
**The Relationship between Psychology and Phenomenology:
an analysis based on Husserl's views**



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Abstract

The relationship between an independent scientific discipline called psychology with phenomenology that presents the methodology and method together is an excuse for investigating the relationship between Husserl and Brentano's thoughts. Although their relationship is come from different sources, according to Husserl's main problem, end, and concern in confronting psychology, a researcher can find a good issue for research. Psychology and phenomenology bond together in favor of philosophy and seek a different intuition. Husserl keeps a type of psychology and uses it to achieve a philosophical attitude. The difference between Husserl and Brentano is both thematic and methodological, and of course, we can refer to the understanding of others and empathy that reduces the subjective aspect of the experience in Husserl's phenomenology. Husserl goes to descriptive psychology with criticizing Brentano's opinion about inner perception and also he criticizes Brentano's psychological reality that is the only appearance for him. Husserl's attempt for modifying descriptive psychology makes to provides practical and functional solutions for contemporary psychologists. Of course, he does not forget the distinctions between psychology and phenomenology in terms of issue and method but especially holds them together. The brief article wants to follow the relationship between psychology and phenomenology from its origin (Husserl's phenomenology) to achieve this purpose, the data of research have been collected through the library method and internet search then they are described and analyzed to reveal the concomitance of psychology and phenomenology. They must come together in the interpretation of the word description.

Keywords: psychology, phenomenology, descriptive psychology, Husserl, Brentano

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Introduction

The relationship between phenomenology and psychology is difficult to define because each of these topics, one in the form of a movement or tendency and the other in the shape of a scientific field, has its predecessors and dispersions. Because of the famous link between the topic of phenomenology and the name of Husserl, everybody a little familiar with phenomenology recognizes the connection between the two subjects. Husserl's perspective is sometimes considered as aligned with and near to psychology, and other times as entirely opposed to it, and this begins where Brentano builds psychology on other sciences, including logic. Our goal has been to study the subject based on Husserl's thoughts because the relationship between phenomenology and psychology is extensive and controversial, so much so that the limitations of a scientific text cannot cover it all. Therefore, because of the reasons proposed later in the passage, we cannot refrain from examining Brentano's ideas.

At first look, it appears that phenomenology is not an academic discipline like psychology or sociology, which studies the content of the psyche or society. Phenomenology and psychology both deal with consciousness through its various manifestations such as perception, memory, expectation, meaning-taking, and imagination, but the point is that they do not work the same way. As a result, their strategy, methodology, and tools can be used to seek for parallels and contrasts. For example, intentionality can be the common denominator of both, just as intuition, introspection, and attention to subjective and objective aspects of experience can be considered their point of departure. For researchers, phenomenology works as a kind of methodology and a method and the extent to which it has borrowed its tools and components from psychology should be examined. Phenomenology can also help to advance empirical psychology's goals by analyzing its theoretical foundation. Examination of these cases requires a glimpse of the views of Husserl and Brentano. To reach the paper's goals, it is necessary that we first recount psychologism and Husserl's critic briefly. Then we will investigate key concepts of psychology to clarify how far apart or even close phenomenology and psychology can be in the face of presuppositions, reduction, and suspension.

Descriptive Psychology: The encounter of Brentano and Husserl's Thoughts

Brentano and the school derived from his views considered psychology a kind of experimental science, and the implication of this notion is nothing but that this discipline is a descriptive science. Of course, Brentano did not consider experience, science, man, psyche (spirit), mind, and purpose as physical-biological matters but he studied the mind and its phenomena descriptively; Husserl called this science, phenomenology. Although at the same time as Brentano, various thinkers were active in studying psychology as the science of descriptive study of mental phenomena, Brentano's status and influence, and of course Wilhelm Wundt, is significant. The

similarities and differences between Wundt and Brentano can also be pointed out, such as Wundt referring to experience as a non-philosophical concept closer to the method of experimentation, while Brentano considers a purely philosophical concept of experience. (Titchener, 1921: 108-120)

In 1874, in his first work, *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*, Brentano proposed the general analysis of mental phenomena and made psychology an empirical science. However, the content of the book reveals that contrary to our initial conception of the adjective “empirical,” he has by the way introduced what is known as the experience of consciousness and consciousness’s knowledge by the presence of itself, which will later appear in phenomenology as *Erlebnis* or the lived experience. However, Brentano’s attempt is a kind of descriptive psychology that Husserl has since used continuously in his phenomenology. But the reason why this psychology is known as descriptive is challengeable.

Some sciences are classified as descriptive because it is apparent that they have prepared and specified issues in the world that should be recognized as facts or matters on earth and in the sky (from a virus to the Milky Way) that can be objects, according to a conventional categorization of sciences. However, for the subject of descriptive psychology, this is not possible. The psychologist must recognize their object and identify their phenomena from the start. These mental experiences, and their distinctions from physical phenomena, become Brentano's preoccupation in descriptive psychology. This type of psychology requires an intuitive understanding of things to grasp its essential characteristics, distinctions, and similarities. As a result, the description is based on an accurate understanding of the general and specific characteristics of the phenomenon. When Wundt proposes introspection as a source for psychological analysis, Brentano has the exact opposite idea. (Willems, 2012, pp. 665-681) Brentano cannot have meant such a thing from the intuitive experience because he has introduced inner perception in opposition to introspection. Introspection deals only with the subjective aspects of the conscious, and he could not have meant such a thing from the intuitive experience.

Brentano's project aims to separate the descriptive and genetic aspects of psychology and to define descriptive psychology as opposed to genetic psychology. Brentano defines genetic psychology as the discipline of causal explaining the formation process of mental entities, that is, empiric/positivistic description their evolution. Descriptive psychology, on the other hand, is the phenomenology of the mind, which investigates mental phenomena a priori. This reveals that descriptive psychology does not have the same meaning for positivists. For Brentano, descriptiveness has at least two implications: first, descriptiveness refers to the mind being active in creating phenomena; And second, descriptive implies the content of mental phenomena. (Brentano, 1995: 137)

Another important aspect is that Brentano has asserted descriptive psychology's logical priority over genetic psychology, as well as its relative independence from

natural sciences such as physics and physiology, while yet expressing a positive and hopeful perspective of genetic psychology. This aroused him to reconsider the link between science and philosophy. Following that, it is his responsibility to provide the precise foundations of pure psychology, that is, psychology without any physiological components. From this point on, psychology does not emulate the various branches of the natural sciences and declares independence (Speigelberg, 1965: 36-38).

The fact that Brentano explored the roots of logic in the psychology of mind and consciousness, and sought to achieve them descriptively, is in itself evidence of the prominent status of psychology and its originality at the time. Husserl finds himself first enthusiastic and then responsible for it. But where and with what motive does Husserl's critique of psychology begin, and what role did Brentano play in Husserl's shift? Indeed, to answer this question, it is necessary to recall Brentano and Husserl's definition of psychology and psychologism.

Psychologism

The term psychologism came into English from the German root *psychologismus*. Between 1890 and 1914, in particular, the debate arose as to whether logic and epistemology were parts of psychology. Frege and Husserl's arguments are especially well-known in this field. After Frege's critics, Husserl also criticizes psychology because of its ambiguousness and relativism, questioning the logical laws, its lack of ability to explain the conclusions, questioning the eternal truth in explaining the unity and universality of the universe, also focusing on the state of affairs. (<https://plato.stanford.edu>. 2020) With this critique, Husserl confronts many philosophers of his time. This is related to the relationship between psychology and logic, and since we are considering its relationship to phenomenology, this is where the relationship between Brentano and Husserl becomes the subject of investigation.

The importance of the psychological debate for Husserl begins with his teacher Brentano trying to define psychology in a way that ultimately (in addition to the independence mentioned earlier) makes it superior to other sciences. In examining the historical background of psychology, Brentano points to two definitions: First, "psychology is the science which studies the properties and laws of the soul, which we discover within ourselves directly by means of inner perception, and which we infer, by analogy, to exist in others" (Brentano, 1973: 4) This comes from a tradition headed by Aristotle's theory of self-knowledge. This traditional definition, which is the subject of the psychology of the soul itself, finds its opponents. Then by juxtaposing the objects of the natural sciences and psychology, another (modern) definition claims that: psychology is the same as knowledge about mental phenomena. But since the primary purpose of this definition is to reduce the science of psychology to the natural sciences, Brentano takes the opposite view, arguing that it has no rational justification. (Ibid., 7) Brentano believes that any definition based on the soul or body which uses metaphysical concepts such as substance is rejected. Just as the

subject of natural sciences is not the body, the subject of psychology is not the soul but rather the physical and mental phenomena instead of the body and the soul.

Of course, the newer definition is, in his view, get rid of metaphysical presuppositions, but according to Brentano, Aristotle also did the right thing when, after the classification of the sciences, he gave importance to self-knowledge or psychology. This led Brentano to claim the superiority of psychology over all branches of science. (Ibid, 8-20) These views also impress Husserl, but he does not consider the subject of psychology as mental phenomenon, and therefore, his intellectual shifts gradually turn his thought towards transcendental phenomenology. Although his ideas continue to move parallel with descriptive psychology and take advantage of it, they also show anti-psychologism tendencies.

Thus, the originality of psychology is the tendency to try to introduce truth as subjective and thus to restore any rational validity to the structure of the psyche. Husserl sees that psychologism reduces everything to a mental phenomenon and closes the way to the objectivity that is necessary for understanding and agreement. This shows that in phenomenology, understanding and agreement are essential. In *Logical Investigations*, on the defense of pure logic, Husserl asks how psychologism can be a solid theoretical basis for logic when its achievement for us is a set of inaccurate and inductive rules? (Husserl, 1970a: 98) He also considers psychologism to be the same as relativism in all its specific subsets and details. (Ibid., 83) However, there is no doubt that science in various branches and methods intersect. Brentano's influence on Husserl, or psychology on phenomenology, is beyond doubt, primarily since Husserl manifests his interest in descriptive psychology from the very beginning in the *Philosophy of Arithmetic*.

But for Husserl, descriptive psychology is not the science of the psychological phenomenon, but the science of experience, but the experience that is not for knowing (that), but for living. According to him, in the face of such an experience, one cannot act in the manner of Brentano and use the inner perception because the inner perception by Brentano is opposed to the external perception, which reduces the status of the external perception. This reduction lies in the fact that Brentano introduces the objects of inner perception as the psychological and as the only possible phenomenon. According to Husserl's analysis, this result contains a metaphysical inference that does not apply to objects outside the real mind of the real universe. Husserl is willing to accept only that part of the inner perception, which implies the ability of consciousness to construct itself, that is, when consciousness reflects on consciousness. Because this is an inherent feature of any actions of the consciousness. Accordingly, Husserl pursues descriptive psychology by applying modifications. (McDonnell, 2012: 74-111)

Thus, in *Logical Investigations*, the difference between Husserl and Brentano is not in method but ontology and descriptive psychology. This difference stems from the fact that Husserl sees in Brentano's theory of internal perception only an emphasis on the

description method, which he agrees with. But Husserl is concerned with how the theory of internal perception can explain acquiring a priori knowledge, if at all! Also, Husserl cannot consider the process of intentional reference as a mental being or phenomenon; he does not accept the similarity of directional intent and the psychological matter and seeks refuge in categorical intuition as a kind of perception. (Rollinger, 2004: 271)

Categorical intuition can keep researchers away from the dangers of psychology because introspection and inner perception in psychology impose specific unique components on the phenomenon of consciousness. These components do not interfere in categorical intuition and direct perception of nature in the phenomenological method. Thus, given the lack of analysis of the preconditions of consciousness, psychology cannot be the ideal phenomenology that Husserl intended. In this case, by the way, phenomenology can help psychology assume review and test its assumptions and assist in qualitative research in psychiatry and psychology by providing the opportunity to use different perspectives. In his view, however, transcendental phenomenology is a fundamental philosophical discipline in the second volume of *The Idea of Phenomenology*. The task of phenomenology is to reveal the nature of knowledge, and in this respect, it cannot be based on the branches of psychology, either explanatory (Wundt) or descriptive (Brentano). Its strategies are reflection, direct intuition, analysis, and description. (Husserl, 1964, VIII: 3-6)

But since Husserl has claimed that phenomenology is the same as descriptive psychology, in some cases, especially in *Logical Investigations*, it can be said with a high degree of certainty that he evaluated consciousness and cognition as related to psychology which needs its cooperation. (Husserl, 1970b: 656-§60) Of course, this statement does not reduce the complexity of Husserl's approach to psychology.

The complexity of Husserl's encounter with the psychology

Husserl's encounter with psychology is complex because he has argued in *Logical Investigations* of the unity and combination of psychological experiences in the form of phenomenological I/Ego, which is, in a sense, consciousness in an absolute sense. But in *The Ideas*, the subject of psychology is introduced as the soul, which can be considered as a fact. Now, does this fact belong to the realm of belief? If so, has he been able to suspend it?

On the one hand, Husserl seems to be aware that psychology never encompasses the realm of real experiences like other natural sciences, such as chemistry, which is why he emphasizes psychological reality. The soul, then, is, in his view, a psychological fact that cannot be removed from consciousness or taken out of its realm. On the other hand, Husserl does not want to question the legitimacy of psychology from a naturalist perspective. The fact is that a part of human problems such as the soul and mental life and mental events could not be covered by the natural sciences in the modern era despite their advancement. Influenced by Cartesian dualism, the duality

of internal and external experience contributed to the separation of psychology from physics or the natural sciences, which in part refers to the separation of mental and physical phenomena. (Gurwitsch, 2009: 490-492) This is in this exact weakness that modern psychology works to identify the mental life of consciousness. But psychology, because of the inaccuracy and lack of tools such as reduction or epoche, cannot deal with its subject purely, and that is why Husserl puts it next to phenomenology.

It is clear to Husserl that the object of psychology is not the same as that of phenomenology. In his book, *Ideas*, his reference to the self as the object of psychology is essentially a critique of Brentano's distinction between the psychological phenomenon and the physical phenomenon. For Husserl, psychology is not the science of phenomena or mental action, but the soul itself is the psychological reality or object whose intentional actions, such as seeing, hearing, thinking, and any feeling, are its states. At the same time, he separates phenomenology from psychology when he states in *Ideas* that phenomenology is related to all phenomena, but he cannot deny the relation between phenomenology and descriptive psychology. Therefore, he does part of his work with psychological descriptions when he says: consciousness is always of something, in the sense that it has an object. Of course, it is essential that he never adopts a psychological perspective and does not intend to study the psychological states of the soul. The goal of phenomenology is to penetrate the essence of consciousness and the flow of experience and the combination of experiences and their intentional correlation. Gurwitsch argues "Taken in its full and concrete sense, the term "intentionality of consciousness" expresses just this correlation or correspondence between acts and their "intentional objects. As the correlate of the act, the "intentional object" is inseparable from it, so that no description of an act of consciousness is adequate unless allowance is made for its intentional correlate". (2009: 494) Thus, Man cannot experience consciousness without an object or be an object to which consciousness does not belong. Intention serves between the object and consciousness, and Brentano has introduced it as the feature of the psychological matter. Phenomenology deals with descriptive analysis and explanation of consciousness and its related matters, including the analysis of the processes of essence and objectification, consistency, and semantics. In this sense, nothing in the world of essence has form, consistency, and meaning except through human consciousness. Then, if consciousness is removed, no essence will be established and nothing will have meaning anymore. But what is the clear difference between psychology and phenomenology in this regard? In his analysis, Jennings argues from a forgotten distinction between phenomenology and psychology that the former analyzes the intrinsic nature of different types of conscious actions and its purpose is merely consciousness, while the latter studies the empirical content of real subjective experiences following real environmental events, and in the case, correspondence is important. (Jennings, 1986: 1240) This thematic difference essentially distinguishes

psychological consciousness from phenomenological consciousness; Because one studies the intrinsic matter without any correspondence with the real matter to achieve absolute knowledge, and the other studies the psychological matter empirically in terms of adaptation to real events, and its goal is to achieve a kind of relative knowledge. Some interpret Husserl's distinction as a subject rather than a method, but the fact is that the subject carries the method with it. Hence, the primary distinction between psychology and phenomenology is both thematic and methodological, and Husserl does not seem to have forgotten these distinctions. But since phenomenology is a method and not a scientific discipline, it can relate to various sciences such as sociology, aesthetics, etc., and this is why the term phenomenological psychology becomes common.

Phenomenological psychology

In Brentano's perception of intentionality as a fundamental feature of the psyche, psychologists did not consider the possibility of phenomenological psychology. But according to Husserl, the task of phenomenological psychology is to systematically explain the types and varieties of intentional experience, teach its reduction to the original intentions, and address the nature of the psychological. It is for the experience of self (self-awareness) and the awareness from others that mental or subjective life can be manifested. (Husserl, 1928: D = I§2)

Through his conscious actions, man relates to the realities and beings of this world (man and animal) and the lifeworld in general. This means that man begins with the same natural attitude, and despite the beginning of the world and the consciousness offered to him in the psychological experience, the presuppositions must be clarified, and reduction must occur. (Husserl, 1983: xix) In psychology and phenomenology, both the world and the consciousness are involved, and intentionality establishes the connection of a person with his lifeworld. Naturalism is always opposed to a phenomenological attitude. They establish a kind of dialectical relationship in which phenomenology always keeps this opposition in order not to get caught up in it. Sometimes describing a person and their conscious actions make it inevitable to enter the realm of psychology. While the action in the realm of psychology pertains to subjective life, it cannot ignore the realities of this world. We have not forgotten that the principal function of intentionality is putting man and the world or consciousness and the world together. This makes it difficult for a psychologist or researcher to identify the area under study. For this reason, it is said: A psychologist must perform what Husserl calls phenomenological-psychological reduction in order to reveal and define the realm of the psychological or subjective. (Gurwitsch, 2009: 495), which means that he must avoid taking any position to confirm or reject anything. As in psychology, a neutral and impartial attitude towards the subject is necessary. He should not share the interests of the subjects he studies. (Ibid., 495) This is highly emphasized in Husserl's phenomenology, and that is why he places the aesthetic

attitude between the natural attitude and the philosophical attitude. Neutrality is the condition for achieving phenomenological experience, occurs after epoche/suspension and reduction happens, and strongly resists the subjective side of psychological experience.

In the middle era of his thinking, Husserl discusses reduction methods in light of the discussion of consciousness-time and psychology. Husserl's shift towards the psychological phenomenon is to describe the Cartesian method by describing the nature of subjectivity. Husserl's use of psychological subject matter is to seek out Cartesian self-evident, albeit a self-evident free from suspicion. In this sense, he finds an independent way from psychology to reduction. So, psychology can lead a thinker to philosophy. (Drummond, 1975: 50-55) Because reduction is the starting point for philosophizing. But this last point should not be interpreted as saying that psychology is the basis of philosophy. The kind of psychology close to the natural sciences is unacceptable to Husserl because the basic premise is that consciousness and psychological events should be studied as a matter of nature with an empirical method. Such treatment of the mind in relation to the body exposes consciousness to natural laws, disturbs it, and leads to nothing but relativity for man. (Natanson, 1973: 46) If, like some psychologists, we do not reduce mental reality to physical reality and consider them merely interconnected, we lose the possibility of a pure encounter with consciousness. Accordingly, Husserl takes the middle way and, in the idea of presenting a method, devises a new scheme that makes critical use of psychology.

If we look at the history of philosophy, this practice is not without its historical precedent. Plato is a good example because he also notes that to reach true knowledge (episteme) in the intellectual realm, apart from feeling (nous), it is necessary to leave behind the senses, and even mathematical assumptions, and of course, thinking abstractly on mathematical assumptions is a good move for the intellect to reach its true dignity.

Husserl maintains the distinction between psychology and phenomenology but recognizes that to reach a critical attitude, several prerequisites must be provided, including some scientific approaches and disciplines, including aesthetics and psychology. Cognition can facilitate our departure from the realm of natural attitudes, provided, of course, that the researcher can use the resources provided by the phenomenological method (such as epoche and reduction). In this sense, some commentators believe that the attainment of the absolute knowledge that Husserl longs for is not in conflict with the case study of particular phenomena, which happens in phenomenological psychology. It is said that disinterest in subjective reactions is not specific to a general tendency to be followed by all phenomenologists. Essences do not preclude attention to specific examples (Synder, 1988: 403-404), which is probably why phenomenological research cannot be indifferent to psychology just as psychology can benefit from a particular method of

phenomenology, such as the importance of giving a clear and direct description of experience through intuition by performing the specific tricks it offers.

But there is another point in Husserl's thought that somehow points out the closeness and distance of phenomenological experience from psychological experience, and that is the critical word "empathy" that Husserl uses to avoid getting caught up in "solipsism." This term emphasizes the importance of the existence of another and the need for intersubjective agreement.

Importance of Other in phenomenology

First, it is better to ask this question: Can the emphasis on one psychological fact diminish the role of other in human experiences? To arrive at the correct answer, it is helpful to look at Luhmann's theory of systems, whose systemic meta-approach is said to have benefited from phenomenology. The reason for reminding this theory is that in it, man is introduced as a psychic system. The use of the word and concept of the system allows us to compare society with man and consequently man with society and its subsystems as a social system. The function of the psychic system is consciousness. The systems theory says that there are connections between different consciousnesses; in other words, thought arises from thoughts and is reproduced. (Luhmann, 1990: 34) In this approach, the function of the psychic system (human) is described as consciousness, but man is never considered as a psychic unit separate from other beings and social realities. In this approach, just as the distinction between system and environment is one of the ontological and epistemological conditions of subsystems, in the case of human beings, their duality of self/other is considered as one of the necessary conditions of social life and, therefore one could be identified by eradicating another. Thus, despite using the term psychology, we cannot conceive of man merely as a psychological object and disregard other objective aspects of his experiences. Now commentators on this theory believe that this emphasis is because of Luhmann's influence from Husserl's noema/noetic dichotomy, who tries not to ignore object's contribution and subject to experience.

Empathy and moderation of the subjective aspect of phenomenological experience

To further emphasize another importance in Husserl's phenomenology, recalling Husserl's theory of empathetic presentations can be particularly relevant. Of course, Husserl uses the term empathy to describe the relationship between human beings (psychic systems), but his analysis differs from that of psychological analysis and should not be confused with the mere transmission of feelings or the experience of other emotions (sympathy). Empathy is a reciprocal exchange of thought between the state of the subject (subject/perceiver) and the affective feature of the object. (Pinotti, 2010: 93-97) It is important to note that Husserl has tried to avoid any psychologism in this regard. In Husserl's thought of not falling into the trap of solipsism, the use of

this term plays a pivotal role, and it is the foundation of agreement and intersubjectivity in human experience, which, according to Husserl, requires certain conditions. Its mere consideration is not enough, such as our relationship with creatures like ourselves that are several light-years away from us. (Husserl, 2006: 137-139)

According to Husserl, every experience implies a reference to others, just as the horizons of the past and the future are necessary for understanding the present. This necessity of the presence and understanding of another has been interpreted as a kind of open horizon for humanity, in the sense that “one’s own experience is inseparable from the experience of others. “Performing the reduction upon himself, the psychologist, in analyzing his own conscious life, becomes aware of its relationship to, and connectedness with, the conscious lives of other persons. Under the reduction, his existence as a human being has acquired the sense of an experienced phenomenon. However, he cannot experience himself as human being unless he experiences himself as living in a certain historical present which, in turn, refers to both a historical past and future”. (Gurwitsch, 2009: 497) This refers to the social nature of human. Also, when we talk about such societies, the importance and necessity of lifeworld become more apparent because it supports and protects the concept of an equal world for all human beings. It is fundamentally crucial that, according to Husserl, it is possible to look at this common ground from different perspectives. However, this common ground itself is a factor in guiding human beings to acknowledge each other’s experiences, and this intercourse among the experiences of conscious subjects allows for consensus. What happens in the collision of consciousnesses is a kind of empathy and transmission of thoughts and ideas. Husserl argues:

Each human being belongs to the surrounding world of the other. In general, the things that are my surrounding world are also the things of the surrounding world of the other. In any case, I can bring into view precisely relations of this kind, which come into consideration as environing relations, or, as we can also say, as sociological relations. Here, things and human beings are not investigated according to what they simply are in their empirical nature. Rather human beings come into consideration as subjects that find themselves “in” the world, which, at the same time, is “over against” them. As such subjects, they “relate” to the world, which they make Present by judging, valuing, and willing, in short, by taking a position or abstaining from position-taking. (2006: P.175)

In his analysis of this issue, Zahavi argues that the question of objectivity has forced Husserl to express this theory because the cooperative agreement of several conscious subjects always necessitates the analysis of the experience of others. The assumption of intersubjectivity is not consistent with the claims of the phenomenological method of suspending all presuppositions. Intersubjectivity is also a genetic experience that is understood in the realm of the transcendent ego. He never means a collective consciousness. This experience is carried out by the individual subject but carries the

need to communicate with others. The other must always be, and this companionship does not mean that his being is for self/me because he also has his being. Husserl has interpreted this practice as a kind of sociality that shows the importance of social relations, and Husserl intended to moderate the solipsistic attitude resulting from a critical view and reduction and suspension. (Zahavi, 2001: 16-21)

The reference to empathy is to differentiate Husserl's phenomenological view with a common term in psychology that indicates the importance of the social dimension in phenomenological analysis and experience, the meaning of which distances itself from the emphasis on the emotional aspects and provides the intersection of intuitions and agreement.

Conclusion

In *Logical Investigations*, Husserl defends descriptive psychology in a sense close to Brentano's definition while at the same time arguing against psychologism. The difference between Husserl and Brentano is that Husserl, unlike Brentano, does not try to make psychology an experimental science, but he tries to introduce his interpretation of descriptive psychology as a method of philosophy.

Descriptive psychology, unlike positivist and experimental psychology, is not based on naturalistic assumptions. Husserl seeks reality in the realm of essence, while naturalism works in the exact opposite direction. Husserl does not intend, like them, to accept only the reality of the natural. If so, the work of consciousness becomes awareness of the outside world and the observance of the natural rules governing it, and in this case, the nature of thought will be tied to representation. Proponents of psychologism will also be tempted to think that thinking is a neuro-physical activity (with deep physical dependencies), that the brain's structure must be studied to study thinking. In studying the mechanism of consciousness, we are not allowed to remain in the realm of the body, nor are we allowed to be content with merely the achievements of the human psychological process such as sense, language, and the flow of association. The perception of any phenomenon should not be interpreted as a psychological phenomenon. In phenomenology, that reality consists of diverse categories of being, and its primary purpose is reaching eidetic attitude, structural perception is essential. Instead of an adjective such as psychological or individual or subjective, that reality is described using attributes such as fundamental and general. This goal undermines the status of psychology and does not allow psychology to be recognized as the basis of philosophy, which proponents of psychologism desire. Some approaches in psychology are taken from the natural sciences, and this is not compatible with the insensitivity of mental events. Consciousness as an event cannot be reduced to a material event or a psychological event. In phenomenology, the two poles of the subject (of course, instead of the subject in Husserl's literature, experience is mentioned) and the object and the noetic and noematic aspects of experience are

mutually exclusive and may not be dominated by the subjective; hence traces of anti-psychologism is also seen.

Of course, modern psychology gets close to identifying the mental life of consciousness, but psychology, because of its inaccuracy and lack of tools such as epoche or reduction, cannot deal purely with its issue (consciousness). And because of the emphasis on introspection, it sometimes gets caught up in the subjective realm of experience. Accordingly, Husserl places a special and modified type of psychology alongside phenomenology, and finally, to absolve himself of the charge of solipsism, he speaks of empathy in a different conception from that of psychology.

In summary, Husserl suggests a new sort of descriptive method based on the critique of psychologism and appeals to descriptive psychology, and the consequence of this method's application is an a priori science. The priori science is scientific psychology of the mind, which eventually proposes phenomenology as the rigorous science and the basis of all sciences, and claims the ability to change all sciences' methods. As a result, psychology encourages and prepares phenomenology for transcendental phenomenology, while phenomenology provides a variety of specific possibilities and techniques. Thus, the two cannot be considered one because in pure consciousness, unlike psychological consciousness, the adaptation of a mental event to reality is not the criterion. The distinction between psychology and phenomenology is remarkable in several respects. First, psychology is a scientific discipline, and phenomenology is a methodology and method. Second, phenomenological tools are used to achieve a particular intuition, while in psychology, the emphasis is on introspection or inner perception; third, the issue of the phenomenology is the intrinsic, and the issue of psychology is the psyche in regards to reality. Finally, their methodological distinction in focusing on experience, because it is apparent that Husserl focuses entirely on experience but is never an empiricist, but in psychology, when studying each psychological event, one must adapt to environmental reality. Therefore, it is these distinctions that make the connection between psychology and phenomenology real and long-lasting. Psychology is an unavoidable foundation for Husserl, who underlines that one should never remain in it to attain a critical point of view. In conclusion, there is a favorable relationship between psychology and phenomenology in Husserl's phenomenology.

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