tradition poses the question: What is our actuality? What is the present field of possible experiences? It is not an issue of analyzing the truth, it will be a question rather of what we could call an

ontology of ourselves, an ontology of the present. It seems to mc that the philosophical choice with which we are confronted at present is this: we can opt for a critical philosophy which will present itself as an analytic philosophy of truth in general, or we can opt for a form of critical thought which will be an ontology of ourselves, an ontology of the actuality" (Foucault, 2007: 94-95).

In the final analysis, Islamic governmentality is based on 1) Islam as the current basic force in people's lives (Islamic force that makes it possible to pose the critical question of what is our present) and 2), Islamic resistance (A resistance that promises a radical return to the Islamic revolution (not seeking the establishment of the rule of law)). In addition, this Islamic political force is not only an alternative to the free market force of neoliberal capitalism, but it can also use the capacities of such a force in the axis of resistance in the region.

6. Conclusion

In transcendental or epistemological approaches, governing subjects is conditional on the realization of political-social structures, laws or certain transcendental principles that come from epistemic devices. For example, a Marxist-Leninist sees an efficient form of government based on doctrines such as the necessity of a certain party's dominance at the head of the government to reach the communist utopia, and a liberal democrat defends the multi-party system, the necessity of creating a congress and governance based on the constitution. If we want to take a brief look at the developments of the constitutional era from this point of view, the problem of the inefficiency of the government in the Persian constitutional era should be found in a transcendental basis that can be expressed in "one word": "law". Since then, various intellectuals and thinkers have tried to comment on how to realize this one word.

In general, in epistemological approaches, the realization of efficiency in the field of governance comes from principles that are considered transcendental in epistemological systems; It means that without them, it is impossible to talk about an efficient government, a noble person, a good citizen, etc. In this case, it is necessary to first discover such principles in Islam and then implement the appropriate structuring with these principles. Obviously, in this case, governmentality (conduct of conduct) is dependent on the compliance of certain principles, rules and laws by the subjects. If we look at subjects and human life in an immanent way, we will come across mutual and inseparable relationships, so that every form is a combination of the relations of forces. Based on this, instead of the concept of government, which comes from an epistemological and transcendental

view of life, the concept of governmentality should be used, which is based on an immanent view of life and is tied to the regulation and conduct of conduct. In other words, in this case, the efficiency of any knowledge requires regulating and conducting the behavior of the subjects. It means that the subjects relate to themselves in such a way that certain relationships are reproduced. Therefore, in Islamic governmentality, Islam should become the most important influential force in the present time so that Islamic governmentality, which is based on a immanent view of life, reproduces its efficiency. The most active form of playing the role of Islam as an efficient force in human life is that due to the force that Islam creates, the enthusiasm of resistance against the obviousness of the present time should be provided for the subjects. Undoubtedly, this Islamic resistance is creative and productive, but unlike neoliberalism, it does not take its products from the force of the free market, rather, it takes from the force of refusal and curiosity that comes from Islam. Therefore, Islamic governmentality, in its most efficient form, requires Islam as a force, so that its subjects use this force to resist the axioms of the present and thus, create and produce in constant opposition to the free market force of capitalism. Undoubtedly, Islam in efficient Islamic governmentality is the driving engine of this resistance against the axioms of the present time and the creation of subjects (not the mere epistemological framework that must be extracted from those governing rules).

Note

1. You see, by "self" I had in mind the kind of relation that the human being as a subject can have and entertain with himself. For instance, the human being can be, in the city, a political subject. Political subject means he can vote, or he can be exploited by others, and so on. The self would be the kind of relation that this human being as subject in a political relation has to himself. No? That you could call in French "subjectivity," but that is not good, I think that "self" is better (Foucault, 2016: 116).
2. In the 1946 Painting, he had wanted "to make a bird alighting on a field," but the lines he had drawn suddenly took on a kind of independence and suggested "something totally different," the man under the umbrella.

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