Feasible Study of Provincialization of Islamic Consultative Assembly Elections by Presenting a Model of a Proportional Electoral System

Hamzeh Alishahi[1] , Faramarz Mirzazadeh[2*], Hassan Khodaverdi[3]

[1,3] Department of Political Science and International Relations, South Tehran Branch, Islamic Azad University, Tehran, Iran

[2] Department of Political Science, Ilam Branch, Islamic Azad University, Ilam, Iran

Abstract:

Elections today, as one of the pillars of democracy, play an important role in citizen participation and oversight of the performance and decisions of the agents of political systems. In the meantime, the parliamentary elections of each country have a different position according to the model of the electoral system of that country. In Iran, the parliament has a history of more than a century, but there are still shortcomings in the elections, the role of the existing electoral system (majority), which is in the first election law of the country since 1906 is important. To correct the current shortcomings of the Islamic Consultative Assembly elections and to maintain the importance of the diversity of constituencies in the country, the plan to provincialize the constituencies from the fifth parliament onwards has always been proposed as an alternative to the current system; Which has not been implemented yet for various reasons. This research seeks to use the descriptive-analytical method to evaluate the possibility of replacing the model of the proportional electoral system (in non-single-seat constituencies) with the current system based on the provincial of the Islamic Consultative Assembly elections. In other words, it seeks to answer the question of whether it is possible to replace the current proportional electoral system model (in non-single-seat constituencies) with the current majority system based on the provincialization of the Islamic Consultative Assembly elections? Our assumption is that among the majority, proportional and hybrid models, the proportional model under provincialization can better meet the needs of today's Iranian society. In this research, data collection is the use of books, articles, and electronic resources.

Keywords: Islamic Consultative Assembly elections, provincialization, proportional elections, majority, electoral formula.

*Corresponding author's Email: f.mirzazade@gmail.com

Introduction

Democracy today has become a pervasive value among different societies. Elections, as the most important manifestation of democracy, play important roles in the transfer of political power; And as a tool to express the demands of the people from the political system and ways to monitor, monitor, and control the decisions and actions of government officials.

Therefore, elections are considered as one of the most important criteria for measuring democracy, democracy, and good governance. Elections, as a platform for competition between political organizations and factions, have always played a key role in the political life of Iranian society, especially after the revolution; And as an important tool in political participation, it has been a turning point in political change. The legislature in any society is the pillar of that society because the right decisions and laws passed can provide or hinder the development process.

In today's democracies, the legislature is made up of representatives elected by the people. The parliament of each country, as the legislative body, following the model of government and the position of the parliamentary institution in the constitution of that country, has an important role from extensive oversight of government actions and law enforcement to the appointment and election of governments. The history of forming the parliament in Iran dates back to 115 years ago and at the time of the constitution; In this respect, at least in the Middle East, it has been a leader compared to other countries. The parliament in Iran was first crystallized as a single-chamber system in the form of the National Assembly, and then with the addition of the Senate in 1949, the parliament in Iran became bicameral.

After the Islamic Revolution in the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the parliament was elected as a one-chamber system with the name of the Islamic Consultative Assembly. Among these, the "electoral system" that is determined by the constitution of each country are among the most significant influential elements; Their role in selecting and selecting the right candidates, the level of citizen participation, strengthening the party system, efficiency and stability of the political system, establishing communication between the electorate and the elected, and other important issues are undeniable.

The electoral system used to hold the elections to the Islamic Consultative Assembly in the years after the revolution was a two-stage electoral system that is one of the majority systems. This electoral system has special consequences for the field of politics, such as weakening or preventing the formation of political parties in Iran. Maurice Duverger was one of the first to study electoral systems and their political consequences scientifically and systematically. According to his findings, proportional electoral systems create multi-party systems (Duverger, 2010, p. 45; Ayoubi, 2003, p. 54).

Provincial elections are meaningless without considering the proportionality of the votes. There is no electoral system in the world whose elections are provincial or federal, but the type of electoral system is the majority and not proportional. In other words, nowhere in the world are provincial and federal elections a majority, but proportional. On this basis, the concern and issue in this research are proposed and efforts are sought to change the country's electoral system from a majority to "provide a model of the proportional electoral system" which may include the provincialization of elections.

Theoretical framework

In 1951, the famous French thinker Maurice Duverger declared his famous law on electoral and party systems. Despite the passage of time, bipartisan laws are still highly valid and valid, and various researchers have tested these theories. In his book Political Parties, Duverger summarizes the impact of electoral systems on the structure of political parties in three general laws, which we describe (Duverger, 1971).

According to Maurice Duverger, a one-stage majority electoral system gives rise to a two-party system. Because in such a system, the political parties alone do not hope to win the election, and all aligned groups and factions must be mobilized to nominate joint candidates. In a one-stage majority electoral system, those who get the most votes over others are considered the winners of the election. As a result, in cases where multiple groups and parties participate in the election, a party with very few votes may win the election.

According to Maurice Duverger's second law, a two-stage majority election creates a multi-party system, and weak, interdependent parties, and society tends to become bipolar rather than bipartisan. In this type of electoral system, only those who have won an absolute majority (half + one voter) can be elected in the first round. In some cases, in addition to the majority, other quotas have been set. In this electoral system, although smaller parties and groups can actively participate in the elections in the first round, they are practically absent from parliament. As a result, they have no role in government formation or decision-making. The majority will have all the power.

According to Maurice Duverger's third law, proportional elections give rise to a multi-party system with cohesive, independent, and powerful parties. In such a system, political parties see no reason to ally with other

parties and can only win a percentage, albeit a small number, of seats by mobilizing their constituents. (Gaxied, 1985).

Maurice Duverger, after examining various electoral systems, announced the above three laws. According to these laws, the current Iranian elections, which were of a two-stage (majority) type; It has mostly caused a multi-party system and parties with weak and interdependent functions and performance, and society has moved towards polarization instead of being two-party; In recent years, we have witnessed the proof of this law.

Following Maurice Duverger's third law, which was more consistent with the title of this study; Proportional elections give rise to multi-party system, cohesive, independent, and powerful parties. In such a system, in addition to the authority intended by the majority systems; Issues such as justice, respect for the rights of minorities, a wider umbrella in society, strong party systems and greater accountability of political agents, as well as the elimination of shortcomings and inefficiencies in the existing majority system.

This issue can reduce dissatisfaction on one hand and increase the level of satisfaction and participation of more elites, political and social activists, political activists and parties, peripheral communities, small groups less seen; On the other hand, if used, it is more appropriate than the successful global models in this field and its generalization and compliance with international conditions and standards.

Research background

Khorramshad and Rafiei Ghahsareh (2018) in their research entitled "Electoral system and its impact on the party system in Iran"; It is said that one of the factors that can have a profound effect on the political parties and the political system of any country is the factor of the electoral system. According to ex-

perts on party and democracy issues, the electoral system used in each country is one of the most important factors shaping the party system of any country. In this article, an attempt has been made to introduce different types of electoral systems; the type of electoral system used in the elections of the Islamic Consultative Assembly should be specified and the impact of this electoral system on the situation of political parties in the Islamic Republic of Iran should be examined.

Natanzi (2017) in his study "Feasibility study of the role of parties in the electoral process with emphasis on reforming the electoral system of Iran" has pointed out that Iran's electoral structures in the vast majority of periods have a majority basis and laws, infrastructure and parties are formed on this basis. One of the characteristics of a desirable and efficient electoral system is the dynamism of political parties. A proportional and mixed electoral system, due to being party-oriented, causes more and continuous dynamism of political parties. The implementation of a proportional and mixed electoral system in Iran allows parties and parties to be organized under the law, and parties to operate continuously and enjoy the freedom and other components of democracy, but this requires a change in Iran's electoral system.

There is a possibility of changing Iran's electoral system, and changing Iran's electoral system will lead to more citizen participation in the administration of the country; However, it should be noted that to change Iran's electoral system, the necessary structures must be provided. Therefore, Iran's electoral laws, which have a majority structure, need to be amended based on different types of proportional and mixed systems in the constituencies of the Islamic Consultative Assembly and the Assembly of Leadership Experts and Islamic Councils.

Akbari et al. (2016) in a study entitled "Provincialization of Centralist elections, with emphasis on the constituencies of South Khorasan Province"; Have stated that the analysis of the findings indicates that the plan to provincialize the elections, despite the goals and claims of the designers and proponents; It will intensify centralism at the national and provincial levels, isolate marginalized and sparsely populated areas, and reduce the participation of people in these areas in elections, especially in the Islamic Consultative Assembly elections.

Analysis and comparison of the votes of the constituencies of South Khorasan province with each other shows the dominance of the two cities of Birjand and Ghaenat and especially the city of Birjand over other regions and constituencies of the province; If the elections become provincial, the intense attention and concentration of all candidates in this city and the defeat of other constituencies against its high weight, in addition to intensifying centralism, will be stressful due to the distribution and ethnic context of the province.

Shojaei (2013) in his research entitled "Pathology of the role of political parties in the elections of the Islamic Republic of Iran" states that in the system of the Islamic Republic, mechanisms were provided in the constitution for the presence of the people in the political arena; And the most obvious of these mechanisms has been the holding of various elections and the participation of the people in them. But the evidence shows that more than a few decades after the dawn of the revolution, political participation is still a mass, transient, unorganized, governmental, and often affirmative participation, in the form of public mobilization and mobilization.

The purpose of this study is to analyze the harms and challenges facing the electoral

function of parties in the Islamic Republic of Iran and finally try to provide solutions to eliminate these challenges and harms. It is assumed that the existence of various factors at the level of government, society, parties, and laws has caused people to operate with less trust and confidence than parties and groups. Therefore, to attract popular participation and play an optimal role in raising the consciousness of the masses and turning their political participation into organized and sustainable participation, political groups must expend more effort and effort than ever before to bridge the gap between the people and themselves. ; And this is not possible except with changes and developments in various fields, including in the field of law, government, society, and finally the performance of political parties.

Mirzadeh Koohshani (2011) in his research "Feasibility study of provincialization of constituencies in the Islamic Consultative Assembly elections" writes that elections today as one of the foundations of democracy play an important role in citizen participation and monitoring the actions and decisions of agents of political systems. In the meantime, the parliamentary elections of each country have a special place as an institution that has the task of legislating and supervising at the macro level. In Iran, the parliament has a history of more than a century, but there are still some shortcomings in its elections.

To correct the current shortcomings of the Islamic Consultative Assembly elections, the plan to provincialize the constituencies from the fifth term of the Assembly onwards has always been proposed as an alternative to the current system, but for various reasons has not yet been implemented. This research intends to use the descriptive-analytical method to evaluate the possibility of replacing this plan with the current system. In other words, this study seeks to answer the question of whether it is possible to change constituencies and adapt them to the borders of the provinces. And what challenges will we face if we change? In this regard, the authors assume that it is possible to change the boundaries of constituencies and adapt them to the provincial capitals; But if the necessary infrastructure is not provided, although the problems of the current system will be solved, it will face new challenges and problems such as increasing election costs, reducing the local feeling and the inability of MPs to address low levels and the entry of famous and wealthy people.

Taghizadeh and Zarghami (2009) in their research entitled "Provincialization of Islamic Consultative Assembly elections" refer; Holding elections to the Islamic Consultative Assembly in the constituencies of the province can, on the one hand, have benefits such as a better representation of representatives in national duties, spreading culture, reducing differences and ethnic conflicts; On the other hand, there will be disadvantages such as ignoring the demands of the people and reducing the participation of the people.

In 1991, Blais and Karty conducted a study of 509 elections in twenty different countries; comparing the electoral laws of these countries, they concluded that in single-stage electoral systems, an average of five parties; in two-stage majority systems and proportional systems, eight parties are competing with each other in the election arena. (Blais, 1991, pp. 79-93)

In 1980, Katz studied the electoral systems of different societies and found that societies with a proportional system, large constituencies, and multiple seats had highly idealistic political parties. (Katz, 1980)

Research literature in the electoral system

The concept of electoral systems

Electoral systems determine the order in which voters' votes are converted into seats (Mansourian, 2017: p.3). Electoral systems can be considered as a set of rules and regulations according to which the votes cast in a general election turn into seats occupied by parties and candidates. (Reynolds et al., 2012: p.25; Nozari, 2002: p.162) The electoral system determines the winner of the election based on the votes cast by the voters and determines what share of power each party or political group has. (Landel, 2010: p.31)

Selecting one of the majority, proportional, mixed, and electoral formulas and how to calculate and allocate seats; Determining the size and number of constituencies and drawing their boundaries; Determining the quotas required to obtain representation seats; And making the ballot known is one of the most important mechanisms that all of them are expected to design in a coordinated and coherent manner from a favorable electoral system. According to Douglas Rae, the four pillars and components of electoral systems are:

A) Electoral formula: means that the electoral system used by the majority is proportional, consolidated, or of another type; and what mathematical formula is used to distribute the seats.

B) Ballot structure: means whether voters vote for a candidate or a party; and whether the voter has only one choice on the ballot or determines a set of priorities.

C) Extent of constituencies: This means how many representatives will be elected from each constituency. (Rae, 1971, p. 25; Landel, 2010, p. 31)

D) Electoral quorum: Lijphart mentions the fourth component and that is the electoral quorum. An electoral quorum means the minimum number of votes a candidate or party must obtain to win an election. (Liphart, 1995: p.412)

The importance of the electoral system

Electoral systems are one of the most important political institutions in any country (Farell, 2011, pp. 4-5). The importance of the electoral system in the political life of a country and its decisive influence on the type of government system, party system, social gaps, status and political status of women, the political situation of minorities, and the level of citizen participation is obvious and has a direct relationship. (Noris, 2004, p. 25) The electoral system has been ambiguous and inefficient in the history of Iran, and specifically from the constitutional point of view.

During the Islamic Republic of Iran, due to the candidate-centered electoral system arising from the model of the ruling majority system, due attention has not been paid to the proportional and integrated electoral system and its requirements and consequences. Unfortunately, despite the extraordinary importance of a country's electoral system for its political life, except for a few cases, comprehensive research and studies in our country on electoral systems in general and its change from the current majority system to a proportional and integrated system has not been done.

This is while by studying the electoral systems and determining their positive and negative consequences and examining and replacing the proposed system as a pilot; Many related political problems in the country that are largely influenced by the electoral system can be solved.

Types of electoral systems worldwide

The number of electoral systems in the world is innumerable. However, based on the four aforementioned factors, namely the electoral formula, the structure of the ballot paper, the size of the constituencies, and the electoral quorum, the current electoral systems can be divided into four main branches and twelve sub-branches. (Reynolds et al., 2012, p.55)

1- Majority systems; This system is divided into 5 sub-branches of simple or relative majority systems in 49 countries (24%); Collective voting system includes 15 countries (7.5%); Collective party voting system of 4 countries (1.5%); Alternative voting system of three countries (located in the Pacific region: Australia, Fiji, and Papua New Guinea); And a two-stage system that includes 19 countries (9.5%) and a total of 90 countries worldwide use the majority system.

2- Proportional systems; this system is a sub-branch of the proportional list system which has 74 countries (37%), and a transferable single-vote system that includes two countries (one percent) and a total of 76 countries around the world use the proportional system.

3- Integrated or mixed systems; this system is also a sub-branch of the parallel electoral system with 24 countries (12%), and the proportional system is based on mixed members with 7 countries (3.5%) and a total of 31 countries worldwide use the integrated or mixed system.

4- Other electoral systems; Other electoral systems with three branches of the non-transferable single electoral system, which are 3 countries (1.5 per-

cent); And the electoral system of limited voting with one country (half a percent); Gibraltar Autonomous Region and the electoral system based on the Burda count of one country (half a percent); It includes the small country of Nauru in the Pacific Ocean, with a total of five countries using these different systems worldwide.

Among the above electoral systems, the following three electoral systems are the most common electoral systems in the world, with more than 95% of the world using one of these three options.

Majority electoral system

The rule of majority systems is very simple. Once the ballots have been cast and counted, the candidates or parties that have won the most votes in their constituency will be declared the winners (Evan, 2004, pp.98-99). In a majority system, the person, list, or lists with the most votes are elected. One of the advantages of this system is to establish a direct relationship between the voter and the elected during the voting.

The majority system, especially in single-seat constituencies, excludes political and ethnic minorities from the race and prevents fair elections. (Research Center of the Islamic Council, 2002, p.148) This system is divided into relative majority and absolute majority. The relative majority system is the oldest electoral system according to which elections are one-stage; and the person, person, list, or list with the most votes wins the election compared to others (even by one vote, regardless of the percentage of votes cast).

The elections to the British House of Commons, the US House of Representatives and Senate, the Assembly of Leadership Experts, and the Islamic Council of Towns and

Villages in Iran are a one-stage majority. To increase the legitimacy of the elected people, some legislators choose the absolute majority system instead of the relative majority system. Under this system, a person or persons, list or lists with more than half of the votes wins the election. The absolute majority is not necessarily the majority plus half plus one, but the majority is more than half. The presidential elections in France and Iran are two-stage with an absolute majority system. Elections to the National Assembly and local city councils in France are also in line with this electoral system.

Proportional electoral system

The fundamental principle of all proportional electoral systems is that each party's share of political power should be commensurate with that party's share of the vote. Electoral systems try to solve the disproportionate problem that may arise as a result of the use of pluralistic systems. (Evans, 2004, p. 99) In the proportional system, each of the elected lists can win a seat in proportion to the number of votes cast in the election; therefore, each list can have representatives according to its acceptability. The larger the constituency and the number of seat in the proportional system, the greater the proportionality (Research Center of the Islamic Council, 2002: p.148). This system requires a list of elections. Parliamentary elections in the Netherlands and Israel and the European Parliament are proportional.

Iran's electoral legislature has never chosen a proportional system. Of course, the proportional system had attracted the attention of some jurists before the revolution, as they proposed it for the National Assembly elections. A proportional electoral system is proposed for the provincialization of the Islamic Consultative Assembly elections, as

this system can provide a representation of provincial ethnic or religious minorities in proportion to their acceptance in the Assembly. The lack of a culture of partisanship and cohesive political parties in Iran hinders the success of the proportional system in the elections to the Islamic Consultative Assembly.

Consolidated electoral system

Consolidated or mixed electoral systems seek to combine the positive features of majority and proportional systems (Farell, 2011, p. 93). In fact, in all mixed systems, two electoral systems (majority and proportional) that each uses a different formula to convert votes into seats are put together. The consolidated (proportional-majority) system seeks, on the one hand, to ensure a balance between the votes obtained from the lists of candidates and their seats, and on the other hand, the formation of stable governments. Many local or city council elections and local council elections in France are based on a consolidated system. Parliamentary elections in Japan, Italy, and Germany are also based on a consolidated system (Harisi Nejad, 2008, pp. 78-101 and 115)

The electoral system in Iran

During this time three election laws were passed generally:
1. First Election Law, approved in 1906.
2. Second Election Law, approved in 1909.
3. The Third Election Law, approved in 1911. (Alam, 2011, p. 6)

As noted, electoral systems determine the order in which voters' votes are converted into seats, which have four main pillars and components. These four components are:
1- The structure of the ballot paper. 2- Electoral formula used. 3- Extent of consti-

tuencies. 4- The quorum set for winning the election.

1- In the time discussed in this section, from the Constitution to the Islamic Revolution; Candidate-based ballots were used in all elections held. And voters were required to write the names of the candidates on their ballot paper (as many as needed) at the time of the election, instead of voting for the political parties (Saeli Kordedeh, 1999, p. 205). Thus, in general, in terms of the structure of the ballot, the electoral systems used in this period were all candidate-based.

2- The second and perhaps most important component of any electoral system is the electoral formula used in that system. The electoral formula is the formula according to which the winner of the election is determined according to the votes cast in the ballot box. The formulas used have three main forms. These three forms are the majority formula, the proportional formula, and the combined formula. In general, in all elections held in the years between the Constitution and the Islamic Revolution, the electoral formula used to elect members of the National Assembly was the first type of formula, the majority formula. (Kavakebian, 2004, p. 17)

3- In the case of the third pillar of electoral systems, the size of constituencies refers to the number of representatives of each constituency or, in fact, the number of seats allocated to each constituency. For example, if a constituency has one representative in parliament, the size of that constituency is one, and if the number of representatives in a constituency is three, the size of that constituency will be three.

At the point in time in this section, from the Constitution to the Islamic Revolution, the size of constituencies throughout the country has varied. For example, in the first election law, the number of representatives in Tehran constituencies was set at 60; At the same time, the size of some constituencies, such as the Baluchistan constituency, was the same, meaning that only one representative was assigned to them. The situation was the same in the next two election laws. Therefore, in all three election laws before the Islamic Revolution, we see the variation in the size of constituencies (variation in the number of seats and the number of representatives allocated to each constituency). (Khorramshad et al, 2013, p. 55)

4- The fourth pillar of any electoral system is the electoral quorum; which is the minimum number of votes that a party or candidate must win to win the election.

In the first election law, there was no quorum in constituencies where the elections were one-stage (Tehran constituency); But in areas where the election was two-stage, the quorum in the first round was half plus one. In the second law, according to Article 18, the electoral quorum was half plus one vote. In the third electoral law, passed in 1911, the electoral quorum was eliminated, and any candidate who received more votes than his or her rivals would go directly to the National Assembly. (Saeli Kordedeh, 1999, pp. 206-207)

The electoral system in Iran after the revolution

After the Islamic Revolution, we have had three election laws along with a plan to amend articles of the Islamic Consultative Assembly election law. In the first election law approved by the Revolutionary Council

in 1979; the ballot paper had a candidate-centric structure, the size of the constituency was not the same, and we saw variation in the size of the constituencies. The quorum set for the first round of elections was one-half plus one of the total numbers of votes cast in each constituency, and in the second round, the quorum was eliminated.

The electoral formula used to elect representatives is the majority formula. The second election law was approved by the first term of the Islamic Consultative Assembly in 1983 (Saeli Kordedeh, 1999, p. 366). As in the previous election law, the structure of the candidate-centered ballot paper, the size of the various constituencies, the majority formula, and only the quorum was reduced to one-third of the total votes.

The third law of the Islamic Consultative Assembly elections in 1999 was approved by the fifth parliament. Here, too, it was largely similar to the electoral system derived from the laws of the first and second elections. In the third election law, too, the ballot papers were candidate-centered and voters should only vote for candidates and not for political parties. (Kavakebian, 2004, p. 72) Diverse constituencies, the electoral formula as before, the majority and only the quorum was reduced again and reduced to a quarter, and in the second stage, the quorum was removed and the candidates entered the Islamic Consultative Assembly with a relative majority of votes. Also, the plan to amend articles of the Islamic Consultative Assembly Election Law (approved by the Assembly on April 23, 2019, and submitted to the Guardian Council) containing 57 articles were approved in a public meeting on Tuesday, April 23, 2019; Which is followed by discussions between parliamentary committees, the public arena, and the Guardian Council.

Therefore, it can be said that in all the elections of the Islamic Consultative Assembly held in the years after the revolution, a single electoral system has been used. In other words, the electoral system resulting from the three electoral laws passed in the years after the revolution was a two-stage (majority) electoral system. In all of these electoral laws, three of the four components of the electoral system have always been fixed and unchanged, and only one component has changed. These cases show that the legislator, experts, and competent decision-makers in this regard have always thought about reforming the election laws, have always been unaware of its most important component, the electoral system, and have focused more on formal reforms. Therefore, the need to change the majority electoral system in proportion to these shortcomings is the main concern of the authors of the article

Electoral systems from the Constitution to the Islamic Revolution

Four components of electoral systems	First Election Law, approved in 1906		Second Election Law, approved in 1909	Third Election Law, approved in 1911	
Ballot structure	Tehran (collective vote)	Other provinces (two stages)	Candidate based	constituencies with the size of more than one (collective vote)	constituencies with the size of one (Simple majority)
	Candidate based	Candidate based		Candidate based	Candidate based

International Journal of Political Science, Vol 11, No2, Summer 2021

Electoral formula	majority	majority	majority	majority	majority
The size of the constituency	more than one	Diverse	Diverse	more than one	one
Electoral quorum	there was not	In the first stage, half of the votes plus one vote; And in the second stage, there was not.	In the first and second stages, half of the votes plus one vote.	there was not	there was not

Electoral systems in Iran after the Islamic Revolution

Four components of electoral systems	The first election law, approved in 1979	The second election law, approved in 1983	The third election law, approved in 1999	Amendment of articles of the Electoral Law approved in 2016, Article 8, Chapter 2
Ballot structure	Candidate based	Candidate based	Candidate based	Candidate based
Electoral formula	majority	majority	majority	majority
The size of the constituency	Diverse	Diverse	Diverse	Diverse
Electoral quorum	In the first stage, half of the votes plus one vote; And in the second stage, there was not.	In the first stage, one-third of the total votes; And in the second stage, there was not.	In the first stage, a quarter of the total votes (25%); And in the second stage, there was not.	In the first stage, one-fifth of the total votes; And in the second stage, there was not.

The plan to provincialize the elections of the Islamic Consultative Assembly

The idea of a provincialization of parliamentary constituencies dates back to before the 1979 revolution, which eventually led to the approval of plans in the Islamic Consultative Assembly. All the plans approved by the parliament envisaged the provincialization of the Islamic Consultative Assembly elections along with the implementation of the majority electoral system. These plans were met with objections to the Guardian Council for violating Sharia or constitutional standards. The repetition of this plan in the sixth, seventh, eighth, ninth, and tenth terms of the Islamic Consultative Assembly shows the necessity of zoning the provincial elections, but this plan has some advantages and disadvantages.

Benefits of provincialization of elections:
1- Better representation of representatives to national duties.
2- Reducing ethnic and religious concerns.
3- The growth of the party and the spread of party culture and thought.

4- Strengthening the role of councils and the possibility of further maneuvering them.

5- Candidacy of well-known and worthy people.

6- Possibility of limiting the number of candidates.

7- Dominance of national attitude in representatives.

Disadvantages of provincialization of elections:

1- Reducing the local feeling and the inability of the representatives to handle the low levels.

2- Increasing election expenses.

3- Marginalizing small areas and cities.

4- Candidacy of famous and wealthy people to the parliament.

5. Reducing people's participation in elections.

6- Increasing social gaps and tensions.

7- Leaving the demands of the people unanswered.

Optimal electoral zoning by considering the proportional formula

The Islamic Consultative Assembly, with its emphasis on demographic and geographical criteria, has determined the boundaries of constituencies, and efforts to provincialize parliamentary constituencies have so far been hampered by the Guardian Council. All the plans approved by the Islamic Consultative Assembly foresaw the holding of provincial parliamentary elections with a majority electoral system. The main concern of the planners of the provincialization of elections was the provincial zoning of parliamentary elections; and the parliamentary electoral system, that is, the quality of the conversion of the people's votes into provincial seats, has never been seriously considered by the parliament.

It seems that the proposal of a suitable electoral system should not be neglected in the provincialization of parliamentary constituencies. Many of the possible disadvantages of provincializing parliamentary elections will be eliminated if a proportional or even consolidated electoral system is determined. In other words, it is appropriate for the Islamic Consultative Assembly to adjust the majority electoral system at all times with the provincial zoning of the parliamentary elections. To deal with the maximum advantages and minimum disadvantages of provincializing parliamentary elections, the implementation of a proportional electoral system is proposed. This system can, on the one hand, provide the necessary stability for the developmental activity of governments and, on the other hand, take into account the rights of minority groups and parties and considerations related to ethnic and religious diversity. In the provincial parliamentary elections, it is possible to help the provincialization of the Islamic Consultative Assembly elections by using majority systems (for single-seat constituencies) and proportional systems (in non-single-constituency constituencies).

In the context of parliamentary elections commensurate with the proportional electoral system (similar to the German Bundestag elections), the geographical territory of each province should be considered as the main constituency. In the geographical area of each province, sub-constituencies (regions) should be determined as a single-seat consisting of a city or district. Each constituency can be determined by demographic criteria from two or more cities and possibly all adjacent districts. The relative majority system can be used to elect representatives in single-seat constituencies. The seats in the main constituency can be divided proportionally between the competing lists in the provincial constitu-

ency. In addition to provincial and regional constituencies, religious constituencies should be determined by the legislature in accordance with geographical and religious criteria due to their exceptional nature.

It is not in vain that some scholars consider the electoral laws of a country as the constitution of that country because the electoral laws have many political and even psychological effects that must be considered before choosing an electoral system for a country. But now the authors think that it is better, like all successful countries in the world in this field, such as Germany, Belgium, and the Netherlands, to use the proportional formula by the provincial or federal electoral system. Electoral laws have a direct impact on the political behavior of parties and voters. Electoral laws can affect political parties in many ways. Research shows that electoral laws affect the number of parties in a country.

Electoral laws can also severely affect the parties' propaganda and campaigning policies. In 1980, Katz studied the electoral systems of different societies and found that societies with a proportional system, large constituencies, and multiple seats had highly idealistic political parties. (Katz, 1980) In particular, a closed list system allows political parties to gain more power, with party leaders becoming the main actors in the electoral arena. If for any reason the legislators want the political parties to be the main actors in the political arena, the proportional system and the closed list are the best and there should be no hesitation in choosing them. Otherwise, we have to go to other electoral systems.

In contrast, a proportional system with an open list reduces the power of political parties to some extent and opens the way for the relative freedom of action of candidates. As voters voluntarily list among the candidates nominated by the parties, the campaign shifts somewhat toward the central candidate. As can be seen, the electoral system can have a direct impact on the behavior of political parties and candidates. The electoral system not only affects the behavior and policy of political parties but also has significant psychological effects on the behavior of voters. It was said that in a one-stage majority system, voters are forced to choose those who have more hope of running for parliament instead of electing the people they like. This vote, known as the "white vote" or the "tactical vote", sometimes causes the voter to choose between the bad and the worse, to block the way for the worse. (Lawrence, ed. 1996, p. 68)

Naturally in proportional systems, people have a better chance of expressing their heart's desires, and tactical voting gives way to the real voting. Of course, in most proportional systems, for political parties to be able to participate in the allocation of seats in proportion to their votes, they must meet the quorum. This quorum varies from country to country and sometimes reaches twelve percent of the vote. That is, parties with less than a quorum have no hope of winning a seat, and their supporters have no choice but to vote tactically. Therefore, in the proportional system, the useful or tactical vote is not lost at all. By examining the various elections in countries that have a proportional system, Richard Guwither showed that supporters of small parties are no longer voting for their party; And they choose parties that are sure they will vote above the required quorum. (Guwither, 1989, pp. 852-859)

Before choosing the desired electoral system, it should be noted that there is a direct relationship between the parliamentary majority and the electoral system. Bliss and Carty, after studying 540 elections in twenty different countries, concluded that only ten per-

cent of proportional legislatures see a parliamentary majority; Thus, with a 90% probability, it can be argued that the proportional system faces the problem of gaining a parliamentary majority and that the parties are forced to form a coalition with each other to form a majority. (Blais, 1987, p. 79)

Examining the results of the 27-nation elections between 1945 and 1945, Liphart concludes that only 20 percent of parliaments were able to hold a parliamentary majority. (Liphart, 1994)

In contrast, a one-stage majority system of up to 69 percent can lead to a one-party majority in the legislature. In his research conducted between 1990 and 1945, Liegefart believes that this percentage is higher, and in a one-stage majority system, we see a parliamentary majority of up to 93%. Regarding the two-stage electoral system, research shows an intermediate state. A study of the Australian and French elections shows that in fifty percent of cases, a parliamentary majority has been achieved. (Blais Carty, 1987)

The result is that the choice between a majority or proportional system is a choice between the one-party parliamentary majority of a party or a parliament based on a coalition of parties.

Pippa Norris states that in countries that have a majority electoral system but have changed it to a proportional system, we have witnessed the formation of powerful political parties. (Norris, 2004, p. 108) The two-stage candidate-centered electoral system is one of the most important obstacles to the formation of powerful and efficient parties in Iran. Conversely, in countries that use a party-centered proportional electoral system, there are both more political parties and more powerful and efficient parties. (Norris, 2004, pp. 106-107)

The importance of zoning is so significant that David Farrell recommends it to electoral system designers (especially in developing countries) such as Iran; when designing the electoral system of their country, pay special attention to the issue of candidate-centered or party-centered electoral system (Farell, 2011, p. 180). Based on this important recommendation and in line with the situation of the country and its election laws from 1906 onwards and the existing inefficiencies; By changing the electoral system from a majority to a proportional one, many shortcomings and problems of the current system can be eliminated and the rest of the pillars of the electoral system can be reformed.

Conclusion

After examining the concept and importance of electoral systems and their types in the world, he described the three conventional electoral systems (majority, proportional and consolidated) that more than 95% of the countries in the world use one of these three models. According to Douglas, each of these electoral systems had four pillars and components; which are: a) Electoral formula. B) The structure of the ballot paper. C) Extent of constituencies. D) Electoral quorum.

The item of the election formula has been fixed since the first election law of the country in 1906 and is of the majority type. In this research, this shortcoming has been eliminated and a proportional model has been proposed. All the plans approved by the Islamic Consultative Assembly foresaw the holding of provincial parliamentary elections with a majority electoral system. The main concern of the planners of provincialization of elections was the provincial zoning of parliamentary elections; And the parliamentary electoral system, that is, the quality of the conversion of the people's votes into provincial

seats, has never been seriously considered by the parliament.

It seems that the proposal of a suitable electoral system should not be neglected in the provincialization of parliamentary constituencies. Many of the possible disadvantages of provincializing parliamentary elections will be eliminated if a proportional or even consolidated electoral system is determined. In other words, it is appropriate for the Islamic Consultative Assembly to adjust the majority electoral system at all times with the provincial zoning of the parliamentary elections. To deal with the maximum advantages and minimum disadvantages of provincializing parliamentary elections, the implementation of a proportional electoral system is proposed.

On the one hand, this system can provide the necessary stability for the developmental activities of governments; On the other hand, it should take into account the rights of minority groups and parties and considerations related to ethnic and religious diversity and act following and like all successful systems in the world in this regard. Provincial elections are meaningless regardless of the proportionality of the votes. There is no electoral system in the world whose elections are provincial or federal, but the type of electoral system is the majority. In other words, nowhere in the world are provincial and federal elections a majority, but a proportional one. On this basis, the concern and issue in this research are proposed and efforts are sought to change the country's electoral system from a majority to "provide a model of the proportional electoral system" which may include the provincialization of elections.

References

Corbin, Henry (2009). History of Islamic Philosophy, translated by Javad Tabatabaei, Tehran, Kavir Publishing

Davari Ardakani, Reza (1998). Farabi, Founder of Islamic Philosophy, Tehran, Institute of Humanities and Cultural Studies

Davari, Reza (2536 Imperial). Al- Farabi Founder of Islamic Philosophy, Tehran, Imperial Philosophy Association of Iran Publications

Ebrahimi Dinani, Gholam Hossein (2000). the Story of Philosophical Thought in the Islamic World, Volume 3, Tehran, New Plan Publishing

Fakhouri, Hana and Jar, Khalil (2004). History of Philosophy in the Islamic World, translated by Abdolmohammad Ayati, Tehran, Scientific and Cultural Publishing Company

Fakhri, Majed (2010). the Course of Philosophy in the Islamic World, Department of Translators, Tehran, University Publishing Center

Ganji, Mohammad Hossein (2011). Generalities of Philosophy, Tehran, Samat Publishing

Golestan, Mariam (2007). Politics and Virtue; Farabi's political philosophy, translated by Hatem Ghaderi, published by Baqa

Ibn Sina, //, (1984). Al-Mabda 'and Al-Ma'ad, Tehran, Institute of Islamic Studies, McGill University, Tehran Branch

Ibn Sina, //, (1997). Theology in the book of healing, research: Hassan Zadeh Amoli, Qom, Qom Seminary Islamic Propaganda Office Publications

Ibn Sina, //, (1400). Ayoun al-Hikma, Ibn Sina's treatises, Qom, Bidar Publications

Ibn Sina, //, (1405 b). the logic of the Oriental, Qom, the library of the Grand Ayatollah Al-Marashi Al-Najafi

Ibn Sina, //, (1998). Theology of Salvation, correction, translation, and research: Yahiya Yathribi, Tehran, Fekr-e-Rooz Publications

Ibn Sina, //, (2004a). Alaei Encyclopedia (Theology), correction: Mohammad Moin, Hamadan, Bu Ali Sina University and the Association of Cultural Works and Honors

Ibn Sina, //, (2009), collection of treatises (seventeen treatises), correction and explanations: Seyyed Mahmoud Taheri, Qom, published by Taha.

Ibn Sina, Hussein Ibn Abdullah (1985a). Al-Najah, edited by Mohammad Taghi Daneshpajooh, Tehran, Tehran University Press

Jamshid Mehr, Fardin et al. (2015). "The place of Sharia in Ibn Sina's political philosophy", Quarterly Journal of Islamic Wisdom, Fifth Year, No. 1, pp. 41-60

Lahori, Mohammad Iqbal (2008). the course of philosophy in Iran, translated by A. ح. Arianpour, Tehran, Amir Kabir Publishing

Metz, Adam (1998). Islamic civilization in the fourth century AH, translated by Alireza Zekavati Qaraguzlu, Tehran, Amirkabir Publishing

Mohajernia, Mohsen (2009). Al- Farabi Political Thought, Qom, Bustan Ketab Publisher

Nasr, Seyed Hossein (2010). Three Muslim Wise Men, translated by Ahmad Aram, Tehran, Amirkabir.

Pouladi, Kamal (2010). History of Political Thought in the West: From Socrates to Machiavelli, Tehran, Markaz Publishing

Rezvani, Mohsen (2012). "A Critical Study of Rosenthal Theory on the Political Philosophy of Islam" Islamic Government, Year 17, Number 1, pp. 171-188

Shakoori, Abolfazl (2005). Ibn Sina's political philosophy and its impact on later periods, Qom, Red Wisdom

Skinner, Quentin (2014). Foundations of Modern Political Thought, Volume I: Renaissance, translated by Kazem Firoozmand, Agah Publications

Skinner, Quentin (2014). Political Science Insights, Volume One: About Method, Translated by Fariborz Majidi, Farhang Javid Publications

Strauss, Leo (2017). A Political Introduction to Philosophy, translated by Yashar Jeirani, Tehran, Agha Publishing

Tabatabaei, Javad (2008). the Decline of Political Thought in Iran, Discourse on the Theoretical Foundations of Iran's Decline, Tehran, Kavir Publishing

Waltzer, R. (2536 Imperial). Farabi, translation from the Islamic Encyclopedia, in Reza Davari, Farabi, Tehran, Imperial Society of Iranian Philosophy Publications

Zarei, Tayyebeh and Rahimian, Saeed (2013). "Study of the city of justice from the perspective of Ibn Sina by adapting to the views of Farabi" Bi-Quarterly Journal of Hekmat-e-Sinavi, 17th year, pp. 57-78