

# *Biometric Based User Authentication Protocol in Smart Homes*

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**Abstract**— The smart home is an important Internet of Things applications. Due to the smartphones development, expansion of their network, and growing the data transfer rate, security in personal life has become a dramatic challenge. Therefore, it is essential to secure such a system to create a sense of relaxation in the lives of users and homeowners to deal with possible occurrences. The integration of technologies for the automation of home affairs with the Internet of things means that all physical objects can be accessed on cyberspace; therefore, the concerns raised by users about the lack of privacy and security are serious arguments that science and technology should answer. Therefore, addressing security issues is a crucial necessity for the development of the smart homes. Although authentication protocols have been proposed based on smart cards for multi-server architectures, their schemes cannot protect the system against stolen smart cards and dictionary attacks in the login phase and do not satisfy perfect forward secrecy. To overcome these limitations, this paper proposes an anonymous, secure protocol in connected smart home environments, using solely lightweight operations. The proposed protocol in this paper provides efficient authentication, key agreement, and enables the anonymity of devices and unlinkability. It is demonstrated that the computation complexity of the protocol is low as compared to the existing schemes, while security has been significantly improved. This protocol ensures that even if the stakeholder's device or the IoT device is attacked, they are robust against them.

**Keywords**— *Internet of Things, Smart Home, Security, Anonymity, Authentication Protocol.*

## 1. INTRODUCTION

The Internet of things (IoT) refers to devices communicating with one another along with their identification and discovery under an integrated network with a specific identifier [1]. Smart home, smart wear, intelligent power distribution network, smart city, all using IoT technology that can help people to improve their health and safety and reduce energy consumption. The new environment and features of the devices, especially smart home-based systems, have made the security of this technology particularly attractive and have provided many architectures and platforms for it. In addition, there is a large volume of communication between devices on a

machine-to-machine basis, which means that we will not have much control over this connection [2].

In addition, due to the ownership of the things and the privacy of individuals, attention to security issues related to identification, discovery, accessibility, access control, privacy, and trust are also more important in the subject of smart objects [3]. Abuse of IoT technology in smart homes will endanger the lives of people; therefore, security is a key issue in the implementation of this technology, which requires extensive research [4]. Ensuring the safety of human life, preventing undesirable events, the availability of objects, cryptography and protection technologies, confidentiality and integrity of information, irrevocability, information security and their security levels in different systems, authentication of objects and individuals using multiple factors such as cipher Pass, location and biometrics, different models for trust and non-centralized authentication, are some of these needs [5]. There are many solutions to provide security and privacy. One of the methods for providing security and privacy is authentication protocols by which the user and servers confirm the validity of the other party before sending data [6].

Five general characteristics, including automation, multi-purpose, adaptation, interaction, and productivity should be provided in a smart home. Various technologies have been developed to provide these features. Home automation is implemented in the form of manageable, programmable and intelligent houses; with the advancement of technology and the introduction of the IoT in this area, the issue of intelligence and especially remote control has been special [7]

Recently, authentication schemes [8] [9] [10] has been proposed based on smart cards for multi-server architectures, but their schemes cannot protect the system against stolen smart card and dictionary attack in login phase and do not satisfy perfect forward secrecy. On the other hand, three-factor authentication, by including biometrics into the authentication schemes, has been proposed in literature [11] [12].

In smart homes, we can use many communication technologies but each of them has security problems that require consideration. The security issue in a smart home is one of the key issues that is posed before choosing the appropriate

platform for its implementation. Essentially providing an unsafe platform can give us a good platform for attacks such as tricks, eavesdropping, and man in the middle, and replay attacks [5].

Therefore, the main challenge in using this technology is the adoption of an architecture that has a proper solution in this area, not only covering the issues of communication and performance of systems in the area but also able to provide security for users. In this way, providing a framework for enhancing security, privacy, and trust are of great importance [13].

In this research, we propose a framework of IoT for improving the security of smart home through the Internet. We can protect and prevent system against well-known attacks such as smart card stolen and dictionary attack by using biometrics in the authentication phase. Also, we can provide perfect forward secrecy in the system. In our system, we use smartphone instead of smart card, so we should access to the smartphone biometric output, but the only output that we can access is user biometric acceptance by the smartphone, which in smart cards is not like that. Therefore, for solving this problem we use hash of biometric output and concatenation of UDID.

The proposed protocol is completely symmetric key based and contains the additional important properties of anonymity and unlinkability of the user and the end-node to any outsider. Thanks to this property, user profiling can be avoided based on the behaviour of the accessed nodes. Leakage of the user's information is not possible even in instances where the end-node is compromised because the end-nodes cannot derive the real identity of the user.

We considered a Two-factor authentication in our system, based on the password of the user and the biometrics of the user's device. Even if the user's device is stolen, the intruder cannot abuse the stored secret information due to its particular construction. All of the other solutions proposed in the literature exploit expensive public key solutions including elliptic curve cryptographic (ECC) operations to obtain authentication and anonymity in the access control system [5].

Improvement of authentication and key agreement protocol in IoT environment, protocol analysis, comparing security requirements, and computational cost between proposed scheme and other schemes are main contributions of this paper. The main contributions of this paper are summarized as follows. We propose two-factor anonymous authentication protocol using biometrics in smart homes and this protocol is completely symmetric key based. All of the other solutions proposed in the literature exploit expensive public key solutions including elliptic curve cryptographic (ECC) operations to obtain authentication and anonymity in the access control system. The proposed protocol contains the additional important properties of anonymity and unlinkability of the user and the end-node to any outsider and leakage of the user's information is not possible even in instances where the end-node is compromised because the end-nodes cannot derive the real identity of the user. In the proposed protocol even if the user's device is stolen, the intruder cannot abuse the stored secret information due to its particular construction.

The rest of this paper consists of the following sections. Section 2 presents the related works. In Section 3, we discuss smart home security and its security requirements. Section 4 describes our protocol. In Section 5, we analyze the security of the protocol. In Section 6, we analyze the performance of the protocol. Finally, we conclude the paper in Section 7.

## 2. RELATED WORKS

Cyberspace includes storage, review and information exchange through network systems and physical infrastructure, especially the Internet. Entering a smart home into the Internet of Things means storing, processing, and analyzing data into cyberspace. Connecting smart home to the Internet and entering it into cyberspace has created new security challenges. Equipment in these homes is important and private information for users should have a high degree of security. These homes are highly vulnerable to online attacks and if the attacker hacks the system, he will access personal information, home-based information, and privacy of their families [14]. The importance of security in smart home is more than the importance of security in other systems [15]. The introduction of IoT technology into smart home has led to a balance between control, security, and privacy [16].

For authentications in WSNs with symmetric key-based system, we have two approaches. In the first approach, we can use secret-sharing as explained in Benenson et al [17] and Banerjee and Mukhopadhyay [18] that let sensors to collaborate in order to make a decision. The second approach contains the domain of smart-card approaches where recently many papers have been published in this approach. However, most of them were vulnerable to Offline Guessing Attack, MITM attack, and Stolen card attack. In our scheme, we guaranty anonymity and untraceability of the user, which make our framework stronger.

WSNs access control is divided into two major architectural categories: distributed or centralized. In the distributed mechanism, the end-device makes the final decision but in the centralized one, final decision is made in gateway level. Centralized access control systems have several severe disadvantages. First, they are not able to make decisions based on contextual information related to the end-device itself since the end-nodes can be seen as smart devices. Second, the central gateway, which stores and manages all information of every device, becomes a single point of failure.

In our scheme, we use anonymous authentication for IoT devices based on symmetric key cryptography. Following its purpose and functionality, our system is called efficient distributed anonymous authentication and access control for smart home sensors using symmetric key cryptography [8].

In our proposed system, we consider 4 entities: (Table 1)

$$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} 1 - \text{Owner} \equiv \text{Registration Server} \\ 2 - \text{User Device} \rightarrow \text{Mobile with Biometric} \rightarrow \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{Fingerprint} \\ \text{Face Detection} \end{array} \right. \\ 3 - \text{User} \\ 4 - \text{end-node} \rightarrow N_j \end{array} \right.$$

In this scheme, the homeowner acts as a registration server and it is responsible for the authentication management of

TABLE 1. ENTITIES IN THIS ARTICLE

	Description
U	User
U <sub>d</sub>	User Device
EN <sub>s</sub>	IoT devices or End-Nodes in Smart Home
O	Home Owner

nodes. All nodes should be pre-installed by the homeowner. In addition, for using IoT devices, the user should login with biometric parameter in smartphone. After user logs into the system, he or she can send an anonymous request with struggling of the homeowner. In designing this system, the main purpose is to maintain anonymity in such a way that no external entity can obtain information from the user or the node.

In our scheme, owner should pre-install all the nodes of network with some secure information. In addition, user needs to register with the owner for key material related for communicating with a particular node or set of end-devices. The secret key material is defined by the owner and kept on the user's smartphone.

In this scheme, the ENs can check the validity of the authentication of the user. If it is positive, a message containing the essential information is sent to the user. Our scheme contains the following security features:

- **Anonymity:** No one can get the identity of the ENs or the user. In addition, we satisfy unlinkability of the users and end-nodes with respect to outsiders.
- **Access Control:** The owner accesses to each node uniquely which no one can access to them.
- **Data authentication:** It is ensured that the information has not been altered by unauthorized or unknown means.

Our system is lightweight, which we limit the operations used in the protocol to hashes, concatenations and symmetric key encryptions/decryptions. In addition, our system is a distributed system that the access control and authentication are made at the sensor layer.

### 3. SMART HOME

Privacy, trust, security, and communications are some of the of the major challenges to smart home, according to the definition and presentation of the smart power company and complementary research by Komninos and his colleagues on smart home security in 2017 [19].

#### 3-1. Smart Home Security Challenges

According to a study conducted in 2015-2017, as shown in Table 2, the challenges in the smart home domain can be the reliability of sensors and monitoring systems and the proper settings for proper operation, reliable and secure communications in the smart home and maintaining integrity of information, proper scenario against system disruption or denial of service, security for integration systems, including decision-making tools and software, reliability and security

TABLE 2. IOT CHALLENGES IN SMART HOME [2] [5] [19]

Title	Description
Privacy	Privacy, and affiliate issues such as information security and disclosure of information and data
Connections	Strength, security stability, high communication protocols and heterogeneity of these communications
Safety	Physical safety of objects, physical access and self-sustainability
Network & Security	The network is also a concern due to communication and the breadth and variety of communications
Security	Preserving security independently of the challenges of the Internet of things
Trust	Trust mechanism
Confidentiality	Maintaining confidentiality and related solutions such as encryption and object constraints have created challenges.
Information Security	Increasing the amount of information, the number of objects and heterogeneity, protecting information security against the Internet of things
Identity Management	Authentication, identification and objects, and standardization in this area are Internet of things concerns.
Energy consumption	The development of the Internet of objects will increase energy consumption, which is also a solution to energy consumption control challenges of the Internet of things.
Big data & Cloud	An increase in the amount of generated data and its transmission methods and the creation of large data has created concerns in controlling the processing of this data.
Ability to work devices and objects together	In order to establish communication and maximize the productivity of the Internet, due to the expansion of the number and heterogeneity of objects, have affected the ability to work with various objects.
Storage	An increase in storage volume takes storage concerns into the volume of generated data
Heterogeneity of objects	Increasing the number of heterogeneities and the need to establish communications and different types of data created and managed and processed

related to architecture and technical design, privacy protection for smart home residents, social protection, privacy and encryption, number of disparate objects and smart devices and big data, cloud and data storage problems are named.

### 3-2. Vulnerabilities

Smart home is a smart living environment that is designed to meet human needs to provide its comfort and security [20]. The advancement of smartphone technology and increased use of smart devices in homes have led to the learning of this technology and on the other hand, have increased the level of security vulnerabilities of users in this area [21]. The security risks are due to the lack of attention of manufacturers to the vulnerabilities of the services provided. Yoon and colleagues conducted a study on the causes of vulnerabilities in 2015, which we will continue to provide the results of this study [22].

- Access to networked systems: Internet-based systems are objects that are connected to the Internet; attacks can be done remotely or with direct access to controllers, networks, or by downloading malware on equipment.
- Physical access to systems: Smart home network, whether wireless or with cable connections, can be physically attacked.
- Systems Limited Resources: Smart device controllers use thin chips and limited memory. This leads to the inability to equip itself with the use of sophisticated security algorithms and lower security levels.
- Lack of uniformity of equipment: The variety of equipment and the lack of sufficient documentation of the operating system, the software used and the security mechanisms used in them will cause vulnerabilities.
- Use Fixed Firmware: Failure to design and providing mechanisms to update the security of the middleware will cause serious vulnerabilities.
- No use of daytime security standards: In designing and operating, the equipment is another vulnerability.
- Lack of expertise in users: The lack of awareness of security issues in home users for managing equipment is one of the most important vulnerabilities in this area.
- Lack of security in accessing cloud services: Failure to use secure and proper protocols for this service will increase the chances of data theft in a single cloud.
- Use of inappropriate and poorly encoded algorithms: Failure in cryptographic algorithms can lead to theft of information.
- Data disclosure: It is vulnerable due to the weakness of the storage space on the cloud or on its own.

### 3-3. Smart home security threats

Connecting smart home appliances will create a link between real life and cyberspace. This connection will bring the threats of cyberspace into human life; therefore, security in intelligent home systems to protect life and health, property, personal information and control home and its equipment is imperative. Daniel Schwartz, a consultant on the security of the

Intelligent Home Systems Security Institute in 2016, presented a study.

This research is done according to the current architecture of the smart home, divides the range of activities in this area into the internal and external boundaries (Fig.1) [23].

The internal range includes indoor equipment and systems that ultimately use a central system to communicate with the outside environment. The outside range is the Internet and Outdoors area, which includes the Internet, the Web, and cloud computing and existing services for controlling home systems. In numerous research and papers, threats to the Internet of things and smart home have been introduced. These studies are based on the type of media, either in terms of manipulation or in terms of change, or the internal and external scope mentioned above.

- Traffic manipulation: In this attack, the attacker with physical or network access, by tampering with traffic, misleads the sender or receiver of the information [20].
- Identity impersonation: An intruder can deceive, steal, and violate privacy by impersonating one of the smart home components [22].
- Remote Control: Attackers provide users with programs that empower users to steal user information remotely.
- Eavesdropping Attack: The attacker may listen to the stream of information. This attack violates the privacy and disclosure of information.
- Reflection: The striker will store the valid data and send it back to the equipment in the future. This data is valid for the system and can therefore cause system confusion.
- Duplicate: In this attack, the attacker uses a duplicate identity on the network.
- Counterfeiting: Object identity is forged and used in multiplication attack.
- Malicious codecs: Media playback codes used to steal and disclose information that violates privacy, trust, and information security.
- Malware: These malwares use corrupt encryption code to corrupt and encrypt data and often extort users to unlock files.




Fig. 1 Internal range and external range and smart home constituent parts [23]

## 3-4. Security Requirements

Exploring the threats and attacks mentioned in the previous section will be a good guide to understanding the security requirements of the smart home domain. In the field of smart home security needs, Kang and his colleagues conducted a study in 2017 [24]. We summarized the general requirements according to the results of this study:

- **Confidentiality:** Ensures that messages exchanged are only understandable by the contact person.
- **Integrity:** This ensures that messages exchanged by a third party are not altered.
- **Validation:** This mechanism ensures that the people who participate in each process are those who claim to be.
- **Availability:** Ensures sustainability and service delivery. Attack target this requirement because these attacks cause disruptions to the service.
- **Access Policies:** This mechanism is intended to ensure that users are properly licensed to perform operations.
- **Freshness:** This ensures that the received information is not duplicate. Replay attacks target this requirement in which an old message is sent to restore its status to its old state.
- **Non-Repudiation:** This mechanism ensures that an entity cannot deny it after doing business.
- **Forward secrecy:** This mechanism ensures that when an object gets out of the network, it will no longer be able to understand the routed information on the network.
- **Backward secrecy:** This ensures that any new object that connects to the network will not be able to understand network communications before joining it.

## 4. PROPOSED PROTOCOL

In this scheme, different phases can be distinguished: (a) the installation phase of the ENs, (b) registration phase, (c) installation phase of the user, (d) user login phase, (e) request phase, (f) answer phase, (g) information retrieval, (h) update of user's password. Fig.2 shows an overview of the protocol among each entity under the different phases. In addition, Table 3 gives a summary of notations and abbreviations.

In first phase, we use (1), pre-shared keys between owner and user ( $K_{uo}$ ) and end-node and owner ( $K_{eo}$ ).

$$K_{uo} = H(H(ID_u^r) \| K_m) \quad (1)$$

$$\begin{cases} ID_u^r \rightarrow \text{real identity of the user like name, national ID...} \\ K_m \rightarrow \text{master key of the owner} \end{cases}$$

This key  $E_k(K_{uo})$  keep in the smartphone is encrypted and even if the user's smartphone is stolen, the attacker cannot access the stored information. Now user enters  $ID_u$ ,  $PW_u$ ,  $BIO_u$ , this information helps the device calculate below information (2):

TABLE 3. SUMMARY OF NOTATIONS AND ABBREVIATIONS

	Description
U, Ud	User and User's device
EN <sub>s</sub>	End-Nodes or IoT devices
O	Home Owner
$K_m, x, y$	Master key and two other secrets of O
$ID_u^r, PW_u$	Real username and password of U
$BIO_u$	$H(\text{Device biometric output (true or false)} \  \text{Device UDID})$
$ID_u = H(ID_u^r)$	Derived identity of U
$N_j$	Identity of end-node j
$K_{uo} = H(H(ID_u^r) \  K_m)$	Secret shared key between O and U <sub>d</sub>
$K_{eo} = H(N_j \  K_m)$	Secret shared key between O and EN




Fig. 2 Overview of the proposed protocol

$$\begin{cases} RPW_u = H(PW_u \oplus BIO_u) \\ ID_u = H(ID_u^r) \end{cases} \rightarrow K = H(ID_u \| RPW_u) \quad (2)$$

Thus, we derive  $K_{uo}$  like (3):

$$D_k(E_k(K_{uo})) \\ K_{eo} = H(N_j \| K_m), \quad N_j: \text{identity of the node} \quad (3)$$

## A. Installation phase of the ENs

Let  $x, y$  be two secrets chosen by the owner.  $N_j$  denotes the identity of the end-node  $j$ . The owner shares below parameters with each node in the network using the pre-installed or pre-shared secret key  $K_{eo}$  between end-node and owner. Note that (4),  $y$  is still a secret parameter for the user.

$$y, N_j, H(x \| y), H(N_j \| H(x)) \quad (4)$$

### B. Registration phase

As we mentioned before, only  $BIO_u$ , together with the encrypted shared secret key with the owner  $E_k(K_{uo})$  are stored on its device. Now if user entered  $ID_u^r$  and  $PW_u$ , the  $U_d$  is able to calculate below parameters (5):

$$\begin{cases} RPW_u = H(PW_u \oplus BIO_u) \\ ID_u = H(ID_u^r) \end{cases} \quad (5)$$

Now with this information,  $K = H(ID_u \parallel RPW_u)$  has been calculated. Then registration request consists of the message registration with the owner to the specific device  $N_j$ . We use a time stamp in  $reqAcc$  to avoid replay attacks (6):

$$ID_u \parallel E_{k_{uo}}(ID_u^r \parallel RPW_u \parallel reqAcc) \quad (6)$$

### C. Installation phase of the users

First, the secret shared key  $K_{uo} = H(ID_u \parallel K_m)$  is computed and after decryption of received message, the owner checks the identity  $ID_u^r$  by verifying if  $ID_u = H(ID_u^r)$  and also with computation of  $RPW_u = H(RPW_u^r)$  uses to compute secret key material with parameters  $x, y$ .

Each of these parameters,  $A_i, B_i, C_i, D_i, E_i$  has a specific role. After these computations, owner sends the message  $E_{k_{uo}} = (B_i, C_i, D_i, E_i, H(B_i, C_i, D_i, E_i))$  to the user's smartphone, so the parameters  $B_i, C_i, D_i, E_i$  will be stored on the user's smartphone. In Fig.3, we can see a graphical overview of the registration and installation phase.

### D. User login phase

First, the user enters identity  $ID_u^r$  and its password  $PW_u$  with  $BIO_u$ , then device can compute in (7).

$$\begin{cases} ID_u = H(ID_u^r) \\ RPW_u = H(RPW_u^r) \end{cases} \xrightarrow{\text{then}} E_i = H(ID_u \parallel RPW_u) \oplus RPW_u \quad (7)$$

Now, if computed  $E_i$  equals with stored  $E_i$ , login is successful.

### E. Request phase

After successful user login, first, the user selects  $N_j$ , then the following (8) and (9) computations are performed by the device.

$$H(x) = D_i \oplus H(ID_u \parallel RPW_u) \quad (8)$$

$$H(A_i) = C_i \oplus H(RPW_u \parallel ID_u) \quad (9)$$

First, from  $H(x)$ , user can construct  $H(V_j \parallel H(x))$  which is also stored at the end-node. Since  $H(x \parallel y)$  is stored in end-node, the end-node constructs  $B_i$  and from  $B_i$  it can find  $A_i$ . Consequently, the following operations are performed to construct a secret shared key and corresponding cipher text.

We consider a random nonce  $N_i$  and a Req which contains time stamp to prevent replay attacks. (Equations (10)-(15))

$$C_1 = H(N_j \parallel H(x)) \oplus H(ID_u \parallel N_i) \quad (10)$$

$$C_2 = H(A_i) \oplus N_i \quad (11)$$

$$V_1 = H(N_i \oplus B_i) \quad (12)$$

$$CID_i = B_i \oplus H(C_1) \quad (13)$$

$$K = H(N_i \parallel N_j \parallel H(A_i)) \quad (14)$$

$$E_K(ID_u \parallel C_2 \parallel Req) \quad (15)$$




Fig. 3 overview of the registration and installation phase



The user needs to enter a new value of the password, and then the value of  $RPW_u$  will be updated. With this update, new values of  $C_i$  and  $E_i$  are computed, which are then stored on the user's device. Also note that the encryption key  $K$  of  $k_{uo}$  needs to be updated, leading to an update of  $E_k(k_{uo})$ .

## 5. SECURITY ANALYSIS

Our protocol protects the system entities from a range of attacks. In this section, we have used AVISPA tool and BAN logic model and informal analysis to show that proposed protocol can withstand all known attacks.

### 5-1. Informal Security Analysis

In this subsection, we also informally prove that the proposed protocol is secure against the all known attacks.

#### 1) Replay attacks

Since inclusion of a time stamp in the reqAcc parameter, replay attacks in the registration phase are avoided. Since an attacker is unable to decrypt the registration request or the corresponding answer, it cannot change any value. In addition, a replay attack on the user's request to the IoT end-node is impossible due to the presence of a time stamp in the request message.

#### 2) Illegitimate data access or control

A user cannot derive a token itself, since the token is included in the computation of the parameter  $A_i$ . From  $A_i$ , parameter  $B_i$  is derived. As a user does not know the secrets  $x$ ,  $y$ , he is unable to find valid constructions for both  $A_i$ ,  $B_i$ . An adversary cannot get access to a node, even if he is in the possession of the user's device. This follows from the two-factor authentication, where identity and password on the corresponding device are required to further proceed the process.

#### 3) Insider attacks

We distinguish the insider attacks by the impact of four different situations, which are dependent on the combination of compromised objects and users:

- Endanger the user's device: here, the enemy is not aware of the user's identity and password. Consequently, the process cannot be continued. Even if an enemy can restore the information stored on the device such as  $B_i, C_i, D_i, E_i, H(B_i, C_i, D_i, E_i)$ , it is still impossible to do so, because a valid request requires an identity and a password.
- At risk of getting the final node: Here, it is possible to send false information. The attacker cannot publish important information related to the user's identity, since the information received is only indirectly related to the user's identity. A damaged node does not have enough information to create users that can handle valid requests to other nodes because the hidden secret is no longer known  $x$ .
- End Device and Endpoint: Since the identity of the owner is unknown, it may be possible to obtain  $H(x)$  from  $D_i$ . As a result, no credible requests to other

nodes can be performed, nor can it be retrieved useful information from other requests.

- End-node user and device at risk: The system is completely broken when the user, device and one of the nodes are compromised. We can expect such a combination of incidents that are very rare.

#### 4) HW/SW attacks

This system is based on a security protocol for smart cards. Similar ideas are applied to the user's side. Even with the recognition of the  $B_i, C_i, D_i, E_i$  parameters, the attacker has no other advantage, since the user's identity and password are required, which is related to the confirmation feature of two factors. Note that the attacker can, according to the  $E_i$  parameter, launch a dictionary attack into the user's identity and password. But we use user biometric parameter that help us to avoid this attack.

#### 5) Mutual authentication

Mutual authentication between the user and the end-node is obtained since the constructed secret shared key  $SK_{ij}$  is built using nonces generated by the user and the end-node. As explained before, only the user and the end-node have the required credentials to generate correct requests and answers for the construction of this key.

#### 6) Anonymity and unlinkability

Note that the user request contains the parameter  $CID_i$ , which is a dynamic reference that is related to the hidden user's  $B_i$  identity. As a result, no one else can connect different requests to a specific user or the same user. It also maintains the privacy of the user's location for any external attacker. From the request, the final node can obtain the indirect link  $B_i$ , which is related to the user's identity. Only the owner can retrieve the actual identity.

The attacker can guess the user's password offline by extracting  $B_i, C_i, D_i, E_i$  information from a lost or stolen mobile phone. However, the enemy will not be able to confirm the encryption using the extracted information obtained. Confirming the guessed password requires that you calculate the  $RPW_u$  enemy, which is not possible, because the enemy does not have any information about the user's biometric  $BIO_i$ .

#### 7) Resist against Man-in-the-Middle attack

In this attack, the attacker tries to hear all the messages between the user and the owner or between the user and the end-user and manually modifies them in the proposed model, even if the user both actively or inaccurately hears all the messages, he cannot get valuable information because he cannot get any information from  $H(ID_u \parallel N_i), H(N_j \parallel H(x))$

#### 8) Perfect forward secrecy

There are two hidden values:  $h(x)$  and  $h(x \parallel y)$ . The first one can be extracted by the user's smartphone; the latter stored on the server. Since an attacker, cannot access the server, then it cannot get the value of  $h(x \parallel y)$  so it is unable to get  $A_i$  too. Given this amount is required to obtain the key, then Perfect Forward Secrecy is fully adhered to.

### 5-2. Simulation For Formal Security Verification Using Avispa

The proposed protocol was formally verified by AVISPA that is a commonly used tool for security protocol assessments. The entities and message exchanges were described by the HLPSSL<sup>1</sup> language. The description and information in details can be found in [25].

This subsection discusses several roles for system entities, the session, the goal and the environment of proposed protocol. In Fig. 5-8, we have presented HLPSSL code for our proposed protocol. These figures show the HLPSSL language code that describes the establishment of the sessions, the environment and security objectives to be guaranteed by our proposed protocol according to the definition of elements declared as secrets in the functions of the entity and the values that authenticate the entities.

Finally, The results shown in Fig. 8 clearly show that the proposed protocol is secure against the replay and man-in-the-middle attacks.

### 5-3. Authentication proof based on BAN logic

In this sub-section, we present the formal analysis (e.g.,

authentication, session-key establishment and freshness) of the proposed protocol using the well-known BAN-logic [26]. For details, the reader may refer to [26] BAN logic notations and rules: We use directly BAN-logic symbols and notations from [26] to verify the proposed protocol. The intuitive assumptions for proof are as follows:

- $A1: O \equiv O \xleftrightarrow{K_{uo}} U$
- $A2: O \equiv O \xleftrightarrow{K_{eo}} EN$
- $A4: U \equiv \#(C2)$
- $A6: O \equiv \#(C3)$
- $A7: U \equiv \#(Nj)$
- $A8: U \equiv \#(Ni)$
- $A9: O \equiv U \Rightarrow Ni$
- $A10: O \equiv U \Rightarrow Rj$

```

role role_A ( A, B, C:agent, Ka:symmetric_key, H:function,
              SND,RCV:channel(dy))
    played_by A
    def= local
    State:nat, IDa, IDb, Ta, Tb, Kac, Na, Nb:text
    const sub1, sub2, sub3, sub4, sub5, sub6, aut_ac, aut_ca :
    protocol_id
    init State := 0
    transition
    1. State=0  $\wedge$  RCV({H(IDa'.Ta').Ta'.H(IDb'.Tb').Kac'}_Ka) =>
    State':=1  $\wedge$  Na':=new()  $\wedge$ 
    % secret({Ka},sub5,{C,A})  $\wedge$ 
    secret({Kac',IDa'},sub1,{C,A})  $\wedge$ 
    secret({Na'},sub3,{C,A,B})  $\wedge$ 
    SND(H(IDa'.Ta').H(IDb'.Tb').Ta'.xor(Na',Kac').H(H(IDa'.Ta').Na'.Ta'
    ))  $\wedge$ 
    witness(A,C,aut_ac,Kac')
    2. State=1  $\wedge$ 
    RCV(xor(xor(Na,Nb'),H(Kac.H(IDb.Tb)))) $\wedge$ H(H(IDb.Tb).
    xor(xor(Na,Nb'),H(Kac.H(IDb.Tb)))) $\wedge$ Na.Ta) => State':=2  $\wedge$ 
    secret({Nb'},sub4,{C,A,B})  $\wedge$ 
    request(C,A,aut_ca,Na)
    end role
    
```

Fig. 5 Role of A in HLPSSL code

```

role role_B ( B, A, C:agent, Kb:symmetric_key, H:function,
              SND,RCV:channel(dy))
    played_by B
    def= local
    State:nat,
    IDb, IDa, Tb, Ta, Kbc, Nb, Na:text
    const sub0, sub1, sub2, sub3, sub4, sub5, sub6, aut_bc, aut_cb :
    protocol_id
    init State := 0
    transition
    1. State=0  $\wedge$  RCV({H(IDb'.Tb').Tb'.H(IDa'.Ta').Kbc'}_Kb) =>
    State':=1  $\wedge$  secret({Kbc',IDb'},sub2,{C,B})
    2. State=1  $\wedge$  RCV(H(IDa.Ta)) => State':=2  $\wedge$  Nb':=new()  $\wedge$ 
    % secret({Kb},sub6,{C,B})  $\wedge$ 
    secret({Nb'},sub4,{C,A,B})  $\wedge$ 
    witness(B,C,aut_bc,Nb')  $\wedge$ 
    SND(H(IDb.Tb).Tb.xor(Nb',Kbc).H(H(IDb.Tb).Nb'.Tb))
    3. State=2  $\wedge$ 
    RCV(xor(xor(Na',Nb),H(Kbc.H(IDa.Ta)))) $\wedge$ H(H(IDa.Ta).xor(xor(Na',
    Nb),H(Kbc.H(IDa.Ta)))) $\wedge$ Nb.Tb) => State':=3  $\wedge$ 
    secret({Na'},sub3,{C,A,B})  $\wedge$ 
    request(C,B,aut_cb,Nb)
    end role
    
```

Fig. 6 Role of B in HLPSSL code

<sup>1</sup> High Level Protocol Specification Language

```

role role_C ( C, A, B:agent, Kac, Kbc, Ta, Tb:text,
    Ka, Kb:symmetric_key, H:function,
    SND,RCV:channel(dy))
    played_by C
    def = local
    State:nat,
    IDb, IDa, Na ,Nb ,Kac, Kbc, Ta, Tb:text
const sub1, sub2, sub3, sub4, sub5, sub6, aut_ac, aut_bc, aut_ca,
    aut_cb: protocol_id
    init State := 0
    transition
    1. State=0 ∧ RCV(start) => State':=1 ∧ IDb':=new() ∧
    IDa':=new() ∧ Ta':=new() ∧ Tb':=new() ∧ Kac':=new() ∧
    Kbc':=new() ∧
    % secret({Ka},sub5,{C,A}) ∧
    % secret({Kb},sub6,{C,B}) ∧
    secret({Kac',IDa'},sub1,{C,A}) ∧
    secret({Kbc',IDb'},sub2,{C,B}) ∧
    SND({H(IDa'.Ta').Ta'.H(IDb'.Tb').Kac'}_Ka) ∧
    SND({H(IDb'.Tb').Tb'.H(IDa'.Ta').Kbc'}_Kb)
    2. State=1 ∧
    RCV(H(IDa.Ta).H(IDb.Tb).Ta.xor(Na',Kac).H(H(IDa.Ta).Na'.Ta))
    => State':=2 ∧
    secret({Na'},sub3,{C,A,B}) ∧
    request(A,C,aut_ac,Kac) ∧
    SND(H(IDa.Ta))
    3. State=2 ∧
    RCV(H(IDb.Tb).Tb.xor(Nb',Kbc).H(H(IDb.Tb).Nb'.Tb)) =>
    State':=3 ∧
    secret({Nb'},sub4,{C,A,B}) ∧
    request(B,C,aut_bc,Nb') ∧
    SND(xor(xor(Na,Nb'),H(Kac.H(IDb.Tb))))).H(H(IDb.Tb)).
    xor(xor(Na,Nb'),H(Kac.H(IDb.Tb))).Na.Ta) ∧
    SND(xor(xor(Na,Nb'),H(Kbc.H(IDa.Ta))))).H(H(IDa.Ta)).
    xor(xor(Na,Nb'),H(Kbc.H(IDa.Ta))).Nb'.Tb) ∧
    witness(C,A,aut_ca,Na) ∧
    witness(C,B,aut_cb,Nb')
    end role
    
```

Fig. 7 Role of C in HLPSSL code

<pre> % OFMC % Version of 2006/02/13 SUMMARY SAFE DETAILS BOUNDED_NUMBER_OF_SESSIONS PROTOCOL /home/span/span/testsuite/results/LATAP6.if GOAL as_specified BACKEND OFMC COMMENTS STATISTICS parseTime: 0.00s searchTime: 0.06s visitedNodes: 14 nodes depth: 8 plies         </pre>	<pre> SUMMARY SAFE DETAILS BOUNDED_NUMBER_OF_SESSIONS TYPED_MODEL PROTOCOL /home/span/span/testsuite/results/LATAP6.if GOAL As Specified BACKEND CL-AtSe STATISTICS Analysed : 6 states Reachable : 3 states Translation: 0.05 seconds Computation: 0.00 seconds         </pre>
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Fig. 8 Analysis of results using OFMC and CL-AtSe tools

Now we have to set goals. Given that the purpose of the protocol is to establish authenticity between entities, we therefore define the objectives as follows:

- $G1: O \mid \equiv V1$
- $G2: U \mid \equiv V2$

Now we proof first goal:

- $R1 = \frac{O \mid \equiv U \xrightarrow{K_{ou}} O, O \triangleleft C1D_i, C1, C2, V1, Ek(IDU, C2, Req1)}{O \mid \equiv U \sim V1}$
- $R2: \frac{O \mid \equiv \#(C2)}{O \mid \equiv \#(C2, V1)}$
- $R3: O \mid \equiv \#(V1)$
- $R4: \frac{O \mid \equiv \#(V1), O \mid \equiv U \sim V1}{O \mid \equiv U \mid \equiv V1}$
- $R5: \frac{O \mid \equiv U \Rightarrow V1, O \mid \equiv U \mid \equiv V1}{O \mid \equiv V1}$

For proofing the second goal:

- $R1 = \frac{U \mid \equiv O \xrightarrow{K_{uo}} U, U \triangleleft C3, V2, Esk(M)}{O \mid \equiv U \sim V2}$
- $R2: \frac{U \mid \equiv \#(C3)}{U \mid \equiv \#(C3, V2)}$
- $R3: U \mid \equiv \#(V2)$
- $R4: \frac{U \mid \equiv \#(V2), U \mid \equiv O \sim V2}{U \mid \equiv O \mid \equiv V2}$
- $R5: \frac{U \mid \equiv O \Rightarrow V2, U \mid \equiv O \mid \equiv V2}{U \mid \equiv V2}$

#### 5-4. Comparison security features

The security features of our proposed scheme with the other prior related schemes will be compared in this section. The results of the comparison are listed in Table 4.

From Table 4, it can be concluded that the proposed scheme is the only one who can resist against various kinds

of known attacks and fulfil the desirable security features. Therefore, our scheme has better security than the previously related schemes.

## 6. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS

Most Smart device controllers have limited resources. Therefore, performance analysis considers as a substantial issue in the real-world. Generally, the performance has been evaluated by using two following main criteria [31]:

### 6-1. Computational Cost (CC)

This criteria has been evaluated according to the time costs of operations symmetric encryption/ decryption and hash functions. For efficiency analysis, we compare the computation costs of our protocol with the other prior related protocols. To facilitate the analysis, we use the following notations to measure computation costs:

- $T_h$ : the time complexity of the general hash function.
- $T_{E/D}$ : the time complexity of general symmetric-key encryption/decryption algorithm.

As pointed out in [16] [17], the running time of a one-way hash function operation, and symmetric-key encryption/decryption operation are 0.00032s and 0.0056s respectively. Thus, we have  $T_h \approx 0.00032s$ ,  $T_{E/D} \approx 0.0056s$ . The results of the computation complexity comparisons of our scheme and other related schemes are summarized in Table 5. It shows that our scheme is as efficient as the most efficient one of these prior related schemes at sensor nodes. Although the computation cost for the user and the GWN of our proposed scheme is higher than that of Jung et al.'s scheme, it should be tolerable because our proposed scheme provides higher security, and resists most well-known attacks.

TABLE 4 . COMPARISON SECURITY FEATURES

Protocol	[30]	[29]	[28]	[27]	Proposed
User Anonymity	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Sensor Node Anonymity	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
User Unlinkability	×	×	×	×	✓
Mutual Authentication	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Resist Stolen Smart Card Attack	✓	×	×	✓	✓
Resist Man-in-the-Middle Attack	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Resist Insider Attack	✓	✓	×	✓	✓
Perfect Forward Secrecy	×	×	×	×	✓
Resist Offline Guessing Attack	×	✓	×	✓	✓
Provide Password Change	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

### 6-2. Communication Overhead (CO)

This criteria has been evaluated by considering the number of transmitted messages in the communication channel between the entities through the phases of authentication. To facilitate the analysis, we use the following notations and values to measure CO [28]:

- random nonce , hash digest (assuming SHA-1 hashing algorithm is applied) and identity: 128 bits
- ciphertext block (if AES-128 symmetric encryption is applied) : 128 bits.

In our proposed protocol, three exchanged messages in (25):

$$\begin{aligned}
 M1 &= \{ID_u^r, PW_u, BIO_u\}, \\
 M2 &= \{CID_i \parallel C_1 \parallel C_2 \parallel V_1 \parallel E_K(ID_u \parallel C_2 \parallel Re q_1)\}, \\
 M3 &= \{C_3 \parallel V_2 \parallel E_{SK_j}(M)\} \quad (25)
 \end{aligned}$$

These require 1408 bits in the time of the login and authentication phase.

Table 6 summarizes the communication costs and the number of messages exchanged for other prior related protocols. We present the length of the message (bits) that an entity transmits or receives. For example, (768/640) indicates that the user transmits 768 bits and receives 640 bits in each session.

## 7. CONCLUSION

Presented protocol in this article, is a highly efficient and distributed authentication protocol to access end-nodes in an

TABLE 5. COMPUTATIONAL COST COMPARISON

Protocol	User	End-Node	Owner/RC	Total
[30]	$7T_h \approx 0.00224$	$5T_h \approx 0.0016s$	$8T_h \approx 0.00256s$	$20T_h \approx 0.0064s$
[32]	$11T_h \approx 0.00352s$	$7T_h \approx 0.00224s$	$14T_h \approx 0.00448s$	$32T_h \approx 0.01024s$
[29]	$7T_h + 2T_{E/D} \approx 0.01344s$	$4T_h + 2T_{E/D} \approx 0.01248s$	$8T_h + 4T_{E/D} \approx 0.02496s$	$19T_h + 8T_{E/D} \approx 0.05088s$
[28]	$5T_h + 2T_{E/D} \approx 0.01344s$	$4T_h + 2T_{E/D} \approx 0.01248s$	$5T_h + 2T_{E/D} \approx 0.01344s$	$13T_h + 4T_{E/D} \approx 0.02688s$
[27]	$8T_h \approx 0.00256s$	$5T_h \approx 0.0016s$	$8T_h \approx 0.00256s$	$21T_h \approx 0.00672$
Proposed	$5T_h + 2T_{E/D} \approx 0.01344s$	$4T_h + 2T_{E/D} \approx 0.01344s$	$5T_h + 1T_{E/D} \approx 0.01344s$	$13T_h + 5T_{E/D} \approx 0.03248s$

TABLE 6. COMMUNICATION OVERHEAD COMPARISON

Protocol	entity	No. of messages
[30]	<i>user</i>	512/384
	<i>sensor</i>	1152/512
	<i>gateway</i>	512/768
[32]	<i>user</i>	512/640
	<i>sensor</i>	1664/1152
	<i>gateway</i>	640/1024
[29]	<i>user</i>	256/256
	<i>sensor</i>	256/256
	<i>gateway</i>	512/512
[28]	<i>user</i>	384/256
	<i>sensor</i>	256/512
	<i>gateway</i>	768/640
Amin [27]	<i>user</i>	768/640
	<i>sensor</i>	384/640
	<i>gateway</i>	280/1152
Proposed	<i>user</i>	384/384
	<i>sensor</i>	1024/768
	<i>gateway</i>	384/640

IoT setting for smart homes, authorized by the homeowner. The efficiency is acceptable to the fact that only symmetric key-based operations are required. Due to the particular construction of the keying materials, the additional features are also obtained such as anonymity and unlinkability of the user and end-node for any outsider. In addition to that, the authentication mechanism can be easily combined with other access control modes. Also, this protocol prevents smart card stolen attack and password guessing attack, due to using customer biometrics parameter in our scheme.

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