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## The Interaction of Science and Philosophy in the Present Age Two Dutch Philosophers: Herman Philipse and Hans Achterhuis



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### Abstract

Herman Philipse considers “religious beliefs, faith and religion [to be] incompatible with science or reason”; he defines religion scientifically and specifically rejects religious doctrine. He describes reason “... as the whole of methods of empirical scientific research and critical discursive thinking as they have evolved in the scientific tradition and will continue to develop in the future” and he defines “... the phenomenon of conscience as a mental organ that can be scientifically explained and that makes the religious explanation superfluous ...”. Herman Philipse classifies science as the highest in rank, discards religion and sees philosophy, a rational view of the world, as based solely on the sciences. For his subject, Hans Achterhuis “... primarily cites biologists, ethologists and evolutionary psychologists with a philosophical interest” because “they presently have more to offer [him] than do his immediate colleagues”. Furthermore, “... it will be clear that ethologists and sociobiologists are of the opinion that the violent behaviour of human beings must be understood in part from the point of view of the evolutionary history of the sort ..... most philosophers and anthropologists are not aware of this. Their considerations suggest that violence only entered our world together with humankind”. Achterhuis’s choice is a “historic concept of violence”.

**Keywords:** philosophy, anthropology, science, communication, the playing field of illusion, truth, power

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## Herman Philipse's philosophy and the sciences <sup>1</sup>

“Philosophers had good reason to reject the presumption that the branches of science are founded on philosophy .... If we summarise the differences between the old and the new conception of philosophy, we can say that according to the notion of philosophy as a rational world view, the philosopher often takes the sciences as his foundation rather than the other way round, and that he must be modest in his own scientific pretensions”, according to Dr. Herman Philipse, Professor of Philosophy at Utrecht University in his *Atheïstisch Manifest* in 1995 (to which *De onredelijkheid van religie* and a foreword by Ayaan Hirsi Ali were added in 2004).

In his view, “... the discussion of philosophical problems often requires a considerable degree of scientific knowledge. If one is not familiar with the overall structure of classical mechanics and quantum theory, and perhaps also genetics, chemistry, certain branches of mathematics and the physiology of the brain, one will not be able to put forward anything of significance in relation to the problem of freedom and determinism .... The scientific attitude requires a number of virtues, such as curiosity, creativity in devising alternative views, recalcitrance, intellectual autonomy, honesty, respect for different opinions, and a willingness to learn from criticism, virtues that, according to the principles of collective hardheadedness, must be regarded as sins .... children must be taught with great care to adopt a scientific attitude from an early age. This does not mean that a large portion of the population should choose a career in science – only those who excel at the aforementioned virtues. But it does mean that a democratic state must esteem scientific research in a narrow sense, because it leads to the development of a cognitive attitude that can serve as an example to every member of society [but] ...it is also a question of the heart and the imagination, of empathy and of love for others”.

He considers “religious beliefs, faith and religion [to be] incompatible with science or reason”; he defines religion scientifically and specifically rejects religious doctrine. He describes reason “... as the whole of methods of empirical scientific research and critical discursive thinking as they have evolved in the scientific tradition and will continue to develop in the future” and he defines “... the phenomenon of conscience as a mental organ that can be scientifically explained and that makes the religious explanation superfluous ...”. In his opinion, we “... often must act in accordance with our conscience because otherwise we [would] lose our self-respect ...”.

The first thing that can be concluded from the foregoing is that Herman Philipse imposes a hierarchy on a number of things that are equal by nature: he classifies science as the highest in rank, discards religion and sees philosophy, a rational view of the world, as based solely on the sciences. However, what he fails to appreciate is the significance of communication for religion and philosophy, art and culture, science and politics, all of which reveal information about the innermost essence of human beings. His rejection of religious doctrine means that he fails to recognise the role

played in this respect by power and the exercise of power. The biggest drawback to religious systems, after all, is not the doctrines themselves, but the hierarchical power structures and rules of life derived from the doctrine, and the accompanying sanctions if they are not adhered to.

When a person exercises power in a way that is contrary to the interests or against the will of others, it makes a caricature of that person's power or the person exercising it. Such exercise of power is contrary to the nature of human beings as absolute entities and therefore contrary to their being and their essential characteristics. Generally speaking, the use of power can be regarded as a form of promotion of interests, and not much objection can be made to this. If people's activities are economically motivated (survival), then the power exercised in that context is generally permissible. This changes when we enter the field of communication (the playing field of illusion) and the economic motive does not play a role. This is primarily the case in permanent forms of communication (religion and philosophy, art and culture, science and politics), all of which take place on the playing field of illusion, where no-one can claim that their truth is absolute nor can they expect another person to recognise it as such.

### **What is communication and when does it take on a permanent form?**

In simple terms, communication is an attempt to connect with another human being. However, a great deal can go wrong, resulting in miscommunication or misunderstandings. In everyday dealings this takes place (incidentally, fleetingly) in our direct contacts with other persons, against a background of economic or simply social reasons (exchange of information (in a broad sense), networking). In relation to the second essential characteristic of human beings as absolute entities (inward-looking (closed); an end in themselves (autonomy, being yourself); isolation and communication (in a broad and immaterial sense)), people communicate for other reasons and this can therefore take place in all other fields in which people are active. Typical of this type of communication is that the content of the message is considerably more complex; direct contact is inadequate for its transfer, so that some other means (indirect, with a more lasting form) must be sought, thus giving communication a permanence in our lives. Texts, textbooks, image and sound recordings are permanent forms of communication. Religion and philosophy, art and culture, science and politics are expressions of this and therefore also belong to the world of the imagination<sup>2</sup>.

From this it follows that communication does not truly exist; it is illusory. Communication cannot alter our isolation. The means of communication are expressions of what people experience, of the process of experience that they perceive and of which they are part, that they are themselves<sup>(3) (4)</sup>. They manifest themselves

outside the detachment of people in a sort of space that we could term the playing field of illusion, where the exchange takes place, by which the link is made.

We must also make a distinction between forms of communication (the means) and the content of the message they put across. As we have seen, communication entails a fair chance of misunderstanding or miscommunication. This means that, to actually put a message across, the sender must have a clear idea of its contents. The sender must correctly translate the contents of the message into the means of communication of choice, so that the recipient of the message can reasonably be expected to understand it (in an objective sense). The recipient will receive the message via his or her own process of experience, thus colouring the translation, which is now different from the original intention of the sender. The original intention of the sender can be approached more closely by conducting further or more intensive communication until both sender and recipient have the impression that the communication properly reflects the intention.

Communication takes place in phases: it starts in the first phase, the process of experience in the sender, taking place via the playing field of illusion, and ending in the final phase of the process of experience of the recipient. This information flow comprises no end of opportunities that could lead to misunderstanding or miscommunication. The social skills and intelligence of those who take part play a big role in this respect. So we can ascertain that we are dealing with a complicated process in which there is but a slight chance that the contents of the message will be identical for both sender and recipient.

A clear picture of man does not emerge from Philipse's philosophy (the process of experience, origin and evolution, essential characteristics), nor how people get along with one another (absolute freedom, possessing and exercising power, communication, conscience, morals and ethics) and how they deal with nature, things every philosophy ought to be based on. The starting point is always the process of experience in which human beings are entangled in everyday life. However you look at it, this always remains the basis. It is where everything converges: origin and evolution and essential characteristics that do not really exist, but that can be seen as motives for action that are anchored in an absolute sense in a person's being. A person's objectives are a logical corollary and can then be formulated. They therefore arise directly from man's origin and evolution and are related to his essential characteristics. But this also means that no philosophy can escape answering the most elementary questions of philosophical anthropology because:

“... philosophical anthropology is a domain all its own, and cannot be replaced by any other anthropology. The ultimate explanation of man lies outside all possible scientific views that have ever been formulated, because they lie within the origins of every branch of science, including the science of philosophy. It is the final ground on which the philosophies, of any nature whatsoever, can be pursued implicitly or explicitly”, according to the philosopher, theologian and classical scholar Dr. Reinout

Bakker, former professor of philosophy, who also "... advocate[s] the necessary collaboration between philosophy and science ... [because] philosophy without contact with the empirical sciences is empty, but also: the empirical sciences are blind without the contribution of philosophy. If one of these two poles is made absolute, there is an imminent danger of gross onesidedness, or even distortion. The fact that the ultimate questions about man are so rarely asked stems from giving the scientific pillar of philosophy an absolute status. Many phenomenologists and existentialists have warned against this scientism ..." (4) (5) (6) (7).

### **Hans Achterhuis's violence and philosophical anthropology**

In his book published in 2008 [*Met alle geweld*], philosopher and emeritus professor Dr. Hans Achterhuis, lacking a "universal definition", defined the word violence as "... more or less intentionally causing or threatening to cause damage to people or objects", which was borrowed from an anthology [*Filosoferen over geweld*] by D. Boeykens. He calls this a descriptive definition that has "normative overtones". It is in any case "not meant in an essentialist sense" because in that case he "... would be trying to indicate the universal essence of violence", which would "require an anthropology and an ontology, a theory on how human beings work in their deepest innermost beings". By contrast, he would "... prefer not to diverge from the fact that violence is definitely a historic concept and that in the course of history, its definition and the value judgment entailed may have seen marked changes".

His philosophical anthropological considerations would lead one to conclude that he is among the philosophers who question the right to exist of philosophical anthropology (5) and are of the opinion that its task, finding the fundamental human truth, has been taken over by the sciences. He specifically cites "... Helmuth Plessner [Germany, 1892-1985; author], who more and more tends to be considered the founder and uncrowned king of philosophical anthropology ... [and] is even often classed as a 'philosophical biologist'". Then, after discussing his philosophy in broad lines, he concludes that "... this biologist, despite his great attention to empiricism, nevertheless end up a more or less traditional metaphysicist ... if we are to make his work productive for a new understanding of nature, it will have to be thoroughly reviewed and added to".

The final conclusion is therefore that for his subject, Hans Achterhuis "... primarily cites biologists, ethologists and evolutionary psychologists with a philosophical interest" because "... they presently have more to offer [him] than do his immediate colleagues". Furthermore, "... it will be clear that ethologists and sociobiologists are of the opinion that the violent behaviour of human beings must be understood in part from the point of view of the evolutionary history of the sort. .... most philosophers and philosophical anthropologists are not aware of this. Their considerations suggest that violence only entered our world together with humankind".

I do not concur in Achterhuis's choice of a "historic concept of violence" because, under the circumstances he put forward, he should at least have investigated whether it was reasonably possible to formulate "the universal essence of violence" and an "anthropology and an ontology, a theory on how human beings work in their innermost essence". In the affirmative case the concept of violence could be anchored in the foundations of human existence and thus could have taken on the meaning with the widest scope, whereas his definition lacks any such firm basis and therefore can be called one-sided, arbitrary – a concept the meaning of which depends on time, place and circumstances, or in his own words "... that its definition and the value judgment entailed may have seen marked changes in the course of history".

In my philosophy of man, violence is essentially connected with conscience and the other, in relation to a conflict of interests. It must be stated first and foremost that human beings as absolute entities are completely free (they have absolute freedom) in the manner in which they achieve their objectives. In this context, violence can only be seen as a means by which to allow our own interests to take precedence over the interests of others by forcing others to promote our interests. Violence, whatever its nature and scope and whatever its consequences<sup>(8)</sup>, is in this context no more than a means of power used between two or more parties and is therefore without a relevant substantive meaning.

In this sense violence is not "the more or less intentionally causing or threatening to cause damage to people or objects", but merely one of the means by which we promote our own interests, the use of which we can also choose to refrain from. Conscience (moral and ethical) is at issue here; the question a person asks is: how shall I deal with the interests involved? Achterhuis's definition of violence is simply the greatest common denominator of a summary of the many types of violence that have existed through the ages on the basis of a meaning he has attributed to the word; it does not have its origin in the foundations of human existence because it cannot be traced back to the essential characteristics of human beings as absolute entities (urge for survival, communication, identity, self-fulfilment, autonomy).

At the beginning of his monumental work, Achterhuis asks himself "What is the counterpart of violence?" To him, "non-violence" is not an adequate answer, but he does not discuss this explicitly in the rest of his work. To my mind, the use of violence should be treated simply as the violent method of promotion of interests, in contrast to the non-violent method which might also be termed the peaceable method, based on a presumed equality of the parties and where their mutual interests are promoted by through consultation and negotiation, i.e. by means of communication without the use of power. The counterpart to violence sought by Achterhuis can then be found in the words 'without violence' or 'non-violent action'. From this point of view, the word non-violence means systematically refraining from the use of violence in promoting one's interests. The use of force can be said to produce forceful behaviour, in contrast to non-forceful.

One of the chief ways in which violence occurs in everyday life is hidden or veiled in our communications without us being aware of it. Communication uses language (verbal), images (non-verbal) and sound (voice) or a combination of these, or certain forms of conduct. To communicate without violence<sup>(9)</sup>, it is important to focus your consciousness on this by observing accurately (what do you see?) and not judging (what do you feel or think?), but only putting forward hard facts. Violence as referred to here is ubiquitous and forms an obstacle to an efficient promotion of interests; it is one of the most significant manifestations of violence. By focusing more consciously on this, we make ourselves morally accountable and allow our conscience to speak, on the basis of respect for and compassion with another person and their interests. What it turns on here is speaking 'with your heart' and not 'with your head', by which you show that you are connected with yourself; then the other person will feel approached on an equal footing.

Rather more alarming is the fact that in Achterhuis's view, violence is inherent in human nature. Where Achterhuis rejects a universal definition on the one hand, through the backdoor he nevertheless advances an important essentialist characteristic, in his view perhaps the most important characteristic of human beings. To my mind, human beings are certainly not violent by nature; quite the contrary. In principle they are free to make moral choices and to take responsibility. A corollary to Achterhuis's view is that aggression and violence cannot be unlearned, not even by focusing on it consciously. Being a great deal more optimistic, I am of the opinion that a lot can be achieved in this sense. In my opinion, this is only not the case when we are dealing with people with a personality problem or problems of psychopathological nature. Living our lives deliberately and consciously, being disciplined, educating ourselves and our children is therefore very much worthwhile; it will enable us to resolve the problems that occur in life in a peaceable (non-violent) manner, and if each of us does so consistently, it ought to be possible to achieve permanent peace (non-violence) in the world.

Finally, the quotations from Professor Bakker<sup>(10)</sup> below show that Achterhuis is correct as to the impasse in which philosophical anthropology finds itself at present, but as to the alternative he chooses (the sciences, more specifically sociobiology and ethology) the two men are miles apart, which he follows with an urgent appeal for philosophical reflection:

"Reviewing the anthropologists discussed [Scheler, Gehlen and Plessner; author), then we see that biology as an empirical science is an inadequate way of interpreting human beings. The three thinkers leave behind remnants that cannot be divvied up over purely scientific categories". "... Plessner centres his anthropology around the eccentricity of human beings, a category that ... defies empirical investigation ..... A comparison of humans to animals is not very productive because human beings are always the subject of the comparison".

“The paralysing uncertainty of the future, not knowing where we are going and where we will be when we get there, the loss of the authority of values and norms and scepticism of the teleology of history leave no doubt that it makes sense to reactualise philosophical anthropology in a joint philosophical reflection”.

“Just as human beings are more than the sum of their parts, so is philosophical anthropology more than the sum of everything the sciences have thought or said about human beings. And philosophical anthropology is also about this ‘more!’”.

## Notes

- Philipse H., 2007, *Atheïstisch manifest en de onredelijkheid van religie, Met een voorwoord van Ayaan Hirsi Ali*, ISBN 978 90 351 26541  
Achterhuis H.J., 2008, *Met alle geweld, Een filosofische zoektocht*, ISBN 978 90 477 0127 9 or ISBN 978 90 477 0120 0
- Bor J. (ed.), Petersma E., 2000, *De verbeelding van het denken, Geïllustreerde geschiedenis van de westerse en oosterse filosofie*, ISBN 90 254 1398-6, with articles by Dr. Th. de Boer, Dr. G. Chemparathy, Dr. R. Fontaine, Prof. E. van Leeuwen, C. Offermans, Prof. H. Philipse, Prof. L.M. de Rijk, Prof. A.J. Vanderjagt, Prof. C. Verhoeven, Prof. H. Visser, Prof. S. Ijsseling, Prof. E. Zürcher and with assistance from Dr. C. Anbeek, Dr. S.C.A. Drieman and Dr. L. Ramaker,  
*Particularly on the significance of the imagination for philosophy, which is considered to be of analogous application to “science and technology, art and religion” in the introduction (p. 9) and the epilogue (p. 383).*  
See earlier work by Karl Popper (1902-1994) on the significance of imagination for science, later elaborated for politics in *The Open Society and its Enemies* (1945).
- Dr. Dick F. Swaab, emeritus professor of neurobiology at the University of Amsterdam, also founder of the Netherlands Brain Bank (for worldwide scientific study of the brain), a division of the Netherlands Institute for Neurosciences of the Royal Dutch Academy of Sciences in Amsterdam, in NRC Handelsblad Zaterdag&cetera of Saturday 22 March & Sunday 23 March 2008 ([www.nrc.nl](http://www.nrc.nl)) [*Wij zijn ons brein*]: “Free will is an illusion. It is not we, but the brain, that determines. Our character, personality, our sexual orientation and what we refer to as mind, it is all found in the brain ... a person ... is his brain.....”  
Saturday 30 August & Sunday 31 August 2008 ([www.nrc.nl](http://www.nrc.nl)) [*De 21 gram*]: “There is no such thing as the soul. When we die, 100 billion brain cells cease working.”  
Swaab D.F., 2014, *We Are Our Brains: From the Womb to Alzheimer's*, Allen Lane, 0844 871 15 15, ISBN 978-0812992960  
Blackmore S.J., 2005, *Consciousness, A Very Short Introduction*, Oxford University Press, ISBN 13: 978-0-19-280585-0 and 0-19-280585-1 and in NRC Handelsblad of 7 December 2006 ([www.nrc.nl](http://www.nrc.nl)): [*Er bestaat alleen ervaring, vergeet de rest*] on the illusion of consciousness and taking leave of the Self, who has given up the idea that she has a free will and Self: “Consciousness is a story told in retrospect” (discussion and interview by Hendrik Spiering).  
Blackmore S.J., 2009, *Ten Zen Questions*, One World Publications, ISBN 978-1-85168-642-1 and 2011, *Zen and the Art of Consciousness*, One World Publications, ISBN 978-1-85168-798-5  
“Almost all scientists and most philosophers claim to be materialists (or at least not to be dualists). In other words, they ought to assume that the brain process would start the action, and not be at all surprised by the results. Yet they were surprised, and go on being surprised. I think the reason is that they, like most people, *feel* as though they consciously decide to act, and that their consciousness causes things to happen.  
So here we have a simple clash between the physical and the mental; between how things are in the physical brain and how they feel from the inside. How do we resolve it?  
I suspect that we will never do so without a revolution in the way we think about consciousness. I don't mean a revolution involving quantum physics, or telepathy, or new forces of nature, or other-worldly spirits and souls. I mean a revolution that goes deep down into our minds and actually transforms our experience, so that we can talk and think in a different way. And this way would have to be something so counter-intuitive that it really does root out dualism ... no-one has yet found a special place where



consciousness happens, or a special process uniquely correlated with conscious, as opposed to unconscious, events.

In reply to the question whether anyone will ever be able to point out a place “where consciousness happens”: “Many neuroscientists think so, and are hunting for the ‘neural correlates of consciousness’ to find it. They are looking for a certain part of the brain, or a particular process, which reliably correlates with conscious as opposed to unconscious processes. This is something of a Holy Grail for consciousness studies. But if I don’t know which sights and sounds I was conscious of, and which I was not, and I cannot tell anyone else which I was conscious of, then no one can possibly know, and so this whole line of scientific research must be entirely misguided.”

Frayn M., 2006, *The Human Touch, Our Part in the Creation of a Universe*, ISBN 978-0-571-23217-8 and 978-0-571-23217-5: “There is no such thing as free will (brain study has shown that a decision has already been taken half a second before we become aware of it), language proves to be ambiguous and consciousness ... is still a huge riddle. Even the laws of nature are no more than human artefacts, the product of the way in which we perceive the universe. In short, all structure that we ascribe to the world arises from our own observation of it.” (book review by Rob van den Berg in NRC Handelsblad of 8 December 2006 ([www.nrc.nl](http://www.nrc.nl)) [*Het beelal zit in ons hoofd, Zin en onzin over mens, aarde en kosmos*])

Watson P., 2006, *Ideas: A History from Fire to Freud*, ISBN 978-0-7538-2089-6, p. 1015, who asks himself whether “... the essential Platonic notion of the ‘inner self is misconceived?” only to conclude: “There is no inner self ... because there is nothing to find.” He states that “the general view [is] that the self arises in some way from brain activity – from the action of electrons” and is surprised that we “still don’t know even how to talk about consciousness, about the self.”

Van Gijn J., 2007, *De ongrijpbare geest*, speaking about his farewell speech on the relationship of body to mind, in which he called the psyche “an impalpable brain activity”, remarking: “... we know for sure that the psyche – the mind – ultimately consists in the operation of cells, connections, molecules and electric currents. But it is such a huge network that we will need several generations of information technology to gain even the slightest grasp of it ... so for the time being it is impalpable”, interview by Wim Köhler NRC Handelsblad 9 and 19 June 2007 ([www.nrc.nl](http://www.nrc.nl))

Stone H., Stone S., 1989, *Embracing Our Selves, The Voice Dialogue Manual*, ISBN 1-882591-06-2, on the nature of consciousness (p. 18): “In approaching the definition of consciousness, we start with the basic idea that consciousness is not an entity – it is a process. What we will be defining, therefore, is not consciousness but the evolution of consciousness. We call it consciousness, but we are not talking about a static condition of being. As far as we are concerned, people do not become conscious; conscious-ness is not a state that people strive to attain. Consciousness is a process that must be lived out – an evolutionary process that continually changes from one moment to the next.” ([www.voicedialogueinternational.com](http://www.voicedialogueinternational.com))

Yalom I.D., 2009, *Staring at the Sun: Overcoming the Terror of Death*, ISBN 978-0-7879-9668-0 (cloth) and ISBN 978-0-470-40181-1 (paperback).

Dr. Irving Yalom, emeritus professor of psychiatry at Stanford University, Stanford, California and existential psychotherapist, uses the term “awakening experience” alongside the term “awakening consciousness” and assumes “deep structures of existence or, to use the theologian Paul Tillich’s felicitous term, *ultimate concerns*: death, isolation, meaning in life and freedom”, comparable with my concepts of experience and essential characteristics of human beings as absolute entities. The four ultimate concerns named form the backbone of his manual from 1980, *Existential Psychotherapy*, in which he gives a detailed description of phenomenology and the therapeutic implications of each.

4. Dagenais J.J., 1972, *Models of Man, A Phenomenological Critique of Some Paradigms in the Human Sciences*, Martinus Nijhoff/The Hague, ISBN 90 247 1290 4

5. Bakker R., 1984, *Studia in honorem Reinout Bakker*, presented by the Centrale Interfaculteit Rijksuniversiteit Groningen, ed. B. Delfgaauw, H. Hubbeling, W. Smith:

“Can philosophical anthropology still exist?”

Philosophical anthropology is a domain unto itself, and cannot be replaced by any other anthropology. The final explanation of man lies outside all possible scientific views that have ever been formulated, because they lie within the origins of every branch of science, including the science of philosophy. It is the final ground on which the philosophies, of any nature whatsoever, can be practised implicitly or explicitly.

In my inaugural speech of 25 January 1965 I spoke of the necessary collaboration between philosophy and science. Philosophy without contact with the empirical sciences is empty, but also: the empirical

sciences are blind without the contribution of philosophy. If one of these two poles is made absolute, the danger of gross onesidedness, or even distortion, is imminent. The fact that the ultimate questions about man are so rarely asked stems from giving the scientific foundation of philosophy an absolute status. Many phenomenologists and existentialists have warned against such scientism.

The methods of a post-modern philosophical anthropology will have to be based on reflection, on the claim that it is possible to debate differences and contrasts on reasonable grounds, and on the individual responsibility for the decisions we all make for ourselves in respect of changes in body and mind. A post-modern version of Sartre's creed: man is and always will be what he makes of himself."

It contains the following references:

Bakker R., 1982, *Wijsgerige antropologie van de twintigste eeuw*; Cf. Van Praag J., 1979, *Levensovertuiging, filosofie en wetenschap* and Bakker R., 1965, *Noodzakelijke samenwerking, Merleau-Ponty's bijdrage tot het gesprek tussen filosofie en wetenschap*, Groningen 1965.

See also Fresco M.F., endowed chair, Centrale Interfaculteit Rijksuniversiteit Leiden in *Levensberichten, Reinout Bakker, Minnertsga, the Netherlands, 2 November 1920 – Spain, 25 March 1987*.

Two more references: *Filosofie en wetenschap*, Kampen 1987 (Reprint of Bakker's inaugural speech and his farewell lecture, published and with an introduction by B. Delfgaauw)

(A reprint has also been published of Merleau-Ponty, *Voorwoord tot de fenomenologie van de waarneming, Ingeleid, vertaald en geannoteerd door dr. R. Bakker*, Kampen 1986)

6. Van Praag J.P., 1994, *The Foundatons of Humanism*, ISBN 10: 087975163 and ISBN 13: 9780879751678

7. Dassen J.L.M., 2013, *A new philosophy of man & humanism*, Stichting Anthroopos Amsterdam, e-book, ISBN 978 90 8666 293 7 <http://ow.ly/NtNnw>

8. Cf. the 'spiral of violence' mentioned by Achterhuis and the 'irrational violence' of Ger Groot.

Groot G., 2003, *Vier ongemakkelijke filosofen, Nietzsche, Cioran, Bataille, Derrida*, ISBN 90 5875 016 7

Achterhuis defines 'irrational violence' as "the endless struggle of forces concealed behind the humanist Western Enlightenment culture ... the evil and violence that have been excluded from our culture".

It is interesting to see how Hans Achterhuis and Ger Groot think that the problems in this area should be dealt with.

Achterhuis on Ger Groot: "In the end he largely distances himself from it. It is undoubtedly thanks to their insights (from Nietzsche to Derrida, author) that we have become aware of the precarious and unstable balance 'of reasonableness, justice, prudence and moderation, that European culture aims to be' (Groot 2003, p. 503). But Groot refuses to follow the philosophers he discusses and make a frontal attack on this unstable structure as they do."

Achterhuis tentatively agrees: "It is true of both persons and cultures that, if they acknowledge their dark sides, and perhaps know how to handle them best, they will ultimately take their distance from them (emphasis added by author). In her large-scale study of religious terrorism, Jessica Stern goes one step further. Invoking Jung, who saw evil as an archetypical shadow in every person, she thinks that this shadow can be integrated in our actions, even leading to creativity (Stern 2005, p. 20). Such a conclusion seems to me to be too quick and easy. Groot's position remains my starting point as well."

In this context I opt for the solution put forward by Voice Dialogue (the psychology of the selves, primary and disowned selves) of Hal and Sidra Stone (Dialogues 5), which greatly resembles Stern's approach. However, in the former the process of consciousness is primary: it can be used to make deliberate choices while giving careful consideration to all interests, or in terms of Voice Dialogue, to all subpersonalities or energy patterns. This makes it clear that violence is not inherent in human nature, but that people can make choices in this respect and take responsibility for them.

9. Rosenberg M.B., 2003, *Non-violent Communication: A Language of Compassion*, ISBN-10: 1892005034 and ISBN-13: 978-1892005038

10. Bakker R., 1981, *Wijsgerige Antropologie van de Twintigste Eeuw, Terreiverkenningen in de Filosofie*, ISBN 90 232 1800 0

See also earlier work by Dr. Ad Peperzak, Professor of Philosophy, Loyola University, Chicago, Illinois, in his *Inleidingen Wijsgerige Antropologie I and II, entitled Vrijheid and U en ik, 1972/1975*, ISBN 90 263 0195 2 and 90 263 2008 6

Achterhuis H.J., *ibid.*, note (1)

Philipse H., *ibid.*, note (1)

See also Charles Hampden-Turner, *Radical Man, The Process of Psycho-Social Development*, 1970, not only for his urgent call for "... a new philosophy for the social sciences – a complete reassessment

of what a science of humanity should be”, but also for his supporting role in the writing of *Models of Man* by Jim Dagenais (4)

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