

Globalization, Identity and ISIS

document type: Research Article

Mehdi Abbaszadeh Fathabadi*

Received: 2022/10/02

Accepted: 2023/01/05

Abstract

Today, one of the most serious threats have engulfed a large portion of the Middle East is the emergence of the Sunni Muslim extremist group, known as ISIS. After capturing a sizeable territory in Iraq and Syria, the group changed its name to Islamic State (IS). This text is geared towards discussing or describing the identification of ISIS in the age of globalization. ISIS at a limited national and regional level (compared to global level of Al-Qaeda) tries to build its identity via radical Islamic ideology, in a globalized world and identity crisis era. The weakening and in some cases breakdown of the political infrastructures such as Iraq and Syria often leads to a narrowing of identity and social solidarity away from national and towards sectarian, ethnic, and kin-based (however fictive) relations. In such a situation the dynamics of identity construction shift away from "project" towards "resistance" identities. If we take to account fundamentalist as a response to the identity crisis and also a solution to save its believers against the unsatisfied conditions of modern age, ISIS extended its ideology well through the region via protest against the unsatisfied conditions of the region. Findings of the research show that beside the similarities between ISIS and other Islamic extremist groups such as emphasizing on salafi ideology, work for founding Islamic Emirate or Caliphate based on Sharia law, extremist interpretations of Islamic religion, Jihadist and Takfiri vision, and believing in suicide tactics and dying for victory, ISIS's main goal is Jihad against Shiites (Near Enemy) and this may be the main difference between them that causes different kinds of behaviors. Other differences are different ideological roots, emphasizing on Jihad or Takfir by Al-Qaeda and ISIS respectively, giving priority to far enemy by Al-Qaeda and to near enemy by ISIS.

Keywords:

Globalization, Identity, ISIS, Salafism, Islam.

* Associate Professor, Faculty of Political Science, Shahid Bahonar University of Kerman, Kerman, Iran
Abbaszadeh@uk.ac.ir

Introduction

Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and under the age of globalization, Islamic terrorism has been propagated as a seemingly unavoidable threat to our daily lives. Across much of Africa and the Middle East, fringe groups have used Islam as a rallying cry to attract supporters who might otherwise dismiss their rather extreme tactics (Gardiner, 2015). Organizations such as al Qaeda and its affiliates propagated a strict, fundamentalist interpretation of Sunni Islam, and eventually looked to wage jihad against anyone who did not share their extremist ideology – an ideology that perceived non-Sunni Muslims as threats to Islam. In al Qaeda's case, jihad was waged with global intentions. However, most terrorist organizations were created with nationalist orientations and only nominally accepted al Qaeda's brand of jihad.

Within the umbrella of Sunni terrorist groups, not all who claim to be jihadists truly desire a return to the Islamic caliphates of the early Middle Ages, which ruled much of the hitherto known world. In fact, many such groups are purely nationalist in nature, but use jihad and Islamist rhetoric as a rallying cry to attract followers from other Islamic groups and countries. Each and every terrorist group is unique in its philosophy, identity, goals, and strategies, and each group must be analyzed carefully to determine the extent of its threat (Gardiner, 2015: 1). Most jihadists and their organizations favor nationalist approaches, with very few groups seeking even a regional caliphate. ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (al-Sham)) is an extremist Islamic organization based primarily on northern Syria and Iraq. Another name for ISIS is ISIL (Islamic State of Iraq and Levant). And more recently after capturing a sizeable territory in Iraq and Syria, the group changed its name to Islamic State (IS).

In the Arab world, its enemies began referring to it as ISIS (due to the acronym of the Arabic name of the movement but also because that acronym sounds very similar to a series of expletives and derogatory words. The people of the region also refer to them as takfiris (those who accuse others of apostasy, heresy, of not being good Muslims and which engage in violent excommunication), an indirect shot not only at their actions but also at their extremist version of Salafism and Wahhabism, as in Islam it is haram (sin) for a Muslim to kill another Muslim.

This group has been given the title of "Terrorist Organization" by the United Nations, European Union, United States and many others. ISIS splits from Al Qaeda although Al Qaeda refrains from supporting it and even calls them "too extreme" for their own interests. Current leader of the group

is Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. On 29 June 2014, IS declared its leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi as the new caliph, or the “leader of the faithful”. The last Caliphate was destroyed with the fall of the Ottoman Empire in the World War I. He considers himself as a religious leader and follows Sharia Law. Members primarily come from the Middle East, but there are members from other nations, most notably western nations, that join ISIS as well. According the June 2014 edition of the Economist, ISIS has 6000 fighters in Iraq and around 3000-5000 fighters in Syria. About 3000 of these fighters come from abroad (500 fighters from European nations such as France and England).

Author tries to answer to this main question: How does ISIS construct its identity in the age of globalization? But before that, we must answer to two other questions in order to pave the way for answering the main question: What is the impact of globalization on identity in general? And what is its impact on Islamism in particular?

1 .Theoretical Framework: Globalization, Culture and Identity

As well known, the globalization, caused by the rapid development of ICT (Information and Communication Technology), is becoming an inevitable trend in the present world. The process by which cultures influence one another and become more alike through trade, immigration, and the exchange of information and ideas is termed Globalization (Giddens, 2000). It has existed for many centuries. However, in the last few years, there has been dramatic acceleration in the degree and intensity of the connections among different cultures and different regions. This is mainly due to advances in telecommunication and a rapid increase in economic and financial interdependence worldwide. Globalization promotes integration and the removal not only of cultural barriers but of many of the negative dimensions of culture.

Now one can argue that the rapid developments in ICT catalyzing and accelerating the dissemination of information, values, beliefs, and the spread of global culture have far-reaching effects on the development of identities and communities. Some of them may be positive whereas others may be negative. This important and controversial concern in globalization discourse is seen in the reciprocal interaction between global and local that is often interpreted as resulting in either cultural homogenization or heterogenization (Appadurai, 1996). The former one refers to the formation of global culture in the area of late capitalism and proceeded powerfully by such various aspect of life as fashion, film industries, language, media, and music, which are universally consumed. The global culture here means the cultural elements and apparatuses shaping the common lifestyle of humans

through the process of globalization. Therefore, it is perceived as an expression of sweeping and overwhelming that undermines local cultures. The latter one, on the other hand, refers to variation and diversity of culture.

Castells (1996, b) regards this as a tension between the "Net" (global cultural flows) and the "Self" (local communal cultures). This tension demonstrates how "sameness" and "difference" in this context manifest themselves as constitutive parameters for the construction of identity as outlined at the beginning of the paper. Castells (1997) notes that such resistances against oppression may result in "resistance identity" formations which he characterizes as the "exclusion of excluders by the excluded" such as religious fundamentalism, territorial communities and nationalist self-affirmation. Said's influential work on orientalism (1978) looks at the ways in which cultural dichotomies have been constructed between Western and non-Western ways of life. He argues that Western cultural imperialism operates through discourses of power, whereby the non-Western world is constructed as the Other, that is, as fundamentally different in nature from the West.

The idea of global cultural polarization continues, nonetheless, to have a widespread currency. It may be found for example in Samuel Huntington's argument (1996) about civilizational conflict between the West and an emergent Islamic- Confucian axis. With the end of the geopolitical Cold War, global conflict will, in his view, see culture wars, leading perhaps to a "global civilizational war".

Benjamin Barber (1995) characterizes global cultural polarization in terms of conflict between McWorld and jihad. These powerful metaphors stand for global consumer capitalism, on the one side, and the fundamentalist struggle for justice for the downtrodden, on the other. Where McWorld means a combination of fast food (McDonald's), fast music (MTV), and fast computers (Apple Mac), jihad (the Arabic word for just or holy war) stands for the forces of cultural fundamentalism and tribalism. McWorld promises to tie us together through the soulless consumption of commodified cultural production, while jihad promises moral liberation from mammon through communitarian political mobilization in pursuit of justice.

Although individual terrorist groups have unique characteristics and arise in specific local contexts, an examination of broad historical patterns reveals that the international system within which such groups are spawned does influence their nature and motivations. The broad political aim has been against (1) empires, (2) colonial powers, and (3) the U.S. - led international system marked by globalization. Thus it is important to understand the general history of modern terrorism and where the current threat fits within

an international context (Cronin, 2002: 34). Anti-Americanism is closely related to antiglobalization, because (intentionally or not) the primary driver of the powerful forces resulting in globalization is the United States. Analyzing terrorism as something separate from globalization is misleading and potentially dangerous. Indeed globalization and terrorism are intricately intertwined forces characterizing international security in the twenty-first century.

In contemporary academia, it has become a commonplace to emphasize that our world is undergoing an identity crisis. Actually, questioning identity formation has been debated so far; nevertheless, the signs of this crisis particularly in social and cultural studies are abundantly increasing as we go through the global, postmodern and information era in which the concept of identity turns out to be more problematic and complex than ever before. Because of the rapid innovations in information and communication technology (ICT), it is important to examine how identity construction has become increasingly complicated. ICT have minimized geographic limitations and have enabled virtual relationships and new social identities through instantaneous global communications. The development of these relationships and identities radically increases the number of interfaces between people and provides increased opportunities for cultural, social and political exchanges between and among people on a global level regardless of geographic location and time zone.

Within the historical evolution of the concept of the identity, there are two common, but opposite, approaches to the questions of what identity means and how it is constituted. In prevalent and traditional approach, especially before the industrial revolution, identity is defined as a constitution based on the recognition of familiar and shared derivations including but not limited to ethnic, linguistic, religious, historical, territorial, cultural and political attributes with other people, groups or ideal (Hall, 1994, 1996). The concepts of familiarity and share in this definition are also associated with the meanings of sameness, belongingness and unity. There is some intrinsic and essential content to any identity which is characterized by either a common origin or a common structure of experience or both. One can be deemed to be born along with his or her identity that appears to act as the sign of an identical harmony. In this regard, identity is determined more likely as a naturalistic and static formation that could always be sustained. This conventional view sees individual as a unique, stable and whole entity.

On the other hand, the discursive approach, as Hall (1996) goes on, delineates identification as “a process never completed and logged in contingency” (p. 2) while not denying that identity has a past. It is always in

the process of becoming rather than being, accordingly, it is constantly changing and transforming within the historical, social and cultural developments and practices such as globalization, modernity, post-colonization, and new innovations in technology. According to this constructionist and discursive view, an individual is a socio-historical and socio-cultural product and identity is not biologically pre-given to a person, instead, he or she occupies it, and more importantly, this occupation may include different and multiple identities at different points of time and settings (Gergen, 1991).

Although both approaches are trying to explain the same concept, their conflicting point is the existence and sustainability of a true, stable, fixed or authentic identity. While the former view of identity is “fixed and transhistorical”, the latter one advocates the identity as being “fluid and contingent” (Woodward, 1997), not an essence but positioning. In social and cultural studies, this debate refers to a tension between essentialists (Descartes, Karl and Husserl) and constructionists/anti-essentialists (Hume, Nietzsche and Sartre) or in recent discussions, a transformation from the conception of modern identity to postmodern identity. This is how Bauman (1996) explains this transformation:

If the modern problem of identity was how to construct an identity and keep it solid and stable, the postmodern problem of identity is primarily how to avoid fixation and keep the options open. In the case of identity, as in other cases, the catchword of modernity was creation; the catchword of postmodernity is recycling. (p.18)

From a sociological perspective, on the other hand, Castells (1997) asserts that identity acts as a source of meaning and experience for people through self-construction and individuation particularly on the basis of cultural attributes in a context marked by power relationships. He identifies three forms and origins of identity building each of which leads to a different social association: a) legitimizing identity that is introduced by the dominant institutions of society to extend and rationalize their domination over social actors, and it generates a civil society including organized and structured social actors, b) resistance identity that is produced by the actors who are in positions of being excluded by the logic of domination, and it leads to building of communities as a response to conditions of oppression, and reinforce the boundaries between the dominant institutions and new ones, and finally c) project identity that is a new identity produced by social actors to redefine their position in the society on the basis of whatever cultural materials are available to them. The example he provides for project identity is that of the feminist movement.

During the era of modernization, planned identity stemmed from the heart of civil society. However in network society, the emergence of planned identity comes from the core of resistive social groups. The social challenges pressing the patterns of dominance in network society, usually manifests itself in the form of establishing independent identities, which are alien with the organizational principles of the network society. They confront the ascendancy of technology, legitimacy of power and the logic of the market economy with their traditions and beliefs (Castells, 2005).

Identities are usually produced within the play of power, representation and difference which can be either constructed negatively as the exclusion and marginalization or celebrated as a source of diversity, heterogeneity and hybridity (Hall, 1996; Woodward, 1997), suggesting that they are relational to other identities. Said's (1978) work on "Orientalism" and its counterpart which Robertson (1991) describes as "Occidentalism", also demonstrates the very same idea. The identity of Oriental culture is seen as a subaltern culture and constituted through its exclusion from the Western culture; therefore it is the West that has given identity to the Orient.

Hall (1996, 1997), echoing Derrida's (1981) notion of "différance", suggests while being constructed through "difference", identity is not fixed or complete, on the contrary, is always deferred. Consequently, he stresses the "fluidity of identity". Identity is not simply a matter of who you are; equally it is about who you are not (Brown 2001:129). Cultural identity is not a mere collection of thoughts, beliefs, traditions, languages and behaviors accumulated through time. Rather it is a cultural selection on how to respond to an outside stimulant in various time frames. As a result, cultural identity is a work plan created by people for their future activities based on past experiences.

Constructivist theory focuses on the role of shared ideational structure in constraining or shaping behavior. The basic idea here is that all identities – civil and primordial – are fluid and subject to continuous construction and reconstruction. Also disparate construction of worldviews, ideas, identities and historical experiences are influential in shaping the structure of politics and society. Constructivist like Wendt (1999) stressed the dialectical relation between domestic and global forces of identity construction, arguing that identity crisis that occurred at the global level has important implications for domestic stability.

Globalization has its primary psychological influence on issues of identity. The central psychological consequence of globalization is that it results in transformations in identity, that is, in how people think about themselves in relation to the social environment. Two aspects of identity

stand out as issues related to globalization. First, as a consequence of globalization, most people in the world now develop a bi-cultural identity, in which part of their identity is rooted in their local culture while another part stems from an awareness of their relation to the global culture. Second, the pervasiveness of identity confusion may be increasing among young people in non-Western cultures. As local cultures change in response to globalization, some young people find themselves at home in neither the local culture nor the global culture (Doku and Asante, 2011: 5). What it means in this context is that in addition to their local identity, young people develop a global identity that gives them a sense of belonging to a worldwide culture and includes an awareness of the events, practices, styles, and information that are part of the global culture. Our global identity allows us to communicate with people from diverse places when we travel from home, when others travel to where we live, and when we communicate with people in other places through media technology (such as e-mail).

As local cultures change in response to globalization, most people manage to adapt to the changes and develop a bi-cultural or hybrid identity that provides the basis for living in their local culture and also participating in the global culture. However, for some people, adapting to the rapid changes taking place in their cultures is more difficult (Doku and Asante, 2011: 6). The images, values, and opportunities they perceive as being part of the global culture undermine their belief in the value of local cultural practices. At the same time, the ways of the global culture seem out of reach to them, too foreign to everything they know from their direct experience. Rather than becoming bicultural, they may experience themselves as excluded from both their local culture and the global culture, truly belonging to neither. In terms of Erikson's (1968) theory of identity formation, it could be said that in facing the issue of identity versus identity confusion in adolescence, globalization increases the proportion of young people in non-Western cultures who experience a state of identity confusion rather than successfully forming an identity.

This, then, is the story that implicates globalization in the destruction of cultural identity, and in the threat to that particular subset of cultural identity that we call 'national identity'. But another, quite contradictory, story can be told: that globalization, far from destroying it, has been perhaps the most significant force in creating and proliferating cultural identity. This story involves a rather different understanding of the idea of 'identity' than the somewhat reified understanding of an individual or collective possession. And it also involves a rather more complex

understanding of the globalization process: one, at least, which allows for a degree of unpredictability in its consequences.

Castells (1997) devoted an entire volume of his celebrated analysis of 'The Information Age' to the proposition that: 'Our world and our lives are being shaped by the conflicting trends of globalization and identity. In other words, globalization tends to integrate and dominate on the one hand and particularize on the other hand and the output of this particularization is the development of localization. Thus, globalization is inclined towards uniformity and integration and simultaneously strengthens cultural uniqueness. According to Robertson's theory, globalization cannot be interpreted as creation of a global culture, rather there is an opportunity for various cultures to interact on a global scale. Localization is the manifestation of an individual's or a group's attempt to regain its identity. Thus, the most comforting and suitable reaction is to search deep inside the historical memory of a group or nation and try to regain past glory and supremacy. These self-assuring memories are intertwined with a specific place and time, which is the core of localization in eastern societies. These societies under the constant barrage of western cultures have no choice but to return to their traditional cultures. In summary, globalization is not to be equated with homogenization or uniformity but finds localization as its counterforce.

2. Globalization, Identity and Insurgency

Discussions among scholars of globalization and insurgency have converged on a number of key issues: First, is that the forces of globalization have let loose the "infrastructure of uncivil society" (Heine & Thakur, 2011:31) and accelerated the transnational flows of clandestine groups (terrorists, insurgents, militias, and criminal syndicates); heightening their organizational effectiveness and lethality. Second, globalization has substantially impacted on identity crisis around the globe by enhancing cultural differentiation and hybridization in "host" as well as diasporic communities (Corcoran, 2003: 23). Third, Sovereignty of nation states have come under siege by transnational as well as sub national forces of globalization undermining weak states, creating crisis of governability and legitimacy (Hanlon, 2008). A disturbing conclusion from this convergence is that insurgents are uniquely positioned to exploit the benefits of globalization in ways the weak states cannot. Globalization creates "marriages of convenience" for insurgents; connected by instantaneous and virtually untraceable communications technologies, insurgents operate anonymously over vast a distance that enables them to disseminate jihadist ideals and tactics; recruit fighters, and solicit arms, financial support while

masking their authorship amidst the noise of legitimate global interaction (Hanlon, 2008).

Kilcullen (2005) contends that there is one set of insurgents who take the entire world, rather than one country, as the field for insurgency, and who seeks in the name of global jihad to overthrow the existing international order. There are also separate insurgencies rooted in local grievances and middle layer insurgents who glom onto local insurgencies and globalize them. Carrol (2012) further argued that all insurgencies regardless of the regional, religious, or cultural commonalities have their roots in local political failings. According to Carrol (2012) Al Qaeda, as the benefactor of the 'global insurgency', has become a decentralized network that only expands when a local grievance allows dissents and political subversives to take up the Al Qaeda's banner in support of their local, non global jihadist cause.

According to traditional wisdom, fundamentalism as a general phenomenon arises in times of crisis. The sense of danger may be the result of oppressive and threatening social, economic, or political conditions, but the resulting crisis is said to be perceived as "a crisis of identity by those who fear extinction as a people or their absorption in to an overarching culture to such a degree that their distinctiveness is undermined in the rush to homogeneity"(Marty and Appleby, 1991, Chapters1 5-16). Religious fundamentalism is thus explained as an instant remedy to the dislocations resulting from rapid change, especially change imposed from without or from above (Sahliyah, 1990).

All these explanations of fundamentalism as a general phenomenon make recourse to the psychological aspects of identity. The religious resurgence of Islamic fundamentalism is often further explained as a defense against outside modernity's threats to a religious group's traditional identity. The psychology becomes further complicated when national, ethnic, and religious identities inter-twined, and restoration of past traditions becomes a mechanism for national self-preservation and cultural purity; this can occur even when the threats to a group's identity are not externally generated. The contradiction between the traditional values and present reality are said to create a sense of anxiety, loneliness, and disorientation. This is especially acute in areas where Western cultural impact is strongest, in cities and universities, particularly in faculties of science." (Hoffman-Ladd, 1993).

3 .The Case of ISIS

The roots of ISIS can be traced back to the early 2000s, particularly, the United States invasion of Saddam Hussein's Iraq in 2003. Iraq War gave the global jihadists a welcome focal point in their struggle against the USA, but

that Iraq at the same time became as attractive as a battle front that it weakened terrorist campaigns elsewhere. Moreover, it is argued that the Iraq conflict contributed to the development of more sophisticated strategic thought in jihadist circles, and to an increase in hostility toward Europe and the Persian Gulf countries (Hegghammer, 2006: 12).

The US-led invasion of Afghanistan in the aftermath of 9/11 denied al-Qa'ida access to its territory thus removing the basis for its unique organizational concept. In more concrete terms, the old al-Qa'ida network seems to have split up into five regionally-defined clusters, whose centers of gravity are in Iraq, Saudi-Arabia, Afghanistan/Pakistan, Southeast Asia, and Europe/North Africa. These networks seem to operate relatively independently from each other, although trans-regional contacts are widespread. In some areas, such as Iraq and Saudi Arabia, the global jihadists have formed identifiable organizations ("al-Qa'ida in the Land of the Two Rivers" and "al-Qa'ida on the Arabian Peninsula"). In other places, such as Europe, the organizational structures are much more difficult to identify.

Chaos and anarchy have spread throughout the Iraqi society to a degree that has severely constrained the ability of social actors to engage in formal, non-violent political struggle. At the same time, the ability of Iraqi political structures and institutions to co-opt or coerce citizens to follow the policies or ideologies of their regime has been weakened severely, while the society, for different reasons - in Iraq, find it increasingly difficult to maintain internal stability and cohesiveness. In this geostrategically crucial region, the weakening and in some cases breakdown of the political infrastructures often leads to a narrowing of identity and social solidarity away from national and towards sectarian, ethnic, and kin-based (however fictive) relations (Le Vine, 2006: 467).

In such a situation the dynamics of identity construction shift away from what Manuel Castells (1996, a) has termed "project" and towards "resistance" identities- that is, from (at least the potential for) relatively positive, open, pluralistic yet inclusive identities to much more circumscribed intolerant, closed, and exclusivist forms. Such a scenario the kinds of managed political openings advocated by many policymakers and local political elites become much harder to sustain, while Islamist forces become one among several actors (albeit the most powerful single force) in a highly contested social and political environment.

What is most important to understand from this discussion is how the occupation, violence, and weakened state and societal cohesion impact the manner in which Islamist forces carve out space for constructing a new

identity and political and social activism accordingly. Yet the rapid and wholesale dismantling of the Ba'thist state, the absence of a functioning civil society or a public sphere before the invasion, the influx of foreign jihadis to the country (which has created a dynamic of "resistance"), and finally the repeated targeting of members of the intellectual and professional class for assassination have all made it more difficult to create the conditions for grassroots political activism.

The chaos has also widened the separation between the "resistance"(closed, often violent) versus "project" (positive, open) identities described above as part of the transformation from a "light" to a "heavy" form of globalization as a result of September 11, the expanded war on terrorism and the occupations of Afghanistan and Iraq (Le Vine, 2006: 470). The dynamics of chaos in Iraq; here I will outline the aspects which are most relevant to our discussion: a central government that is only nominally in control of the country and has little ability to deliver either security or essential services, and great difficulty in carrying out the business of daily life for a significant number of citizens; the spread of disease and high morbidity rates across the country(including the deaths of at least 100,000 Iraqis from the violence of the war); the lack of security or ability to travel associated with high crime and other violence across the country; a lack of infrastructure- sewers, electricity, fresh water- across a significant area of the country, extremely high unemployment (verging on 70% nation-wide); a rising gray and black market; the presence of numerous foreign fighters (Muslim and "coalition") whose ideologies and strategic goals are different than those of most Iraqis. Making matters more difficult is the weakness of the emerging state, already described as a contributor to the chaos, but also a factor in its own right. This is because as long as the state remains weak it is impossible to achieve either political or social hegemony and thereby bring the majority of Iraqi citizens to support its ideological and political project.

At the same time, its weakness creates political, economic, and ideological vacuums that are filled by tribal, black market, and religious initiatives respectively. These forces in turn increase the chaos, which weakens both the state and society even more. The absence of a well-developed Iraqi public sphere, especially in the context of a chaotic environment and weak state, has made it much more difficult for the Iraqi public to maintain a level of social solidarity in the face of a violent occupation, massive corruption, and deep ethnic and sectarian divisions that have led to much greater intra-communal violence in the context of resisting the occupation, and have seen much less use of the public sphere and other non-violent means of resistance. In the weak state and society, dynamic

socio-religious movements have had the most public success in resisting the aims of the occupying powers - although to what end it is still not clear.

Migdal argues that the weaknesses of many states in the developing world have made it historically difficult for them to achieve planned social change, particularly with the rise of neoliberalism as the dominant economic paradigm (Migdal, 1988:5). In this arena socio-religious movements are increasingly active participants; yet at the same time their broad religious identities and ideologies (the "Umma" or community of believers worldwide, an Islamic law that is not grounded in the laws of the modern secular state) challenges the hegemony of the "nation-state" in which they operate.

While the US-led coalition forces were trying to establish control in Iraq, a group by the name al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) was formed in 2004, primarily to wage a guerrilla war against the coalition forces and their domestic allies within Iraq (Laub and Masters, 2014). Major source of the present appeal is the anger and moral outrage provoked by the invasion of Iraq (Sageman, 2008: 41). In other words, ISIS had started as an al - Qaeda franchise. The first leader of AQI was an Arab of Jordanian descent named Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. Al- Zarqawi's AQI started an extremely brutal campaign to "ignite a sectarian war against the majority Shia community."(CNN, 6 September, 2014)

Although Zarqawi's rhetoric was similar to bin Laden's, his targets were quite different from the start. Zarqawi directed his malevolence on fellow Muslims especially Iraq's majority Shiite population. Bin Laden and Al-Qaeda regarded the Shiites as heretics, but rarely targeted them for slaughter. Zarqawi's intentions were underlined with the bombing of the Imam Ali shrine in Najaf, the holiest place of Shiite worship in Iraq. One reason of targeting this tribe according to him is sheer convenience. The Shiites were easier targets because they didn't yet have the ability to fight back. But there was also a political calculation after Saddam was toppled, Shiite politicians replaced the Sunnis who had long dominated power structures in Iraq. Zarqawi was counting on Sunni resentment against the Shiites to build alliances and find safe haven for his groups. By 2004, Zarqawi's campaign of suicide bombings across Iraq had made him a superstar of the international Jihad movement and won the endorsement of Bin Laden himself. Zarqawi now joined his group to Bin Laden's rebranding it al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), (it is also sometimes called al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia, but don't confuse that with AQIM, which refers to the Algerian Franchise, al-Qaeda in the Maghreb). Thought this tactics of killing innocent civilian by Zarqawi has been seriously condemned by other al-

Qaeda groups but Zarqawi ignores their chidings and continued in his merciless activities on the civilians mostly the Shiites.

Unfortunately, Zarqawi's ambitions were cut short in June, 2006 when U.S Air Force dropped a pair of 500 pound bombs on his hide-out, 20 miles north of Baghdad. The death of Zarqawi did not stop the activities of this deadly group as his remaining members still scout for avenues within the middle-east and beyond to perpetuate their brutal onslaughts. The situation in Syria gave this Zarqawi's group safe haven to operate.

Today, governments are mainly backed by an urban elite, but their ability to control the wider population is weak and relies heavily on state-sanctioned violence rather than consensus. The Middle East is not as 'Arab' and 'Muslim' as it is made out to be, although the ongoing violence is impacting harder on minority groups, making them the first to leave. The lack of legitimacy and engagement with minorities and poorer sections of the community is prevalent all over the region, making it harder for these governments to control their borders. These result in what some refer to as "geographies of hate" in marginalized border regions (Jacobs, 2015: 1). North Sinai is just one of the many marginalized spaces between national borders where the ISIS ideology is flourishing. North Lebanon, the border between Turkey and Syria or the border between Syria and Iraq are other examples. Massive population growth in the region in recent years, met with a lack of serious employment opportunities or investment in education, means there is little hope that the recruitment of young fighters in these border areas will stop any time soon.

As Marc Lynch et al (2015) argue in a recent Project on Middle East Democracy report entitled *The Arab Thermidor: The Resurgence of the Security State*, the response to the uprisings has resulted in almost all regimes across the region becoming 'more intolerant and more repressive', (p. 3) with the chaos allowing for extremist movements such as ISIS to thrive.

In the final analysis, ISIS is the natural culmination of the US intervention in Iraq, Maliki's authoritarianism, Assad's ruthlessness and post-Bin Laden Al Qaeda's discomposure. The question is less the pull of ISIS in the eyes of its militants or its grand-standing towards the Umma than its real reach and impact on the ground. As al Baghdadi reintroduced the street style of al Zarqawi and focused on prison breaks to staff his group with ruthless operators, he also pursued a centralized conquer-and-hold approach to seize territory instead of an open ended evanescent insurgency. Tested in Iraq in 2012-13, the strategy was then applied in Syria (See Caris and Reynolds, 2014) With the 'Islamic State' announcement in 2014, this is

now coupled with “symbolic state-building”(Sayigh, 2014) overreaching claims. Abu Ayyub al-Masri, replaced al Zarqawi as the leader of the group in June 2006 and changed the name of the group from AQI to Islamic State in Iraq (ISI), and named Abu Omar al-Baghdadi as its leader.

The name ISI was given with an aim to garner support from the people of Iraq. In 2010, Abu Ayyub al-Masri and Abu Omar al-Baghdadi met the same fate as al-Zarqawi (as he was killed in a joint US-Iraq operation). From April 2010 onwards, the onus of running ISI fell on Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, who again changed the name of the outfit to Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) or ISIS. ISIL has been named after Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, in early 2013, declared the absorption of al-Qaeda backed militant group in Syria, known as Jabhat al-Nusra or Al-Nusra Front. By this time, Al-Nusra’s popularity in Syria had already gained prominence and this came in conflict with the proclamation of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi for the merger of AQI and Al-Nusra to form ISIS or ISIL. The ISI’s declaration of adding Al-Nusra to its group clearly expressed the vision of its leader for a broadened objective of controlling a larger territory of Syria by fighting the regime of the President Bashar al-Assad and various opposition groups in the country. It should also be noted that Al-Nusra is considered to be one of the best armed and most successful groups fighting against Bashar al-Assad, and is known for carrying out some of the deadliest attacks in the ongoing Syrian crisis, including several suicide bombings.

On 9 April 2013, recognizing an opportunity dovetailing the crisis in Syria, Abu Bakr al Baghdadi stepped out to announce the creation of the Islamic State of Iraq and al Shaam — in effect adding Syria to his existing Iraq dominion. In that statement, al Baghdadi declared that the anti-Bashar al Assad Syrian rebel group Jabhat al Nusra (the Front of Victory), set up in January 2012, was joining his movement as the local Syrian branch of ISI. Yet, the next day, Jabhat al Nusra’s leader Abu Mohammad al Jawlani rejected the integration stating that “neither the al Nusra command nor its consultative council nor its general manager was aware of this announcement. It reached them via the media and if the speech is authentic, we were not consulted.” This then led to a split within al Nusra, a wing of which opted for integration into ISIS, which also secured the support of Harakat Ahrar al Shaam (the Movement of the Free Men of the Levant), another powerful rebel group set up in Syria in 2011. Stepping in to settle the dispute, on 23 May, Ayman al Dhawahiri disavowed the ISI-al Nusra merger (“Sheikh Abu Bakr al Baghdadi was wrong when he announced the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant without asking permission or receiving advice from us and even without notifying us...The Islamic State in Iraq and the

Levant is to be dissolved, while the Islamic State in Iraq is to continue its work”) and called anew for ISIS’ disbandment the following 7 November(GCSP Policy Paper, 2014: 3). The merger announcement did not go down well with the parent organization of al-Qaeda. After failed attempts to ease out differences between ISIS and Jabhat al-Nusra, on 3 February 2014, Al-Qaeda formally dissociated itself from its onetime affiliate in Iraq and Syria, and announced that ISIS “is not a branch of the al-Qaeda group...does not have an organizational relationship with it and [al-Qaeda] is not the group responsible for their actions”(Sly, 2014).

When in the afternoon of 4 July 2014, ISIS leader Abu Omar al Baghdadi climbed the stairs of the Imam’s minbar (pulpit) — pacing himself one step at a time — to deliver the sermon of the Friday prayers at the Great Mosque in Mosul, Iraq, an important moment in the saga of Al Qaeda played out. A few days earlier, on 29 June, ISIS’ spokesman, Abu Mohammad al Adnani, had announced (in a statement released in Arabic, English, French, German and Russian) the birth of an ‘Islamic State’ with al Baghdadi (identified per an extended lineage meant to establish religious credentials and nobility pedigree; Ibrahim ibn Awad ibn Ibrahim ibn Ali ibn Mohammad al Badri al Hashimi al Husayni al Qoraishi) as “leader Caliph Ibrahim.” On 1 July, al Baghdadi himself had issued a “Message to the Islamic Umma” calling on Muslims from around the world to immigrate to the new Emirate. The coincidence of al Baghdadi’s sermon with the first Friday in Ramadan and with the United States’ independence day was hardly fortuitous, and such timing added indeed to the climactic theatricality staged by a group bringing its own marketization(GCSP Policy Paper, 2014: 2).

Table 1: The Evolution of ISIS

Configuration	Period	Leader(s)
Jama’at al Tawhid wal Jihad	Late 1999-17 - October 2004	Abu Mus’ab al Zarqawi
Al Qaeda fi Bilad al Rafidayn	October17, 2004- January 15,2006	Abu Mus’ab al Zarqawi Abu Omar al Baghdadi
Majlis al Shura al Mujahideen	January15,2006 - October15 , 2006	Abu Hamza al Muhajir

Islamic State of Iraq	October 15 , 2006- April 9 ,2013	Abu Hamza al Muhajir Abu Ayyub al Masri Abu Bakr al Baghdadi
Islamic State of Iraq and al Shaam	April 9, 2013- June 29 , 2014	Abu Bakr al Baghdadi
The Islamic State	June 29 , 2014- present	Abu Bakr al Baghdadi

source: authors

4. Identification of ISIS through Ideology

One way to understand the identification of ISIS is through understanding its Ideology. Ideology of a group reflects some aspects of its Identity. One of the core elements of ISIS ideology is back to the “Pure” version of Islam practiced by the Ottoman Empire (before it was taken over by European influences). One of the mission statements of ISIS according to their founder Zaraqawi is to be a caliph of all Muslims in the world now under the rule of ‘caliph’ Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.

On June 29th, 2014, this movement of a thousand names assumed yet a new one: on the first day of Ramadan, it proclaimed itself Caliphate and became the Islamic State (IS), calling on other extremist groups and those of faith not only to recognize it as such, but to swear an oath of allegiance. Al-Baghdadi, its leader, no longer considers ISIS a primus inter pares among the extremist movements with whom negotiations can take place on an equal footing, but instead that it is superior to the other movements, religious or confessional congregations and believers are subject to ties of allegiance and religious subordination. Its territorial claims expand: it is no longer just control of al Sham that the movement seeks but instead the Islamic domination of Dar el Islam (the lands of Islam, an appeal that includes old Al Andalus, ie, among others, the south of Spain) and areas that are religiously significant to the Islamic cosmogony, such as Khorasan (India, part of Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan and parts of Central Asia), key territory for the advent of the Koranic version of Armageddon (Perelli, 2014: 3).

Through self-proclamation of the coming of the Caliphate - that is a global state - followed by demands for the adhesion and loyalty of believers,

congregations and armed groups use one of the two mechanisms established by the dogma, tradition and history of the Muslim world in order to give legality and legitimacy to their actions. In effect, in Islamic tradition the Caliph has the power to declare jihad. In the name of the Umma (world/nation of believers) that they have come to embody, they have declared the abolition of national borders and the distribution of areas of influence established by colonial mandates (the famous abolition of the limits set by Sykes-Picot, for example) and have adopted the medieval terminology of emirates as the new territorial subdivisions of power, influence and management. Through this, dressing itself as a mellifluous reference to a Golden Age, using the political vocabulary of a glorious past, they merely use the same formula that Pan-Arabism had in mind when it stated: an Arab Nation sustained by nation states (Perelli, 2014: 3).

Slaughter is its goal—slaughter in the name of higher purification. Mass executions are proof of the Islamic State's profound commitment to its vision. Controversy also surrounds the targeting of Iraqi Shi'ites by Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi and his organization "al-Qa'ida in the Land of the Two Rivers." In the past, the global jihadist movement emphasized pan-Islamism and unity among Muslims in the face of the threat from the external enemy. Although Salafi discourse has always been virulently anti-Shi'ite, Arab Islamist militants have never in modern times targeted Shi'ites on the scale we are now witnessing in Iraq. Al-Zarqawi most likely found inspiration for this strategy during his time in Pakistan, where anti-Shi'ite violence has been common since the mid-1980s. The mass-casualty attacks on Iraqi Shi'ites have drawn criticism from a number of quarters. There are indications that the leadership in the old al-Qa'ida has been sceptical to this development. Some grassroots radicals have questioned the anti-Shi'ite strategy in the discussion forums (Hegghammer, 2006: 27). This aspect of ISIS

Ideology can be explained by the new political conditions in Iraq after Saddam Hossein, meaningly the domination of Shi'ite over Iraqi society. So just like anti-western ideology of Al-Qaeda that is a reaction toward the global western domination, anti-Shi'ite ideology of ISIS is a reaction toward the Shi'ite domination in Iraq. This is the form of resistance identity discussed above. The political system introduced after the overthrow of Saddam Hussein in 2003 reinforced these identities, at the expense of a more inclusive Iraqi identity. The more sectarian nature of the rule of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki's democratically-elected government has marginalized many Sunni. The Syrian civil war has added to the Shi'a-Sunni divide. These factors have supported the rapid advance of the Sunni militant group Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS, also referred to as Islamic

State of Iraq and Levant, ISIL) in Iraq in June 2014. Although initially ISIS primarily relied on foreign fighters, local Sunni have become willing supporters. The ideological component of ISIS is thin and ranks secondarily to its identity (Levantine) and confessional (Sunni) dimensions when Bin Laden consistently stressed political goals and unity among Islamists of all hues, including non-Arabs and non-Sunnis.

Understanding ISIS is not easy without understanding Wahhabism. Wahhabism is the mother of extremist neo-Salafist (Jihadist Salafi) movements (Crooke, 2014) Wahhabi and ISIS ideologies have the same intellectual roots; Both believe in a pure Islam fanatically, reject other Islamic sects (especially Shittes) as apostates and justify killing apostates according to Koran. Meanwhile ISIS 's ideology about establishing "Islamic State" or Caliphate is based on Egyptian extremist ideologist, Seyyed Qotb, in the contemporary world. He was a member of Ikhwan group that went out from the group as a part of an extremist movement later founded two jihadist groups named "Jamaa al-jihad" and "Jamaa al-Takfir wa al-Hejra" in Egypt. He planned the Idea of "Islamic State" or Caliphate under the impact of a well-known Pakistani extremist ideologist, Abu al-aala Modudi.

So three main concepts compose the ideology of ISIS: Caliphate, Takfir and Jihad (Crooke, 2014). ISIS give the priority to the establishment of Caliphate in Islamic countries by jihad against their apostate governments (near enemy), on the contrary Al-qaeda give the priority to jihad against western non-Islamic states especially United States (far enemy) as protectors of near enemy. ISIS rejects all characteristics of Modern culture especially democracy and emphasize on the enforcement of Sharia as the main solution of the problems in the age of globalization. Enforcement of Sharia by instrument of violence, terror and killing (named jihad) is something basic in the identity of ISIS. So as capturing the territory and building a State or if we can say Nation-State (a pure Islamic one) with its all necessities (Friedman, 2014). The group sees itself as defender of Islam in the new Crusade War; the war that western states especially U.S ignited against Islam through the project of globalization.

If we take to account fundamentalist as a response to the identity crisis and also a solution to save its believers against the unsatisfied conditions of modern age, ISIS extended its ideology well through the region via protest against the unsatisfied conditions of the region. It wants to remove all the modern characteristics from the face of Islam, by means of returning to pure Islam experienced in the early ages of Islam. In fact, ISIS resists globalization for returning to the past and enforcing salafist ideology.

It invokes violence, because it feels it cannot do this project well in the age of information and communication technology.

Conclusion

In an increasingly globalized world, culture has emerged as a central arena of contestation. Culture in its various forms serves as a primary carrier of globalization and modern values, and cultural issues are so fraught precisely because of their impact on both individual and national identity. The idea that modernization often proves disruptive to traditional societies and that this can cause revolutionary turmoil is not new. In the mid-19th century, Alexis de Tocqueville concluded that rage and political upheaval stemmed not from poverty and deprivation or from the exercise of power itself, but from more symbolic causes including rising expectations, feelings of humiliation, and reactions against a ruler considered "illegitimate... and oppressive." (Tocqueville, 1967: 14). A century later, a leading social scientist, Seymour Martin Lipset, identified relative deprivation as a source of upheaval and found that disruptions caused by economic and social modernization could radicalize sections of the middle and professional classes and cause them to be attracted to extremist movements (Lipset, 1960: 131). But what is increasingly evident today is the key role played by culture, for it serves as the transmission belt by which so much of the impact of globalization and modern values is conveyed to foreign audiences, and through which identities are so profoundly challenged.

Islamic radicalism is by no means dominant, and it remains contested because its antirational, theocratic and misogynist values do not provide a viable option for successfully confronting the tasks of modernization. Ultimately, the causes of fanaticism and cultural backlash lie not within the United States and the West, but inside the troubled societies themselves. In these situations, culture is a mode of self and group expression and a source of upheaval and contestation. There is less a "clash of civilizations" than a clash within civilizations. Outsiders can take steps to encourage moderate elements within these societies, but much more depends on developments inside the countries concerned.

The lagging of the Arab region behind the rest of the world is impelling a violent redirection of antiglobalization and antimodernization forces toward available targets, particularly the United States, whose scope and policies are engendering rage. Al-Qaeda will eventually be replaced or redefined, but its successors' (like ISIS) reach may continue to grow via the same globalized channels and to direct their attacks against U.S. and Western targets. The current trajectory is discouraging, because as things

currently stand, the wellspring of terrorism's means and ends is likely to be renewed: To frustrated people in the Arab and Muslim world, adherence to radical religious philosophies and practices may seem a rational response to the perceived assault, especially when no feasible alternative for progress is offered by their own governments.

The prescriptions for countering and preventing terrorism should be twofold: First, the United States and other members of the international community concerned about this threat need to use a balanced assortment of instruments to address the immediate challenges of the terrorists themselves. Terrorism is a complex phenomenon; it must be met with short-term military action, informed by in-depth, long-term, sophisticated analysis. Thus far, the response has been virtually all the former and little of the latter. Second, the United States and its counterterrorist allies must employ a much broader array of longer-term policy tools to reshape the international environment, which enables terrorist networks to breed and become robust. The mechanisms of globalization need to be exploited to thwart the globalization of terrorism.

The economic and political roots of terrorism are complex, increasingly worrisome, and demanding of as much breadth and subtlety in response as they display in their genesis. The United States must therefore be strategic in its response: An effective grand strategy against terrorism involves planning a global campaign with the most effective means available, not just the most measurable, obvious, or gratifying. It must also include plans for shaping the global environment after the so-called war on terrorism has ended-or after the current political momentum has subsided.

The United States, working with other major donor nations, needs to create an effective incentive structure that rewards "good performers"-those countries with good governance, inclusive education programs, and adequate social programs-and works around "bad performers" and intervenes to assist so-called failed states. Also for the longer term, the United States and its allies need to project a vision of sustainable development-of economic growth, equal access to basic social needs such as education and health, and good governance- for the developing world. This is particularly true in mostly Muslim countries whose populations are angry with the United States over a perceived double standard regarding its long-standing support for Israel at the expense of Palestinians, policies against the regime of Saddam Hussein at the expense of some Iraqi people, and a general abundance of American power, including the U.S. military presence throughout the Middle East.

References

- Appadurai, A. (1996), *Modernity at large. Cultural dimensions of globalization*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Barber, Benjamin, (1995), *Jihad vs. Mc World*, New York: Ballantine Books.
- Bauman, Z. (1996), "From pilgrim to tourist - or a short history of identity", In S. Hall & P. du Gay (Eds.), *Questions of cultural identity*, (pp. 1-17). London: Sage Publications.
- Brown, Chris (2001), "Globalization, borders and identity", In: Albert, M., Jacobson, D. and Lapid, Y. eds, *Identities, border, orders: rethinking international relations theory*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 2001, 117-137.
- Caris, Charles C. and Reynolds, Samuel (2014), "ISIS Governance in Syria", Institute for the Study of War, 1 August.
- Carrol, S.(2012), "Global relevance of Classical Counter insurgency strategy", Available at www.eir.info/2012/.../Retrieved, 12/10/2013.
- Castells, M. (1996) a, *The Power of Identity*, London: Blackwell.
- Castells, M. (1996) b, *The rise of network the society*, Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.
- Castells, M. (1997), *The power of identity*, Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.
- Castells, M. (2005), *The network society: A cross-cultural perspective*, Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar.
- Corcoran, F. (2003), "The refugee challenge for Ireland: cultural globalization or identity crisis?" Available: http://www.wacc.org.uk/publications/md/md1998_3/corcoran. Retrieved 04/07/2013.
- Cronin, Audrey Kurth (2002), "Behind the Curve: Globalization and International Terrorism", *International Security*, Vol. 27, No. 3 Winter, pp. 30-58.
- Crooke, Alastair (2014), "You Can't Understand ISIS If You Don't Know the History of Wahhabism in Saudi Arabia", *The Huffington Post*, 27/8, available at: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/alastair-crooke/isis-wahhabism-saudi-arabia_b_5717157.html
- Derrida, J. (1981), *Positions*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Doku, Paul Narh and Asante, Kwaku Oppong (2011), "Identity: Globalization, culture and psychological functioning", *International Journal of Human Sciences*, Volume: 8 Issue: 2 .
- Erikson, E. H. (1968), *Identity: Youth and Crises*, New York: Norton.
- Friedman, George (2014), "The Islamic State Reshapes the Middle East", *Geopolitical Weekly*, November 25, available at: <http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/islamic-state-reshapes-middle-east#axzz3KSEwuY5W>.
- Gardiner, David, C. (2015), "The Death of Global Jihad: The Origin and Reality of Islamic Terrorism", Thesis for Master of Arts, State University of New York, College of Arts & Sciences, Department of History.
- Gergen, K. J. (1991), *The saturated self: Dilemmas of identity in contemporary life*, New York: Basic Books.

- Giddens, A. (2000), *Runaway world: How globalization is reshaping our lives*, New York: Routledge.
- Hall, S. (1994), "Cultural identity and diaspora", In P. Williams & L. Chrisman (Eds.), *Colonial Discourse and Postcolonial Theory: A Reader*, (pp. 392-403). New York: Columbia UP.
- Hall, S. (1996), "Introduction: who needs identity?" In S. Hall & P. du Gay (Eds.), *Questions of cultural identity*, (pp. 1-17). London: Sage Publications.
- Hall, S. (1997), "The work of representation", In S. Hall (Ed.), *Representation: Cultural representations and signifying practices*, (pp. 13-64). London: Sage Publication.
- Hanlon, Q.H. (2008), "Globalization and the Transformation of Armed Groups", Available at: [Http://www.jeffnorwitz.com/siteassets/book .pdf](http://www.jeffnorwitz.com/siteassets/book.pdf). Retrieved 12/10/2013.
- Hegghammer, Thomas (2006), "Global Jihadism after the Iraq War", *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 60, No. 1 (Winter), pp. 11-32.
- Heine, J. & Thakur R. (2011), *The dark side of globalization*, Tokyo: United Nations University Press.
- Hoffman-Ladd, V. J. (1993), "Muslim Fundamentalism: Psychological Profiles", Paper presented at the Fundamentalist Project, M. E. Marty & S. R. Appleby (Eds.)
- Huntington, Samuel, (1996), *the Clash of Civilisations and the Remaking of World Order*, New York: Simon & Schuster.
- "-ISIS Fast Facts", CNN, 6 September 2014, <http://edition.cnn.com/2014/08/08/world/isis-fast-facts/>
- Jacobs, Jessica (2015), "On the margins of terror: Daesh and the new geography of hate in Sinai", available at: <http://www.opendemocracy.net /jessica-jacobs/on-margins-of-terror-daesh-and-new-geography-of-hate-insinai> (accessed 10 June 2015).
- Khan, Zeba (2014), "Words matter in ISIS war, so use Daesh", *The Boston Globe*, October, 2014.
- Khaniki, H. (2001), "Role of media in identity formation", *Hamshahri Daily*, 2606, 12-13.
- Kilcullen, D. J. (2005), "Countering global insurgency", *Journal of Strategic Studies*, 28: 4, 597 Available at : www.polsci.wvu.edu/.../Kilcullen. Retrieved on 6/12/2013.
- Last, Murray (2011), "Nigeria's Boko Haram", *Muslim Institute Blogs*. URL: <http://www.musliminstitute.org/blogs/travel/nigerias-boko-haram-professor-murray-last> [Accessed October 31, 2012].
- Laub, Zachary and Masters, Jonathan (2014), "Islamic State in Iraq and Syria", *Backgrounders, Council on Foreign Relations*, 8 August 2014, <http://www.cfr.org/iraq/islamic-state-iraq-syria/p14811> .
- LeVine, Mark (2006), "Chaos, Globalization, and the Public Sphere: Political Struggle in Iraq and Palestine", *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 60, No. 3, Summer, pp. 467-492.

- Lipset, Seymour Martin (1960), *Political Man*, Garden City, New York: Doubleday.
- Lynch, Marc, et al (2015), "The Arab Thermidor: The Resurgence of the Security State", (POMED) available at: http://pomeps.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/POMEPS_Studies_11_Thermidor_Web.pdf
- Marty, M. E., & Appleby, S. R. (Eds.) (1991), *Fundamentalism Observed*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Migdal, Joel S. (1988), *Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World*, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Ould Mohamedou, Mohammad Mahmoud (2014), "ISIS and the Deceptive Rebooting of Al-Qaeda", GCSP Policy Paper, Geneva Center for Security Policy, August .
- Perelli, Carina (2014), "ISI, ISIS, ISIL, Daesh, IS ... A many-headed Hydra, a Chameleon of a Thousand Names and Appearances", RESDAL from Beirut, October 11th, available at: www.Resdal.org.ar (Red De Seguridad Y Defensa De America Latina).
- Robertson, R. (1991), "Japan and the USA: The interpretation of national identities and the debate about orientalism", In N. Abercombie et al. (Eds.), *Dominant Ideologies*, London: Unwin Hyman.
- Sageman, Marc (2008), "The Next Generation of Terror", *Foreign Policy*, No. 165, March-April, pp. 36-42 .
- Sahliyah, E. (Ed.) (1990), *Religious Resurgence and Politics in the Contemporary World*, New York: State University of New York Press.
- Said, E. (1978), *Orientalism*, New York: Penguin.
- Sampson, I.T. (2012), "Religious violence in Nigeria: Causal diagnoses and strategic recommendations to the state and religious communities", Available at: www.ajol.info/index.php/ajcr/article/view Retrieved on 23/11/2013.
- Sayigh, Yezid (2014), "Da'ach: Khilafa Islamiya 'Alamiya am Douaila Islamiya fil Iraq" ("ISIS: Global Islamic Caliphate or Islamic Mini-State in Iraq?)" , *Al Hayat*, 24 July.
- Sly, Liz (2014), "Al-Qaeda disavows any ties with radical Islamist ISIS group in Syria, Iraq", *The Washington Post*, 3 February.
- Tocqueville, Alexis de (1967), *Democracy in America*, New York: Harper & Row.
- Wendt, A. (1999), *Social Theory of International Politics*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Woodward, K. (1997), "Concepts of identity and difference", In K. Woodward (Ed.), *Identity and differences*, (pp.8-61). London: Sage Publications.